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  • CAMPANTE Filipe (10)
  • GUIMARAES Bernardo (5)
  • NGUYEN Bang Dang (5)
  • NGUYEN Kieu-Trang (4)
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Document Type
  • Working paper (19)
  • Article (6)
  • Doctoral (Phd) thesis (1)
Publication date 2020-12 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2020-08
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This paper studies discrimination in financial markets in the context of the “Dreyfus Affair” in 19th century France. We analyze the market performance of firms with Jewish board members during this historical episode. Building on empirical evidence and a model with antisemitic and unbiased agents, we show how investors betting on firms with Jewish connections earned higher returns during the media campaign organized to rehabilitate Dreyfus, the unfairly accused Jewish officer at the center of the Affair. Our paper provides novel evidence that discrimination can affect stock prices and create rents for some market participants. While these rents may attract betting against discriminators, the uncertainty surrounding discriminatory beliefs can limit the extent of arbitrage and allow discrimination to survive in the long run.

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Cette thèse regroupe trois essais dans les domaines de l’économie politique et du développement économique. Le premier chapitre étudie l'impact des administrateurs coloniaux en Afrique Occidentale Française sur la persistance des conflits au sein des pays et présente une analyse du lien entre la personnalité des premiers administrateurs et l'hostilité envers l'État. Les résultats présentés dans ce chapitre montrent que les premiers administrateurs coloniaux ont eu un effet persistant sur les conflits politiques. Le deuxième chapitre propose une évaluation des liens entre la distance aux capitales, la démocratie, la représentation politique des femmes et l'accès aux services de santé en Afrique Subsaharienne. Ce chapitre montre que la distance de la capitale à un effet négatif sur l’accès aux services de santé maternelle et infantile dans les pays moins démocratiques, mais pas dans les pays où les institutions démocratiques sont plus fortes. Dans les États moins démocratiques, augmenter le taux de femmes politiques au sein des assemblées nationales est aussi associé avec une couverture géographique des services de santé plus équitable. Le troisième chapitre porte sur les marchés informels dans le secteur de la santé et présente une évaluation des paiements informels dans les établissements publics de santé au Viet Nam. Ces paiements informels sont plus fréquents dans les provinces où les investissements en santé publique sont moins élevés. Ce chapitre montre que ces paiements ne sont pas associés avec une meilleure qualité de soins rapporté par les patients, et suggère plutôt qu’ils sont effectués en réponse à la mauvaise qualité des services disponibles.

in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Publication date 2019-07
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
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We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

Publication date 2019-06 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : DP13771
DALVIT Nicolò
LE CHAPELAIN Alexis
ZENOU Yves
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We study how friendship shapes students' political opinions in a natural experiment. We use the indicator whether two students were exogenously assigned to a short-term "integration group", unrelated to scholar activities and dissolved before the school year, as instrumental variable for their friendship, to estimate the effect of friendship on pairwise political opinion outcomes in dyadic regressions. After six months, friendship causes a reduction of differences in opinions by one quarter of the mean difference. It likely works through a homophily-enforced mechanism, by which friendship causes politically-similar students to join political associations together, which reinforces their political similarity. The effect is strong among initially similar pairs, but absent in dissimilar pairs. Friendship affects opinion gaps by reducing divergence, therefore polarization and extremism, without forcing individuals' views to converge. Network characteristics also matter to the friendship effect.

Publication date 2019-06 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : 13771
DALVIT Nicolò
LE CHAPELAIN Alexis
ZENOU Yves
2
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We study how social interaction and friendship shape students' political opinions in a natural experiment at Sciences Po, the cradle of top French politicians. We exploit arbitrary assignments of students into short-term integration groups before their scholar cursus, and use the pairwise indicator of same-group membership as instrumental variable for friendship. After six months, friendship causes a reduction of differences in opinions by one third of the standard deviation of opinion gap. The evidence is consistent with a homophily-enforced mechanism, by which friendship causes initially politically-similar students to join political associations together, which reinforces their political similarity, without exercising an effect on initially politically-dissimilar pairs. Friendship affects opinion gaps by reducing divergence, therefore polarization and extremism, without forcing individuals' views to converge. Network characteristics also matter to the friendship effect.

in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Publication date 2017-10
NGUYEN Kieu-Trang
TRAN Anh
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We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Publication date 2016-04 Collection LIEPP Working Paper : 52
LEE Yen-Teik
NGUYEN Bang Dang
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The external networks of directors significantly impact firm value and decisions. Surrounding close gubernatorial elections, local firms with directors connected to winners increase value by 4.1% over firms connected to losers. Director network’s value increases with network strength and activities, and is not due to network homophily. Connected firms are more likely to receive state subsidies, loans, and tax credits. They obtain better access to bank loans, borrow more, pay lower interest, invest and employ more, and enjoy better long-term performance. Network benefits are concentrated on connected firms, possibly through quid pro quo deals, and unlikely spread to industry competitors.

Publication date 2015-11 Collection LIEPP Working Paper : 39
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
128
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128
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We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence for two key predictions: (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The predictions hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries, and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory) – exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

44
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This paper shows how a public policy shapes convergence of beliefs through newly-formed social networks, with a focus on political opinion. We use a unique natural experiment that randomly assigns students into first-year groups at a French college that forms future top politicians. Pairs of students in the same group are much more likely to become friends. The randomized group membership serves as instrumental variable in a dyadic regression of differences in beliefs on friendship. We find that students’ political opinions converge particularly strongly between friends, reaching 11% of a standard deviation only after 6 months. Convergence is strongest among pairs least likely to become friends without the randomized exposure, or friends whose characteristics are the most different. While there is evidence of homophily in network formation, it does not seem to affect the estimates of convergence, except among very similar friends. The same strategy shows that a longer network distance implies slower convergence.

Publication date 2015-04 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : 10526
LEE Yen-Teik
NGUYEN Bang Dang
24
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Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms’ headquarters and operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser.

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