Le rapport qui suit porte sur l’état de l’Union européenne en 2014, année décisive à bien des égards en raison d’échéances institutionnelles importantes : nouveau Parlement européen, nouvelle Commission européenne, remplacement du Président permanent du Conseil européen et du Haut Représentant pour la politique étrangère et la sécurité. Chaque intervenant, appuyé par les participants, a pointé les changements que la crise a pu apporter à l’Union européenne. Ce rapport met en évidence trois questions : - La forme de l’union politique qui permettra une nouvelle légitimation de l’Union européenne. La crise implique en effet une réflexion sur la relation entre les institutions communautaires et les Etats membres ; elle ouvre davantage la voie à la différenciation au sein du projet européen, voire pour le Royaume-Uni, à une renégociation de son statut de membre de l’Union. Indéniablement, le couple francoallemand continue à apparaître central au regard de l’union politique. - En lien avec l’union politique, figure en deuxième lieu le problème essentiel de l’avenir économique et social de l’Union européenne dans un contexte accru de mondialisation. - Enfin, la troisième question a trait à ce que l’Union européenne peut et doit faire dans le monde, en sachant que cette réflexion a précédé les évènements récents et, à bien des égards inquiétants, en Ukraine.

Differentiation is a principle that has applied to the polity and policies of the European Union since its creation. It has been reinforced in the last 20 years as a consequence both of successive enlargements and of a broadening of the EU policy agenda. The British renegotiation process and the UK referendum scheduled for 23 June 2016 constitute a further stage in the debate on differentiation. For the first time a ‘no’ vote in a national referendum could mean that disintegration rather than differentiation is the preferred choice for an EU member state...

Le texte propose tout d'abord une description du positionnement du Nordeste dans les inégalités nationales. Les États qui composent cette région présentent les indicateurs de pauvreté les plus élevés, les plus faibles niveaux de développement et les inégalités les plus importantes au sein du Brésil. La suite de l'article est consacrée à l'analyse du positionnement du Nordeste dans les rapports de pouvoir, les équilibres économiques nationaux, les circulations humaines et les imaginaires nationaux brésiliens. L'attention est portée, dans un premier temps, au processus de construction historique de la position périphérique de cette région, marquée, d'une part, par la force des oligarchies conservatrices et une riche histoire de mobilisations contestataires et d'autre part, par les politiques d'aménagement du territoire menées depuis la capitale fédérale. Dans un second temps sont abordées les continuités et transformations des rapports de domination propres à cette région, avec une mise au point sur les politiques actuelles de lutte contre la pauvreté et quelques éléments de débats sur la redéfinition participative des politiques de développement.

Le Ceriscope est une publication scientifique en ligne du Centre d’études et de recherches internationales (CERI) réalisée en partenariat avec l’Atelier de cartographie de Sciences Po. Parution dynamique centrée sur un enjeu international, elle sera consacrée chaque année à un sujet différent (2011 - Les Frontières ; 2012 - La Pauvreté). Les contributions mises en ligne seront actualisées et de nouvelles publications viendront les développer et les enrichir au fil du temps. Le Ceriscope s’inscrit dans la politique d’édition en ligne dans laquelle le CERI a choisi de s’investir. Sous la direction de Christian Lequesne, directeur du CERI, et Marie-Françoise Durand, responsable de l’Atelier de cartographie, il rassemble des chercheurs et des experts internationalement reconnus qui traitent des enjeux mondiaux et des questions internationales au sens large à partir des différents axes de recherches du CERI. Réalisation collective, le Ceriscope offre une analyse qui s’appuie sur de multiples supports : textes, cartes, graphiques, photographies, diaporamas... Il permet une navigation transversale par thème ou aire géographique (espaces) dans la lignée des problématiques traditionnelles du CERI mais également une recherche avancée par mots-clés, type de document et auteur.

