Co-auteur
  • DRAGO Francesco (10)
  • HENRY Emeric (6)
  • VERTOVA Pietro (5)
  • PHILIPPE Arnaud (5)
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Type de Document
  • Article (20)
  • Working paper (9)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (3)
  • Communication dans des actes de colloque publiés (1)
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This policy brief discusses how voters respond to public policies with a particular focus on crime control policies. We present the main methodological issues that the researcher faces to disentangle the response of voters to the consequences of policies from the other factors. We present the results of a study of the consequences of the 2006 Italian collective pardon. Using randomness in local variation in recidivism rates we show that Italian voters held the incumbent government responsible for local variations in recidivism caused by the collective pardon. We conclude by discussing the consequences for the evaluation of the electoral response to public policies.

in Journal of the European Economic Association Publié en 2019-08
DRAGO Francesco
SOBBRIO Francesco
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This study analyses voters' response to criminal justice policies by exploiting a natural experiment. The 2006 Italian Collective Pardon Bill, designed and promoted by the incumbent center-left (CL) coalition, unexpectedly released about one-third of the prison population, creating idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across pardoned individuals. Municipalities where resident pardoned individuals had a higher incentive to recidivate experienced a higher recidivism rate. We show that in those municipalities voters "punished'' the CL coalition in the 2008 parliamentary elections. A one standard deviation increase in the incentive to recidivate-corresponding to an increase of recidivism of 15.9 percent-led to a 3.06 percent increase in the margin of victory of the center-right (CR) coalition in the post-pardon national elections (2008) relative to the last election before the pardon (2006). We also provide evidence of newspapers being more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals and of voters hardening their views on the incumbent national government's ability to control crime. Our findings indicate that voters keep politicians accountable by conditioning their vote on the observed effects of public policies.

Publié en 2019-04 Collection Sciences Po LIEPP Working paper : 88
ABRAMS David
PHILIPPE Arnaud
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In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina’s unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture.

Publié en 2019-04 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-06
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How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group’s value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate, may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not.

Publié en 2019-03 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-04
ABRAMS David
PHILIPPE Arnaud
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In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina’s unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture.

in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) Publié en 2018-11
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In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a laboratory experiment, that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: (i) Past fines affect directly individuals’ future propensity to cooperate, and (ii) when fines for noncooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer toward others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first one, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies.

Directeur de la thèse GALBIATI Roberto Publié en 2018-09
AJZENMAN Nicolas
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Cette thèse est composée de trois essais qui contribuent à la littérature sur la politique économie des pays en développement. Le premier chapitre se penche sur les déterminants de la malhonnêteté attitudes et explore le rôle de l'exemple corrompu des dirigeants politiques dans le façonnement du comportement civique des citoyens. Le deuxième chapitre analyse les effets distributifs du crime organisé lié à la drogue au Mexique en termes d'impact sur les prix des logements. Le troisième chapitre étudie les sanctions électorales exercées par les électeurs exposés à des services publics de mauvaise qualité. En particulier, il montre comment les citoyens assignés au hasard dans les écoles publiques avec une infrastructure déficiente punissent le politicien responsable en réduisant sa part de vote.

in COGITO, la lettre de la recherche à Sciences Po Publié en 2017-02
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Quels sont les impacts d’une crise économique sur le niveau de criminalité ? C’est à cette question classique mais jamais vraiment résolue que Roberto Galbiati– chercheur au Département d’économie – , Vincent Bignon et Eve Caroli essaient d’élucider dans leur article “Stealing to Survive? Crime and Income Shocks in Nineteenth Century France” (“Voler pour survivre? Crime et chocs de revenu en France au XIXe Siècle”) à paraître dans The Economic Journal.

in Migrants, migrations Sous la direction de THIOLLET Hélène Publié en 2016-09
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L’espace Schengen est-il une passoire ? Y-a-t-il de plus en plus de migrants ? L’ouverture des frontières crée-t-elle un appel d’air pour l’immigration ? La population européenne va-t-elle être remplacée ? Le modèle d’intégration français marche-t-il ? Les jeunes issus de l’immigration sont-ils moins patriotes que les autres ? L’immigration crée-t-elle du chômage ? L’immigration coûte-t-elle chère ? La crise qui touche l’Europe depuis 2015 a radicalisé les positions politiques et les discours sur les migrations, l’asile et l’immigration… Pour ne plus se contenter des idées reçues, les auteurs dissipent les malentendus et répondent aux 50 questions essentielles. Autour d’Hélène Thiollet, des scientifiques, spécialistes des migrations et venus de disciplines différentes – économistes, sociologues, démographes, anthropologues, politistes, historiens, géographes – proposent des données fiables et des éléments d’interprétation des controverses scientifiques à partir desquelles chacun pourra se faire une opinion.

in The Quarterly journal of economics Sous la direction de HARVARD UNIVERSITY Publié en 2016-07
BELLOC Marianna
DRAGO Francesco
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This article presents a unique historical experiment to explore the dynamics of institutional change in the Middle Ages. We have assembled a novel data set, where information on political institutions for northern central Italian cities between 1000 and 1300 is matched with detailed information on the earthquakes that occurred in the area and period of interest. Exploiting the panel structure of the data, we document that the occurrence of an earthquake retarded institutional transition from autocratic regimes to self-government (the commune) in cities where the political and the religious leaders were the same person (episcopal see cities), but not in cities where political and religious powers were distinct (non–episcopal see cities). Such differential effect holds for destructive seismic episodes and for events that were felt by the population but did not cause any material damage to persons or objects. Ancillary results show that seismic events provoked a positive and statistically significant differential effect on the construction and further ornamentation of religious buildings between episcopal and non–episcopal see cities. Our findings are consistent with the idea that earthquakes, interpreted in the Middle Ages as manifestation of the will and outrage of God, represented a shock to people’s religious beliefs and, as a consequence, enhanced the ability of political-religious leaders to restore social order after a crisis relative to the emerging communal institutions. This interpretation is supported by historical evidence. [Abstract's publisher]

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