Co-auteur
  • CAMPANTE Filipe (10)
  • GUIMARAES Bernardo (5)
  • NGUYEN Bang Dang (5)
  • NGUYEN Kieu-Trang (4)
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Type de Document
  • Working paper (18)
  • Article (6)
Publié en 2020-08 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2020-08
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This paper studies discrimination in financial markets in the context of the “Dreyfus Affair” in 19th century France. The Affair originated from the wrongful conviction of a Jewish officer, Alfred Dreyfus, and revealed the depth of antisemitism in French society. We show that firms with Jewish board members experienced abnormal stock returns after several salient events of the Affair. However, in the long run, these firms experienced higher returns during the media campaign sparked by J’Accuse...!, a famous editorial that paved the way for Dreyfus’ rehabilitation. Our preferred interpretation is that media coverage of the Affair changed beliefs among antisemitic investors, allowing those who bet on Jewish-connected firms to capture excess returns through arbitrage. Our findings provide novel evidence on the existence of rents from discrimination and the economic impacts of antisemitism.

in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Publié en 2019-07
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
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We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

Publié en 2019-06 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : DP13771
LE CHAPELAIN Alexis
ZENOU Yves
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We study how friendship shapes students' political opinions in a natural experiment. We use the indicator whether two students were exogenously assigned to a short-term "integration group", unrelated to scholar activities and dissolved before the school year, as instrumental variable for their friendship, to estimate the effect of friendship on pairwise political opinion outcomes in dyadic regressions. After six months, friendship causes a reduction of differences in opinions by one quarter of the mean difference. It likely works through a homophily-enforced mechanism, by which friendship causes politically-similar students to join political associations together, which reinforces their political similarity. The effect is strong among initially similar pairs, but absent in dissimilar pairs. Friendship affects opinion gaps by reducing divergence, therefore polarization and extremism, without forcing individuals' views to converge. Network characteristics also matter to the friendship effect.

in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Publié en 2017-10
NGUYEN Kieu-Trang
TRAN Anh
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We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

Publié en 2016-04 Collection LIEPP Working Paper : 52
LEE Yen-Teik
NGUYEN Bang Dang
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The external networks of directors significantly impact firm value and decisions. Surrounding close gubernatorial elections, local firms with directors connected to winners increase value by 4.1% over firms connected to losers. Director network’s value increases with network strength and activities, and is not due to network homophily. Connected firms are more likely to receive state subsidies, loans, and tax credits. They obtain better access to bank loans, borrow more, pay lower interest, invest and employ more, and enjoy better long-term performance. Network benefits are concentrated on connected firms, possibly through quid pro quo deals, and unlikely spread to industry competitors.

Publié en 2015-11 Collection LIEPP Working Paper : 39
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
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We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence for two key predictions: (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The predictions hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries, and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory) – exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

This paper shows how a public policy shapes convergence of beliefs through newly-formed social networks, with a focus on political opinion. We use a unique natural experiment that randomly assigns students into first-year groups at a French college that forms future top politicians. Pairs of students in the same group are much more likely to become friends. The randomized group membership serves as instrumental variable in a dyadic regression of differences in beliefs on friendship. We find that students’ political opinions converge particularly strongly between friends, reaching 11% of a standard deviation only after 6 months. Convergence is strongest among pairs least likely to become friends without the randomized exposure, or friends whose characteristics are the most different. While there is evidence of homophily in network formation, it does not seem to affect the estimates of convergence, except among very similar friends. The same strategy shows that a longer network distance implies slower convergence.

Publié en 2015-04 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : 10526
LEE Yen-Teik
NGUYEN Bang Dang
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Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms’ headquarters and operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser.

Publié en 2014-10 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2014-13
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
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We investigate the links between capital cities, conict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that this threat is rendered less e_ective by distance from the seat of political power. We develop a model that delivers two key predictions: (i) conict is more likely to emerge (and to dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capital cities are associated with misgovernance. We show evidence that both patterns hold true robustly in the data, as do other ancillary predictions from the model.

Publié en 2014-09
CAMPANTE Filipe
GUIMARAES Bernardo
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Motivated by a novel stylized fact - countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance - we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.

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