Home to more than 7.5 lakh Muslims, Ahmedabad houses over 50 per cent of this population in just one locality: Juhapura. Comprised of a cluster of various sub-areas such as Sankalit Nagar, Maktampura, Gyaspur, Makarba, Sarkhej and Fatehwadi—often having ambiguous and overlapping administrative boundaries—over 4 lakh Muslims live in Juhapura, amidst substandard public infrastructure and suffering from a stigmatized public perception.\

In effect, Ahmedabad has become the most religiously segregated city of modern India. Out of the 11 cities examined in the book Muslims in Indian Cities, Ahmedabad and Mumbai emerge as clear cases where the relevance of Muslims in the city has declined, combined with ‘higher level of violence with political—and even sometimes cultural—obliteration’ (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012, pp. 318–319). Ahmedabad showcases an even stronger manifestation of ghettoization compared to Mumbai—and ten other Indian cities—according to the segregation index developed by Raphael Susewind.\

But what is a Muslim ghetto in India? This category has even been granted official recognition in the Sachar Committee Report, whose authors

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1 For a general history of spatial segregation in Ahmedabad in general and Juhapura in particular, see Jaffrelot and Thomas (2012). Facing ghettoisation in riot-city.

2 Ahmedabad’s municipal boundaries score 0.57 on this segregation index whereas the score of the conglomerate that includes areas beyond the municipal limits is 0.62 (0 being the least segregated zone; 1 being the most segregated place (Susewind, 2017).}
claim that ‘Fearing for their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country’ (2006, p. 14). This ubiquitous process of ghettoization has severe effects on the community through ‘inadequacy of infrastructural facilities, shrinking common spaces where different SRCs [socio-religious categories] can interact and reduction in livelihood options’ (ibid.). However, the notion of ghetto is not specific to India—in fact, the word comes from the name of a tiny island in Venice where Jews were forced to live in the Middle Ages. Like Gayer & Jaffrelot (2012), we use Loïc Wacquant’s definition of a ‘ghetto’ as ‘a bounded, ethnically [or religiously] uniform sociospatial formation born of the forcible relegation of a negatively typed population’. They further elucidate (p. 22):

Building upon this basic definition, the concept of ‘ghetto’ can be further elaborated by pointing out five major characteristics of these spaces of relegation: an element of social and/or political constraint over the residential options of a given population; the class and caste diversity of these localities, which regroup individual of different social backgrounds on the basis of ethnic or religious ascribed identities; the neglect of these localities by state authorities, translating into a lack of infrastructures, educational facilities, etc.; the estrangement of the locality and its residents from the rest of the city, due to lack of public transportation as well as limited job opportunities and restricted access to public spaces beyond the locality; the subjective sense of closure of residents, related to objective patterns of estrangement from the rest of the city.

Despite the unmatched scale of ghettoization in Juhapura, aided by the State’s deliberate neglect, its residents have somewhat developed the place on their own, redeeming Juhapura from its stigmatized identity.3 Although this contrarian claim is not true for the way the Hindu community perceives Juhapura, the impression that Juhapura is not merely a safe locality but also a developing, ‘cosmopolitan’ place and a ground for unity is gaining momentum among Muslims, as evident from the inflow of Muslims from Saurashtra (for whom Juhapura is a gateway to Ahmedabad), for instance. In this chapter, we examine this paradox by offering responses to these key questions: What are the ways in which Muslims living in Juhapura resist the problems caused by ghettoization—and even, sometimes, benefit from this segregation? How do the signifiers of unity and division such as sectarian identification, class, caste and gender play out within the ghetto? We try to go beyond the feelings of victimization that prevailed after the 2002 pogrom to analyse the trajectory of India’s largest Muslim ghetto, without, in any way, minimizing or ignoring the impact of sociopolitical and cultural exclusions affecting this locality.

