Co-auteur
  • ROVENTINI Andrea (37)
  • GAFFARD Jean-Luc (16)
  • DOSI Giovanni (16)
  • GUERINI Mattia (13)
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Type de Document
  • Working paper (32)
  • Article (31)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (3)
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Publié en 2021 Collection Sciences Po OFCE Working Paper : 14/2021
DOSI Giovanni
LAMPERTI Francesco
MAZZUCATO Mariana
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We study the impact of alternative innovation policies on the short- and long-run performance of the economy, as well as on public finances, extending the Schumpeter meeting Keynes agent-based model (Dosi et al., 2010). In particular, we consider market-based innovation policies such as R&D subsidies to firms, tax discount on investment, and direct policies akin to the “Entrepreneurial State” (Mazzucato, 2013), involving the creation of public research oriented firms diffusing technologies along specific trajectories, and funding a Public Research Lab conducting basic research to achieve radical innovations that enlarge the technological opportunities of the economy. Simu- lation results show that all policies improve productivity and GDP growth, but the best outcomes are achieved by active discretionary State policies, which are also able to crowd-in private investment and have positive hysteresis effects on growth dynamics. For the same size of public resources allocated to market-based interventions, “Mission” innovation policies deliver significantly better aggregate performance if the government is patient enough and willing to bear the intrinsic risks related to innovative activities.

Publié en 2019-11
GUERINI Mattia
THI LUU Duc
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We propose a novel approach to investigate the synchronization of business cycles and we apply it to a Eurostat database of manufacturing industrial production time-series in the European Union (EU) over the 2000-2017 period. Our approach exploits Random Matrix Theory and extracts the latent information contained in a balanced panel data by cleaning it from possible spurious correlation. We employ this method to study the synchronization among different countries over time. Our empirical exercise tracks the evolution of the European synchronization patterns and identifies the emergence of synchronization clusters among different EU economies. We find that synchronization in the Euro Area increased during the first decade of the century and that it reached a peak during the Great Recession period. It then decreased in the aftermath of the crisis, reverting to the levels observable at the beginning of the 21st century. Second, we show that the asynchronous business cycle dynamics at the beginning of the century was structured along a East-West axis, with eastern European countries having a diverging business cycle dynamics with respect to their western partners. The recession brought about a structural transformation of business cycles co-movements in Europe. Nowadays the divide can be identified along the North vs. South axis. This recent surge in asynchronization might be harmful for the European Unio because it implies countries’ heterogeneous responses to common policies.

We develop a macroeconomic agent-based model to study how financial instability can emerge from the co-evolution of interbank and credit markets and the policy responses to mitigate its impact on the real economy. The model is populated by heterogenous firms, consumers, and banks that locally interact in dfferent markets. In particular, banks provide credit to firms according to a Basel II or III macro-prudential frameworks and manage their liquidity in the interbank market. The Central Bank performs monetary policy according to dfferent types of Taylor rules. We find that the model endogenously generates market freezes in the interbank market which interact with the financial accelerator possibly leading to firm bankruptcies, banking crises and the emergence of deep downturns. This requires the timely intervention of the Central Bank as a liquidity lender of last resort. Moreover, we find that the joint adoption of a three mandate Taylor rule tackling credit growth and the Basel III macro-prudential frame-work is the best policy mix to stabilize financial and real economic dynamics. However, as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio spurs financial instability by increasing the pro-cyclicality of banks’ liquid reserves, a new counter-cyclical liquidity buffer should be added to Basel III to improve its performance further. Finally, we find that the Central Bank can also dampen financial in- stability by employing a new unconventional monetarypolicy tool involving active management of the interest-rate corridor in the interbank market.

