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The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly

 

Notice

Type:   Working paper
 
Titre:   The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly
 
Auteur(s):   Mondello, Gérard - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (Auteur)
Salies, Evens - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Auteur)
 
Date de publication:   2018-03
 
Éditeur:   Université Côte d'Azur
 
Collection:   GREDEG Working paper  :  14
 
Mots-clés:   [en] Tort Law, Strict liability, Negligence Rule, Imperfect competition, Oligopoly, Cournot competition
 
JEL:   D43,  L13,  L52,  K13
 
Résumé:   [en] Summary: This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge. Key Words: Tort Law, Strict
 
URL:   http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2018-14.pdf
 
 

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Version de l'éditeur 2018-14-the-unilateral-accident-model-gmondello.pdf.pdf 0,63 MB