Existe-t-il un lien systématique entre l'organisation du mécanisme de décision au sein d'une union monétaire et le niveau d'inflation moyen que cette union tend à produire ? Autrement dit, une union décentralisée est-elle inflationniste ? A l'inverse de l'analyse de Casella et Feinstein (1989) qui utilise un argument de type « free rider » pour montrer que décentralisation égale inflation, cet article, en s'appuyant sur une réflexion à la fois théorique et historique, suggère que le prétendu biais inflationniste des unions décentralisées peut être corrigé au moyen de mécanismes eux-mêmes décentralisés.

La thèse s'articule autour de deux idées principales : d'une part la mobilité du travail constitue un mécanisme d'ajustement essentiel en régime de change fixe ; d'autre part, le développement des politiques sociales contribue à ralentir le processus d'émigration. L'argumentation s'appuie à la fois sur une réflexion théorique, fondée notamment sur la théorie des zones monétaires optimales, et sur une analyse historique, centrée sur deux époques de l'histoire contemporaine : celle de l'étalon-or et celle de l'entre-deux-guerres. Le chapitre 1 s'attache ainsi à montrer le rôle clé des migrations internationales dans le processus d'ajustement de l'étalon-or. Le chapitre 2 analyse ensuite l'impact de la législation bismarckienne sur l'émigration allemande. Enfin, le chapitre 3 fournit une explication alternative à la chute de l'étalon-or. Au total, l'objectif de la thèse est de montrer l'existence d'un trilemme de politique économique entre migrations internationales, régimes de change et politiques sociales.

Textbook accounts of the Anglo-French trade agreement of 1860 argue that it heralded the beginning of a liberal trading order. This alleged success has much interest from a policy point of view: unlike modern GATT/WTO multilateral agreements, it rested on bilateral negotiations. But, in reality, how great were its effects? With the help of new data on international trade we provide empirical evidence. We find that the Anglo-French treaty and subsequent network of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade agreements coincided with the end of a period of unilateral liberalization across the world, and that it did not contribute to expand trade at all. This is contrary to a deeply rooted belief among economists and economic historians. We conclude that, contrary to a popular wisdom, bilateralism did not promote trade in the 19th century.

We explore the history of the Austro-Hungarian currency through the floating exchange rate regime of the 1870s and 1880s and the adoption of the gold standard in 1892. Though actual convertibility remained an elusive dream, the A-H Bank was able to stabilise the currency by establishing a credible (de facto) shadow-gold standard by 1896. Though the currency fluctuated by as much as 7% per annum before 1896, credibility was established very quickly, and thereafter the currency was successfully kept within an informal target zone of 0.4%, despite of the well-known internal (and external) political problems of the monarchy and in spite of a number of major financial crisis of foreign origin. This remarkable record positions the Dual Monarchy squarely in between the elite core and the plebeian peripheral countries of the time.

A natural experiment with an exchange-rate band in Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century provides a rare opportunity to discuss critical aspects of the theory of target zones. Providing a new derivation of the target zone model as a set of nested hypotheses, the inference is drawn that policy credibility and market efficiency were paramount in the success of the Austro-Hungarian experience.

The essays, written by leading experts, examine the history of the international financial system in terms of the debate about globalization and its limits. In the nineteenth century, international markets existed without international institutions. A response to the problems of capital flows came in the form of attempts to regulate national capital markets (for instance through the establishment of central banks). In the inter-war years, there were (largely unsuccessful) attempts at designing a genuine international trade and monetary system; and at the same time (coincidentally) the system collapsed. In the post-1945 era, the intended design effort was infinitely more successful. The development of large international capital markets since the 1960s, however, increasingly frustrated attempts at international control. The emphasis has shifted in consequence to debates about increasing the transparency and effectiveness of markets; but these are exactly the issues that already dominated the nineteenth-century discussions. (Publisher's abstract)

