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  • BROUSSEAU Eric (9)
  • SCHEMEIL Yves (4)
  • ZLOTOWSKI Yves (4)
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in La Lettre du CEPII Publié en 2000-03
SGARD Jérôme
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Le défaut sur la dette extérieure et la dollarisation de l’Equateur sont les symptômes d’une grave crise politique et économique. Ces événements, affectant un petit pays, restent d’une portée internationale limitée. Toutefois, l'insolvabilité équatorienne adresse aux artisans de la nouvelle architecture financière internationale des questions fondamentales, différentes de celles posées par les crises de liquidités mexicaine ou asiatiques. La faillite d'un Etat n'est pas un problème nouveau, mais le développement de la finance désintermédiée réclame des solutions inédites. Comment parvenir à coordonner les créanciers privés ? Comment, ensuite, partager le fardeau des pertes entre les créanciers, privés et publics ? Les réponses butent aujourd'hui sur le statut des créances. L’évolution de ce statut permettrait à la fois de maintenir l'accès des petits pays aux marchés et de prévenir les situations d'aléa moral pour les pays "systémiquement importants" qui bénéficient de l'intervention d'un prêteur en dernier ressort (...).

Rather than evolving as a platform for renegotiation and debt discharge, as on the Continent, English bankruptcy emerged as a liquidation-only procedure after majority arrangements among creditors were banned in 1621. Over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the courts then developed an alternate, private-law set of rules on the basis of the old English trust and the Composition agreement, which belonged of the medieval cross-European Law Merchant. The main advantage of this little-known institution was its perpetual character and the flexibility of its governance, and its main drawback was obviously the requirement of voluntary initial adhesion. Symmetrically, under the Continental model, collective action was easier to obtain but it did not extend beyond the doors of the court. The discussion brings forward two further themes: the symmetry between adjudication and voluntary adhesion to a collective contract; and the capacity of judges to invent new legal concepts out of diverse set of existing rules, rather than through the simple, bottom-up approach usually emphasised by the literature on the Common Law tradition.

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Between 1982 and 1989, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acted as a third-party in a total of 109 debt restructurings between 41 debtor states and their creditor banks. At the core of these restructurings was the old Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), ie the standard IMF instrument for conditional lending to member-countries. The SBA was thus transformed into a three-way, voluntary arrangement that de facto rested on a rule of mutual veto. This self-sustained, though largely ad hoc procedure depended on the systematic ignoring of all hard-law or contract-based rules that could have shaped the debt restructurings. This article analyses: (i) how this regime emerged through trial and error during the 1970s; and (ii) how it was implemented, accounted for and justified after the 1982 Mexican crisis.

Les échanges de liquidités entre banques centrales ont constitué une réponse pragmatique à la crise financière. En contournant le FMI et les règles du jeu multilatéral, ces pratiques pourraient mettre en péril la cohésion des dispositifs de régulation économique internationale.

Sous la direction de MALLARD Grégoire, SGARD Jérôme Publié en 2016-06
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Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets, edited by Grégoire Mallard and Jérôme Sgard, extends the scholarship of law and globalization in two important directions. First, it provides a unique genealogy of global economic governance by explaining the transition from English law to one where global exchanges are primarily governed by international, multilateral, and finally, transnational legal orders. Second, rather than focusing on macro-political organizations, like the League of Nations or the International Monetary Fund, the book examines elements of contracts, including how and by whom they were designed and exactly who (experts, courts, arbitrators, and international organizations) interpreted, upheld, and established the legal validity of these contracts. By exploring such micro-level aspects of market exchanges, this collection unveils the contractual knowledge that led to the globalization of markets over the last century.