This chapter is organized into five sections. First, we provide a history of Juhapura, coeval with incidents of large-scale anti-Muslim violence in postcolonial Ahmedabad, which resulted in segregated living zones. We particularly examine the development of Juhapura in light of State-enforced discriminatory laws such as the Disturbed Areas Act 1991 and the post-2002 migration of middle-class and wealthy Muslims to the ghetto. In the second section, we show how elite migration to Juhapura has allowed its residents to negotiate with the state and bring limited improvements to the delivery of public services, despite the majoritarian character par excellence of the State in Gujarat. However, as we show in the third section, the arrival of rich, educated Muslims in Juhapura has not necessarily resulted in the emancipation of poor, lower-caste Muslims. Here, we focus on the creation of class and sect-specific ‘citadels’, representing fractured solidarities within Juhapura, to highlight the non-linear nature of citizenship in Juhapura. Lower-class Muslim women have crucially resisted elite and orthodox tendencies within Juhapura, signifying a merger, even if limited, of class, caste and gender in Juhapura. Then, we suggest a few recommendations to improve the state of religious fragmentation within the society of Ahmedabad as well as to enhance Juhapura’s public infrastructure and political

representation. Finally, after summarizing our findings, we conclude that the current state of affairs in Juhapura is a result of the post-1990 transformation in the nature of the State in Gujarat from a de facto Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation) towards a de jure one, with legal mechanisms facilitating discrimination against Muslims. In the post-2014 environment of nation-wide hegemony of Hindutva politics, this legally sanctioned form of Hindu Rashtra—‘the Gujarat Model’—has been replicated across India, alongside deepening of the Hindutva ideology.

Map 1: Locating Juhapura


Map 2: Muslim Pockets in Ahmedabad and Outside


Box 1: A Historical Muslim City

The old and previously walled part of Ahmedabad, its cityscape dotted with prominent Islamic monuments and architecture, became India’s first UNESCO World Heritage City in 2017. Although this moment was one of pride for its Muslim residents, a year later, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, in a bid to erase Islamic influence on Ahmedabad’s history, wanted to rename it ‘Karnavati’ after Karnadev Solanki, a Chalukya ruler. In some sense, this failed move represents the central dilemma Muslims in Ahmedabad face: whether to take pride in the city’s rich history or to be bothered by their current status as ‘second-class citizens’.

Unlike their present peripheral status, Muslims in Ahmedabad historically enjoyed a privileged position. During the age of Muslim kings, beginning in 1411 AD, Ahmedabad was established as Gujarat’s capital not only for political reasons but also due to its unique socio-economic model of the Mahajan system, where local elites cooperated with each other and took care of the community. Muslims, occupied key aristocratic positions alongside the Bania-Brahmin elite, apart from being traders. Ahmedabad’s linear trajectory of development meant that from the late 16th to the early 17th centuries, the city was one of the ten most populous cities in the world, with the population at one time reaching a peak of four lakh people.

The decline of Ahmedabad began with the end of the Mughal era in the mid-17th century when the Marathas, locally known pejoratively as ganim (meaning, raiders), wreaked havoc in the city. In turn, its population declined to less than 80,000 people. Later, the British rule, starting in 1818, brought peace to

4 For the myth-making phenomenon in relation to renaming Ahmedabad to Karnavati, see Laliwala (2018). Does renaming Ahmedabad ‘Karnavati’ have anything to do with the city’s history?
the city and allowed its traders to flourish—in fact, Ahmedabad’s elites supported British colonial power during the rebellion of 1857–58. Yet, the political erasure of Muslims from the local elite associations that began with the Maratha period could not be stymied. Mahatma Gandhi’s nationalist movement, which was initially based in Ahmedabad from 1915 until 1930 due to the city’s Mahajan culture and its proximity to Gandhi’s idea of trusteeship, did not feature any influential local Muslim voice.

Although popular leaders such as Rauf Valiullah and Ehsan Jafri provided political representation to the Muslim community in the post-Independence era, the community’s socioeconomic decline, with the injury of Partition and the rise of Hindu nationalism with frequent large-scale episodes of anti-Muslim violence, was hard to ignore. For example, post-Independence, according to official records, Ahmedabad has witnessed more than 1,500 murders during incidents of ethnic violence, mostly of Muslims—a majority of which took place in the 1969 and 2002 riots.

