Debate

New public management and professionals in the public sector. What new patterns beyond opposition?☆

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Abstract

The proliferation of reforms in public administration based on the principles and instruments of the “New Public Management” (NPM) have triggered protest from and collective action by many professional groups in various sectors (healthcare, education, justice, social work, research . . .) and raised questions about the future of professionals working in the public service, particularly as concerns their autonomy. However, after analyzing the situation, it seems that the opposition between NPM and certain professional groups is not the last word in the debate. Should changes be seen as the decline of professional groups and of their autonomy or as a transformation of professional models, an overhaul of professionalism, etc.? Such questions, which current events in France and Europe have brought to the fore, are food for ongoing sociological thought. They are broached here empirically, from the field, applying varied levels of analysis and research. The contributors to this dossier explore the different forms of tension existing between professional groups and NPM.

Keywords: New public management; Professional groups; Professions; Occupational autonomy; Reform of the public administration; Professional bureaucracies; Professionalism; France

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1. Introduction (Philippe Bezes, Didier Demazière)

In France, a large number of collective protests have recently exposed the conflict existing between reforms inspired by New Public Management (NPM) and professional groups operating in the public sector and working in state administrations. Many examples illustrate the tensions between them. In 2003, reacting to the “Orientation and Planning Law for Research and Innovation”, the association Sauvons la recherche (SLR – “Let’s save research”) brought together scientific and literary scholars bent on defending public funding in French research. The movement was opposing the government’s short-sighted views and high productivity vision of public research. Student and university demonstrations against the August 10th 2007 law relative to Universities’ liberties and responsibilities (the so-called LRU law) were a new phase in the battle. Commenting the law, Annie Vinokur clearly placed the reform within the deployment of NPM that attacks the scientific and pedagogical autonomy of academics (enseignants-chercheurs) by diluting their representation, promoting employment by contract, funding research by projects and quantitative assessment (Vinokur, 2008, p. 15). In a totally different domain, on December 22nd 2008 a “Call of Calls” (l’appel des appels) demanded the creation of a joint national committee in which professionals of various disciplines would stand together against the social and humane consequences – described as disastrous – of the neo-managerial reforms being implemented in various sectors: “In the name of a ‘homo economicus’ ideology, the powers that be are undoing and recomposing our occupations and missions by increasingly exposing both professionals and users to the “natural” laws of the Market. That ideology has proved catastrophic even in the business milieu where it began. We, the professionals of care, social work, education and justice, information and culture, refuse that such an ideology today should cause the ‘bankruptcy’ of care, social work, education and justice, information and culture” (http://www.appeldesappels.org/l-appel-des-appels-1.htm). The protest was echoing the “Movement in Defense of Public Hospitals” (Mouvement de défense de l’hôpital public) set off in 2009 by healthcare professionals opposed to the “Hospital 2007” project, the hasty application of a case-payment system (tarification à l’activité [T2A]) and the “Hospital, Patients, Health and Territory” law (Loi hôpital, patients, santé et territoires, HPST) promulgated on March 11, 2009. Last but not least, in February 2011, collective action by magistrates, lawyers and other professionals of justice (civil servants working as court clerks, educators, etc.), as well as demonstrations and work-to-rule strikes broke out in reaction to criticism voiced by President Sarkozy after a case of recurrent offense (“l’affaire Laëtitia”). These social movements also crystallized opposition to budget and staff cuts and was openly hostile to the “managerialization” of justice so well described by Cécile Vigour (2006, 2008).

A comprehensive analysis shows that all these actions came in response to reforms implying methods or principles borrowed from NPM and denounced by professional groups in the public sector as being a threat, to their autonomy in particular. Put in a nutshell, NPM can be defined as a doctrinal puzzle (Hood, 1991; Merrien, 1999; Bezes, 2009) made of sediments that have settled in successive strata out of a ragbag of axioms derived from economic theories, prescriptions deduced from knowledge on management, descriptions of ways of doing things tested in reforms (especially in English-speaking countries), and systematic analyses produced by institutions such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to promote new ways of imagining administrative organization. Partly amended over the past 20 years, the NPM doctrine advocates five organizational principles and recipes: separating strategy, leadership and control from implementation and execution; fragmenting vertical bureaucracies by setting up independent administrative agencies, through decentralization, or by empowering consumers; systematically resorting to market mechanisms (competition between public actors and with the private sector,
individualization of incentives, externalization); transforming bureaucratic hierarchies by reinforcing the responsibilities and autonomy of the officials in charge of implementing state action; introducing result management based on achieving objectives, measuring and evaluating performance, and developing new forms of control within contract-driven programs. Since the 1980s, many reforms have got underway that mobilize all these instruments separately or combine them in ambitious programs inspired by the ideals of NPM and impacting most of the national public administrations and areas of state intervention (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Calling into question certain “bureaucratic” rules – in Max Weber’s sense of the word – these reforms also implied criticism of professional groups in the public sector, what Henry Mintzberg (1979) called “professional bureaucracies”. The trend has been observed in specific forms and with specific temporalities in many countries of continental Europe (Germany, France, the Netherlands), Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark) or North-America (United-States, Canada). The reforms carried out in Great Britain, however, led first by the Conservative (Thatcher) then by the Labour (Blair) governments, seem to represent the movement best. In many British academic works NPM reforms have been interpreted as an attack against professional groups, in particular those who participate in organizing and operating the public services of the National Health Service (NHS) and who defend NHS principles and values more than other public agents do (Dent, 2003; Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Flynn, 1999; Scott, 2008; Thomas and Davies, 2005). Comparable dynamics that blend in with the advance of neo-liberalism – particularly in the field of healthcare – promoting market logics, individualization, performance review and choice by “consumer-clients”, have been observed in Germany (Kuhlmann et al., 2009), the Netherlands (Oomkens, 2010), Denmark (ibid., Kirkpatrick et al., 2009) and Sweden (Blomgren, 2003). A similar observation holds for France as well. Neo-managerial ideas have gradually evolved and been disseminated by the state, especially since the 1980s, and have hardened in transversal reforms such as the Institutional Act on Budget Legislation (Loi organique relative aux lois de finances, called “LOLF”) adopted August 1st, 2001, or in numerous sector reforms (Bezes, 2009). Several militant works see eye to eye when describing the frontal opposition between NPM neo-liberal reforms and the professions in the public sector (Bonelli and Pelletier, 2010; Chauvière, 2007; Gori et al., 2009).

How should these changes be interpreted? The opposition between NPM and the professions is doubtless heuristic in that it provides a first interpretation of what is at stake in the ongoing transformations. However, given the knowledge acquired by the sociology of professions and the amount of research carried out on neo-managerial reforms, we may well wonder if such a binary approach suffices and if it cover all the angles. On one hand, it does fairly accurately duplicate the discourse of those involved in the conflicts. On the other hand, it also reactivates the well-known but superficial notion that has prevailed in research on organizations and the professions according to which “management” and “professions” or “managerialism” and “professionalism” are diametrically opposed (Gleeson and Knights, 2006). But up to what point can that opposition be considered the last word in the matter? Such is the question we will be focusing on in this debate-provoking dossier, offering various points of view on the fate of professional groups in the public sector challenged by neo-managerial reform. How do the reforms affect the elements – themselves specific – that make for professionalism in the public sector? What categories can we summon up to theorize the professional dynamics observed in these contexts, i.e. the decline of the professions, the disappearance of professional autonomy, the splintering of professional groups, the new layout of professional territories, and de-re-professionalization? Which essential characteristics of public sector professions have been affected, and which dimensions – all of which refer to professionals’ legitimate autonomy – should be given priority in our analysis: specialized knowledge, the usefulness of expertise, activity control, results, protectionism, shared values,
the strength of collective identities? Throughout our introduction and the five contributions that follow, we reflect on the forcefulness and pertinence of concepts of the sociology of professions in the light of recent collective commitments and conflicts. The notion of autonomy – and our hypothesis is that it has been especially challenged by the reforms – is at the heart of the debate.

1.1. Characterizing professionalism in the public sector to better understand neo-managerial reforms and their effects

The professional quality of the services provided by bureaucratic administrations has long been acknowledged, particularly as a result of research on street-level bureaucrats in many sectors – the police, teachers, social workers, judges – that has underlined two of their major attributes: the fact they are in constant touch with citizens, and a certain form of sovereignty and discretionary judgment on the job (Lipsky, 1980). This last was more systematically developed by Henry Mintzberg (1979) who applied the concept of “professional bureaucracy”, characterized by three main features: the intricacy of the knowledge and expertise public agents possess, generally acquired after long years of study outside the organization; decentralized authority and agents’ considerable autonomy linked to the asymmetry of knowledge, weak hierarchical control and the limited standardization of activities; the importance of collegiality in organizing work and regulating activities. Such bureaucracies function thanks to a mix of legal administrative rules inspired by the Weberian model and sophisticated forms of professional regulation of practices. It has therefore also been called “bureau-professionalism” (Clark and Newman, 1997). As an ideal-type it corresponds to many sectors of the administration where services are produced and delivered by agents endowed with highly specialized types of expertise, e.g. healthcare (particularly the hospital sector), justice, the police, education, higher education, or yet again fields linked to the development of the Welfare state, such as the social services.

The emergence of professional experts inside the administration, particularly those in charge of dealing with constituents’ situations and problems (ill health, litigations, pupils, beneficiaries...) has however assumed peculiar forms compared to the classic professional model. Those specific forms must be taken into consideration to understand how neo-managerial reforms have affected the professions. Classically, the ideal-type of a profession consists in a specific content corresponding to an occupation combined with a form of institutional control that ropes off the group (Elliott, 1972; Larson, 1977; Wilensky, 1964). In the public sector, the first element seems more firmly established than the second, so that state professionalism resembles “occupational” rather than “status-based” professionalism (Freidson, 1983). All professionals possess – though to varying degrees – specialized and codified knowledge, practical know-how acquired through experience, the competence to deal with the cases that crop up; all share the same conception of their function, and recognize each other in a collective identity defined by their specialization and occupation. It seems less sure however that they themselves can control the borders of the group for, though situations are not the same everywhere, the instruments to determine who can enter – legal monopoly, influential professional organizations, deontological codes, etc. – have so far not been very effective. Professional groups in the public sector are therefore characterized more by their occupation than by any professional order. The autonomy of professionals working in an administration depends on how bureaucratic it is, which justifies asking how they relate to the professional model: is their profession “status-based”, “occupational” or “organizational”? (Noordegraaf, 2007).

As NPM principles and instruments are injected into the public sector, such questions become more frequent and more pressing. Being a professional within the state system is different from
belonging to a regulated or status-based profession, but public sector professionals appear still more vulnerable in the face of neo-managerial reforms that seek to disqualify them. Reforms are described as aiming to undermine professionals’ power and reinforce the control of their activities by introducing and promoting rationality, standardization and accountability. At least three of the components of professionalism come under attack: their autonomy (whittled down by the reforms); their discretionary judgment on the job (which elicits misgivings); their occupational effectiveness and costs (which elicit criticism). The contemporary reforms seem like strategies aiming to reinforce control in general and managerial control in particular (via managerial tools) over powerful professional groups delivering services in the public sector (e.g. Ackroyd et al., 1989).

There has been a great deal of literature dealing with such attacks in the healthcare sector. Head and shoulders above the rest, the reforms of the British NHS (National Health System) have been abundantly analyzed (Allsop, 2006; Currie et al., 2009; Dent, 2003; Harrison, 2002; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994; Moran, 2000; Morrell, 2006). The healthcare professions have by and large been much researched, and the effects of neo-managerial reforms and professional groups’ “reactions”, “resistance” or “response” to them in various national contexts frequently analyzed: care professionals in French hospitals – departments heads, physicians, nurses (Belorgey, 2010), Swedish nurses acting collectively first to support then to oppose healthcare reforms in the 1990s (Blomgren, 2003) or nurses in the Netherlands confronted by performance based contracts (Oomkens, 2010), physicians in Denmark and Great Britain (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009) or Germany and Great-Britain (Kuhlmann et al., 2009), maternity care professionals – doctors, midwives, nurses – in Finland or Canada (Sandall et al., 2009) etc. Analyzing modifications in American hospitals, some authors have pointed to the decline of professional supremacy in favour of a thriving orientation stamped by managerial and market logics (Scott et al., 2000).

Aside from the healthcare sector, other research has shown how professionals in the public services generally have been exposed to so-called neo-managerial reforms (Ackroyd et al., 2007 and Kirkpatrick et al., 2005), submitted to modes of steering based on performance criteria (De Bruijn, 2002, 2010), resisted attempts to bring them in line (Fournier, 1999) or the new modes of “post-bureaucratic” organization (Morris and Farrel, 2007). Work on professional groups in the French public sector supplement the analyses carried out in other countries on the many sectors particularly exposed to systems of governance by performance: justice (Vauchez and Willemez, 2007; Vigour, 2008), the police (Boussard et al., 2006; Jones and Newburn, 2009; Matelly and Mouhanna, 2007; Ocqueteau, 2006, p. 259–283), education (Demailly, 2008; Maroy, 2006), higher education (Deem et al., 2007) and domains connected to the development of the Welfare state such as social work (Chauvière, 2007; Harris, 1998). Described as major trends (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Pollitt, 1993), these movements appear largely transnational though temporalities vary depending on the country (Leicht et al., 2009).

1.2. Seeing beyond the opposition between New Public Management and professional groups in the public sector

Clearly, emphasizing the opposition between NPM and professionals working for the state certainly makes ongoing transformations immediately intelligible. But does it make the phenomena totally intelligible and does it stand up against the knowledge accumulated by the sociology of professions, on the one side, by research on neo-managerial changes, on the other? The central hypothesis in this dossier and its various contributions is that opposition can only be a starting
point, because in academic research the terms of a problem are clearly different from what they are in the field of political and social conflicts.

In a historical context where reforms proliferate and conflicts harden, the opposition between NPM and the professions reflects the antagonistic stances of actors in the field. At one end, political declarations denounce the autonomy of professional groups working within state systems, a discourse that bolstered the programs of the new Right in the United States and Great-Britain in the 1980s (R. Reagan, M. Thatcher) (Foster and Wilding, 2000) or more recently in France (N. Sarkozy). In a context of globalized financial capitalism focused on the costliness of the Welfare state and linked to a professional autonomy and practitioner-discretion judged excessive, that discourse was backed up by mounting vocal criticism of the budget on the part of finance ministers. At the other end, in the name of the best interests of the public service, we hear pleas in favour of the professions, warning against the risk of deteriorating their know-how and professionalism, pointing to the threats directed against an autonomy deemed indispensable for the delivery of services, and opposing budget cuts. That polarization shows that the dangers of NPM are deplored by actors who have a stake in it (Gori et al., 2009) as much as by committed academics (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Radin, 2006). But that (seemingly) “common cause” condemning attacks on the professions is but a particular time in the reaction; it has clearly become “the myth”, useful in political conflicts as well as in defending professionals affected by the reforms, and in building and upholding professionalism.

At either end, polarization has frozen the significant moments of the power struggles and collective battles. But, precisely because they must be historicized, such moments also constitute a sociologically valid, though insufficient, grid for deciphering the changes at hand. Neomanagerial ideology is not a definitively stable doctrine (Hood, 1998); it is embodied above all in tools – indicators of performance, new accounting and audit systems, cost analysis, competition, etc. – and organizational constructs – agencies, externalization, etc. Though it sometimes looks like “ready-made thinking” – a short-cut employed by its promoters, detractors or analysts – NPM has been partly appropriated by some, become a part of national and local systems (sometimes at the same time as other reforms) and been implemented through concrete technologies which mould its orientations and stakes. Certain texts that propounded neo-managerial doctrine, in particular in the late 1990s, may thus have attributed the lion’s share to interpretations that accommodated the professional model and even adopted some of its principles. In that event, several ideas were given importance: the specific nature of the public service, the importance of user satisfaction, the quality of delivery, working in partnerships, the local dimension of policies, empowering communities to set up public services (Exworthy and Halford, 1999, p. 8–9; Ferlie et al., 1996, p. 14–15; Newman and Clarke, 2009). The “Third Way” and New Labour reforms under Tony Blair correspond to that description (Tournadre-Plancq, 2010), conserving part of Thatcher’s legacy (individualization, activation), and amplifying it (performance review) but at the same time adding ideas of social inclusion and partnership, by including public sector professionals in networks made of administrations, associations, users and private organizations associated within the framework of public-private partnerships (PPP).

