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  • NADEAU Richard (11)
  • FRANÇOIS Abel (10)
  • LEWIS-BECK Michael S. (9)
  • BAUMGARTNER Frank (6)
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in Journal of European Public Policy Publication date 2017-03
DORAY-DEMERS Pascal
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Over the last 25 years, fiscal rules (FRs) have been proliferating in Europe bringing in-depth change to the architecture of fiscal institutions. This paper investigates different theories explaining the changes in national fiscal rules stringency (FRS) using a panel of 28 European countries from 1990 to 2013. The authors found evidence that fiscal stress prevents fiscal reform in the short term, and leads to stronger fiscal rules in the long term. This pattern corresponds to the ‘war of attrition’ argument formulated by Alesina and Drazen [(1989) ‘Why are stabilizations delayed?’, The American Economic Review 81(5): 1170–88]. The authors found evidence that countries eager to join the EU showed their commitment to Maastricht targets by incorporating FRs into national laws. Countries facing financial difficulties after the 2009 sovereign debt crisis were coerced into adopting more stringent FRs to obtain fiscal support from the EU. Both cases support the idea that coercive diplomacy might explain the strength of national fiscal rules in the EU.

in Le Monde Publication date 2017-04
COHEN Daniel
VERTIER Paul
SENIK Claudia, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
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Des chercheurs spécialistes de sociologie électorale démontrent que le choix des électeurs de Le Pen et de Macron dépend autant de leur optimisme (ou pessimisme) que de leur niveau de vie

in Journal of European Public Policy Publication date 2006
BAUMGARTNER Frank
FRANÇOIS Abel
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We use data on French budgeting to test models of friction, incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium. Data include the overall state budget since 1820; ministerial budgets for seven ministries since 1868; and a more complete ministerial series covering ten ministries since 1947. Our results in every case are remarkably similar to the highly leptokurtic distributions that Jones and Baumgartner (2005) demonstrated in US budgeting processes. This suggests that general characteristics of administrative processes create friction, and that these general factors are more important than particular details of organizational design. The legendary centralization and administrative strength of the French state, especially when compared to the decentralized separated powers structure of the US system, where the theory was developed, is apparently not sufficient to overcome cognitive pressures causing friction. Further, our French data cover a wide range of institutional procedures and constitutional regimes. The similarity of our findings across all these settings suggests that administrative structures alone are less important than the cognitive reasons discussed in the original model.

in European Security since the Fall of the Berlin Wall Sous la direction de FOUCAULT Martial, MÉRAND Frédéric, FOUCAULT Martial, IRONDELLE Bastien Publication date 2011
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in Revue politique et parlementaire Publication date 2016-04
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Pour plusieurs universitaires, dont le directeur du Cevipof, Martial Foucault, la colère, la peur ou l'enthousiasme jouent un rôle déterminant et sous-évalué dans le processus électoral

Publication date 2012-06
CALDEIRA Emilie
ROTA-GRAZIOSI Grégoire
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Decentralization has been put forward as a powerful tool to reduce poverty and improve governance in Africa. The aim of this paper is to study the existence, and identify the nature, of spillovers resulting from local expenditure policies. These spillovers impact the efficiency of decentralization. We develop a two-jurisdiction model of public expenditure, which differs from existing literature by capturing the extreme poverty of some local governments in developing countries through a generalized notion of the Nash equilibrium, namely, the constrained Nash equilibrium. We show how and under which conditions spillovers among jurisdictions induce strategic behaviours from local officials. By estimating a spatial lag model for a panel data analysis of the 77 communes in Benin from 2002 to 2008, our empirical analysis establishes the existence of the strategic complementarity of jurisdictions' public spending. Thus, any increase in the local public provision in one jurisdiction should induce a similar variation among the neighbouring jurisdictions. This result raises the issue of coordination among local governments, and more broadly, it questions the effeciency of decentralisation in developing countries in line with Oates' theorem.

in British Journal of Political Science Publication date 2013-07
LEWIS-BECK Michael S.
NADEAU Richard
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Almost all the prolific work done on economic voting has been based on the classic reward–punishment model, which treats the economy as a valence issue. The economy is a valence issue, but it is much more than that. This article explores two other dimensions of economic voting – position and patrimony. Investigating a 2010 British survey containing relevant measures on these three dimensions, the authors estimate their impact on vote intention, using a carefully specified system of equations. According to the evidence reported, each dimension of economic voting has its own independent effect. Moreover, together, they reveal a ‘compleat’ economic voter, who wields considerable power over electoral choice in Britain. This new result confirms and extends recent work on American and French elections.

Publication date 2017-07
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Avec le discours de politique générale et l’ouverture, lundi 17 juillet, de la Conférence nationale des territoires, la réforme fiscale trouve toute son actualité. Edouard Philippe parle d’un « souffle fiscal » avec comme principales mesures : la baisse des prélèvements obligatoires ; l’exonération de la taxe d’habitation à 80% des contribuables ; le remplacement de l’Impôt de solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF) par l’Impôt sur la fortune immobilière (IFI) et l’introduction d’un Prélèvement forfaitaire unique (PFU) taxant les revenus mobiliers (intérêts, loyers, dividendes, etc.). L’objectif premier est de rabaisser le déficit public à 3% du PIB (Produit intérieur brut) conformément aux critères européens. Dès lors, un effort de réduction des dépenses publiques sera nécessaire. Il commencera avec les collectivités territoriales où le gouvernement ambitionne de faire 13 milliards d’économies sur 5 ans. Emmanuel Macron avait, au cours de sa campagne, envisagé également la suppression de 70 000 postes dans la fonction publique. Cependant, des voix s’élèvent contre cette réforme fiscale qui bénéficierait majoritairement au 10% des ménages les plus riches. Alors, peut-on craindre une régression en termes de justice sociale ? Nous recevons Martial Foucault, professeur des universités et directeur du CEVIPOF et Philippe Laurent, Maire de Sceaux.

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