The article examines the evolution of Russia’s soft power strategy over the past twenty years. The author analyzes the goals the Russian leadership set when starting this work, and shows that those goals were not limited to improving the Russian image on the world stage. The following periodization of Russia’s soft power evolution is proposed: the rise (2000-2007/2008), institution-alization (2007/2008-2013/2014), and tightening (2013/2014-till present). The article explores how Russian soft power changed during these periods: what tools were used, what role formal and informal institutions played, and what ideas and values were used as a foreign policy narra-tive. The analysis of the evolution of the Russian strategy allows us to correlate different stages of its development with Joseph Nye’s concept, as well as to show the intermediate and final re-sults of its implementation.

Putin’s Russia has evolved towards greater assertion in world politics, including the use of military means in Europe and the Middle East. The chapter explains the key reorientations of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century by delving into the geopolitical thinking that has been influential in the Russian course. Four main geopolitical theories have been dominating in the Kremlin’s views since the 2000s: Eurasianism, Isolationism, Exceptionalism and the Westerners’ approach. Taking into consideration these four main geopolitical streams and the fact that they have all emerged in past historical contexts, our chapter aims at explaining their reformulation today and how they interplay among themselves. At the bottom line, we expose the renewed significance of the Eurasian vision and scale for Russia and how it contributes to explain the “turn to the East”, initialed in 2008, in detriment of relations with Europe. Common to the four the geopolitical discourses is the question whether Russia is European or a different entity and a reflection about Russian isolation. The incorporation of these views in the Kremlin’s choices point to further estrangement from cooperation with Europe, and leave the way open for different modes of engagement towards the East at large.

Justice is one of the central and most frequently mentioned concepts of Russia’s foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st century.

The XXIst century is witnessing a historically unprecedented approximation between Russia and China. In 1997, both countries initialled a strategic cooperation, turning Moscow into the first third party to sign such a document with Beijing. In 2001, bilateral cooperation was officially reinforced with the “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation”. Additionally, Russia’s foreign policy has been operating a turn towards the East since 2008, in the face of deteriorated relations with Europe and contestation of the US-led liberal order. This chapters aims to analyse the Russian perspective on the greater involvement of China in the Eurasian space, namely under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We argue that, despite a rhetoric of cooperation and peaceful relations, competition is operating in several areas. The analysis unpacks dynamics in the economic, military, political/diplomatic and cultural domains.

Après l’effondrement de l’Union soviétique, les pays baltes représentent un espace complexe pour la diplomatie russe. La coopération demeure plombée par un passé commun, perçu différemment par les anciens membres de l’Union. La Russie actuelle utilise l’héritage soviétique à la fois comme un moyen de pression et comme un instrument d’« influence douce » sur ses partenaires baltes.