The professionalism/managerialism twosome – a classic analytical grid in the sociology of professions – (e.g. Freidson, 1986, p. 149 sq., 1994; Haug, 1975) also seems notably out of kilter with respect to recent research that has recommended overcoming overly-essentialist or over-standardized versions of professionalism (Evett, 2003a, 2006a), to reflect more subtly on the interactions between managers and professionals (Farrell and Morris, 2003; Lazega and Wattebled, 2010) and between organizations and professions (Ackroyd, 1996; Kirkpatrick and Muzio, 2011). Many studies have been carried out in the sociology of professions
on the extraordinary variety of professional dynamics that cannot be simply put down to managerial aggression. Scholars have examined the decline of some professions (Freidson, 1986), the surfacing of new “groupings” where professional contours are blurred or variable (Demazière and Gadéa, 2009), the fact that professional organizations tend to become bureaucratic (Freidson, 1994), the significance of inter-professional competition (Abbott, 1988) or the emergence of a form of scientific bureaucratization of knowledge at the heart of the professions (e.g. the case of evidence-based medicine, Harrison, 2002).

Would it not also be apposite to pay more careful attention to the transformations of certain managerial functions (leadership, control) in public organizations, boosted by the ever-greater number of audits (Power, 1999) by the new technologies for “governing at a distance” or by performance and an increasing number of control bureaucracies (Hood et al., 1999). The means of piloting and directing public organizations – which are in the process of changing but do not form a simple picture – will be a test for those new instruments. First, because governing by performance translates into forms of re-bureaucratization which do not result in very effective leadership. Secondly because, depending on the sector and existing power relations, the new forms of leadership are not identical.

To simply abide by the “NPM vs. public sector professionals” opposition thus appears unsatisfactory for two reasons. Professional groups in the public sector are not standard entities and – neo-managerial reforms notwithstanding – are involved in transformations of considerable importance. From one country and one sector to the next, the contents of neo-managerial reforms are not the same. Their effects too differ, pointing to the need to observe them in their interaction with the professional groups whose modes of regulation and activity are what the reforms precisely aim to modify. In other words, neo-managerial reforms and contemporary professional activism give rise to interesting questions for analysis and interpretation which are less conducive to considering that the opposition between NPM and public professionals goes without saying than to implementing the terms of the opposition with the objective of getting beyond them. What is at stake is understanding and demonstrating how introducing managerial rationality and tools can lead to differentiating between professional trajectories, recomposing their activity, and separating their worlds.

1.3. New Public Management and professional groups in the public sector: new clues for interpretation

Researching the issue of relations between NPM and professional groups in the public sector is particularly daunting. The political and scientific stakes are high and require varied and in-depth investigations. In this dossier, we are seeking simply to outline a discussion that suggests the complexity of the relations between NPM and the professions, a prelude to launching the debate between specialists in both fields and elicit incisive analyses of the consequences of managerial reforms on the professional groups operating in public sector organizations. The five contributions that follow will fuel the debate from different analytical angles, as is obvious in the variety of analytical scales chosen, the multiplicity of empirical fields presented and the different ways the question has been broached.

In order to explore the tensions between NPM and public sector professionals, each contributor in his/her own way discusses the categories of crisis, loss, and decline. Thomas Le Bianic investigates the contrasting effects of NPM’s various approaches to the modernization of professional bureaucracies. Catherine Paradeise questions the outcomes for the academic professions of the recent reform in piloting French universities. Romuald Normand looks into
the reorganizations of the teaching profession and activity according to the British Third Way reform. Daniel Benamouzig and Frédéric Pierru explore the impact on professionals in the French hospital sector of the profound transformations taking place in public health regulation. Finally, Julia Evetts analyzes the changes occurring in the service sector professions affected by NPM and interprets their subsequent transformations in terms of differentiated forms of professionalism.

We hope that the debate initiated in this dossier will be picked up and pursued, for input from other horizons, well-documented observations and relevant conceptualizations would greatly benefit the issue. As things stand, several points have been variously stressed and reworded in the various contributions that might help us advance in understanding how the professions are being impacted by NPM, namely that professions are not isolated entities, they interact with their environment; professions are not equivalent entities, they are characterized by variable consistencies and rationalizations; professions are not homogeneous entities, they are traversed by internal divisions; professions are not immutable entities, they dwindle, disappear, emerge and assert themselves; professions are not stable entities, they are constantly confronted by an assortment of changes. Let us briefly consider these five points.

Can the tensions and contradictions between NPM and public sector professionals be put down to an underlying conflict fermenting at the heart of professional bureaucracies? Wouldn’t adopting such a point of view right from the start involve the risk of staging isolated entities defined by and within a single, conflictive relationship: on one side new strata of personnel in charge of management and managerial control, on the other side professionals seeking to preserve their margins of autonomy (Alford, 1975)? Despite the fact they occupy different positions in the administrations, are those two categories radically and invariably opposed in the way they relate to the organization (Raelin, 1986)? Though both categories have specific functions, are they hermetically cut off from each other and does their relationship really boil down to a conflict of interests? Catherine Farrell and Jonathan Morris underline the extent to which such an interpretation remains superficial and is unable to account for the complexity of the personal and professional relationships or the forms of cooperation that develop in a public organization (Farrell and Morris, 2003). Roughly speaking, the ecological approach of professions cannot be reduced to jurisdictional struggles (Abbott, 2003; Boussard et al., 2010) but must take into account the variety of interactions that professionals engage in with other elements of the organizations where they work: peers, subordinates, managers, etc. The five articles following elaborate on these interrogations and contribute further clarifications. For instance, to what extent is the autonomous and independent public sector professional still a valid and significant figure, to what historical and localized details does that model correspond, how can one construct analytical points of view that do not consider the model an implicit but, on the contrary, question its concrete applications? Are relations between professions and organizations fatally dominated by the tension between the former’s quest for independence and the latter’s will to be in control or can they be conceived of – and observed – according to different logics, for example in terms of what the first contribute to the functioning of the latter or of the protection offered by the latter to the first? Does analyzing relations between NPM and the professions in a number of observable situations not also imply the need to take the plurality of professional groups into consideration, as well as the ways they relate to each other? This questioning leads to a finer and more complex analysis of the effects of managerial reforms and suggests that their installation does not only mean breaking with the established order in which autonomous professionals were isolated from their organizations, but means encountering – and in most cases – upsetting the relations and exchanges in which professionals are involved in organized worlds.

Another angle for thinking out the opposition between NPM and the professions is the fact that professional groups in the public service have not all acquired the same consistency, are
not all equally legitimate. The intricacy of the tasks at hand, the importance attributed to the problems to be solved, the degree of esoteric knowledge that must be brought to play, the prestige of their social status, the exclusiveness of specialized skills, the leaders’ moral authority, the weight of professional institutions... all these and many other factors differentiate professional groups. Does training the spotlight mainly on autonomy not lead to seeing it as an overly-uniform feature, thus turning professions into an overly-homogeneous – a generic – category? Should inter-professional differentiation not be integrated in a comparative perspective that would point out degrees of vulnerability and unequal capacities for resistance (Thomas and Davies, 2005)? Does considering that professional groups are all similarly affected (negatively) by the neo-managerial reforms not lead to an exaggeratedly stylized, radical and simplistic stereotype? Analyzing the British hospital sector, Stephen Ackroyd (1998) shed light on the differential impact of NPM depending on the groups and diagnosed the inequalities among them: physicians preserved their autonomy better and were less affected by NPM than nurses. Research on NPM reforms reveals strategies and reactions on the part of professionals that range from e.g. “colonizing” the new managerial tools, through “dissociation” (which consists in adopting them formally but without allowing them to affect their actual work), to “reconfiguration”, a combination of the first two (Dent et al., 2004; Jespersen et al., 2002) The articles presented here participate in the brainstorming by designating the large number of phenomena that go into modulating the tensions between NPM and the professions in the public sector, among which the value attributed to services rendered comes first (along with estimating associated costs) as well as the professional group’s aptitudes for organization and cohesion. The diversity of professionalism is also the result of professionals’ defensive capacities and strategies for collective resistance, of their motivation to make practices fit the new demands and of their strategies for adapting to change. Consequently, is it not necessary to admit that professional dynamics are inevitably pluralistic, even increasingly heterogeneous, as certain groups are enfeebled while others are empowered? Similarly, should the weakening of professional groups or corps be theorized in terms of backsliding and decline in the face of a dominant NPM or should it rather be seen as professional models being transformed, as professionalism in the process of reconstruction (see e.g. Sehested, 2002)?

These differentiations can be explained in part by the fact that professions are not all equally held together by common interests. In fact, far from being homogeneous entities, they are traversed by internal divisions for which many factors can be held responsible: working habits, definitions of the right way of doing things, status-based distributions, degrees of legitimacy, etc. Do NPM reforms not contribute to redefining positions and hierarchies precisely by creating new roles, denigrating certain practices, promoting renovated modes of assessment, introducing new interests, opening new spaces for commitment, etc.? In response to neo-managerial pressures, is it not (hypothetically) the lot of professionals to be seen as versatile? Analyzing the effects of the British reforms paints a vast panorama of professionals’ gains and losses (Ferlie et al., 1996) which must be carefully scrutinized because internal differentiations shift, creating processes of group “reorganization” (Freidson, 1985) or “re-stratification” (Kirkpatrick et al., 2009) Our contributors do not shy away from that perspective and look into the ways neo-managerial logics and instruments have generated divisions and differentiation within the professional groups in the public sector. Should these internal differences not be scrutinized more closely? For though sometimes difficult to discern because they express value systems, the ways one relates to one’s work, and conceptions on quality, such differences allow one to perceive practices, interests and the reactions to the reforms. Do changes contribute to fortifying internal segmentations, e.g. between elite and rank and file practitioners or between different sorts of expertise, or do they lead to a more general reshuffling of the cards? How should professionals’ collective reactions, that often take
the form of protesting against change imposed from without, and individual reactions, generally more diversified or even irreconcilable since they oscillate between appropriation and resistance, passing through indifference or avoidance, be considered? Does the spread of neo-managerial reforms not often depend on the activism of certain particular professionals who in that case are not only associated or enlisted, but also confirmed and remunerated for their help in implementing the changes? More generally, should the proliferation of dividing lines within the professional groups be interpreted as indicating a process of destruction or explosion, as a sign that the impact of reforms has changed, or as a sign that the perimeters and borders of the professions are shifting?

In a context of change, professional groups may disappear, be recomposed, become more influential or more assertive. Seen as an ongoing process, should NPM and changing forms of leadership, organization and state control not also be examined in light of the fact they cause new professionals to emerge, particularly at the managerial level? Investigating this is all the more pressing as current developments seem somewhat paradoxical: some groups, due to the effect of reforms that are eroding their autonomy are said to be on their way to “de-professionalization”, while others, due to the emergence or growing importance of new occupations – consultants, service providers, project managers, controllers, and so on – are on the contrary assumed to be on the road to professionalization. Managers, supervisors, controllers – personnel responsible for restructuring and weakening professional groups – are themselves caught up in a process of professionalization (Noordegraaf, 2007) marked by the stabilization of skills and ad hoc knowledge, the creation of training programs, the definition of codes of conduct or deontology and the introduction of selection and assignment procedures. This makes it indispensable to identify more clearly who the vectors of neo-managerial logics in the organization are. What are the profiles and itineraries of those who in the professional bureaucracies occupy those fortified positions of leadership and control? Are we seeing the birth of a new “class of managers”, mirroring what James (Burnham, 1942) observed in public organizations in the 1940s? And is that new class particularly differentiated? By rewording these questions, some of the contributors reconsider those emerging managerial functions from different angles. Given that these new managerial roles – in schools, universities, hospitals – are often filled by (former) professionals, how do they now identify themselves? Do they still see themselves as peers and are they considered as such, or do they tend to form a new category of workers? Have they broken with their former activities and fields of expertise to give themselves over exclusively to their new missions or do they combine the two sets of duties? Have the ways of building those roles and the repertoires of action associated to them become distinctive and what paths did they follow? Though some studies have been forthcoming, we still lack the research that would allow us to analyze the new “managerial” functions and the individuals who fill them, particularly in the hospital universe (Causer and Exworthy, 1999; Kitchener, 2000) or in teaching (Barrère, 2006; Buisson-Fenet, 2009) Some authors (Kitchener, 2000) point to the hybrid nature of professional and managerial roles, e.g. when a British physician has become hospital director and taken on new responsibilities (commercial, etc.). It is not a foregone conclusion that such “managers” are necessarily in favour of NPM orientations (even if they are heterogeneous); their own trajectories may on the contrary lead them to resist or remain passive in the face of the spillover effects of the reforms (Farrell and Morris, 2003, p. 137) According to other authors, the growing power of the managerial component does not necessarily result in “managerializing” professions in the public sector (Ferlie and Geraghty, 2005); it may translate into forms of overlap or coexistence or scenarios whereby public sector professionals “colonize” the functions of management or new forms of state expertise emerge.

The tensions between NPM and the professions and their effects must also be better replaced in context by analyzing the broader dynamics that affect the professional activities concerned
themselves, for the professions are not permanent fixtures but are traversed by masses of change. In many fields, such as medicine, teaching or social work, occupations are plagued by a growing uncertainty as to how to word a problem, how to solve it, the effectiveness of a method, and what should be given first priority (White and Stancombe, 2003) Service activities are difficult to foresee and schedule for many reasons – of which some are intrinsic – since the definition of service remains incorrigibly vague (Lipsky, 1980) and rests on implicit and non codified knowledge (Sternberg and Horvarth, 1999) Those developments, which prompt professionals to question the very meaning of their work (Sutherland and Dawson, 2002) and which generate ethical dilemmas (Pailet, 2007) interact with external logics such as the fact that users become more demanding (Weller, 1998) or costs are rationalized, etc. Correlations are many and complex and cannot be merely reduced to the intensification of neo-managerial reforms. As our dossier makes clear, those reforms are not the only cause of transformations that may destabilize or destroy professional services. They are part of change – of major proportions in some cases, more minor in others – variously connected to the dynamics of the milieus in which professionals operate. This approach leads to refining our descriptions by integrating the diversity of causes and forms of change. Beyond the categories that allow capturing significant phenomena, does NPM not appear in composite forms that vary according to the period and national framework but also according to the sectors and domains where it has been introduced? Similarly, are professional groups engaged in relatively linear and predictable courses of action or are their trajectories unpredictable or even erratic? In order to understand the evolution, dissemination and installation of the reforms and the reactions, resistance and adjustments they provoke, the effects, impact and consequences they produce, how should the temporalities involved be considered? Undeniably, the reforms introduced in the public sector in the name of NPM are a threat to professionals who had attained a certain degree of autonomy thanks to their expertise, to the quality of services performed and to their personal and collective conception of a job well done. Our dossier opens the debate on that point of view, suggesting directions for analysis and recommending further research on the question. Given the homogeneous nature of professionalism in the public sector – whether one examines inter- or intra-professional differences – multiplying case studies seems worthwhile in order to arrive at well-founded propositions. But there is more: that heterogeneity is ambiguous because professions are not clearly delineated entities, circumscribed as if they were natural and forcefully institutionalized. Understanding them is inseparable from understanding the dynamics of change propelled by internal or external sources of which NPM is only one part. Grasping them is also inseparable from context, characterized by a diversity of worlds and actors – recipients of services, hierarchies, other professionals, experts. . . Professions are therefore both a historical and a relational category, and the advantage of questioning the relationship between them and NPM is above all to remind us that being a professional is a process rather than a status. It is perhaps also because of that intrinsic fragility that the protection (or aggression) and attack (or defense) of public service professionals give rise to lively battles (more rarely to debates) in the public sphere. We are waging a debate here (not a war), which we hope will be instrumental in clarifying the phenomenon and encouraging sociologists to persevere in their exploration.

