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Sanctions that signal: An experiment

 

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Type:   Article
 
Titre:   Sanctions that signal: An experiment
 
Auteur(s):   Galbiati, Roberto (1977-...) - Département d'économie (Auteur)
Schlag, Karl H. - University of Vienna (Auteur)
Van Der Weele, Joël J (Auteur)
 
In:   Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
 
Date de publication:   2013
 
Éditeur:   PAYS-BAS  :  Elsevier
 
Volume:   94
 
Pages:   34-51  p.
 
ISSN:   01672681
 
DOI:   10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002
 
Mots-clés:   [en] Sanctions, Beliefs, Expressive law, Deterrence, Coordination, Minimum-effort-game
 
JEL:   C92,  D23,  K42
 
Résumé:   [en] The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.
 
 

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