Despite these trends of marginalization in urban Gujarat, more Muslims in Gujarat live in urban areas than in most other parts of India. In 2011, as against the national average of 40 per cent urbanization among Indian Muslims, roughly 65 per cent of Gujarati Muslims lived in urban areas. In 2001, it was 59 per cent of Gujarati Muslims. This characteristic is particularly startling even if we account for the fact that Gujarat is one of the most urban states of India: in the 2011 census, urbanization was recorded at 43 per cent in Gujarat vis-à-vis the national level of 31 per cent. At 63 per cent, however, Gujarati Muslims are 23 per cent more urban than the whole of Gujarati society. Movement towards urban areas among the Muslims in Gujarat can be attributed to a desire of safety, leading to the creation of gated urban communities like Juhapura. After the 2002 riot, as the 6 per cent increase in the rate of Muslim urbanization from 2001 to 2011 shows, Muslims moved from villages where they were in a minuscule number to cities. For instance, villages near the city of Ahmedabad were emptied of Muslims as they left, mostly for Juhapura, Vatva, Citizen Nagar and Chandola Lake area, among other places. In some sense, these migratory trends and the stark neglect of Muslims in urban Gujarat complicate the Ambedkarite idea of the city as a place for emancipatory social mobility to break free from traditional hierarchical structures, such as caste. In the rest of this chapter, we explore whether Muslim migration to gated zones like Juhapura is merely for safety or not. What does this say about the Ambedkarite idea of mobility, which considers the city as an emancipatory space, while the village is ‘a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness and communalism’? (cited in Jaffelot, 2005, p. 110).

1. The Journey towards Juhapura through Ethnic Violence

Public imagination has demonized Juhapura’s reputation, generalizing it as a space where the rejects of society live. However, the ghetto comprises of smaller and overlapping localities such as Sarkhej, Makarba, Gypsuar, Fatehwadi, Town Planning Scheme (TPS) 85, Sankalit Nagar etc. In reality, Juhapura is only a small part of the ghetto, but it has come to be used as an umbrella term to lump all these different localities together and signify the Muslim ghetto in Gujarat in public perception.

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6 Both these leaders met a cruel end. Rauf Valiullah, a Rajya Sabha member from the Congress Party, was murdered by the Lateef gang in 1992. Ehsan Jafri, who represented Ahmedabad in the Lok Sabha twice, was killed during the 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom.

7 As per Varshney-Wilkinson’s dataset, Ahmedabad witnessed over 1,100 murders during Hindu-Muslim violence between 1950 and 1995. If we add figures from 2002 riot, the number jumps to more than 1,500 (2006).

8 A note on the terminology is needed here. We have chosen to use the term ‘ethnic’ over ‘communal’ since anti-Muslim violence relates with the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra, the Hindu nationalist version of the ethnic nation-state. We borrow this usage from a recent work by Raheel Dhattiwala (2019).
Sarkhej, located in the western outskirts of Ahmedabad, is a township whose initial history is concomitant with that of the Gujarat Sultanate (1407–1573 AD). Its most well-known moment in medieval history comes in 1451 AD: at the time of the establishment of the Sarkhej Roza compound—comprising of a mosque, a lake and several tombs including the mausoleum of Shaikh Ahmed Ganj Baksh—the spiritual guru of Ahmed Shah I (d. 1442) suggested that the city of Ahmedabad should be built nearby. Ahmed Khattu (d.1446), an advisor of Ahmad Shah I from Patan, was buried here. Later, Mehmud Begda (d. 1511), a successor of Ahmad Shah I, and his family were honoured in the same compound with magnificent tombs after their deaths. Although Ahmedabad came under Mughal rule in 1573, later on, in 1583 or 1584, the battle between the Mughal Empire led by Abdul Rahim Khan-e-Khana and Muzzaffar Shah II of the Gujarat Sultanate took place at Sarkhej.

This locality was a human settlement cum production centre, especially of crafts and indigo, coeval with small production centre-oriented villages such as Usmanpura, Kochrab and Vasna. However, the centrality of Sarkhej in the sociopolitical history of Gujarat did not result in the establishment of large settlements until the 20th century, for two reasons. Firstly, the focus of the Gujarati Sultanate, as well as of the Mughal Empire, the Marathas and the British that followed it in ruling the state, was on developing the urban core in the old, walled city of Ahmedabad. In this urban core, Ahmad Shah I built the Bhadra Fort, Jama Masjid and Manek Chowk to mark the walled parts of Ahmedabad as the city centre. Secondly, the distance from the city centre to Sarkhej was accentuated by the difficult task of crossing Sabarmati River through the water route. The expansion of western Ahmedabad, on whose periphery Sarkhej is located, began only after 1892, with the construction of the Ellis Bridge over the Sabarmati River in Ahmedabad.