2. Professional bureaucracies confronted by New Public Management: decline or regeneration? (Thomas Le Bianic)

It is today widely accepted that the autonomy of public sector professionals is threatened. Many studies converge to show the processes of managerial rationalization at work in public
bureaucracies, the perverse side effects connected to setting up performance indicators or the rise of a consumerist discourse in sectors such as healthcare, social work or education. Though reforms have taken on different guises depending on the country or policy sector, they are unified under the same NPM banner and express common concerns, namely that of achieving better cost control, rationalizing the offer of services and breaking down professional corporatist behaviour, the underlying assumption being that it goes against the public interest.

We will be dealing here mainly with the “professional bureaucracies” of healthcare, education and social work, to which much research has been devoted over the past years both in France (Demailly, 2008; Dubet, 2002; Bonelli and Pelletier, 2010) and abroad (Dent et al., 1999; Exworthy and Halford, 1999; Ferlie and Geraghty, 2005; Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). Due to the early implementation of NPM reforms in Great Britain and their radical nature, that country will occupy a special place in our analysis, since assessing the consequences of NPM some 30 years after the arrival of neoliberal governments ensures a certain degree of objectivity.

It is striking to note the gap between the changes that have affected the professions in the public sector and the interpretations sociologists have proposed. During the 1960s and 1970s, while the public sector seemed monopolized by the professional model – combining the closed shop, the defence of a code of professional ethics and the joint regulation of public policies – sociologists were prompt to denounce the power and hegemony of the professions. The dominant image was one of selfish professionals driven by their own economic interest and applying strategies to maintain their supremacy. When during the 1980s and 1990s new ways of managing professionals emerged, approaches that had been criticized a few years earlier were again in favour. The same authors therefore alternated between being the most virulent critics and the apostles of professionalism, such as Eliot Freidson whose evolution is a particularly clear example between his first works on “professional dominance” (Freidson, 1970) and his latest book on the virtues of “professional logics” in the face of the market and bureaucracy (Freidson, 2001).

We will however make a less alarming statement here and take off from the following argument: though it can hardly be denied that professional bureaucracies have of late been profoundly disrupted, it seems excessive to declare that we are seeing “the end of professions” (Broadbent et al., 1997; Southon and Braithwaite, 1998) that “managers” have conquered “professionals” (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002) or that “de-professionalization” has today become the general trend (Haug, 1988; Ritzer and Walczak, 1988). Those analyses consider professions as passive agents of reforms and describe the attributes of professionalism (autonomy, responsibility, trust. . .) as frontally opposed to those of managerialism (standardization of output, outside control, hierarchy), with the risk of reifying each category and missing the fact that in actual work situations they intermingle.

Instead of talking of decline it seems more relevant to study how the transformations of bureaucratic professions and public organizations intersect under the effect of neo-managerial reforms. These evolutions have been underpinned by a paradox: on one side, the classic model of professions is being negatively affected by the growing influence of managerial discourse and of new modes of market-like organization. But on the other, public agencies’ growing need for expertise has placed professions at the heart of the productive process, calling upon workers’ capacity for initiative and autonomy and for increasingly specialized knowledge (Alvesson, 2004; Brint, 1994). More generally, we observe a transformation in the way expertise is being used: the model of regulated professions that derived its legitimacy from institutionalized scientific knowledge is called into question by the generalization of the need for external expertise (consultants, auditors, evaluators. . .) as much as for the internal expertise of bureaucratic professionals expected to justify their knowledge and adopt more critical and reflexive attitudes.
The classic model of the profession therefore constitutes an obstacle for understanding the present transformations of professionalism and several authors have suggested enlarging the concept; the terms “expert professionalism” (Brint, 1994) “knowledge worker” (Alvesson, 2004) or “new professionalism” (Evetts, 2006b) have been advanced. We will be asking what this semantic shift can signify and what these new categories for thinking out the place of expert knowledge in public organizations – today in connection with NPM – can contribute.

But first, in order to understand where NPM’s main critiques lie, we shall return to the model of professional bureaucracy. We will then describe the major changes brought on by the introduction of NPM and show that these developments are more ambivalent than what usual empirical descriptions assume. Finally, we will show how shifting from the category of “professional” to that of expert casts a new light on the evolutions of contemporary professional bureaucracies.

2.1. The end of professional bureaucracies?

Since the end of WWII, “professional bureaucracies” (Mintzberg, 1982) have provided the model for the organization of expertise, particularly in the public sector in professions historically linked to the rise of the Welfare state which allow for a good amount of autonomy and work control. The model has inspired a variety of theories and is light-years away from the Anglo-Saxon variant, since it combines professionals’ discretionary judgment with dependence on the “institutional project” of the organizations that employ them (Demailly, 2008; Dubet, 2002). Professionals have also been involved in the definition of the contents and policies connected to their field of expertise within the framework of neo-corporate regulation, particularly in the fields of healthcare (Hassenteufel, 1997) or education (van Zanten, 2008).

Beyond their instrumental role, professional bureaucracies have also been seen as vectors of citizenship and social bonding, capable of correcting the inequalities produced by market economies. Thomas H. Marshall (1939) thus saluted the new alliance that was shaping up in Great Britain between the values of professionalism and those of the Welfare state, pushing into the background the liberal and “individualistic professionalism” founded on the distance vis-à-vis the state and service to the wealthiest clients to the benefit of a “social service professionalism” aimed at integrating and satisfying the needs of the majority. Thus, in many countries the bureaucratic professions were one of the pillars of Social-Democracy, participating in a mode of resource allocation based on citizenship rather than on the market (Hanlon, 2000).

By the end of the 1970s, professional bureaucracies were being disparaged by the neo-conservative Right as well as by the social-democratic parties, particularly in the United Kingdom. On the right wing, the Thatcher governments undertook a series of reforms aiming to fight against the corporatisms of certain professions and open them up more widely to competition. As Michael Burrage points out “[...] the reforms were remarkably consistent. They were pursued through three Governments, numerous ministerial changes, and in a variety of institutional settings, and they repeatedly struck at exactly the same target – the discretion and autonomy of professionals” (Burrage, 1997, p. 141). Cutting public spending directly impacted the professions, which were rapidly seen as obstructing change and, by the end of the 1970s, healthcare, education and social service professionals were the brunt of much criticism. They were described as selfish, inefficient.

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1 This original form of state professionalism has been explored in depth by various currents of the sociology of professions, in particular by M.-S. Larson (1977) who proposed the concept of “organizational profession”; Hannes Siegrist (2001) who offered the concept of “neo-corporate professionalism” or yet again Clarke and Newman (1997), the concept of “bureau professionalism”.
and not very inclined to be held accountable to the public (Foster and Wilding, 2000). They were accused of diverting public resources to their own rather than users’ benefit (Saks, 1995). Reforms during the Thatcher period were not limited to professional bureaucracies and also attacked various liberal professions remunerated by public funds or carrying out public service missions. For instance, the monopoly of solicitors in real estate transactions was contested by the creation, in 1985, of the new profession of licensed conveyancer. They also had to face a thorough reform of the system of jurisdictional assistance, since managing the funds—of which the Solicitors’ professional association used to be in charge—was entrusted to a new central office under government control (Burrage, 1997).

Though less attention has been paid to criticism emanating from the Social-Democratic Left, nonetheless during the 1970s and 1980s their critiques were quite sharp. Critics partly revived the analyses of the Marxist sociology of the times which considered professions as cogs in the capitalist system that participated in social reproduction and exerted various forms of domination over users (Larson, 1977; Navarro, 1976). A leaflet of the Fabian society published in the early 1980s under the title Professionalism and Socialism (Wilding, 1981) denounced five broad areas in which state-connected professions were powerful: elaborating public policies, defining the public’s needs and problems, allocating resources, interacting with people, and work control. The author criticized the professions’ lack of accountability, their excessive paternalism and the gap between their scientific rhetoric and poor performance. These analyses did not translate into direct political applications during the 1980s but became part of the criticism levelled by the conservative right and created an unfavourable climate for the professions. At the end of the 1990s, New Labour concentrated on professions in quite a different tone, advocating citizenship participation and decentralized administrative structures.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the critique of professional bureaucracies was made worse by a series of judiciary scandals involving mainly doctors, teachers and social workers, inciting the public administration to meddle even more with the internal regulation of the professions in the name of the general good (Allsop and Jones, 2006; Stanley and Manthorpe, 2004). Some of the medical scandals in the United Kingdom during the 1980s and 1990s were particularly well covered by the media, such as the Shipman case in which a G.P. had assassinated several dozens of his patients, or the Bristol Hospital affair where for several years there was an exceptionally high rate of mortality in the department of infantile heart surgery without any sort of action being forthcoming. Conservative as well as Labour governments took considerable advantage of those scandals to cast doubt on the validity of professional self-regulation and justify setting up new control systems.

2.2. From words to acts: implementing New Public Management in professional bureaucracies

NPM has taken so many different forms and the modalities of its application have varied to such an extent over time that resorting to the generic notion is problematic. The first variants of NPM in the early 1980s emphasized the virtues of the market, competition and “downsizing”, but the experiences of the 1990s were especially marked by the will to reinforce the control of managers over professionals by employing instruments for assessing and piloting the latter’s activity. Public policy analysts often characterize NPM as being the implementation of “post-bureaucratic” organizations (Hoggett, 1996) that combine three features: (1) decentralized administrative units run by autonomous managers whose responsibility is thereby reinforced; (2) internal markets separating purchasers from providers and/or resorting to private suppliers to
create competition among public service providers; (3) instruments to assess and measure performance allowing better control of personnel. In practice, however, such a coherent pattern has rarely been observed; NPM is a heterogeneous body of doctrines that has been called a “doctrinal puzzle” (Bezes, 2005) or “mythical concept” (Merrien, 1999). Many authors have also stressed the unfinished character of the reforms (Hoggett, 1996) that usually combine classical bureaucratic mechanisms – centralized decision-making, formal assessment – with innovative elements. The effects of NPM on professional bureaucracies must here be distinguished on two levels: praxis and institutional regulation.

2.2.1. Rationalizing and reinforcing control over frontline professionals

To the extent that it is aimed first and foremost at cutting costs, NPM has overhauled the modes of financing in the public services, switching from a logic of means to a logic of results. The emphasis on “performance” has led to multiplying accounting indicators and based the financing of public bureaucracies on “output”. The consequences of these instruments on work practices have been variously interpreted. Recent sociological writings can be read through four interpretative grids: “de-professionalization”, “segmentation”, “re-stratification” and the “dissociation” between instruments and professional praxis.

The theory of de-professionalization is rooted in a more ancient literature, heir to the neo-Marxist writings of the 1970s and 1980s (Derber, 1982; Haug, 1988). In the 1990s, that literature was given a new lease on life by underlining the growing domination of accounting techniques that permit controlling professionals’ activities “at a distance”. Some authors borrowed Michel Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” to describe the transformations (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2002; Fournier, 1999; Light, 2001) thereby linking up with the work done in France on the techniques of governing by instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004) Beyond setting up clearly identifiable and measurable “quasi-products”, assessment and control authorities also sought to interfere with the content of the work itself by applying “good practice” standards (Harrison, 1998) aiming to ensure the quality and transparency of the service offered to the public.

Other authors have argued that setting up new instruments of control would increase the segmentation of professions between elites and rank and file practitioners. As Eliot Freidson (1984a) pointed out, negotiations accompanying the implementation of new instruments usually end up with professionals obtaining representatives, a fact that allows them to preserve their autonomy collectively. Some authors thus note the emergence, in the field of healthcare, of a “scientific-bureaucratic” medicine whose main actors are the elites of the profession itself (Harrison and Ahmad, 2000). The upper fringe of the profession “colonizes” the sphere of management, limiting the potential effects of the instruments of control. But that collective autonomy only holds up to the detriment of practitioners and may lead to a divorce between the upper fringe of the profession and frontline professionals. Other authors, however, closer to the “de-professionalization” theory mentioned above, see professional elites being co-opted by state actors as the sign of a long-term decline of the professions, who are gradually falling in line with the criteria promoted by the political authorities, more indirectly by the world markets (Coburn, 2006).

A third analytical grid highlights the phenomena of re-stratification and the redefinition of hierarchies, as professional groups compete for the control of new jurisdictions. NPM has created new opportunities for certain professionals or “semi-professionals” in quest of recognition such as nurses, social workers, teachers to a lesser extent. The notions of productivity, efficiency, quality, versatility, which until then had been considered alien to professionalism are henceforth part and parcel of it and even sometimes claimed by the professionals themselves (for the case of nurses, see Acker, 2005). Those professionals also perceive current changes as a chance to free
themselves from the domination of other professions by accessing more prestigious functions in middle-management as supervisors or coordinators. The changes underway may also contribute to redefining the lines of command between segments within the same occupation. In the field of healthcare, research indicates that recommendations for clinical practice can become “resources” and serve as tools to make a specialization legitimate vis-à-vis third parties (Castel and Merle, 2002).

Finally, various authors have observed “dissociation” (Dent et al., 2004) between instruments and actual practice and professional attitudes of “surface compliance” towards policy instruments. The esoteric nature of professional wisdom and know-how is a permanent obstacle to codifying their activities. In public hospitals, research on the payment by results system (tarification à l’activité [T2A]) shows that, due to the “a-symmetry of information between management and professionals” and the “Balkanization inherent in professionalization that goes against simple ways of coordinating”, it “has little impact on the core activities” (Moisdon, 2010, p. 223). Also, as Christopher Hood (2007) has remarked, one notices a routine appropriation of the tools and a formalistic deviation consisting above all in “covering oneself” when the time comes to present results and in “blame shifting” in case of failure, rather than setting out to correct the sources of a mistake.

2.2.2. Organs of professional regulation under the control of state and public: the example of the United Kingdom

At a more institutional level, NPM has led to profound changes in the professions’ internal modes of governance, particularly in countries which have a long tradition of professional self-regulation such as the United Kingdom. Reforms undertaken during the 1990s regarding professional regulation are part of the more general context of the advent of a “regulatory state” in the United Kingdom (James, 2005) looking to achieve greater transparency in public agencies. In most cases, lobbying and official representation with the public authorities were better differentiated from regulation (keeping and updating professional registers, disciplinary functions), leading to the creation of independent regulatory bodies composed of members of the profession, representatives of the civil society and sometimes of the governing administrations or financiers. The case of healthcare is particularly edifying: the role of the General Medical Council (GMC), which before had granted licences to practice medicine and had exercised disciplinary control and accredited training institutions since 1858, was thoroughly overhauled under the direction of the Ministry of Health (Allsop and Saks, 2002; Salter, 2003). Reforms had three main objectives: (1) increasing the number of representatives from civil society; (2) reinforcing the role of the GMC in disseminating clinical norms and standards addressed to practitioners; (3) setting up a revalidation system, mandatory every five years, to check that professionals’ information and skills were up to date. Beyond the emblematic case of physicians, a general extension of the realm of professional regulation took place during the 1990s, since professions that previously had not been submitted to procedures of registration or periodic skills control henceforth answer to a regulatory authority. It is particularly the case of all the paramedical professions that since 2001 sit together in the Health Professions Council.

It should be pointed out that the principle consisting in separating regulatory bodies from regulated activities has not been applied so strictly in all countries; the United Kingdom is an extreme case. Elsewhere, new regulatory authorities have been tacked onto the existing structures which remain influential and succeed in limiting outside control. Comparative studies on the issue of healthcare (Kuhlmann and Burau, 2008) show that in many countries forms of neocorporatist management associating the medical profession, public authorities and social security
administrations are still controlled by physicians and that the power structures have not really been altered by the reforms.

2.3. From Professional bureaucracies to governing by expertise?

How can we, then, assess the impact of NPM in professional bureaucracies almost three decades after its first applications? The above discussion shows that it would be vain to try and calculate professionals’ gains and losses, since situations vary according to sectors, countries or occupations. Most studies indicate that the changes do not lead to a single form of de-professionalization, but do not leave unchanged the forms of power or hegemony that existed during the “golden age” of professional bureaucracies either. Often consisting of fine gradations, such an evaluation is probably due to the fact that the type of professionalism that serves as a yardstick for measuring the value of change is relatively fixed, whereas forms of professionalism as such evolve.

