Co-auteur
  • ROZENBERG Olivier (6)
  • CORON Gaël (5)
  • DEL SOL Marion (3)
  • GORRY Philippe (3)
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Type de Document
  • Article (19)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (13)
  • Compte-rendu d’ouvrage (11)
  • Livre (3)
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Independent regulatory agency has become the standard institutional choice in Western Europe. Little is known, however, about the involvement of legislators in their design and in their monitoring. In this paper, we analyse ex-ante and ex-post legislative involvement for 48 regulatory agencies enacted in France. We show that legislators debate and design more substantially agencies for which the government bill has already granted them more powers to appoint members to their board, or to be appointed as board members themselves. Once enacted, agencies that allow greater participation by legislators in their decision-making are subject to greater scrutiny, and this even after controlling for routine oversight activities. Regulatory domains matter, though only for ex-post legislative oversight. These results suggest that legislative involvement is selective and driven by strategic considerations. More fundamentally, they imply that legislative involvement could be more important in regulatory agency activities than usually assumed.

L’article apporte un éclairage sur quatre modalités d’intégration de résultats qualitatifs et quantitatifs en science politique. Elles sont appliquées à des configurations différentes, mais où le but est à chaque fois de répondre à une même question de recherche. Ces différentes approches sont illustrées à partir d’exemples tirés de la littérature en économique politique, portant respectivement sur la syndicalisation dans les démocraties capitalistes avancées, sur le vote économique, sur la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique et sur la régulation financière.

in International Journal of Parliamentary Studies Publié en 2021-05
BAR-SIMANN-TOV Ittai
WAISMEL-MANOR Israel
LEVANON Asaf
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This research note introduces two novel indexes designed to measure legislative activity (ParlAct) and use of digital devices to maintain legislative functions (ParlTech) during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. It will also present a novel comprehensive dataset on the functioning of legislatures during a critical period of the pandemic, providing scores for 152 domestic legislatures on both the ParlAct and ParlTech indexes. It will be argued that both indexes could also serve as templates for future research on legislative activity during other pandemics, crises and contingencies.

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1ères lignes : Au sein de la littérature consacrée à l’analyse des relations entre pouvoirs politiques, administration et intérêts privés, l’Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a longtemps constitué un important cas d’étude . Pour le lecteur familier de ce vaste domaine de recherche, l’évocation de cette agence en charge de la protection environnementale aux ÉtatsUnis (intervenant dans de nombreux domaines allant de la pollution atmosphérique à l’usage des pesticides, en passant par la réglementation sur les substances toxiques ou l’eau potable) rappellera sans doute le débat qui avait opposé Dan Cook et Brian Wood dans l’American Political Science Review à la fin des années 1980 : alors que le premier voyait dans l’EPA le prototype d’une bureaucratie constamment ballotée entre l’influence de la présidence et celle du Congrès, le second soutenait au contraire que les « ressources » de l’agence et le « zèle » de ses membres lui conféraient une autonomie lui permettant d’ignorer, voire de déjouer, les coalitions d’intérêts défendus par les acteurs politiques

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We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.

in Private Health Insurance and the European Union Sous la direction de BENOÎT Cyril, DEL SOL Marion, MARTIN Philippe Publié en 2021-01
DEL SOL Marion
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This publication has no abstract

in Private Health Insurance and the European Union Sous la direction de BENOÎT Cyril, DEL SOL Marion, MARTIN Philippe Publié en 2021-01
DEL SOL Marion
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This publication has no abstract

in Private Health Insurance and the European Union Sous la direction de BENOÎT Cyril, DEL SOL Marion, MARTIN Philippe Publié en 2021-01
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This publication has no abstract

Sous la direction de BENOÎT Cyril, DEL SOL Marion, MARTIN Philippe Publié en 2021-01
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Research has paid little attention to date on how European Union law and regulation affect both the public-private mix in healthcare and the organization of private health insurance as an industry. Filling this gap, this collective book provides insights on the political economy of EU insurance regulation, its impact on private health insurers and on its interactions with domestic healthcare policy-making in four countries. Assembling original contributions drafted by a multidisciplinary team, Private Health Insurance and the European Union offers a thorough examination of a largely unrecognized source of EU influence in healthcare – and sheds a new light on the role played by private actors in social policy.

in Private Health Insurance and the European Union Sous la direction de BENOÎT Cyril, DEL SOL Marion, MARTIN Philippe Publié en 2021-01
CORON Gaël
HOUSSOY Thomas
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