1.1 The Making of Juhapura: Secular Beginnings Clash with the 1969 Riot

The residential set-up of Juhapura, including Sarkhej within its limits, picked up pace from the early 1970s. This colony for slum dwellers was developed just after Ahmedabad’s first major incident of Hindu-Muslim violence in 1969 (though the violence had little relation with Juhapura’s initial set of residents). Although minor incidents of violence in Ahmedabad had occurred prior to the 1969 riot, this large-scale rampage, occurring in the same year as Mahatma Gandhi’s centenary birth anniversary, was then an outlier in Ahmedabad’s history but it would have important consequences on the living patterns of communities in Ahmedabad.9

The 1969 carnage in Gujarat has been linked to socio-economic factors such as the declining importance and ultimate closure of cotton textile mills in Ahmedabad. This reasoning gives only a partial picture of the rioting. In fact, the three-day rally in December 1968 by the head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), M. S. Golwalkar, sowed the roots of the riot. It was held in Maninagar, from where Narendra Modi has been elected multiple times. Later on, in June 1969, a few months after a Hindu police officer in Ahmedabad accidentally pushed a copy of the Quran to the ground, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind allegedly provoked Muslim sentiments in a conference it organized. In early September 1969, during the annual Ramlila festival, a copy of the Ramayana fell to the ground when a Muslim police officer tried to control the crowd. Although the Muslim side was willing to apologize, Hindu leaders organized themselves under the Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti to lead anti-Muslim demonstrations. In mid-September 1969, Balraj Madhok, a Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) leader, made a provocative speech in Ahmedabad. A few days later, a group of Muslims and Hindus had a scuffle near the Jagannath Temple. After this, uncontrollable clashes began.10

9 Rioting between Hindus and Muslims in Ahmedabad was first recorded in the early 18th century. In 1714, during the festival of Holi, a minor riot broke out between Hindus and Muslims of Ahmedabad as a group of Hindu men sprinkled gulal on a passer-by Muslim according to the Mirat-e-Sikandari. Later on, during Eid-al-Adha in 1716, violence could have occurred between Hindus and Muslims on the issue of cow slaughter. For more on this ‘pre-history of communalism’, refer to Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth, 2011.

10 The government commission set-up to inquire into the causes of 1969 riot led by Justice P Jagannmohan Reddy
The 1969 riot was the deadliest incident of Hindu–Muslim violence since Partition. Officially, 660 people were killed, including 430 Muslims while unofficial figures ranged from 1,000 to 2,000 (Shah, 1970). A total of 1,074 people were injured, 592 Muslims among them; over 48,000 people were rendered homeless and property worth 42 million rupees was destroyed in Ahmedabad alone, of which 32 million rupees’ worth belonged to Muslims (Reddy, 1970, pp. 179–182). The riot also spread to neighbouring districts.

A unique feature of the 1969 rioting involved the participation of neighbours in violence against each other. This characteristic was particularly pronounced in working-class chawls as Dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), attracted by the Hindu right-wing doctrine of Hindu unity against the Muslim enemy, for the first time attacked their Muslim neighbours. In a city with over 1.25 lakh mill workers (‘TLA five decades’, 1971; Spodek, 2012, p. 195)—roughly 7 per cent of its population—this change marked the beginning of the destruction of the multicultural fabric of Ahmedabad.

Nevertheless, the growth in Juhapura’s human settlement in the early 1970s was somewhat unconnected to the 1969 riot. In 1973, heavy flooding in the Sabarmati River destroyed over 2,000 houses, mostly slums on the riverbank. In turn, the Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG), Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC), Oxfam and Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited (HUDCO) designed a planned housing colony called Sankalit Nagar in Juhapura with some 2,250 houses to accommodate the flood victims. This original expansion tells that Juhapura’s journey did not begin as a ghetto. It was more like the previously intermixed areas of the fortified walled city of Ahmedabad or its eastern industrial belt with a working class population. In fact, the government and various NGOs gave slum dwellers the option to choose their neighbours, as opposed to building separate colonies for Hindus and Muslims (as has become the rule lately). Most of them did not consider religion while making their choice (David, 2002, p. 6). Apart from Muslims, the original residents of Sankalit Nagar came from Hindu low castes (Bhois, Thakores, etc.) and Dalits. Floods, a ‘secular’ natural disaster, could not break inter-religious community bonds. Several housing societies of Juhapura still carry the legacy of its previously intermixed nature in their names, such as Gandhi Smriti, Samir Vihar, Prachina and Sardar Smriti.