2.3.1. Beyond New Public Management, governance?

Since the mid-1990s, there have been calls to modernize professional bureaucracies through more “joined up” policy approaches and great cooperation between professionals in charge of specific policy sectors. In the UK, marked by the rise to power of New Labour in 1997, some authors interpreted the changes as a shift from “post-bureaucratic” modes of coordination which characterized NPM to a model of “governance” based on network partnerships between professionals, citizens and private actors in policy making (Ferlie and Geraghty, 2005; Newman, 2001). They were supposed to lead to relations of a less hierarchical nature among “principals” and “agents” and to the decline of Thatcher-era market-style forms of coordination in favour of network coordination. Contrary to the reforms introduced by “hard” versions of NPM in the 1980–1990s, this second phase was supposed to preserve a certain degree of autonomy for agents by appealing to their expertise – alongside other sources of knowledge available in civil society – when elaborating public policies.

Though many professionals welcomed the reforms, as Janet Newman (2001, p. 121) pointed out a fundamental contradiction nevertheless existed between NPM forms of control and the call for governance because “the over-preoccupation with internal issues – securing accountabilities, building systems of control, developing skills and capacities – has tended to limit the ability of organizations to develop the kinds of networks and partnerships needed to respond to shifts in the external environment”. Also, those tasks are not very prestigious and are of little value to the organizations because they do not lend themselves to the standardized forms of assessment produced by NPM and are not very attractive in terms of career development. Recommending partnerships and coordination does not always allow overcoming the logics of compartmentalization by profession or administrative service and may lead to forms of recentralization and increased formalism in decision-making.

2.3.2. The Rise of expertise and decline of professional bureaucracies

A different reading of the changes consists in replacing them in the larger picture of a declining model of professionalism vs. the rising trend of expertise in public as well as private organizations. For various authors (Alvesson, 2004; Brint, 1994; Reed, 1996) professional bureaucracies are not threatened so much by new modes of management as by the development of a market of “expert worker” skills that extends beyond the borders of the organizations. For Steven Brint (1994), the values of altruism and public service embodied in social trustee professionalism have been
supplanted by expert professionalism, highlighting rare competences linked to the attributes of the individual rather than to the monopoly of a professional community. Expert professionalism should be particularly desirable in a context where organizations exist in uncertain environments, which are less predictable and entail risks for their clients or themselves.

Therefore, in the daily conduct of public policies, and to deal with complex and differentiated problems – depending on the populations, places or conditions of implementation – we are increasingly confronted with the demand for expert knowledge i.e. the wisdom and specialized know-how frontline professionals possess. The appeal to expertise has led some authors to reconsider the theory of de-professionalization or the decline of professions in the present-day context (Evetts, 2006b; Fournier, 1999) and to hypothesize that what we are seeing is rather a reactivation of certain aspects of professionalism, used by managers today and claimed as techniques for controlling workers “at a distance”. That new ideology of professionalism is nevertheless supposed to include classical dimensions “such as exclusive ownership of an area of expertise, client trust and practitioner competence, autonomy and discretion in work practices and occupational control of work” (Evetts, 2006b, p. 525). Self-regulation would be stressed as a form of work control, but the ideology also means emphasizing the will to reinforce identification with the organization by eliciting stronger support on the part of professionals for the values it sets forth.

There again, however, there is a strong contradiction between the rise of expertise and the forms of management produced by NPM. NPM seeks in fact to make professionals loyal to their organization’s culture and develops assessment and control procedures backed up by internal markets, while experts’ careers are mainly played out on external markets of competence. NPM therefore runs the risk of having less of a hold over these expert professionals than over the classical figure of the professional bureaucrat.

Implementing NPM in professional bureaucracies has thus had contrasting if not contradictory effects. Though there is hardly any doubt that the forms of organizational control over professionals have evolved from the “mandate” model based on trust and autonomy to the “contract” model characterized by greater accountability to the political authorities and citizens, the change cannot be conceptualized simply in terms of loss of autonomy or of the “resistance” of professionals to managers. Indeed, as stressed by J. Newman (2001), NPM’s modernizing discourse on professional bureaucracies constantly oscillates between two models: one that promotes standardized work procedures, vertical integration and control over professionals’ output; the other that stresses the “modernization” of public service by reinforcing the potential of local initiatives, expertise, self-regulation and implicating professionals in the reforms. The two facets of modernizing professional bureaucracies are in a deadlock and produce an acute sense of uncertainty. Though NPM has caused the culture of public sector professionals to evolve – they are now more careful about taking into consideration the need to obtain results and the financial limits of their activity – it is less sure that the actual savings made are up to NPM promoters’ expectations, given that the reforms themselves generate considerable expense. The series of reforms over 30 and some odd years in countries such as the UK have ended up by exhausting public sector professionals and been accompanied by the rise of a new bureaucracy, whose cost, however, has rarely been evaluated.

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2 See, e.g., in the field of social policy, the increasing resort to “expertise on people” (“l’expertise sur autrui”) as a mode of regulation for granting social benefits. As Léa Lima (2010) points out: “In many domains of social action that are incumbent upon the public authorities, lawmakers abstain from imposing too precise juridical stipulations, delegating to local agents the capacity to set their own rules quite autonomously”.

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3. The Academic profession in the clutches of New Public Management: the French case (Catherine Paradeise)

Much has been written about the economic theory behind the reforms – seen as radical in, e.g., Great Britain or as incremental in e.g. France – which since the 1980s have aimed to reorganize the steering and organization of public administrations in Welfare states under the sign of efficiency (for a review of the situation in seven countries see Paradeise et al., 2009). The reforms concern healthcare as well as justice, the police as well as secondary education, or – what will occupy us here – higher education. A smaller number of studies have analyzed the effectiveness of the reforms which claim to solve the problem that has caught public funds in a double bind. On the one hand, the exorbitant rise of costs associated with mass societies that, in the Welfare states, came in response to families’ growing demand for education – 13 universities and 150,000 students in France in 1956, 84 universities and 2.25 million students today – and also more recently to answer the growing need expressed by state and industry for knowledge as being the mainstay of innovation. On the other hand, mistrust of the professions involved – allegedly careless about their production costs and reticent to apply the rationalizations that might affect their “corporatist” interests – has set in.

Henceforth identified as the “New Public Management” – a short cut that makes quick work of the rapid or gradual national histories of its invention and implementation – solving such problems is now a principle shared by all the Welfare states, consisting of three interconnected propositions: (1) decentralizing micro-management (and consequently its tools) at university level, which some people have interpreted as an attempt to desecrate the “institution” of higher learning demoted to the rank of a crude “productive organisation”; (2) centralizing control at a distance by public authorities – states, or regions, depending on the country – based on creating a feedback loop between centralized incitements, measuring entities’ performance by appointed agencies and allocating a increasing percentage of the resources; (3) the “fractal” declension of this model, i.e. the universities – agents at n level with respect to their principal (the central administration) – becoming at level n-1 the principals of the agents that compose them. From those principles, NPM derives systems that aim to establish a quasi-market regulation orienting the organizations’ offers of service according to their users’ demands, transformed into quasi-clients of standardized goods. Rationalization pulls activities out of their context and deprives them of their individuality. Thus does it pave the way to the exogenous, impersonal and comparative measurement of performance, and motivate producers – university teachers transformed into “knowledge workers” – to compete for access to resources.

Partisans of professional regulation have countered that perspective by claiming that such a rationalization seriously affects the contents of professional output whose main property is precisely to be context-dependent and deliver unique goods. Sociology has stressed the complexity of the problems that confront professionals and the indecisiveness of the solutions at which they arrive (Karpik, 1995, 2007) by inferring (Abbott, 1988) from the tacit knowledge they have incorporated (Wilensky, 1964), and thus the fact that a quality-based economy is inaccessible to standardization. The reforms have therefore reactivated the theory of the proletarianization of the professions that was so popular in the 1970–1980s (Paradeise, 2005). Is the autonomy of professionals – acting as a collegial community – when determining the ends and means of an activity (albeit indispensable for the quality of service) compatible with subordination to organizational objectives as defined by external managers (Paradeise, 2008)? Can institutions devoted to delivering the public goods of education, healthcare, justice, collective security, etc., be managed as if they were multinational corporations? Can the quality of professional service
tolerate subordinating its offers to the demand of users supposed not to know what is good for them?

Thriving managerial power, the armed branch of rationalization that enlists “liberal” professionals in private service organizations or transforms public sector professional bureaucracies into mechanistic bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1982), is supposed to favour the development of a variety of private or public initiatives directed against the autonomy of professionals incapable of responding except by resisting or succumbing. An empirical analysis of the reforms reveals that the reality of the evolutions is more complex, more uncertain and more diversified than what such a cut-and-dried image would have us think, as we shall now demonstrate in four points. Professional arenas cannot be reduced to a binary opposition between university teachers and administrators-cum-managers by the grace of the “organizational turn” (Krücken and Meier, 2006) (3.1); the image of professional unity does not hold up under the scrutiny of its internal segmentations (3.2); what is being played out in debates on university governance does not only concern the redistribution of power among professionals and public authorities, but also among professional segments (3.3); the offer of reform is not alien to a profession historically accustomed to “co-management” (3.4). The strain between organization and profession is part and parcel of organizing and piloting public institutions that provide professional services. Through the more or less overt conflicts that punctuate the ways professionals relate to their supervisory bodies, modes of managing that tension at the institutional as well as the national level are being (re)invented. Quite clearly, it is one of the major stakes of the reform, one on which future results will depend.

3.1. “Administration” and professions are not in an exclusively one-to-one relationship

Societies usually take into consideration the specificities of professional activities by setting up specific regulations to protect them from the despotic injunctions of the market and the hierarchy (Freidson, 2001). It is a dangerous privilege, since it makes them both judge and party for the quality of services they provide. Professional monopoly runs the risk of becoming abuse of power when a profession collectively deviates from its missions of general interest to benefit private, corporatist interests, or anomaly when faulty socialization and self-regulation by the professional corps cause professionals to confuse their individual freedoms with their collective autonomy under the corps’ control. Professional bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1982) long preserved that privilege by sustaining a live and let live relationship between two internal hierarchies – managerial and professional – without the first having any real hold over the second or the second exerting any control other that collegial over the first, sparing professionals from becoming servants to a master – whether market or organization. For that reason, university presidents, in France as elsewhere in Europe, were traditionally simply primus inter pares with no particular authority and universities for a long time simple receptacles for professional decisions in which they had no say, applied in conformity with rules and by personnel controlled from afar.

Andrew Abbott (1988) has pointed out that, in the medium term, the dynamics of professional ecologies punish professions that do not meet their obligations. The power delegated them is overseen by potential candidates for exercising a more or less exclusive competence over all or part of their territory – users, collective actors and institutions claiming to speak in their

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3 We postulate here the uniqueness of university work and output as justifying professional claims. All is not unique in the university, no more than in the world of magistrates (Smigel, 1969). It would therefore be essential to analyze how and for which professional segments the development of the mass society and transformation of university offers modify the unique character of the activity [quoting Lucien Karpik].
name (associations, elected personnel, trade unions, government, etc.). Universities are in fact not destabilized simply by the injunctions of public authorities that want to install rationalization with an eye to what their investments will yield. The relative falling out-of-love of users can be observed in France when they vote with their feet by quitting the public school system for private schools that claim, often abusively, to offer better education (Vatin and Vernet, 2009). They remind us that though the university teacher’s mission is to develop and spread disinterested knowledge, he/she must also remain attentive to students’ employability, to promoting innovation and respecting professional ethics (Evetts, 2006c; Paradeise and Lichtenberger, 2009). Invited or not, various stakeholders take it upon themselves to enter the arenas where the relevance of choices, cost and quality of professional services are being debated. These stakeholders explicitly challenge professional monopoly on decisions as to university objectives, resources, organizations, and activities (Callon et al., 2001; Joly, 2007; Paradeise, 2008). They promote the idea that defining professional objectives cannot be left up to them alone, for they are not in the best position to identify and take into consideration the plurality of legitimate needs addressed them in the name of audiences whose competences and aspirations have changed. Academics cannot shake free from such pressures simply by repeating that they alone are competent, no more than other bureaucratic professions can.

3.2. A multifarious professional world

The overly simplified opposition that we have just exposed also neglects the heterogeneity that strongly divides a professional group when it comes to its values, quality references, practices and interests.

Jason Owen-Smith and Walter W. Powell have shown that commercializing knowledge and developing connections with industry diversify the values of researchers in the life sciences working in the same departments (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). Michèle Lamont (2009) describes how criteria for judging academic output vary from one end of the humanities spectrum to the other. Comparing historians, managers, physicists and biologists, Christine Musselin and Valérie Becquet stress the unequal value attached to teaching and research activities, and the diversity of their practices, from the most individual, where cost is essentially measured in terms of time to the most collective, entailing a precise division of labour and costly systems that result in a variety of forms of internal and external cooperation and specific sources of power (Musselin and Becquet, 2008). In sum, professional segments are differentiated according to the material and symbolic advantages that a university status procures them in terms of internal career perspectives and access to external service markets.

Segmentation according to scientific discipline is itself crossed by other dividing lines: the hierarchical importance of statuses and what they imply regarding peer relations, the relative importance of teaching, research, and administrative tasks, partaking in external activities – e.g. clinical work, consulting, working as a lawyer – accessing the benefits of a hundred little arrangements depending on one’s scientific discipline, generation and, frequently, institution. . . By reshuffling the cards, scrambling up the established conventions that used to govern relations between the professions and interested parties but also between professional segments, the impact of reforms is therefore more or less violent depending on whether existing arrangements have been more or less favourable. Though representing an unbearable constraint for some, it has motivated others to act (Knorr-Cetina, 2006). In 2009, the debate in France on the status of “teacher-researchers” (enseignants-chercheurs) cast a crude light on the tensions it stirred up. By changing the definition of that status – from counting only the number of hours actually
taught yearly to an individualized calculation of full-time salaried employment spread over several activities – the preparation of the decree of April 25, 2009 blew the top off Pandora’s box. Mechanically increasing the amount of teaching owed by “non-publishing” personnel provoked alliances based on previously unheard claims between reputedly conservative scientific disciplines – jurists – statutory segments normally inclined to protest – associate professors (maîtres de conferences) – and institutions traditionally unaccustomed to protesting. The coalition rested on the double (material and symbolic) stigma of those labelled “non-publishing teachers” who became the “university underdogs” relegated to teaching chores (Henkel, 2000) while their salaries were doomed to lose the benefit of hours that until then had been calculated as overtime and the revenue of extra-curricular activities, made more difficult by heavier teaching schedules.

Reactions to the reforms are not exempt from internal confrontations that bear on both the representation of what the profession should be and the conception of the university and how it should be run (Paradeise, 1998; Paradeise and Lichtenberger, 2009). These battles – political as it turns out – can rip the professional milieu to shreds; the inner redistribution of power between segments is as much at stake as the redistribution of leadership between hierarchical regulators (managerial and collegial). The social construction of reality as a binary conflict between a unified and threatened profession and managerial authorities of various ranks, participates fully in defining the nature of professional autonomy.

3.3. Permeable borders between professionals and managers

Determining what is due to intra-professional battles and what has to be put down to conflicts between the profession and its supervisory bodies is all the more difficult in the field of higher education as borders between academic and administrative-managerial worlds are often very blurred. Proletarianization theory is based on the axiom that there exists a clear-cut distinction between “professionals”, users, and managers. Musselin (2001) has shown how the dwindling of French universities as territorialized entities, dominated by the University as the national union of university departments, is associated with a regulation based on national systems that directly links the supervising ministry to the scientific disciplines in advisory or decision-making bodies where the disciplines are represented by distinguished personalities more or less directly chosen and controlled by their peers. University presidents are primus inter pares. The top civil servants in charge in the central administration and a large fraction of their departments – even the minister him or herself – mainly hark from the academic world, to which they often return once they have finished their term, as is also the case for the presidents’ teams and deans or department heads.