Avec une dette publique s'élevant à 132,1 % du PIB et une croissance négative de la productivité au cours des vingt dernières années, l'Italie semble prise au piège d'un endettement élevé et d'une faible croissance. Nous nous concentrons sur les facteurs à l'origine de ces deux fléaux en Italie, et examinons de quelle façon ils sont intimement liés : une croissance atone limite les marges de manœuvre budgétaires et sème le doute sur la viabilité de la dette publique ; la réduction de l'espace budgétaire et les règles budgétaires strictes pèsent à leur tour sur la croissance et les investissements publics. Dans la première partie, nous discutons des racines de l'explosion de la dette publique italienne, des tentatives de consolidation budgétaire du pays dans les années 1990 et au début des années 2000, et enfin des effets de la grande récession et de l'austérité budgétaire. Dans la deuxième partie, nous identifions les faiblesses structurelles de l'économie italienne. Nous soulignons notamment le biais de spécialisation vers les secteurs à faible technologie, le « nanisme » des entreprises italiennes, la mauvaise allocation des talents et des ressources, la fracture Nord-Sud et ses conséquences sur le marché du travail. Nous concluons par quelques recommandations politiques pour une relance de la croissance en Italie. Notre première proposition plaide pour des politiques industrielles favorisant l'accumulation des connaissances et l'apprentissage. La deuxième proposition prévoit une nouvelle règle d'or budgétaire européenne qui exclurait certains investissements publics spécifiques du calcul du solde primaire structurel. Notre troisième proposition porte sur la réglementation du marché du travail et préconise l'introduction d'un salaire minimum d'une part, et la facilitation des politiques de reconversion professionnelle d'autre part. Notre quatrième proposition souligne la nécessité de parachever l'Union bancaire et de résoudre le problème des prêts non performants afin d'améliorer la solidité du secteur bancaire italien. Enfin, nous concluons que le sort de l'Italie est inextricablement lié à celui de l'Europe et que l'Italie a besoin de davantage d'Europe pour échapper à son endettement élevé et à son faible taux de croissance.

Depuis 20 ans, l’Italie apparaît prisonnière d’une faible croissance, d’un endettement élevé et de faiblesses structurelles, exacerbées par la Grande récession de 2008. Ainsi, en 2018, le PIB par habitant en volume, corrigé des parités de pouvoir d’achat, atteint le même niveau qu’en 1999 (graphique 1). L’Italie est désormais devancée par l’Espagne ; elle est également le seul des quatre grands pays de la zone euro qui n’a pas retrouvé son niveau d’avant-crise. Dans un Policy brief intitulé « Italie : sortir du double piège de l’endettement élevé et de la faible croissance », après avoir étudié l’historique de l’endettement public, nous tentons de cerner les causes de la stagnation italienne, qui s’illustre également par la baisse de la productivité globale des facteurs (graphique 2). Le graphique 2 montre que cette productivité globale des facteurs en Italie a connu une baisse cumulée de 7,9 % au cours des 20 dernières années. Ceci contraste avec les gains d’efficacité enregistrés en France et en Allemagne, où la productivité a augmenté respectivement de 4,1 % et 7,9 %.

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With public debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP and negative productivity growth over the last twenty years, Italy appears to be stuck in a high-debt and low-growth trap. We focus on the causes of Italy's two main economic plights and discuss how they are intimately related: a slow growth limits the budgetary margins and casts doubts on public debt sustainability; the reduced fiscal space and the tight fiscal rules in turn weighs on growth and public investment. In the first part, we discuss the roots of the explosion of Italian public debt, the country's consolidation attempts in the 1990s and early 2000s and finally, the effects of the Great Recession and fiscal austerity. In the second part, we identify the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy. We notably emphasize the specialization bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation of talents and resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market consequences. We conclude with some policy recommendations for a revival of growth in Italy. Our first proposal calls for industrial policies which foster knowledge accumulation and firm learning. The second proposal envisages a new European fiscal golden rule which would remove specific public investments from the computation of structural primary balance. Our third proposal is instead related to labor market regulation, and advocates for the introduction of a minimum wage on the one hand, and the facilitation of retraining policies on the other hand. Our fourth proposal highlights the need to complete the banking union and to solve the issue of non-performing loans in order to improve the robustness of the Italian banking sector. Lastly, we conclude that Italy's fate is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy needs more rather than less Europe to escape its high-debt and low-growth trap

