Coauthor
  • SATZ Debra (1)
  • CHIN Clayton (1)
  • POAMA Andrei (1)
  • VOLACU Alexandru (1)
Document Type
  • Article (27)
  • Part or chapter of a book (14)
  • Book (5)
  • Newspaper article (5)
  • Show more
in The Journal of Ethics Publication date 2011-06
0
views

0
downloads
This paper shows that the problem of treating people as equals in a world marked by deep-seated and, often, recalcitrant inequalities has implications for the way we approach the provision of security and justice. On the one hand, it means that racial profiling will generally be unjustified even when it might promote collective interests in security, on the other, it means that we should strive to create racially mixed juries, even in cases where defendant and alleged-victim are of the same race. The paper examines a recent report on race and jury trials in the United Kingdom and concludes that, despite the author’s claims that all-white juries are fair, the data shows the complex ways in which racial differences are translated into unjustified and arbitrary inequalities. Hence, it concludes, racially mixed juries are desirable, and sometimes necessary for justice, though probably not sufficient.

in Notre Dame Philosophical Review Publication date 2016-05-12
0
views

0
downloads
This brilliant and challenging book provides an overview and defence of 'luck egalitarianism', one that helpfully connects debates on luck egalitarianism to debates on what aspects of our lives egalitarians should try equalise (the 'equality of what?' debate/the debate on the 'metric' of equality) and on what respect, if any, it makes sense to see each other as equals. The book illuminates different conceptions of luck, as found in the philosophical literature, clarifies the difference between telic and deontic equality, and explains the 'levelling down' problem and the way that this affects luck egalitarians, and egalitarians more generally. For these reasons, the book provides a handy introduction to a range of philosophical debates about equality amongst analytic philosophers, whether or not one is particularly interested in luck egalitarianism. However, this is not an easy book to read, and while it is advertised as suitable for advanced undergraduates, I find it hard to imagine using it in any undergraduate course I have taught in the United States, England, France or Switzerland. But this is definitely a book that masters and doctoral students should be able to read by themselves and that will be helpful for teachers preparing classes on luck egalitarianism or on equality more generally. [First paragraph]

Liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin, insist that a just society must try to make sure that socio‐economic inequalities do not undercut the value of the vote, and of other political liberties. They insist on this not just for instrumental reasons, but because they assume that democratic forms of political participation can be desirable ends in themselves. However, compulsory voting laws seem to conflict with respect for reasonable differences of belief and value, essential to liberal egalitarians. Nor is it clear that such laws would actually achieve their intended purpose. Consequently, it is doubtful that there is a ‘liberal defence of compulsory voting’, as Lacroix, among others, maintains.

in Contemporary Political Theory Publication date 2006-05
0
views

0
downloads
This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. [First paragraph]

0
views

0
downloads
In the last issue of Public Policy Review Sarah Birch argued that Britain should make voting compulsory, and that the law should actively enforce legal duties to turnout at elections.1 She argues that ‘governments need to have democratic legitimacy to pull countries through difficult times’, and that low turnout threatens that legitimacy. Moreover, she claims, ‘economic stress exacerbates perceptions of social inequality’, and suggests that if alienated groups do not see Parliament as a means to improve their lot, they will turn to extra-parliamentary ways of doing so. [First paragraph]

in Public Reason Publication date 2009-03
4
views

0
downloads
Should voting be compulsory? Many people believe that it should, and that coun- tries, like Britain, which have never had compulsion, ought to adopt it. As is common with such things, the arguments are a mixture of principle and political calculation, reflecting the idea that compulsory voting is morally right and that it is likely to prove politically beneficial. This article casts a sceptical eye on both types of argument. It shows that compulsory voting is gen- erally unjustified although there are good reasons to worry about declining voter turnout in established democracies, and to worry about inequalities of turnout as well.

in Journal of Philosophy and Public Issues Publication date 2016
0
views

0
downloads
According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups’ claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens.1 This room for political choice, I believe, is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others. However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider’s intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. This article relates those worries to Brettschneider's distinction between coercion and persuasion and his claims about how we should draw the public/private distinction in the case of religion.