From the 1980s on, French school politics gained momentum, timidly at first, more firmly later, backed by the resources provided by the new incremental policies (Musselin and Paradeise, 2009). The movement also enabled new stakeholders to assert themselves, with regions in the lead. The contours of universities’ strategies and identities became more precise as, to varying degrees, university presidents and their teams became more capable of taking initiatives to instigate programs and exert control over their own territories (Mignot-Gérard, 2007). The legal entity formed by the “Universities’ liberties and responsibilities” act (Libertés et responsabilités des universités [LRU] 2007) and the “Research orientation and programming” law (Loi d’Orientation et de programmation de la recherche [LOPR] 2006) crowned the cumulative effects of the many more or less minuscule and unrelated incremental changeovers (Lindblom, 1959) of the

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4 In the sense evaluation committees give to this term.
30 previous years. Universities were endowed with the technical tools needed to ensure their autonomy and reorganize the national leadership system. The ongoing transformations enhanced the universities’ potential for diversification and incited the departments to consolidate their managerial skills. Should these changes result in the de-professionalization of academics by separating professionals from managers and establishing the supremacy of the latter over the former? To this day, the answer is no. First of all, academics everywhere retain their political and managerial control over university resources, whether in the central or regional administrations, in the new funding or assessment agencies (ANR, AERES) or as members of university presidential teams reinforced by the reform but as yet still democratically elected by local academic suffrage.5 Though it is likely that increased autonomy has modified presidents’ ambitions6 by opening up new opportunities to act within the universities, the fact of “being in charge” does not make them any less “academic” than their colleagues! Nevertheless, we must not underestimate the effects of the “organizational turn” that has taken place in the universities (Krücken and Meier, 2006) because, over a period of approximately 30 years, it probably modified the attractiveness of the presidential function (depending on which discipline he/she belonged to), bringing about an evolution in the amount of time spent “in charge” during their career and doubtless creating specific milieus that act to promote the values and interests of those “hybrid academics”. Though it is likely that the profiles of academics placed at the interface between the administrative and the professional have considerably changed in terms of disciplinary, institutional, and geographic origins, they participate in the recomposing and consolidating those hybrid forms of professionalism that formerly existed in university co-management à la française, which is how Julia Evetts more broadly qualifies the contemporary evolution of the professions (Evetts, 2003b).

Thus, in concrete terms, the separation between professionals and managers is not as unambiguous as a hasty observer might imagine. Little empirical proof is available of a directly imposed managerial order and measurable loss of autonomy. In public bureaucracies as in large private service companies (Brivot, 2010), professionals’ attitudes with respect to the aims and nature of the new managerial systems are certainly ambivalent. But if the various professional segments are not equally enthusiastic for the new ways of organizing universities and knowledge production and dissemination, it cannot be said that it is done externally to “the” profession. The active participation of specific professional segments in the reform may reinforce their autonomy and power. As E. Freidson (1986) already suggested years ago, the sacrifice of professional autonomy has perhaps been over-stated to the detriment of its redistribution.

3.4. The strain between profession and organization in the (re)construction of academic regulations

A given productive activity is not assigned by nature to either collegial, commercial or hierarchical regulations (Abbott, 1988; Karpik, 1995). This assignment is the locally stabilized result – consolidated in institutions and people’s minds though still fragile – of social relations that have designed and distributed the various worlds of cooperation and exchange in a society. The typical “professional” form of regulation thus cannot be taken for granted. To survive, it must restrain

5 In some countries, presidents are now appointed the way school principals have always been appointed in France, but the situation remains exceptional.

6 An emblematic figure is Dr. Axel Kahn, the famous geneticist who very explicitly justified running for the position of university president by the opportunities to act contained in the LRU Law; but that does not say anything about how extensive those changes are.
the centrifugal forces stemming from the internal competition between its segments (Bucher and Strauss, 1961), the external pressures of candidates seeking to invade its territories, the temptations of specific stakeholders to impose market and/or hierarchical regulations upon it. These actors can subvert, from within or from without, the founding conventions of the profession by casting doubt upon the legitimacy, effectiveness or efficiency of its regulation. The major reforms of the years 2000 in France, concluding a thirty-year episode of incremental changes under the more or less explicit pressure of the public authorities, users, employers, but also of specific professional segments, have rattled the structure that buttressed the universities as professional bureaucracies. In that ordeal, professionals have obviously not been merely the passive receptacles for external commands, but have actively participated in rebuilding their justifications and recomposing their regulations.

Justifying their legitimate professional autonomy guaranteed by collegiality remains a major stake in a complex landscape marked by the continued pressure of the various stakeholders. In the name of their own competence, professionals refuse to be stripped of the right to define the services they offer. All of them stress the dangers of substituting regulation by accounts for regulation by professional knowledge. They dispute the significance and universality of indicators used to assess their performance and denounce the perverse effects (Gingras, 2008; Dubois et al., 2010) of using standard measurements that disregard the diversity of modes of production and expression of knowledge. They also point out that academic quality would suffer from the possible moral disengagement of professionals. They resist universities being territorialized in the name of scientific unity. They draw attention to the dangers of developing Matthew effects (Merton, 1968; Larivièrè and Gingras, 2009) by emphasizing the discrepancy between social costs and benefits when concentrating resources on the best performers (Franck and Cook, 1995), etc. The vigour and content of these denunciations vary greatly however according to scientific discipline, status, and localization, because the modes of disciplinary production and expression, the activities characteristic of different statuses, and the departments, are unequally thrown off balance by new forms of performance review.

The argument in favour of professional autonomy is pointless if it is not supported by the repositioning of the profession in the new institutional landscape. That fundamental question remains largely open today. New procedural norms and ex-post evaluation of performance create new opportunities for institutions to determine what forms their local implementation should take. Academics have a major role to play by furthering their own values, practices and interests, whereas up to now the tutelary protection of the state on the whole dispensed them from having to partake in face-to-face negotiations both in their universities and with other stakeholders. Academics feel uncomfortable when confronted with the obligation to write up new rules at the decentralized level of each institution, for they are not only required to participate in inventing the rules but also the arenas where they will be debated. After so many years of local arrangements and paying lip service to the dogmatic rules of the “supervisory authority”, they have trouble engaging in decision-making processes in their own institution. They also have trouble imagining that decentralizing organizational authority towards universities and allowing for the diversification of local strategies is compatible with preserving professional unity. As is quite common in France, they expect the national bureaucratic authorities to protect their professional values, thereby engendering perverse effects that only further damage their existence as a professional corps.

All this goes towards explaining the ambivalence of academics with respect to the reform and their sometimes very negative reactions. Nevertheless, those who end up being their spokespersons... also end up negotiating the new rules, both locally and nationally. Nationally,
the hard-hitting conflicts that surrounded the above-mentioned decree of 2009 concerning the status of “teacher-researcher” illustrate that ambivalence: after a chaotic process, blockages and anathema have finally led to a compromise solution between the interested parties.7 Locally, universities have invented, through processes depending on their local power structures, new in-house ways of implementing administrative processes, for instance as regards hiring. At the national level, new arenas for professional debates on values, practices, interests, and orientations have emerged. It was the case at the end of the last century when the Conference of University Presidents increased university presidents’ opportunities for independent action and when the organizational turn prompted university managers (secretary generals, accountants, etc.), to create think tanks and associations to share their experiences. It is the case today with scientific associations caught up in the growing need for positioning and coordination, as, on one hand, the role of local authorities becomes increasingly important (for e.g. hiring)8 and as, on the other hand, a growing fear of formalistic and universalistic judgments (e.g. in assessment) takes hold.9 Those evolutions all illustrate the emergence of new opportunities for professional socialization, dialogue and control.

A significant part of French academics fear that by becoming organizational actors they will lose their professional identity. That fear does not stand up when observing other university systems, historically founded on strongly territorialized organizations but where professional identities are nonetheless firmly asserted. Organizational and professional sources of power do not seem incompatible in such contexts, even if the tension between the two extremes is written into the university institutions of which it is a part. That tension does not irremediably plunge the profession into a dark pit where it must abdicate its autonomy and shrink into the identity of “knowledge workers”. Nevertheless, controlling the tension to the advantage of both profession and organization requires conditions that, like the chicken and the egg, always revert to the question of the profession’s capacity for self-regulation. Though profession and organization can play with each other, mutual caution is also required, as the American example demonstrates. Their coexistence draws its strength and positivity from “respecting several fundamental principles: professional independence [. . .]; recognizing each person’s expertise in his/her special field; and judges believing in the mission entrusted to him or her” (Lamont and Cousin, 2009).

In the last analysis, a positive relationship between profession and organization springs from a shared faith in the validity of the systems of representation, decision-making and professional judgments, as well as in the value of “togetherness” in academic organizations backed by efficient management, neither being able to do without the other. As Michèle Lamont and Bruno Cousin put it, “that way of functioning is the fruit of an academic culture relatively confident in its shared values and conscious of what is at stake, but also of traditional norms, gradual adjustments and on-the-job learning”. Thus, for example, American academic senates are institutions whose strength has to be understood as part of a game of checks and balances between professional vs. organizational rationales. Ideally, they recall when necessary that building organizational performance cannot prevail over the universities’ universal missions and that management

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7 And not only, as a superficial on-the-spot analysis might lead one to think, between contested state supervision and professionals massively protesting the reform.
8 I.e. posting openings for employment, as sociologists do in the Association of Sociologists Teaching at the University (Association des sociologues enseignants du supérieur [ASES]).
9 See e.g. the editorial on evaluating the Physical sciences for engineers (Sciences physiques pour l’ingénieur [SPI]) in the 2008 Chabbal report on the future of engineering. See also the many debates and internal as well as external negotiations in sociology as in other fields of the social and human sciences (Sciences humaines et sociales [SHS]) about the criteria for classifying scientific journals and comparing the value of different types of publication.
is therefore not justified in whittling the interest of knowledge down to its mercantile utility alone.

4. Conclusion

Largely attributable to the institutional forms promoted by the long history of the University founded by Napoleon, the double frailty of both the French university profession and university organizations contributes to developing defensive attitudes in the face of the reform. From that point of view one can, along with E. Freidson (2001), declare that professions are not in the same position in all countries. They play their role of alternatives to market and bureaucratic regulation more easily in states that function through “coordination” rather than “hierarchy”, counting on existing groups to support them in implementing their decisions and adopting “reactive” policies rather than using heavy administrative machinery to impose their orientations in an “interventionist” perspective. At the end of the day, the resolution of the tension between academic organizations and professions depends on the aptitude of old Welfare states such as France to become coordinators rather than commanders, more reactive than interventionist, to turn away from substantive and prefer constitutive policies,\(^{10}\) which in the long term will facilitate the self-fulfillment of professional actors confident in their aptitude to create the framework for their own self-regulation. If, clearly, the relationship between managers and professionals is modified by the transformation of the universities’ modes of leadership, such an evolution does not mean the death of professionals. For them to fully assert themselves in the new context supposes a twofold development, on the one hand confirming the gradual transfer from the supervisory institutions to the benefit of decentralized agencies, and on the other hand building a professional corps able to assert itself in all the fields of academic negotiation. This double issue is certainly not reserved to professionals in higher education and public research. It concerns all the professions exercised within the framework of public bureaucracies that, as such, are impacted in the same way by the reform of the modalities of public leadership.

5. The teaching profession put to the test of New Public Management: the Third Way reform (Romuald Normand)

In Britain, the identity of the teaching profession was defined with respect to the comprehensive school system invented by the Labour Party as a result of considerable commitment on the part of pedagogical activists and the Left to end the premature selection of pupils, create a core curriculum and promote active methods in secondary education. During the 1960s and 1970s, that professional model became the reference point in many countries committed to making access to secondary and higher education more democratic. Today, under the effect of reforms inspired by the principles of NPM (Bezes, 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) that form of pedagogical organization has come under fire. The policies initiated by Tony Blair and his government illustrate this well.

The Third Way is looked upon as an experimental field for NPM in education as well as in other realms of public action (Clarke et al., 2000; Derouet and Normand, 2011a; Faucher-King and Le Galès, 2010; Normand, 2011). France has not been left out of these evolutions and changes are perceptible in the modes of governing the system of education – liberalizing the

\(^{10}\) In studying public policy, “substantive policies” – which prescribe what should be done – are opposed to “constitutive policies” – which prescribe how one should go about finding solutions or choosing an option.
school catchment area, a new policy based on Education Action Zones programs, implementing the LOLF (Finance Laws of August 1st 2001), popularizing a performance culture – and in teachers’ methods (a common set of knowledge and skills, signing contracts setting targets with the schools, pedagogical boards to promote team work). Thus challenged, the teaching profession can indeed be seen as threatened in its professional identity, as facing an inevitable process of disqualification and de-professionalization. I feel however that the reform rather corresponds to a change in professional model that establishes new occupational rules while reorganizing work in the schools. It transforms control mechanisms that depend less on a bureaucratic order and more on assessing activities and individuals. This can lead to negative side-effects such as pressures to perform and be efficient, induced by a stubborn insistence on outcomes that prevents a new professionalism from emerging. But the new regulation also produces positive effects on the definition of responsibilities, the recognition of skills, conceptions of teaching and learning, and sharing information. Naturally, it creates new norms for professional socialization and integration but also new opportunities for teacher autonomy and subjectivation (Dubet, 2009).

I have borrowed a series of examples from the English experience to sketch the trends that are recomposing teachers’ modes of membership, professional identity and occupational borders step by step. I will point to some of the criticism sociologists have addressed to basing the organization of work on performance, cost control and the quest for efficiency. I will describe the effects of the new performance regime on the restructuring of the English teaching profession and show how NPM has transformed role sharing and teachers’ responsibilities in the schools as well as the conditions for entering the profession and training. To conclude, I will compare a few of these features to ongoing reforms in the French context.

5.1. The teaching profession restructured by performance management

Severely ostracized by the New Right, the culture and professional identity of the English teaching profession were put to the test at the beginning of the 1980s. The right to collective negotiation was abolished and salaries and career development revised. Teachers’ trade unions expressed their opposition to tightened controls, the increase of time on the job and the individualization of professional itineraries but they were powerless to put a stop to the restructuring. At the same time, performance management got underway, with two objectives: improve the excellence of schools and develop competition in order to foster quality. Transparent assessments of pupils’ scores were supposed to help orient family choices and contribute to a better distribution of public funding. The definition of curricula was centralized and entrusted to a national agency which set up the standards. Pedagogy in the classroom was modelled on the tests administered to pupils. Head teachers had to fill their role of manager and were held accountable for their actions before governing bodies with extended powers that involved parents and business representatives to a greater extent.

Teachers’ reactions to the reforms were very different although they all shared the same impression of anomie and de-professionalization (Mac An Ghaill, 1992). On one hand, “activist” teachers, trade union members and those in sympathy with the Labour Party, were vehemently opposed to reforms and changes in their working conditions. They protested against the creation of intermediary positions in schools and remained attuned to the principles of equal opportunity and meritocracy conveyed by the comprehensive school model. On the other hand, more “traditionalist” teachers opposed trade union action by asserting their attachment to pupil selection and the transmission of academic knowledge. They upheld the principle of teachers’ authority in the classroom and criticized the pedagogues. In between the two groups, a minority of teachers,
equally opposed to strikes and collective action, were laying the groundwork for a new professional culture. Those “entrepreneurs” accepted willy-nilly the principles of NPM and of extending their responsibilities outside the classroom. Added to the frantic rhythm of reforms, disagreements such as those contributed to weakening the profession’s control of the activity by fairly rapidly submitting it to pressures to perform and inter-individual competition.

As of 1997, the Labour government’s “modernist” policies pursued the reform of the teaching profession by reinforcing the importance of accountability: it created a complex and hierarchical system of standards, benchmarks and strategic targets to improve performance. By becoming more interventionist and managerial, the Department of Education restructured working conditions and teacher training. But, though it continued to diversify the statuses of public institutions, it soon ran into difficulties to recruit and keep teachers on post in the most deprived urban areas. It then promised to balance “pressures” to obtain results and teacher “support” to help them be “good professionals”, without however giving up on performance. The policy was made official in a green book called *The Performing School: Managing, Teaching and Learning in a Performance* (Gleeson and Husbands, 2000), a report meant to revise teachers’ professional careers by inaugurating a system of performance-related pay (PRP). Contradictory reports were written up by the *National union of teachers* (NUT), which even went to court to obtain a revision of performance-based standards (but only succeeded in obtaining a small change).