1.2 The Making of a ‘Muslim Place’ in the 1980s–1990s

The 1980s was a particularly tumultuous period in Gujarat’s political history, with continuous Hindu–Muslim riots in cities like Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodara and small towns, especially in central and northern Gujarat. Consequently, the intermixed social fabric of Juhapura transformed after each riot as Hindus left the area and more Muslims moved in: the former left the place as they felt insecure in the minority pockets they occupied whereas the latter moved in precisely because they felt safer in a Muslim-dominated area.

The rise of the Hindu right wing—in the wake of the economic collapse of the cotton textile mills and the Congress Party’s backward caste-oriented politics—enabled an ethno-religious turn in Gujarat’s politics. Madhavsinh Solanki, a lower-caste Kshatriya Chief Minister of Gujarat, along with Jinabhai Darji, another lower-caste Congress leader, had engineered a formidable coalition comprised of Kshatriyas, Harijans (Dalits), Adivasis, Muslims, or KHAM, representing over 60 per cent of the state’s population. In the early 1980s, Madhavsinh

13 The exact opposite occurred when slum dwellers living on the banks of Sabarmati were rehabilitated in the late 2000s due to the Sabarmati Riverfront gentrification project: Hindus and Muslims, who previously stayed together, were relocated separately on religious lines. For more on this phenomenon, see, Desai (2014). Municipal politics, Court sympathy, and housing rights.


Solanki’s government announced 27 per cent reservation in public jobs and education for OBCs. Due to this socially progressive political mobilization, the Congress Party swept the 1980 and 1985 state elections. In turn, the upper castes and upwardly mobile agrarian, Shudra communities such as the Patels (also known as Patidars) became infuriated and shifted their political support to the emerging Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

This shift first resulted in caste violence between the antireservationist upper castes and Patels on the one side and the Dalits on the other in 1981. The BJP, to benefit politically and deepen its roots in Gujarat, propagated the idea of Hindu unity vis-à-vis the KHAM alliance of the Congress Party. The BJP, along with the Sangh Parivar, portrayed Muslims in a stereotypical manner as an underclass of gangsters and criminals who were taking away jobs from Dalits and OBCs. By the mid1980s, the castelist nature of violence had transformed into an ethno-religious battle between Hindus and Muslims, highlighting the resilience of upper-caste and Patel hegemony in Gujarat’s politics. The rioting from February to July 1985 left 275 people dead in the city of Ahmedabad (Spodek, 1989, p. 765). A repeat of this scale of violence was seen the very next year, leaving over 100 people dead in Ahmedabad. Dalits, who had been attacked by the upper castes and Patels in 1981 in casteist violence, were now attacking Muslims (Shani, 2007, p. 140–147). In some sense, Dalits (as well as OBCs and tribals) emerged as the foot soldiers for the Hindu nationalistic movement in Gujarat.

During this period, Dalits and OBCs who lived next to Muslims in the old city, the eastern industrial belt as well as in Juhapura shifted to other parts of Ahmedabad—a phenomenon not unique to Ahmedabad. By the early 1990s, OBC Hindus and Dalits living in Juhapura had left the area. Some of them moved to the nearby areas of Vasna, Vejalpur and Guptanagar (David, 2002, p. 6). In a sense, this migration was a result of a ‘neighbourhood churn’. Because of this churning, the existing population would be residing next to strangers and not among those with whom they had shared friendly bonds for a long time. Due to this feeling of alienation or estrangement amidst a politically charged environment, they may decide to move out. This was one of the main reasons for the Hindu population moving out of Juhapura. Similarly, as the tolerance for Muslim neighbours declined, Muslims had no choice but to move to the city’s periphery, to areas like Vatva and Juhapura.