Publié en 2019-05 Collection Working paper de l'OFCE : 07/2019
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With its public debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP and its negative productivity growth over the last twenty years, Italy appears to be the sick man of the European Union. In this Policy brief, we focus on its two main plights: high public debt burden on the one hand, sluggish GDP and productivity growth on the other hand. Both issues are intimately related: a slow growth limits the budgetary margins and casts doubts on public debt sustainability; the reduced fiscal space in turn weighs on growth and public investment. The first part is dedicated to describing the history and causes of Italian public debt. A first phase, from the 1960s to the 1980s, was characterized by a positive but moderate growth of debt. A second phase saw the explosion of public debt, from 54% of GDP in 1980 to roughly 117% in 1994. The budget law of the Amato's government in 1992 initiated a third phase, marked by a significant fiscal consolidation effort, and the decrease of the public debt to GDP ratio. The Great Recession interrupted this consolidation era and a last phase began from 2008 on, when the public debt-to-GDP ratio consequently increased. In the second part, we review some of the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy. We notably emphasize the specialization bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation of talents and resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market consequences. We conclude with four policy recommendations for a revival of growth in Italy. Our first proposal is technical and proposes a new European fiscal golden rule which would remove specific public investments from the computation of structural primary balance. Our second and third proposals are related to the regulation of the labor market, with the introduction of a minimum wage on the one hand, and the facilitation of retraining policies on the other hand. Last, we call for a revival of industrial policies in order to foster knowledge accumulation and firm learning. Our view is that Italy's fate is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy needs more rather than less Europe.

in Regional Environmental Change Publié en 2019-03
LAMPERTI Francesco
MANDEL Antoine
SAPIO Alessandro
BALINT Tomas
KHORENZHENKO Igor
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Understanding the complex, dynamic, and non-linear relationships between human activities, the environment and the evolution of the climate is pivotal for policy design and requires appropriate tools. Despite the existence of different attempts to link the economy (or parts of it) to the evolution of the climate, results have often been disappointing and criticized. In this paper, we discuss the use of agent-based modeling for climate policy integrated assessment. First, we identify the main limitations of current mainstream models and stress how framing the problem from a complex system perspective might help, in particular when extreme climate conditions are at stake and general equilibrium effects are questionable. Second, we present two agent-based models that serve as prototypes for the analysis of coupled climate, energy, and macroeconomic dynamics. We argue that such models constitute examples of a promising approach for the integrated assessment of climate change and economic dynamics. They allow a bottom-up representation of climate damages and their cross-sectoral percolation, naturally embed distributional issues, and traditionally account for the role of finance in sustaining economic development and shaping the dynamics of energy transitions. All these issues are at the fore-front of the research in integrated assessment. Finally, we provide a careful discussion of testable policy exercises, modeling limitations, and open challenges for this stream of research. Notwithstanding great potential, there is a long way-to-go for agent-based models to catch-up with the richness of many existing integrated assessment models and overcome their major problems. This should encourage research in the area.

In this work we study the granular origins of business cycles and their possible underlying drivers. As shown by Gabaix (Econometrica 79:733–772, 2011), the skewed nature of firm size distributions implies that idiosyncratic (and independent) firm-level shocks may account for a significant portion of aggregate volatility. Yet, we question the original view grounded on “supply granularity”, as proxied by productivity growth shocks – in line with the Real Business Cycle framework–, and we provide empirical evidence of a “demand granularity”, based on investment growth shocks instead. The role of demand in explaining aggregate fluctuations is further corroborated by means of a macroeconomic Agent-Based Model of the “Schumpeter meeting Keynes” family Dosi et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 52:166–189, 2015). Indeed, the investigation of the possible microfoundation of RBC has led us to the identification of a sort of microfounded Keynesian multiplier.

in L'économie européenne 2019 Sous la direction de CREEL Jérôme Publié en 2019-02
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