in Contractual Knowledge. One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets Sous la direction de SGARD Jérôme, MALLARD Grégoire, SGARD Jérôme Publié en 2016-06
MALLARD Grégoire
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The word contract carries different weight in different contexts. Bankers and politicians, diplomats and economists, lawyers and judges all have complex understandings of what a contract is and what it means for them. In the recent sovereign debt negotiations with the Euro group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the newly elected radical left government of Alexis Tsipras asked their European peers to substitute for the previous “program” of structural reforms a new “contract” – a “social contract” – between the Greek government and its creditors (Quatremer 2015). The Greek leaders also inscribed their negotiation in a longer temporality than their European counterparts: arguing for a partial cancellation of the debt that Greece owed to Germany, Tsipras (2015) reminded his fellow Europeans that Germany had itself failed to compensate Greece for the costs of reconstruction after World War II (WWII) – including money directly borrowed by Germany from Greece during the war. This proposal was not at all what the European leaders expected to hear: for them, the only “contracts” in play were those of Greece's debt and related agreements with the European Union (EU) and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) entered into as part of a stabilization program...

in Harvard International Law Journal Publié en 2019-06
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Daniela Caruso asks whether private law concepts may be instrumental in defending the interests of aggrieved thirdparties to Regional Trade Agreements, or whether the former are doomed to remain ignored “non-parties.” This comment builds on her arguments and extends the discussion to the case of sovereign debts and IMF conditionality, where the parties also tend to act as “monadic,” realist, international agents. The hypothesis that emerges is pessimistic: in the absence of a developed jurisdictional order—a form of constitutionalization— third-parties and their interests are as difficult to identify as the broader public space where they should belong.

A New York, dans les heures qui ont suivi les attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001, les principales banques centrales du monde ont annoncé une mesure inédite, à bien des égards révolutionnaire mais qui, dans la confusion du moment, est passée entièrement inaperçue. Ces banques allaient échanger immédiatement entre elles des lignes de crédits libellées dans leurs monnaies respectives : la BCE allait ainsi recevoir des dizaines de milliards de dollars émis par la Réserve Fédérale américaine (Fed), en échange d’euros qu’elle livrerait à la banque centrale américaine (...).

in Economic History Review Publié en 2017-05
BEUVE Jean
BROUSSEAU Eric
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French mercantilism is generally associated with absolutist policy-making subject to capture by rent-seeking interests. This article investigates how the Bureau du Commerce, a small state agency in charge of commerce and the supply side, handed out rents and privileges to private entrepreneurs. We coded how the Bureau investigated and decided all 267 voluntary submissions received between 1724 and 1744. It is shown that the Bureau’s formal, rule-based decision-making process could actually differentiate between alternate policy aims and target them consistently over time, with more or less powerful sets of rents. From this, a hierarchy of revealed policy preferences is derived. First comes technical innovation and diffusion, then local economic development; import substitution is only in the third position, followed by consumers’ welfare. Lastly, and in contrast to a long line of authors, it is shown that the production of luxury goods was not a significant or valued objective.

in Critique internationale Publié en 2002-04
SGARD Jérôme
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La crise en Argentine est entrée dans une phase aiguë au début de 2002, à l’issue d’une maturation particulièrement longue. Contrai rement aux scénarios de rupture inattendue créant un choc international violent, comme lors de la crise russe de 1998, on a vu approcher le désastre de très loin. Et quand il est arrivé, l’effet de surprise a été nul et la contagion financière inexistante. Le paradoxe est assez étonnant. Depuis 1995, des dizaines de contributions savantes ont tenté de définir des « indicateurs avancés » ou des « tableaux de bord » permettant d’anticiper les crises financières; dans le même temps, le Fonds monétaire international menait un grand tapage pour que les pays menacés lui fournissent une information « prompte et transparente », qui laisserait le temps, face à une crise montante, de mettre en place une stratégie de containment. Or voilà qu’un des principaux pays émergents, un des modèles des années 1990, porteur d’une dette de près de 130 milliards de dollars, fait naufrage lentement pendant des mois, sinon des années, sans que personne ne réagisse (...).

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