PRP created a system of performance-based assessment whereby the hierarchy holds the teacher accountable for pupils’ progress. Still today, he/she must demonstrate he/she is keeping up and improving his/her skills with respect to a certain number of professional criteria: test results, managing the classroom and evaluation, updating professional knowledge, effectiveness in respecting prescriptions and implementing the reforms. What is more, careers and remunerations vary depending on whether teachers are satisfied with doing the minimum by filling the classic pedagogical functions in the classroom or whether they accept responsibilities in the school by coordinating a team and organizing training for their colleagues or having their expertise recognized as a “High skills teacher”.

As a result of empirical studies carried out in schools, sociologists have stigmatized the negative effects of performance management. Stephen Ball explains that a sort of “schizophrenia” has taken a hold of teachers who henceforth must choose between teamwork and individualization, autonomy and conformity to norms, professional improvement and performance (Ball, 2001). Though they “played along” and “conformed to prescriptions”, they felt the need to manipulate the information that allowed them to adapt to the objectives assigned them. Sharon Gewirtz (2002) tells how new management monetized and differentiated pupils’ academic value. If each child represents a *per capita* budget for the school, the gifted or strongly motivated pupil is a guarantee that the school will obtain good scores for a minimum of investment: he/she is therefore profitable. Conversely, pupils with difficulties, most often coming from the more modest households, are not valuable assets for management.

5.2. Leadership: diversifying roles and recomposing an occupational professionalism

Performance politics are symptomatic of the transition from occupational to organizational professionalism (Evets, 2003b). The first model is based on logics whereby a professional group disposes of collegial authority in the school and peer relations are based on trust. That posture implies a large degree of autonomy and discretionary judgment, particularly in matters of pupil assessment. Work is governed by the expression of a solid social identity and a code of ethics largely elaborated by the professionals themselves. The second model corresponds
both to a tightening up of work control by managers corresponding to a pecking order and a horizontal sharing of roles and responsibilities in the school. It implies internal implementation of standardized procedures and external forms of regulation and quality assessment by tools (indicators, benchmarks) or by specific professionals (auditors, inspectors, supervisors). Teachers’ tasks and professional activities are thus modified because they are called upon to perform different acts outside the classroom in order to function in a team with their colleagues.

Given the differentiation of roles and responsibilities, several intermediary positions have been officially recognized (Gunter and Rayner, 2007). “Teacher leaders” are positions filled by experienced practitioners who take part in improving their colleagues’ performance or in implementing collaborative work. They accompany young teachers in the classroom by observing their pedagogical practices. The local authorities have recruited expert practitioners as “consultants” to implement the national strategy in favour of literacy and numeracy. To acknowledge the functions of “pedagogical advisers” better or the work accomplished by temporarily “assigned” teachers, the Department of Education created an “advanced skills teacher” status. In terms of middle management, scientific discipline coordinators and teachers with pedagogical responsibilities are asked to fill leadership positions (Normand, 2010). Skill guides define their work in various fields: strategic leadership and how to develop an academic discipline, directing and evaluating pedagogical activities, team management, providing staff and resources.

That new role and structure followed inspectors’ reports stressing the need for an intermediate teaching force to contribute to school improvement. Training programs were organized by the executive training centre (the National College for School Leadership) to support the new functions. The position of “coordinator” is another form of “leadership”. It is filled by a teacher who tutors or does vocational training with his/her colleagues. He/she may also be called upon to work with pupils with special needs or play the part of “facilitator” in action-research projects by coordinating the group of teachers and the research team. He/she usually works in the school but may also belong to a learning community network, which organizes the exchange and transfer of knowledge and professional skills among several schools. Finally, there are the “innovators”, i.e. teachers involved in a school improvement group or in projects financed by sponsors, universities or other partners. At the local or national level, innovation gives rise to reference or good practice guides for teachers.

The division of labour with the team in charge differs from one place to the next due to the fact that public schools are governed by a variety of statuses, offer different educational services, are supported by different public or private resources, and participate diversely in large national programs or innovative networks. The exercise of leadership is also criticized by research scholars when it resembles discourse aiming to cover up hierarchical, functional and prescriptive postures hinging on efficiency and performance. Neo-conservatives had conceived of leadership as head teachers wielding their moral authority and playing the role of entrepreneur (Grace, 1995). The Labour government enlarged that conception to better regulate professional practices. Teacher control was thus reinforced by applying various managerial techniques (Butt and Gunter, 2007): symbolic and honorific compensations for the best leaders, labeling and giving credit for leadership skills, supporting those who actively support the reform and shunning its detractors. Today, the function of “distributed leadership” characterizes the missions and tasks school principals and teachers fill on a daily basis within the framework of digital work environments. Sociologists are generally skeptical about the actual possibilities of transforming the professional environment (Gunter, 2001, 2005; Thrupp and Willmott, 2003). They consider that functional and strategic leadership is simplistic because it only takes the formal dimensions of human relations into
account, whereas they feel that more informal interactions are just as decisive when organizing work in schools.

5.3. Entering the occupation and training: a continuous professional evolution

The green book on performance also induced significant changes for basic training and entering the teaching profession. Two systems in particular were developed: induction and mentoring. By simultaneously introducing the young teacher to occupational rules and the diversity of pedagogical experiences, professional induction aims to coordinate basic training and effective methods. Also, professional standards stipulate the conditions for advancing in the career (Evans, 2008; Mahony and Hextall, 2000). Those standards describe precisely the skills and know-how teachers must aim for during the five broad stages of their professional career, from the position of teaching assistant, where they obtain their Qualified Teacher status to the last position of Advanced Skills teacher. Among the thirty-odd criteria of the evaluation procedure, the teacher is expected to be steadily, efficiently and pertinently committed to his/her “continuous professional development”, as well as in that of his/her colleagues (Derouet and Normand, 2011b). That conception of vocational training is justified on behalf of performance (Malet and Brisard, 2005). It must continue throughout one’s professional life, close to the actual situations experienced in the workplace. According to official standards, professional development should benefit from research results in the educational sciences concerning pedagogical effectiveness and depends on knowledge not limited to disciplinary expertise.

Sociologists have criticized the conception of “professionalism” as projecting an ideal-typical image of school organization far removed from teachers’ actual practices (Evans, 2008; Ozga, 1988). Beyond their daily contact with a large quantity of prescriptions and tasks, many teachers adopt attitudes and cognitive patterns that testify to the existence of skills that managerial approaches overlook. The behavioural and intellectual aspects of work accomplished above all in micro-situations conflict with rules of procedure and conduct coterminous with the implementation of professional standards and good practices. Sociologists thus show that emotions, ethics and working styles escape restrictive definitions. Beyond the functional and distributed dimensions that regulate pedagogical activity and training in schools, a whole range of motivations, beliefs and implicit evaluation exists, as well as tacit knowledge which – though management chooses to ignore them – are nevertheless essential features of the profession.

5.4. In France: towards New Public Management in education?

Though the performance culture is today the rallying cry of the top-level administration of France’s Éducation nationale, many middle-range executives and school heads are still reticent to embrace managerial postures and apply assessment tools (Barrère, 2006). Teachers are very attached to their pedagogical freedom in the school and opposed to reinforced control by the hierarchy. But the model of professional bureaucracy that separates the administration from school life and from life in the classroom through strongly differentiated missions and statuses is today called into question. While tensions are exacerbated in the context of budgetary crisis, the Ministry refers to the general reform of public administration to implement cautious changes. The idea that some executives – superintendents and school principals – will henceforth receive performance-based remunerations has little by little sunk in. Similarly, changes in teacher assessment that would give head teachers more power are being examined. Some could be hired according to
competency profiles. Beyond the “Napoleonic” mystique, the invention of a “Studies Prefect” has created the new function of transversal coordinator, modifying the traditional sharing of roles and responsibilities in the most underprivileged schools. The reform of teacher training, severely criticized for its lack of ambition and utilitarian vision, implicitly spread the idea of continuous professional development.

Ongoing reforms, which broadly speaking are based on NPM principles, should be more to the advantage of school principals than inspectors. Strengthening the local autonomy of schools would give the former more room for action. Conversely, inspectors feel threatened in the long term because they run the risk of losing important powers to regulate, particularly in the realm of accountability. Trade unions also are divided between reformists, favourable to pedagogical diversification and redefining the occupation, and dissenters, opposed to the introduction of neo-liberalism in public education. These power struggles must be accounted for when trying to imagine the professional transformations ahead. Even in England, teachers’ resistance had consequences. After fruitless attempts to boycott national assessments, the trade unions obtained lighter workloads and a letting up of pressures to obtain results (Jones, 2009). The right to a more balanced relationship between professional and family life was also recognized.

Nothing allows us to say today that an evolution à l’anglaise will take place in France, although certain elements of the reform in France seem born of Third Way politics, especially in the sector of priority education. According to the classification of NPM reforms established by Christopher Pollitt, England belongs to the “competitor” category. The country highlights competition in the public sector and favours quasi-markets as well as contracts on a large scale, appointing civil servants on contract and remunerating them according to performance, as well as advocating fewer barriers between public and private sectors. France is among the “modernizers”. French political decision-makers believe in the role of the state but also proclaim the need for important changes in the way administrative systems are organized. According to them, this must be done through result and performance-driven budgetary reforms, by softening statutory rigidities in the public services, by more extensive decentralization or de-concentration in the ministries, and by improving the quality of public service. The market and competition play a lesser role, as does privatization.

Various countries therefore have followed somewhat different paths to reform their systems of education. True, applying techniques and systems aimed at obliging teachers to be accountable has tightened controls of the teaching profession. But the balance between professional autonomy and standardizing practices, pressures to perform and modes of coordination in the workplace vary considerably. Depending on the ideology of the moment, the history of educational institutions and trade unions’ aptitudes for collective action, the transformations of the professional model take on quite distinct national traits. Despite everything, NPM puts the teaching profession to the test and the same goes for the planned and hierarchical administrative organization in which a professional group accomplished its various missions while being based on a single status. Will teachers in France gain more professional autonomy or will they be subjected to a process of de-professionalization? Their pedagogical freedom (to which they so often refer) will theoretically be framed by new standards governing their activity. Skill criteria will possibly redefine their missions and career development. Reinforcing the pedagogical part head teachers play in conjunction with the phased withdrawal of inspectors may upset the traditional balance between pedagogy and administration. Imposed by developing assessment and digital work environments, forms of transversal coordination and intermediary functions might redistribute roles and responsibilities. Those evolutions will be a major challenge for teachers whose careers have followed the traditional professional pattern but are likely to be
accepted by the younger generation, more receptive to change and innovation (Rayou and van Zanten, 2004). Some teachers will also find new opportunities for autonomy in initiatives that up to now were out of bounds. Others will feel their occupation is declining and experience a drop in professional status. However, heralding an in-depth transformation of the state civil service, the neo-managerial turn seems irreversible, even though it continues to elicit strong opposition.

6. Professionals and the “System”: the institutional integration of the medical world (Daniel Benamouzig, Frédéric Pierru)

6.1. From autonomy to the integration of professionals?

The sector of healthcare is a classical laboratory for studying the professions (Freidson, 1984b, 1970). Medicine emerged as a professional organization during the 19th century and stabilized during the 20th before entering a new period which affected its relations with various stakeholders, mainly the uninitiated such as merchants or state employees. Sociology is not lacking for the analytical wherewithal to characterize those dynamics. After pointing out the features that characterize professional organization, it has described processes of professionalization, sometimes unfinished or competitive, and the threats that loom over the autonomy of healthcare professionals, physicians in particular. New demands and new attributions have revealed the growing importance of new actors, new instruments for governance, new forms of responsibility and new knowledge – in economics, the law or management (Benamouzig, 2005; Dodier, 2003; Fillon, 2009; Hermitte, 1996). All these elements have eroded the autonomy of professionals and been variously assessed by the social sciences.

While some authors somewhat radically judged that medicine was being “de-professionalized”, others noted that, reacting to more egalitarian and pluralistic demands, professions were opening up to a more democratic form of regulation (Moran, 1999; Ritzer and Walczak, 1988). These interpretations marked the end of the historic model of professions, typical of the post-war decades (Starr, 1982). The idea of a profession today designates less a form of integrated organization, regulated autonomously on the inside and protected within its borders by state recognition than a partial or fragmented process, pluralistic dynamics attempting to acquire a temporary and precarious form of autonomy, locally and in their own time. That autonomy is often menaced or put on the spot by the many interventions of actors, professionals or lay-people associated with public regulation or market logics – including transnationally – that cancel out any likelihood of recognition or protection by the traditional defenders of the professional model, i.e. the nation-states (Le Bianic and Vion, 2008). For some thirty-odd years now many studies have shown that these revised representations of the professional phenomenon translate a sense of “crisis” often expressed by the professionals themselves. While accounting for the transition of the (albeit idealized) historical model towards new organizational forms, does such a perception in terms of “crisis” enable us to qualify the ongoing processes at all positively (Dobry, 1991–1992)?

The main risk induced by that representation is not only to give rise to a certain degree of complacency regarding the hazy and implicitly normative notions of “crisis”, “threat” or “crumbling” professions often put forward by professionals themselves. There is also the risk – among sociologists as well – of sparking off a boomerang reaction aiming to reaffirm the virtues of the historic professional models and describe them in a positive light – at least from an analytical point of view – despite the fact they are today clearly challenged. In his more recent works, observing the difficulties raised by the managerial integration of American medicine, E. Freidson pleads for a renewed professional model based on “institutional ethics” replacing the old “practical”
ethics (Freidson, 2001, p. 216–220). By enhancing the specificity of activities called “prudential”, Florent Champy attempts to identify the contents of professional activities upon which a renewed aspiration to autonomy might be built (Champy, 2009). Though, on one hand, the approach puts the problem generally enough and, on the other hand, it attempts to grasp the specifics of professional labour, one fails to see how some activities could claim a specifically professional status, since all human activity is from certain points of view “prudential”, as Aristotle already noted in his day. It is not sure that by concentrating on professional labour – the case of the sociology of professions – sociological analysis is armed to gauge the endogenous as well as exogenous – especially the institutional – transformations in which the professions are presently engaged.

We propose to return to the sources of the sociology of professions to evaluate the more general position they occupy in institutional, not specifically professional environments, particularly in state-run and commercial contexts. On that level, it seems likely that transformations of the healthcare professions will be seen as the effect of a “transversal process of integration” (Chandler, 1988, 1997). That representation contrasts with the well-worn notion of explosion or splintering suggested by the sociology of professions, just as it is a far cry from reaffirming the classic professional model. The interpretative grid we suggest seeks to translate the manifestations of an integration process taking place at the transversal level of a sector of activity, often at the periphery of more ancient institutions rather than at the level of a profession. The tensions between the traditional register of the professions and that of a transversal integration around sector-embedded institutions not only account for ongoing transformations in a positive way, they also allow for a better understanding of certain difficulties locally experienced by actors who are concretely going through a “dispossession”, a “crisis” or a “crumbling” of their activities, and whose principles of organization assuredly are in a state of flux.

A sociological reading such as this one supposes a change in point of view and scope: ordinary phenomena, frequently observed from the standpoint of a single profession must, according to us – when seen under the angle of plurality, rupture, incompleteness and instability or on the contrary (and in reaction to them), in terms of continuity or even permanence – be considered on a considerably larger scale including the professional dynamics of sector transformations, which in that case call for a description. Considered in that light, the erosion of professionals’ autonomy does not resemble a lesser professional integration as much as a reinforcement of their institutional integration. To illustrate the way professional logics encounter the transversal processes of institutional integration, we shall first characterize the sector’s major evolutions in order to situate two examples of professional dynamics closely linked to those processes. The latter, which are mainly bureaucratic, can be more analytically described as forming intermediary levels of command that adopt the new functions of regulation, coordination and control within the framework of a renovated “governance”, itself endowed with transversal, quantitative instruments that largely escape the exclusive control of professionals (Chandler, 1988, 1997; Lefebvre, 2003).

