Type
Article
Titre
The informational role of supermajorities
Dans
Journal of Public Economics
Auteur(s)
Éditeur
NL : Elsevier B.V.
Volume
92
Numéro
10-11
Pages
2225 - 2239 p.
ISSN
00472727
Résumé
EN
We study a collective decision making environment where an agenda setter makes strategic proposals to privately informed voters who vote strategically. We show that, consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the agenda setter to propose supermajorities. Due to an informational role that we unveil, optimal supermajorities can be less costly than minimum winning coalitions, even though more voters are awarded a positive share. We also examine consequences in terms of quality of decision making. We show that the introduction of a strategic agenda setter can lead to socially suboptimal decisions.

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