The instances of ethnic violence reappeared in the early 1990s, at the peak of the Ram Janamabhoomi movement to establish a Ram Mandir in Ayodhya at the site of the Babri Masjid by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). L. K. Advani’s rath yatra in September–October 1990 to canvass support for this movement began from Somnath Temple in Dwarka, Gujarat. This was a site of injury to Hindu pride as Mohammed Ghazni, a sultan of the Ghaznavid Empire, had destroyed the temple in the past, and it was chosen strategically for asserting Hindu pride. This ended up causing tremendous disturbances. For instance, in April–October 1990, over 30 people were killed in the city of Ahmedabad (Gallonier, 2013). The riots that followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 spread to urban Gujarat, including Ahmedabad and Surat (which had previously not seen large-scale ethnic violence). In the month of December alone, 58 people were killed in Ahmedabad (ibid).

Simultaneously, a demonizing vocabulary to refer to Juhapura emerged. The area was routinely termed ‘mini Pakistan’, bringing in the two-na-
tion theory to describe Ahmedabad’s geography. A physical wall built to demarcate the boundaries of Juhapura from its Hindu neighbourhood Vejalpur is still referred to as the ‘Wagah Border’, or sometimes as Ahmedabad’s very own ‘Berlin Wall’ (see photograph 1). Juhapura emerged not only as a place where riot victims sought refuge but where Muslims moved to pre-empt the possibility of becoming a victim. Its all-Muslim nature was purely for safety concerns in the 1990s—an identity which, since then, has continued to solidify itself, as more Muslims consistently migrated towards the ghetto.

Image 1: The Wall of Juhapura

Walls or ‘borders’ demarcating Juhapura from its neighbouring Hindu locality is a commonplace phenomenon, demonstrating the mistrust and distance between the two religious communities. Apart from these higher than usual walls, the entry and exit points of Juhapura, as well as their residential quarters, are dotted with police stations—in turn restricting the geographical spread of the ghetto.

Credit: Christophe Jaffrelot

Box 2: De Jure Hindu Rashtra in Gujarat through the Case of the Disturbed Areas Act 1991

The ghettoization process in Gujarat has been fostered by a law that actively promotes housing segregation among its urban populace. The Disturbed Areas Act 1991, which replaced the original law passed in 1986, allows the state government to declare riot-prone urban areas as ‘disturbed’, by which sale of property requires additional permission from the collectorate’s office.

The original aim of the act was noble: to stop distress sale of properties in riot-prone localities in the aftermath of numerous incidents of religious violence in the 1980s and 1990s. In practice, this well-intentioned law has been misused with the justification of stopping the Muslim takeover, real and imagined, of Hindu-dominated localities. More than 40 per cent of Ahmedabad’s geography, including localities used as entry and/or exit points from Juhapura, come under the purview of this law. It has been effectively used by the state government to prevent the ‘horizontal’ geographical expansion of the Muslim population, pushing them to ghettos like Juhapura on the outskirts of Ahmedabad. In practice, it is very difficult for Muslims to obtain administrative permission to buy any accommodation in mixed neighbourhoods coming under this law—even in places where they used to live and/or that their family had left in the past because of communal violence.

The Disturbed Areas Act, which restricts the spatial mobility of Muslims and prevents inter-community interactions, marks a fundamental transformation in the nature of the state in Gujarat. The state in Gujarat is not only filled with Hindu right-wing elements, representing a deepening of right-wing ideology; it is also invested in granting a legal recognition to Hindutva politics. In effect, the de facto nature of Hindu Rashtra—as manifest in acts of deliberate state neglect—mutates to a de jure Hindu Rashtra with anti-Muslim laws like the Disturbed Areas Act.

17 The first recorded reference to this ‘border’ is available in Times of India, ‘The great wall of Vejalpur’, 16 February 1994. The first academic reference to this physical wall is found in Breman (1999). Ghettoization and Communal Politics.

