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A Signaling Theory of Nonmonetary Sanctions



Type:   Article
Titre:   A Signaling Theory of Nonmonetary Sanctions
Auteur(s):   D'Antoni, Massimo - Dipartimento di Economia Politica, University of Siena, Italy (Auteur)
Galbiati, Roberto (1977-...) (Auteur)
In:   International Review of Law and Economics
Date de publication:   2007
Éditeur:   ÉTATS-UNIS  :  Elsevier
Volume:   27
Pages:   204-218  p.
ISSN:   01448188
DOI:   10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.008
Mots-clés:   [en] Optimal deterrence, Nonmonetary sanctions
JEL:   K42
Résumé:   [en] It is a widely accepted conclusion of the economic literature on optimal law enforcement that nonmonetary sanctions should be introduced only when fines have been used up to their maximum extent. In this paper it is shown that when the sanctioning policy conveys information about the harmfulness of the sanctioned behavior, the use of nonmonetary sanctions can be optimal even when the monetary fine is not maximal. The argument is formalized in a model with rational but uninformed individuals, who know that the enforcer has better information about the harmfulness of actions but are uncertain about the true objectives of the enforcer.


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