6.2. National Governance: a transversal integration

Somewhat paradoxically, the “healthcare system” as a notion refers to a historically fragmented ensemble. Nevertheless, if national governance appears unmistakably pluralistic, even fragmented, recent reforms have introduced logics and tools to coordinate the hospital sector and ambulatory medicine. Various degrees and tempi of integration, such as resorting to NPM principles, recipes and instruments for action (agencies, hiring on contract, quantified indicators, performance-based remuneration, competitiveness, etc.) must not prevent us from perceiving the general trend, observable on the national as well as the regional level. Creating a large number
of sanitary agencies – emblematic of the state’s managerial modernity – was accompanied by merging steering committees and clarifying the hierarchy at the centralized and territorial levels (Bezes and Le Lidec, 2010). Traditionally considered the administration’s poor relative (Berthod-Wurmser, 1987; Chatriot, 2001; Friot, 1996; Valat, 2001), the healthcare system has gradually become more powerful and been reorganized in three large fields of competence.

Firstly, repeated crises have reinforced public health regulation. For a long time judged “old and musty”, the administration now directs many specialized agencies in the field. Responding to the injunctions of NPM, the system has come out as modern, flexible, efficient, reactive, not without having pushed around a few well-established corps such as physicians, pharmacists or veterinarianinspectors of public health (Torny, 2005). Without a doubt, those agencies have modified the relationship between the medical sector – or more generally science – and public decision-making by attenuating the technocratic nature of expertise. Their activity has however proved ambiguous for their independence justified numerous controls which replaced them in the administrative zone of influence. Though the participation of lay people has not always been easy to implement, introducing procedures in the agencies’ activities has reinforced their formalistic character. Increasing their number reinforced administrative expertise in public health, but the overlapping of competences and the system’s instability have not made piloting them any easier (Benamouzig and Besançon, 2005; Bricq, 2007; Buton, 2006).

Secondly, state action in the hospital sector has traditionally been characterized by moderate centralization, causing the administration to impose a strict observance of rules and regulations but – as a form of “domesticated Jacobinism” in France commands – allowing institutions to be quite autonomous as far as their local management was concerned. Over the past few years, the action of the Ministry in this area has been reinforced due to the effects of territorialisations, regional hospitalization agencies being created in 1996, regional healthcare agencies (Agences régionales de santé [ARS]) and to pricing, known as the prospective payment system (tarification à l’activité), set up in 2004, a measure that let the supervisory instances off the political hook of financial arbitration, since henceforth it is usually handled by managerial tools (Jobert, 1979; Schweyer, 1998). In that field too, the Ministry was backed by independent bodies such as the Health Authority (Haute autorité de santé [HAS]) that participates in applying quality indicators, or the more recent National Agency for improving performance (Agence nationale d’aide à la performance [ANAP]) that accompanies the restructurings.

Thirdly and lastly, as financial constraints became tighter the Ministry’s attributions in matters of social accounting were reinforced. Introduced by the Juppé rulings of 1996, the annual preparation of the Social Security Finance Laws (Lois de financement de la sécurité sociale [LFSS]) entrusted the task of synthesizing public actions in the healthcare sector to the Ministry’s bureau of finances. Preparing the law thus allowed gathering and classifying the demands expressed by the sector’s administrative actors (Pierru, 2011). Beyond state monopoly in affairs of social accounting, what is most striking is the correlative weakening of the historical diarchy between state and Social Security – to the latter’s expense. Partially taxing the revenue of health insurance was accompanied by the state’s regaining control of social democracy, the “partners” hesitating to shoulder the unpopular management of healthcare expenses. In 2004, the national sickness fund reform sped up integration: the new National Union of regional sickness funds (Union nationale des caisses d’assurance maladie [Uncam]), directed by a top civil servant with extra prerogatives obtained at the expense of the other social partners, was placed at the head of an array of mandatory insurance schemes. The sickness funds network, in particular, underwent
a more vertical structuring at the expense of the relative autonomy of private local agencies. Simultaneously, private insurance brokers joined public management in the National Union of Private Insurance Brokers (Union nationale des organismes d’assurance complémentaires [Unocam]) (Hassenteufel and Palier, 2005).

Overall, reinforcing the central healthcare administration followed two paths: along with reorganizing it in the form of agencies extra funds were allocated and coordination was improved by way of transversal instruments particularly aimed at finances (Le Galès and Scott, 2008). Integrative dynamics remain nonetheless plural and partial: though more formalistic, the authorities continue associating multiple payers in an as yet very fragmented administration, as demonstrated by the diarchy maintained at the regional level between state and health insurance, whose regional echelons remain exterior to the recently founded Regional Health Agencies (Agences régionales de santé [ARS]) (Bras, 2009).

6.3. Regional Governance: contracting, a paradoxical leverage for integration

Forming intermediate lines of command appears even more clearly at the regional level, considered since the early 1990s to be the territorial echelon best suited for directing and coordinating public action (Schweyer, 1998). State services and health insurance were at first induced to collaborate, then to merge. The regional hospitalization agencies (Agences régionales de l’hospitalisation [ARH]) – public interest groups in charge of restructuring the hospital sector exclusively – by the “HPST” Law of 2009 were turned into public administration institutions (ARS) whose competences also cover city medicine and the social-medical sector. The coordination and gradual strengthening of the supervisory authorities changed the practices of institutional chiefdoms, which were slowly acculturated to management techniques (Pierru, 1999, 2010; Schweyer, 2006) while at the same time their strategic autonomy was more strictly monitored. Evolutions were accompanied by a redefinition of attributions, once again paradoxical: as in the case of agencies at the national level, NPM contracting principles seem to be used as leverage to achieve the vertical integration of the sector. In fact, contracting has fortified both the competence of the supervisory authorities and actors’ autonomy. But over and above, it has engendered two other integrative effects. First of all, it has imposed the clarification – the creation even – of echelons making it possible to hire “principals” as well as “agents” and all ranks in-between on contract (Mougeot, 1986). Creating the ARS on a regional scale and “poles” that locally assemble several services, illustrates the overlapping of new levels of contracting, defining a line of command more directly controlled by the supervisory authorities. Those levels in turn are more closely connected to both public and private structures, traditionally kept separate in the French healthcare system. Hospitals and clinics are henceforth part of the generic “healthcare institution” category and, as such, they are witnessing the convergence of personnel statuses and financial principles, which also means benefits for certain segments, particularly in the private sector. Contracting also supposes producing and treating information enabling the supervisory agencies to evaluate the volume and nature of a department’s activity objectively. Activity indicators developed since the 1980s – Medicalization Program Information Systems (PMSI) followed by T2A – allowed authorities to become more familiar with and subsequently control the activity of the departments if not of the services (Moisdon, 1999; Moisdon and Tonneau, 2008). At the same time, certification procedures, backed by quality of care indicators, have allowed describing dimensions of the activity that financial indicators had missed (Robelet, 1999). Aimed at the authorities, they reduce the asymmetry of information between them and the institutions, as a result more directly included in a chain of command. They also contribute to bringing together care and administrative personnel, forming internal coalitions vs.
the authorities. In so doing, they advance the integration of care and managerial functions, while instigating more marked relations between the various levels of command (Vincent, 2005).

To sum up, contracting leads to a redistribution of power: setting up intermediate levels and generalizing indicators reinforces formalization and allows for more direct outside control over medical activities within the framework of a more vertically structured hospital sector. The contract as a tool enhances supervisory authorities’ ability to regulate and limits the sovereignty of institutions and professionals. Paradoxically, the ideal of contractual regulation, originally intended to replace the old methods of planning, seems paradoxically to have formed a more integrated hierarchical system (Light, 2000)! Nevertheless, such integrative dynamics do not all take place in the same way in the “health system”. In contrast with the hospital sector, the state must in other departments negotiate compromise solutions with other institutional or professional authorities. For instance, despite reiterated attempts at introducing more collective practices in primary care, the liberal identity defended by most physicians’ unions has allowed the profession to preserve the largest part of the traditional functioning of ambulatory care, at least for the time being (Hassenteufel, 1997).

6.4. What professional future for physicians in a more integrated institutional environment?

The notions of integration and intermediate hierarchies are an invitation to apprehend how professional dynamics relate to the transformations of their institutional environment positively, and, in the present case, the evolutions of a medical profession today in the grip of management. By not focusing on the crises or the crumbling of pre-crisis social structures, these notions perpetuate the old but still acute debates on the de-professionalization of medicine. Observing the practices of a more integrated medical system in American managed care, E. Freidson outlined some of the recompositions connected to the incorporation of professionals into more bureaucratized organizational formats (Freidson, 1994, p. 194–198). He underlined the extent to which the integration of medicine was accompanied not by decline but by the stratification of the medical profession (Freidson, 2001, p. 210). Therefore, according to him, the medical world today is organized around three poles: scientific elites charged in particular with elaborating good practices founded on evidence-based medicine; a new managerial elite positioned on the interface between clinical activities and management; and rank and file practitioners carrying out exclusively clinical activities. Though, as standards, protocols and other managerial tools become more widespread the latter are undeniably seeing their autonomy dwindle, control of the profession remains in the hands of the new professional elites. This analysis allows measuring the impact of the integration process in a profession which for a long time was thought of in terms of a liberal arts model. Its principal drawback, however, is to observe the process exclusively from a professional point of view, which generally leads to characterizing it negatively. A complementary way of looking at it is to consider professional transformations from the point of view of more general institutional dynamics. In particular, the notion of intermediate lines of command motivates us to examine how integration affects the professions, though of course all the segments are not equally concerned. Independently from the three professional registers identified by E. Freidson, certain medical segments appear, though not tension-free, more readily associated with integrative dynamics. Such is the case of internal medicine and anaesthesia-reanimation, whose particularly transversal activities turn out to be quite attuned to integrative logics.

After the Debré reform of 1958, internal medicine emerged from the vast transformations of the hospital system that institutionalized full-time hospital duty for hospital physicians and created the University Hospitals (centres hospitalo-universitaires [CHU]). Whereas organ specialties
proliferated, internal medicine was conceived of as a “global” form of medicine, guaranteeing a transversal approach to hospital problems and patients. The branch of learning was defined in 1966 and criteria to qualify for it established in 1970. A national trade union was created in 1975, a learned society in 1979. Finally, a dedicated diploma saw the light in 1984. During that period, technique and specialization were closely correlated and proved to pay better and provide greater prestige than the more intellectual and global approaches. Like city medicine, internal medicine became less attractive and suffered an identity crisis just as it was becoming a recognized specialty. In a competitive context between specialties heightened by budgetary constraints, internal medicine was thenceforth torn in two opposite directions (Boinet and Pierru, 2010). While the professional elite working in the university hospitals wished to situate internal medicine among the other biomedical specialties where it could occupy various “niches” (rare diseases, complex diagnoses . . .), other internists, confronted by the restructuring of smaller institutions, tried to re-enhance the transversal and inclusive vocation of internal medicine (Kelett, 2002; Kelett and Vandercscheuven, 2007, p. 509). In the sociological terms of this article, saving internal medicine would in that case depend on the response to demands linked to the integrative process: a fraction of internists dream of integrating specialized medical knowledge and picture themselves as integrators of those who intervene in the chain of care-givers, or of the complex dimensions of care, whether medical, technical, relational or even social and economic. In the name of their transversal skills, some internists claim for themselves new hierarchical or managerial positions in the departments. Thanks to this sort of reorganization, internal medicine should be able to reverse the original stigmata – lack of specialization or of technical superiority – turning it into an emblem of value that reasserts the primacy of the intellectual over the technical act, the superiority of an all-inclusive and “humanist” care network over the fragmented objectivity of biomedicine. Yet, that option, voiced in French as well as in international professional journals or during conferences, remains for the moment a minority position, given that the elite of the specialty remains attached to the traditional and technical model of biomedicine.

From a sociological point of view, anaesthesia-reanimation presents many similarities with internal medicine. It too is a recent speciality (1966) and part of the “hospital’s general medical practice” (Faure, 2005). The work of anaesthetists, who for a long time had to compete with specialized nurses, has been reduced to the role of assistant during the “noble” and complex interventions of surgeons (but also of cardiologists and gastroenterologists). Following the extension of their area of intervention after the 1958 reform, anaesthetists succeeded in having their speciality recognized thanks to determined collective action. At the turn of the 1970s, a specialized diploma was created and intensive care services saw the light of day. Also, in the context of a growing number of court cases involving anaesthesia incidents, actions undertaken by their new national trade-union (Syndicat national des anesthésistes-réanimateurs [SNPHAR]) allowed anaesthetists to obtain statutory improvements and the recognition in the Code of deontology of shared responsibility with surgeons (Faure, 2005). Reforms reinforcing the institutional integration of the sector were often approved by representatives of that professional segment – the whipping boy of the better-established segments, which explains why, as of the 1980s, anaesthetists supported the creation of “departments”, foreshadowing the “poles” recently created to oversee the medical services both medically and managerially (Gatelmand, 2001). Generally speaking, the stream of reforms that ensued in the 1980s and 1990s were an opportunity for anaesthetists to denounce and combat “hospital feudalism”. Some of their trade-union spokespersons even adopted the rhetoric of “hospital business” promoted by the director of hospitals at the time and momentarily fashionable (Johanet and Ibarra, 1989; Pierru, 1999). In short, the very modest recognition of the specialty has led them to play the integration game. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the most recent
series of events, representatives of that professional segment have gradually let go their previous choices for reform and sided with those who are opposed to the “HPST” reform voted during the summer of 2009 which, as we have seen, accentuates the hierarchical integration of hospital organization. Anaesthetists are therefore in an uncomfortable position, caught between the “mandarins” judged “archaic” and “passé”, and organizational patterns that disrupt their working conditions and diminish their influence as physicians on the decision-making strategies in their department.

One last word: it is important to pay attention to the way general integration dynamics are differentially refracted within one and the same profession. As sketched out here, all the segments of a single profession are not equally willing to play the integration game – there are “integrated” and more traditional segments – nor are they all affected by it to the same degree. Also, chances are that all the professions are not concerned to the same extent by the process, which therefore calls for more in-depth investigations in a variety of fields in order to be able to make reasonable comparisons. Nonetheless, from having observed ongoing recompositions in the world of healthcare we think it possible to suggest a transversal proposition: more than de-professionalization on one side, or the timeless persistence of the professional model on the other, we must try to understand the new place professions now occupy in a transformed environment that is pulling professionals – to different degrees and according to different variables, and with unexpected difficulties for different categories of actors – towards a rather massive integration.

7. New professionalism and New Public Management: changes and continuities (Julia Evetts)

The links between NPM and the possible emergence of a new and different form of professionalism raise interesting and challenging questions for sociologists of professional groups. Whether or not either of these is a “new” form is debatable since both include elements of continuity as well as of change. This paper will focus on professionalism and attempt to clarify to what extent a new and different type of professionalism is developing. In other papers, I have argued that, in contemporary societies, professionalism is changing and being changed. One consequence is that we seem to be witnessing the development of two different, contrasting and ideal typical forms of professionalism in work that is knowledge-based and service-sector: (1) organizational professionalism and (2) occupational professionalism (Table 1).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Model 1: two ideal types of professionalism in knowledge-based work.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational professionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourse of control used increasingly by managers in work organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rational-legal forms of authority</td>
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<td>Standardized procedures</td>
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<td>Hierarchical structures of authority and decision-making</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managerialism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability and externalized forms of regulation, target-setting and performance review</td>
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<td>Linked to Weberian models of organization</td>
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As an ideal-type, organizational professionalism is characterized by a discourse of control, used increasingly by managers in work organizations, and it incorporates rational-legal forms of authority and hierarchical structures of responsibility and decision-making. It involves increasingly standardized work procedures and practices, consistent with managerialist controls. It also relies on external forms of regulation and accountability measures, such as target-setting and performance review. Professional discourse at work is used by managers, practitioners and customers as a form of occupational control, motivation and expectation.