18 For more on this subject and its recent misappropriation by the state government, see Jaffrelot and Laliwala (2018). The segregated city.
In recent times, the de jure Hindutva nature of Gujarat's state has only strengthened. For instance, in mid-2019, the Gujarat government modified the logic behind the Disturbed Areas Act through an amendment: from preventing distress property sales to maintaining a ‘demographic balance’ in the so-called disturbed localities. The state government gave further discretionary power to top-level bureaucrats and prescribed a jail term of six years in case of non-compliance with the law (Dabhi, 2019). Anxieties over Muslim expansion in Paldi, an upscale locality in Ahmedabad dominated by Jains and Hindus, motivated this change.19

1.3 Juhapura’s Post-2002 Pogrom Trajectory

The 2002 anti-Muslim pogrom resulted in a ‘proper’ ghettoization in Juhapura. The scale of the violence in 2002 was unprecedented. It was a reaction to over 50 kar sevaks (devotees wishing to build a temple of Lord Ram) being burned to death in a train coach near Godhra railway station, allegedly by a Muslim mob. The rioting that followed was not merely a case of anti-Muslim violence but was an ethnic cleansing.

Small towns and villages, especially in the central and northern Gujarat region, too were affected, besides cities such as Ahmedabad and Vadodara. This reach of violence in rural Gujarat, especially in the tribal zones of Dahod, Chhota Udaipur, Panchmahal and Banaskantha, confirmed the militant indoctrination of tribals through the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, a branch of the RSS. Official figures put the death toll at a little above 1,000—mostly Muslims—whereas unofficial estimates claim over 2,000 people died in this carnage (‘Nanavati Commission Report’, 2019). There were widespread accusations of state complicity. More than one lakh houses, and a thousand hotels along with hundreds of religious places (mostly mosques and dargahs), were either damaged or destroyed.20 The impact was so large that Ahmedabad alone had to accommodate over one lakh Muslims in refugee camps, which were marred by dismal State services. Much has been said about the causes of the 2002 pogrom as well as its electoral implications for the BJP, but little is known about its far-reaching consequences on Gujarati society. (Jaffrelot, 2011; Spodek, 2012).

Middle-class and elite Muslims—doctors, lawyers, business persons, academics, politicians, judges, police officers—in cities like Ahmedabad and Vadodara were attacked on a large-scale for the first time. Relatively affluent Muslims with greater social capital, despite having connections with the State authorities, were not safe. Even a former Member of Parliament like Ehsan Jafri was helpless: he was mercilessly killed at Gulberg Society in Ahmedabad by a mob of more than 5,000 Hindus. Muslims in elite societies of Paldi, too, were assaulted on a large-scale for the first time by an angry mob, allegedly led by the late Haren Pandya, an ex-MLA from Ellis Bridge constituency. At this point in history, elite Muslims of Ahmedabad realized the importance of safety over the status of living in posh, inter-religious localities: consequently, they migrated to Juhapura in large numbers.

Apart from the relief colonies built in Juhapura by Islamic reformist organizations to accommodate riot victims, a large-scale migration of Muslim elites from Ahmedabad and nearby smaller towns and villages to Juhapura took place. In a way, this migration added economic diversity to the ghetto and made it a ‘class-blind’ locality (although, as we will show, Juhapura has its own set of class divisions). This ethnic homogeneity coupled with economic heterogeneity fits our definition of a ghetto and the framework of ghettoization developed by Loic Wacquant, which sees the ghetto as a composition of four elements: ‘stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement’ (2004, p. 1).

19 In August 2019, the state government withdrew the permission granted to Varsha Flats, a redeveloped housing scheme by Muslims. Varsha Flat residents have approached the Gujarat High Court which had earlier stayed the eviction of residents. The Ministry of Home Affairs, though, has sought clarifications from the Gujarat government on the proposed amendments. See Dave (2020). Gujarat: Disturbed Areas Act amendment held back by MHA.

20 The most comprehensive report on the 2002 pogrom remains the Human Rights Watch’s ‘We Have No Orders To Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat’.
2. Paradoxical Development through ‘Negotiating’ Elites

Our fieldwork shows that middle-class and elite migration, which has particularly increased in the last 15 years due to a real estate boom, has allowed Juhapura residents to privately develop their locality (to a limited extent) and negotiate their civic demands with the state more effectively. In fact, despite no incidents of large-scale anti-Muslim violence after 2002, Muslims—including the middle classes and elites—continue to shift to Juhapura.