in La honte Sous la direction de LACROIX André, SARFATI Jean-Jacques Publication date 2014
0
views

0
downloads
L’association de la notion de vie privée à la honte explique en grande partie l’ambivalence qui entoure celle-ci . L’idée, tout particulièrement, que le droit à la vie privée n’a de valeur que si l’on a des secrets honteux à cacher donne l’impression que celle-ci n n’a aucune valeur si l’on tient à la liberté et à l’égalité des personnes. Au mieux, il semblerait que la vie privée seulement à préserver l’hypocrisie et les conventions sociales arbitraires qui nous rendraient – indûment honteux de nos sentiments, de nos désirs, de nos croyances, de nos idées et de nos expériences. Au pire, elle permettrait aux gens de cacher des comportements trompeurs, manipulateurs, coercitifs ou fondés sur l’exploitation, bref des comportements immoraux, voire illégaux. Dans les deux cas, il paraît difficile de saisir la valeur de la notion de vie privée si l’on a une prédilection pour un mode démocratique de gouvernement associé à la liberté d’expression, ainsi qu’à des idéaux de transparence et de promotion de la justification et de l’usage du pouvoir. Cet article vise à remettre en cause cette perception intuitive et consacrée de la vie privée en démontrant que le fait que cette dernière protège les gens de la honte constitue plutôt une raison importante de la valoriser si l’on se soucie de la démocratie. Comme on le verra bientôt, la notion de vie privée ne permet pas seulement de protéger ceux qui ont honte : il y a plusieurs formes d’expression parfaitement souhaitables, estimables et démocratiques qui requièrent, malgré tout, la confidentialité que permet le droit à la vie privée pour se développer et s’actualiser pleinement. Cela dit, il demeure important de ne pas confondre le honteux avec l’immoral, l’injuste avec l’illégal, ou encore de supposer que la protection du caractère privé d’actes honteux doit mettre en danger, plutôt que protéger, notre capacité à nous voir et à nous traiter comme des égaux. Commençons par examiner l’éthique de la révélation ou de l’« outing », c’est-à-dire de la publication forcée et sans consentement d’information personnelle délicate. On verra que, dans la majorité des cas, le souci démocratique pour la liberté et l’égalité rend problématique la prétention qu’une telle pratique puisse être justifiée, et ce, même lorsqu’elle est utilisée pour défendre une cause incontestablement juste qui promeut l’égalité civique et politique des citoyens. On explorera donc les enjeux d’une telle critique de la pratique de l’outing au regard des notions de vie privée et de liberté d’expression et de presse, avant de conclure avec quelques réflexions sur l’importance de la vie privée pour le mode démocratique de gouvernance.

in Political Ethics Sous la direction de CROOKSTON Emily, KILLOREN David, TRERISE Jonathan Publication date 2017
0
views

0
downloads
Must we vote for the common good? This isn’t an easy question to answer, in part because there is so little literature on the ethics of voting and, such as there is, it tends to assume without argument that we must vote for the common good. Indeed, contemporary political philosophers appear to agree that we should vote for the common good even when they disagree about seemingly related matters, such as whether we should be legally required to vote, whether we are entitled to vote secretly rather than openly, or what form of democracy is most morally desirable. Such agreement is puzzling, then, given the extensive disagreements that surround it. Hence, the aim of this paper is to consider whether the only morally correct way to vote is to vote for the common good. My hope is that even those who are not persuaded by the answers that I can offer at the moment, will find that the question is less easy to answer than they may have thought, and that the ethics of voting merits more sustained attention than it has received thus far.

0
views

0
downloads
Is forcing Catholic opponents of abortion to pay taxes for abortion coverage in health plans the same as forcing pacifists to fight? The answer, we’ll see is, is ‘no’, because of the nature of abortion, taxation, and democratic government. We will then examine the implications of these claims for the role of religious bodies in the provision of public services.

Next