Scholars have traditionally argued that the stock of specie in circulation in France in the 19th century was considerable and that this "financial backwardness" accounted for France's slower economic growth in that century. Scholars have also claimed that the French bimetallic system was inherently unstable. It is true that until the 1880's, gold and silver coinage formed the main portion of French monetary stock, perhaps as much as 52% in 1885, but the supposition that this somehow hindered French industrialization requires correction. This is especially true given the fact that no precise figures for the annual monetary stock had existed until recently. As a result of new estimates, two periods of specie can be detected: 1830-52 (predominant silver coinage) and 1853-66 (predominant gold coinage as a result of the depreciation of gold). In general, by the 1850's the stock of specie in circulation was much smaller than conventionally believed and did not exceed by much that in Great Britain. There is no reason to believe that the French bimetallic system adversely affected the French economy.

This book traces the roots of global financial integration in the first "modern" era of globalisation from 1880 to 1913. It analyses the direction, destinations and origins of international financial flows in order to determine the domestic policy choices that either attracted or deterred such flows to developing countries. The book deposes the idea that the gold standard and other institutional arrangements were the key to attracting foreign investment, pointing to the stability and probity of political systems as much more important. One of the major conclusions is that the successful management of international financial integration depends primarily on broad institutional and political factors, as well as on financial policies, rather than simply opening or closing individual economies to the international winds. The Making of Global Finance: 1880-1913 can serve as a valuable tool to current-day policy dilemmas by using historical data to see which policies in the past led to enhanced international financing for development. It also includes historical data that will interest all scholars of economics and economic history, as well as the casual reader.

In this paper we chart the geography of the gold standard. We highlight the late date of the move to gold and the variety of transition strategies. Whether a country with a currency convertible into specie operated a gold, silver or bimetallic standard at mid-century depended not so much on whether it was rich or poor as on the monetary standard of the foreign country or countries to which its transactions were linked. When it came to the distinction between specie convertibility and inconvertibility, however, domestic economic conditions came into play. In particular, there was a strong correlation between economic development, as proxied by the level of per capita incomes, and possession of a convertible currency.Most countries went onto the gold standard between the 1870s and the first decade of the twentieth century. We enumerate the factors propelling this transition and analyse variations in its timing. Factors shaping the course of this transition include the level of economic development, the magnitude of reserves relative to world specie markets, whether reserves were concentrated at the central bank, and the presence or absence of imperial ties.

In this paper we chart the geography of the gold standard. We highlight the late date of the move to gold and the variety of transition strategies. Whether a country with a currency convertible into specie operated a gold, silver or bimetallic standard at mid-century depended not so much on whether it was rich or poor as on the monetary standard of the foreign country or countries to which its transactions were linked. When it came to the distinction between specie convertibility and inconvertibility, however, domestic economic conditions came into play. In particular, there was a strong correlation between economic development, as proxied by the level of per capita incomes, and possession of a convertible currency.Most countries went onto the gold standard between the 1870s and the first decade of the twentieth century. We enumerate the factors propelling this transition and analyse variations in its timing. Factors shaping the course of this transition include the level of economic development, the magnitude of reserves relative to world specie markets, whether reserves were concentrated at the central bank, and the presence or absence of imperial ties.

This paper is an exploration of the theory of endogenous regime changes which takes as an illustration the making of the classical gold standard. The international gold-based fixed exchange rate regime that surfaced during the 1870s has traditionally been interpreted as resulting from a mix of structural factors (Kindleberger (1993)), free-rider problems (Kenwood and Lougheed (1972)), transaction costs considerations (Redish (1992)), or political economy forces (Gallarotti (1990)). This paper - initially written to disentangle these various theories - argues that none of the traditionally accepted views proves sufficiently robust to closer scrutiny. We build a model of the pre-1870 international monetary system which allows us to formally test and reject the `free-rider' and `structural' views. We rely on historical and microeconomic evidence to criticize the `transaction costs' and `political economy' theories. Finally, we provide an alternative explanation of the emergence of the gold standard. Our conclusion is twofold. First, we argue that the making of the gold standard was very much the result of path-dependency and coordination problems. Second, we claim that the very process through which the gold standard was adopted played a major role in shaping its operation.