In contrast, and again as an ideal-type, occupational professionalism is characterized by a discourse constructed within professional occupational groups and incorporates collegial authority. It involves relations where employers and clients trust practitioners. Authority is based on practitioner autonomy, discretionary judgment, assessment, particularly in complex cases. Such authority depends on common and lengthy systems of education and vocational training and the development of strong occupational identities and work cultures. Any controls are operationalized by practitioners themselves, guided by codes of professional ethics monitored by professional institutes and associations.

As ideal-types each is an extreme form and, as with all ideal-types, it is assumed that most actual cases will fall somewhere between the two. The characteristics are intended to include both structures (e.g. of work patterns, authority and accountability) and relationships (e.g. of discourses and control mechanisms). It is significant, however, that whereas occupational professionalism emphasizes relationships, organizational professionalism is more dependent on structures.

There are also additional complications associated with different levels of analysis. The ideal-types are constructed to apply to macro and mezo levels of analysis (e.g. social systems, institutions and organizations), but the complexities at micro-levels are particularly interesting. As Andreas Liljeegren (2007) has indicated, social workers use professionalism as a discourse to describe their work and some professional practitioners continue to operationalize aspects of occupational professionalism – in their own and clients’ interests – despite working in systems where organizational professionalism is the dominant form. Hence, micro- and macro-variations and complexities form different contexts for further analysis.

In this paper, the two ideal-types are used to examine the links between NPM and professionalism in the contexts of the public services of Western post-industrial societies. Public service sector managers and employee/practitioners increasingly use professionalism as a discourse of occupational control, rationalization and motivation and provide a useful context in which to examine changes in and to professionalism.

The first section of the paper describes NPM as a promotion of organizational professionalism but with important distinctive characteristics. These indicate a variant form of professionalism compared with the two extreme ideal-types. The second section explains professionalism as an occupational value and indicates both the changes to and continuities in professionalism in these organizational contexts and with NPM. This enables an assessment of both novel and more familiar aspects of professionalism to be indicated.

7.1. New Public Management: organizational professionalism and variations

In Western societies, citizens are demanding smaller, cheaper and more effective governments and, at the same time, asking for better public services and more professional practitioners (Hanlon, 1998; McLaughlin et al., 2002). To try to resolve this paradox, governments have experimented with different ways of being more productive, improving performance, minimizing waste and reducing costs. NPM is one such initiative. The UK has played a pivotal role in developing it
and can arguably claim to have been its “birthplace” (McLaughlin et al., 2002). However, the impact of NPM has been widespread and it is becoming one of the dominant paradigms for public management across the world and in particular in Europe, North America, Australasia and the Pacific Rim.

Although there continues to be debate over the precise nature of NPM, the classic formulation in C. Hood (1991) lists seven doctrines which have been summarized by Stephen P. Osborne and Kate McLaughlin (McLaughlin et al., 2002, p. 9): hands-on and entrepreneurial management; standards and measures of performance; output controls; disaggregation and decentralization of public services; competition in provision; private sector styles of management; discipline and parsimony in resource allocation.

The stated objective of NPM is greater efficiency and effectiveness in producing and delivering public sector services. However, two requirements for classical management are missing in many parts of the public services where professionals are involved in service delivery. The two missing requirements are: acceptance of the role of management to control work activities and the possibility of standardizing the work. When these are absent – that is when the ability to define the nature of the work process is limited and the definition of the outputs of the work is problematic – then these tasks would seem to be unsuitable for both market and organizational controls.

Yet, despite these absences, accounting logic and the quantification of outputs nonetheless continue to be prominent in the NPM of public services. NPM also incorporates ideological elements, such as an emphasis on being “enterprising change agents” as well as “set[ting] and maintain[ing] high standards, to lead by example and to inspire, motivate and empower others” (UK Department of Health, 2001, p. 4). In addition, NPM includes competing, even contradictory, discourses: of quality and quantity, of transactional and transformational, and of “notions of public service” and public enterprise (Bolton, 2005). Professionals are required to do their best for their clients but also to achieve this within tight financial controls. This is the language of “commercialized professionalism” (Hanlon, 1998) and it includes many characteristics of a “moral crusade” (Hewison, 1999).

Attempts to manage professionals have proved to be enduringly problematic (Bolton, 2005). Instead, it is deemed to be more effective for professionals to become or to be “recreated” as managers (Maile, 1995). The incorporation of professionals into management is a distinctive strategy aimed at controlling professionals through normative techniques which involve performance review and benchmarking, continuous quality improvement, appraisal and target-setting. Professional managers are obliged to absorb and maintain the discourse of enterprise alongside the language of quality and customer care. Ideological references to empowerment, innovation, autonomy and discretion remain intuitively appealing to professionals who continually strive to deliver a quality service to their clients.

It is important to recognize that output and performance measures also represent a “discourse of competition” (Hoggett, 1996, p. 15) or what some authors term “individualization” (Broadbent et al., 1999). When individual performance (whether of pupils and teachers or of general practitioners and consultants) is linked to the success or failure of an organization, then this amplifies the impact of any failure. The danger in this is that social cohesion and institutional action is undermined and competition can threaten both team working and collegial support.

In NPM there is an increased emphasis on professionalism in work. Professionalism, in this sense, means self-regulated competence by autonomous individuals or teams. At the level of individual professional actors professionalism can be seen as a powerful motivating force of control “at a distance” (Miller and Rose, 1990; Burchell et al., 1991). Valérie Fournier (1999, p. 290) demonstrates how, in a large privatized service company of managerial labour,
the reconstitution of employees as professionals “also involves the delineation of ‘appropriate work identities’ and potentially allows for control at a distance by inscribing the disciplinary logic of professionalism within the person or the employee so labeled”. Service and knowledge workers and other employees are having to, and indeed choosing to reconstitute themselves in organizational and occupational forms which incorporate career development alongside the self-managing and self-motivated employee (Fournier, 1999; Grey, 1994).

As a discourse of self-control, professionalism can also be interpreted as an ideology which not only enables self-regulation but also sometimes even self-exploitation. Georgina Born (1995) illustrates this well in the very different context of French musicians and the hours spent practicing until a performance is perfect. It is clearly expressed in the work culture of professional (in the sense of not amateur) artists, actors and musicians in general. Once self-defined as a professional musician or artist, to set time or other limits on one’s work or practice is illegitimate. The expectations by self and others of the professional (whether artist, musician or public service professional) do not include such limits. For the professional, the needs and demands of audiences, patients, clients, students and children are paramount. Professionals are expected and expect themselves to be committed, and morally involved in their work.

In public service NPM, relationships between professionals and clients are also being converted into customer relations, namely through the establishing of quasi-markets, the use of customer satisfaction surveys and evaluations, and quality measures and payment by results. The production, publication and diffusion of quality and target measurements are critical indicators for changing welfare services into a market (Considine, 2001). The service itself is focused, modeled on equivalents provided by other producers, shaped by the interests of consumers, and standardized. But the marketing of a service organization’s service product connects professionals much more to their work organization than to their professional institutions and associations. Professional work competencies become primarily related to, defined and assessed by, the work organization. It seems that NPM is working more to promote organizational professionalism and to further undermine occupational professionalism. There are some important qualifications to this, however, which need to be mentioned. It is important to remember that NPM should not be seen as linked only to the marketing of public services but rather linked as well to concepts of the plural state and the governance of public services rather than just their management. This means that the planning, management and provision of public services is negotiated between a number of agencies, including governmental, voluntary, community and private sector enterprises. Then, one of the key tasks of governance becomes managing these complex networks of public service provision (McLaughlin et al., 2002, p. 10), monitored by community and client/customer satisfaction surveys and comments. As a consequence, this broadens the debate about NPM from earlier concerns about marketing to a focus on governance in delivering public sector services.

The ideal-types of organizational and occupational professionalism might not reflect the complexities of this different form of NPM professionalism. Professionalism is changing and being changed in public sector workplaces. It is important, therefore, to move beyond ideal-typical analyses and instead try to assess the extent of change and/or of continuities in the interpretations of professionalism as an occupational value.

7.2. Professionalism as an occupational value: changes and continuities

The analysis of professionalism as an occupational value has a long history in sociology. In early analyses of professions in both Britain and the USA, the key concept was “professionalism” and its importance for the stability and civility of social systems (e.g. Carr-Saunders and Wilson,
Early American social theorists of professions developed similar interpretations.

The best known, though perhaps most frequently misquoted, attempt to clarify the special characteristics of professionalism, its central values and contributions to social order and stability, was that by Talcott Parsons (1939, p. 457–67). He recognized and was one of the first theorists to show how a capitalist economy, a rational-legal social order (from Max Weber) and modern professions are all interrelated and mutually balancing in maintaining and stabilizing a fragile normative social order. Talcott Parsons emphasized that professions demonstrated an alternative approach to controlling work and workers compared with the managerial hierarchies of bureaucratic organizations. Professional values emphasize shared identity (based on competencies produced by education, training, apprenticeship and socialization), sometimes guaranteed by licensing. Professional relations are characterized as collegial, cooperative and mutually supportive and relations of trust characterize practitioner/client and practitioner/employer interactions.

The work of T. Parsons has subsequently been subject to heavy criticism mainly because of its links with functionalism (Craib, 1997; Dingwall, 2008; Dingwall and Lewis, 1983). However, Eliot Freidson's analysis of professionalism as the third logic returns to the differences between professionalism and rational-legal, bureaucratic ways of organizing work (Freidson, 2001). He examines the logics of three different ways of organizing work in contemporary societies (the market, the organization and the profession) and he illustrates the respective advantages and disadvantages of each for clients and practitioners. In this analysis, he demonstrates the continuing importance of maintaining professionalism (with some modifications) as the key organizing principle for public service work.

If professionalism is worth preserving as an occupational value, and as an alternative and contrasting way of controlling work and workers to that of organizations and markets, then which aspects of professionalism have changed and are being changed by NPM and other organizational mechanisms? And which aspects remain and continue to be constructed and controlled by the professional group itself?

Returning to the ideal-types of occupational and organizational professionalism, is the first currently under threat, challenged by or in competition with organizational forms as well as by more general economic, political and social changes? Is NPM best interpreted as the state’s response to political and financial problems posed by the high financial and fiscal costs of public services or as the state’s response to the difficulties of controlling and managing sometimes powerful professional groups? Does NPM also indicate a new and different form of professionalism or alternatively the further development of either occupational or organisational professionalism?

Professionalism has undergone change, and today can be interpreted as a tool of government endeavouring to promote commercialized professionalism (Hanlon, 1998) or organizational professionalism more generally. Certainly, there are strong elements of hierarchy, bureaucracy, output and performance measures and even standardized work practices which are characteristic of organizational forms of control of work and workers. Also, when service sector professionals have proved enduringly difficult to manage and to resist change, then an important part of governmental strategy becomes to re-create professionals as managers, and thus to employ normative techniques in management.

A discourse of enterprise is now intermingled with discourses of professionalism, quality, customer service and care. Professionals are tempted by the ideological components of empowerment, innovation, autonomy and discretion. In fact, the measurement of and attempts to demonstrate professionalism actually increase the demand for explicit accounting of professional competences. The work organization’s managerial demands for quality control and audit, for target setting and
performance review become reinterpreted as promoting professionalism itself. This quest for professionalism and accountability is highly competitive and individualistic (Broadbent et al., 1999; Hoggett, 1996) but also a bureaucratic means of regaining control of a market-directed enterprise staffed by professionals.

In addition, there are elements and characteristics of NPM professionalism which qualify it as a new and distinctive variant of professionalism. This variant goes beyond the ideal-types of organizational and occupational forms of control in that it emphasizes governance and community controls, negotiations between complex numbers of agencies and interests, and re-creating professionals themselves as managers. The control of professionals in public services is to be achieved by means of normative values and self-regulated motivation. The discourse of enterprise is fitted alongside the language of quality and customer care and the ideologies of empowerment, innovation, autonomy and discretion. The NPM variant of professionalism also includes a discourse of individualization and competition, whereby individual performance is linked to the success or failure of the organization. These elements and characteristics introduce powerful mechanisms of worker/employee control in which the occupational values of professionalism are used to promote efficient organizational management.

In numerous ways, governments which are centralizing and regulatory are also intent on demonstrating value in their public service budgets and seem to be using NPM to redefine professionalism and accountability as measurable. But before we acknowledge the decline (and possible demise) of occupational professionalism and the predominance – and possible supremacy – of organizational professionalism, it is necessary to acknowledge some of the ways in which occupational professionalism continues to operate.

The occupational control of work is still important in some previously powerful occupational groups such as law, less so medicine (Broadbent et al., 1997; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2006). Such control is also of increased importance in some newly powerful professional groups such as international accountancy. In addition, there are examples of attempts by some occupational groups to reclaim professionalism, such as midwifery (Bourgeault et al., 2004), medicine (Kuhlmann, 2006) and, more generally, professions in Europe (Neale, 1994).

In these cases, both national institutions and European professional federations are involved in aspects of the regulation of the occupational groups, including developing performance criteria, providing target setting, and making arrangements for continuing professional development (CPD). In assisting governments to define and construct regulatory systems, national professional institutions and European federations are continuing to operationalize the occupational control of the work. They are also constituting a Durkheimian form of moral community based on occupational membership (Evetts, 2006d). In addition, there are also examples of the sharing, modifying and adapting of particular regulatory regimes between different professional institutions and federations (Evetts, 1994a).

Other continuities characteristic of occupational professionalism remain and these seem resistant to change despite sometimes clear policies and incentives to adjust. One is gender: gender differences in professional careers and occupational specialties persist, though some interesting variants are emerging and situations are becoming more complex, for instance in medicine (Riska, 2001a,b) and nursing and community nursing (Burai, 2005; Dahle, 2006). Women are entering established professions in larger numbers and proportions, and men are entering female professions, and both genders are successfully progressing in their “new” careers, for instance women in management (Evetts, 2000) and men in nursing and teaching (Davies, 2003; Evetts, 1994b). In other occupations, particularly those still professionalizing (again, nursing
Table 2
Changes and continuities in professionalism as an occupational value in New Public Management service professions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Continuities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External forms of regulation</td>
<td>Prestige, status, power, dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit and measurement</td>
<td>Competence, knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets and performance indicators</td>
<td>Identity and work culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work standardization, financial control</td>
<td>Discretion to deal with complex cases, respect, trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition, individualism</td>
<td>Collegial relations and jurisdictional competitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational control of the work priorities</td>
<td>Gender differences in careers and strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible range of solutions/procedures</td>
<td>Procedures and solutions discussed and agreed within specialist teams</td>
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<td>defined by the organization</td>
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and midwifery), women are often numerically dominant and they use professionalism in order to secure new tasks, responsibilities and recognition (Bourgeault et al., 2004; Broadbent, 1998; Dahle, 2003).

Women are increasingly becoming managers, but management itself is being changed and standardized. It might be that men are leaving this (less interesting and powerful) field and moving upwards, where they can, and sideways (for example, into consultancy or private practice) when they cannot. Evidence here is anecdotal, but the increasing influence of human resources theories, practices and systems is having an impact on managerial work.

Table 2 is my summary of aspects of change and continuity in the interpretation of professionalism as an occupational value in NPM public service professions which goes beyond the ideal-types of organizational and occupational professionalism. The table is a simplification of what is, in fact, a highly complex, variable and changing situation. Professional occupations are different both within and between nation-states and other contexts are constantly changing as new nation-states and European policies emerge, develop, and are adapted and modified in practice and in local workplaces. When used with care and due caution however, this list might enable an assessment of the prominence of change or continuity of professionalism in different occupations and work places.

It is necessary to repeat again that these changes and continuities include both structural and relationship aspects and characteristics; importantly, the changes are more structural while the continuities tend to be relational. The contexts for different occupations and professions are also complex, diverse and variable both within and between different nation-states in Europe and North America. In addition, these changes and continuities have been identified and illustrated at macro- and mezo-levels of analysis but there might also be significant micro variations in different work places and local organizational contexts, for instance in social work (Liljegren, 2007).

References


