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Runner-up patents: is monopoly inevitable?

 

Notice

Type:   Article
 
Titre:   Runner-up patents: is monopoly inevitable?
 
Auteur(s):   Henry, Emeric (1976-...) - Département d'économie (Auteur)
 
In:   The Scandinavian journal of economics
 
Date de publication:   2010
 
Éditeur:   SUÈDE  :  Almqvist & Wiksell
 
ISSN:   03470520
 
Résumé:   [en] Exclusive patents sacrifice product competition to provide firms incentives to innovate. We characterize an alternative mechanism whereby later inventors are allowed to share the patent if they discover within a certain time period of the first inventor. These runner-up patents increase social welfare under very general conditions. Furthermore, we show that the time window during which later inventors can share the patent should become a new policy tool at the disposal of the designer. This instrument will be used in a socially optimal mix with the breadth and length of the patent and could allow sorting between more or less efficient firms.
 
 

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