It has been argued that central bank cooperation was important to the working of the gold standard before 1914. This article takes a critical view of the central bank cooperation thesis and, relying on new archival research as well as on secondary sources, offers an alternative picture of central bank relations during the nineteenth century. Central bank cooperation was exceptionally never reciprocal and always failed to institutionalize: scholars seeking to explain the stability of the gold standard will have to look in other directions

This paper examines the historical record of the Austro-Hungarian monetary union, focusing on its bargaining dimension. As a result of the 1867 Compromise, Austria and Hungary shared a common currency, although they were fiscally sovereign and independent entities. By using repeated threats to quit, Hungary succeeded in obtaining more than proportional control and forcing the common central bank into a policy that was very favourable to it. Using insights from public economics, this paper explains the reasons for this outcome. Because Hungary would have been able to secure quite good conditions for itself had it broken apart, Austria had to provide its counterpart with incentives to stay on board. I conclude that the eventual split of Hungary after WWI was therefore not written on the wall in 1914, since the Austro-Hungarian monetary union was quite profitable to Hungarians.

In this paper, we lay the foundations of bullion points theory in the context of exchange rate analysis between bimetallic and monometallic nations. The theory is then applied to the study of the Paris-London exchange rates between 1846 and 1870. In particular, we show that both the position and spread of bullion points between monometallic and bimetallic nations reacted endogenously to shocks on international gold and silver markets. The distance between the upper and lower specie points tended to shrink when large disequilibria occurred on world bullion markets, and to expand when these disequilibria receded. Second, we show that bullion points constrictions and dilations as well as exchange rate movements triggered specie flows in and out of France, as a way to stabilize initial imbalances. France acted as the arbitrageur of last resort between the gold and silver segments of the international monetary system, and this in turn placed a substantial amount of 'endogenous' pressure on its monetary system

Avec la Première Guerre mondiale commencent à la fois le XXe siècle et la fin d'une période d'internationalisation économique et de régulation des déséquilibres par le marché : la crise de 1929 et la Seconde Guerre mondiale renforcent cette marche à l'étatisation des institutions de l'échange, du crédit, du travail et de la production. Puis, en deux décennies, à partir des années 70, ce mouvement s'inverse : les marchés se libéralisent, le libre-échange se propage, et l'ordre économique mondial, de nouveau, impose sa loi aux politiques nationales. Aux yeux de l'historien, il semble bien que la globalisation financière en cours soit au cœur d'un phénomène troublant : la résurgence, en pleine modernité, de la « civilisation du XIXe siècle ».

Trends in international finance in recent decades have inspired considerable research on bloc- and band-based international monetary arrangements. From this literature has emerged models providing the basis for much recent work in international monetary economics. To date, however, their application to historical experience has been rare. The authors, therefore, highlight parallels between modern-day target zones, on the one hand, and the classical and interwar gold standards and Bretton Woods System, on the other. They suggest that bloc-based international monetary arrangements are in fact an historical commonplace; they have been the rule rather than the exception. Copyright 1996 by Scottish Economic Society.

"Regarder le monde comme un espace mobile et fluide. S'émanciper de l'idée d'une scène internationale orchestrée par les seuls États. Sortir des figures classiques de l'ennemi, de la frontière, des identités exclusives. Montrer tous les acteurs des échanges internationaux, qu'ils soient publics ou privés, individuels ou collectifs, politiques, économiques ou sociaux, locaux, nationaux, régionaux ou mondiaux. Représenter les innombrables interdépendances et enchevêtrements de nos histoires, autant que les désordres et les dysfonctionnements d'un monde pluriel."