2.1 Self-help in the Era of a de jure Hindu Rashtra

In our definition of a ghetto, we have highlighted the indifference of the State to the locality’s development of essential infrastructural facilities. Juhapura fulfilled this criterion even more evidently under the BJP government, as one of the obvious objectives of the 2002 pogrom was to drive Muslims out of the prominent localities of urban Gujarat. This form of Hindutva politics has been supplemented, as we have discussed above, by the establishment of a de jure mini-Hindu Rashtra where religious minorities had no place, which saw Muslims being forced to resettle at the periphery, in quasi-no man’s land areas like Juhapura, where the state would ignore them. This strategy of obliteration of the other in Gujarat has slowly been nationalized, as evident from the Sangh Parivar’s fight against ‘land Jihad’ elsewhere in India.

The state apathy that Juhapura faces in these circumstances has forced its residents to build and improve basic infrastructural facilities on their own. This counter-hegemonic process has been facilitated by the post-2002 arrival of middle-class and elite Muslims, who possess some intellectual, financial and social capital. In some ways, Juhapura became a privately-developed city. Some of these private initiatives were linked with ideas of piety and religious charity, as the role of NGOs will testify below.21

These private initiatives are particularly important because Juhapura was included within the official municipal limits of Ahmedabad only in 2006 (Das, 2015). Until then, various parts of the locality were divided under five panchayats that fell under the purview of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA), restricting the growth of public infrastructure in the ghetto due to concerns over clearance of land as ‘non-agricultural’ land. The inclusion of Juhapura in the AMC, however, did not make private initiatives redundant, as the local power centres held the residents of Juhapura responsible for any lack of public infrastructure. For instance, Surendra Patel, ex-chairman of AUDA (1996–1997, 1998–2005), ex-Rajya Sabha member, and currently the Treasurer of BJP Gujarat, told us, ‘Juhapura has innumerable unauthorized constructions with illegal electricity lines. Residents do not even pay property taxes to the government. In that case, you [Muslims] must change your mentality to bring development’ (Patel, 2019).

Images 2 and 3: F. D. School and a private charitable hospital

Credit: Christophe Jaffrelot

The issue of encroachments allowed the state to neglect its duties of providing essential infrastructure or privatizing these services. Surendra Patel cited an instance when a real estate developer was pressured to open a private school by the state: ‘Ed-

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ucation is a problem among the Muslims, which I realized while working for Juhapura. I remember that once a builder was opening a big complex in Juhapura. I stopped the opening and told him to open a school on a floor of the complex to get the permission. He had to do it’ (2019).

In this context, Juhapura residents had to create their own facilities—a form of ‘privatization by design’, which fits the framework of ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ that privileges privatization. Some of the newcomers possessed the necessary intellectual, financial and social capital to enable the constructions of these facilities. This capital is behind the creation of over 30 primary schools in Juhapura, including Crescent School, F. D. High School, New Age School, Shanti Niketan and Model School. The combined capacity of these schools, however, is not more than 3,000 students at the Class I level. For instance, Crescent School, which started classes in 2008, serves just over 2,000 students in its classes from junior kindergarten until the 12th standard, with a staff of 90 teachers. Its fees of Rs. 1,400 per month for English medium and Rs. 1,200 per month for instruction in Gujarati makes it an institute that targets middle-class families.

While some of the lower middle-class and poor Muslims can benefit from these undertakings, there is still a real deficiency of schools serving the poor population of Juhapura. V. K. Tripathi, an educationist based at the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, calculated in 2013 that Juhapura had at least 6,000 children reaching school-going age every year, given a population of at least three lakh Muslims with a birth rate of 2 per cent. He added: ‘Only 2,800 children are admitted to class I, of which only 360 (13 per cent) [are admitted] in four government primary schools. This is far below the national average. The teacher to student ratio in government schools is dismal, poorer than 1:50. The non-grant schools (all Gujarati medium except three which were English medium) admit around 2,400 students at class one level’ (Janmohammed, 2019).

On top of inadequate infrastructure, a few Muslim charity-based private schools in Juhapura are inspired by the idea of religious, morality-infused education. They wish to impart the knowledge of Arabic and the Quran apart from lessons in ethics and good behaviour at school. While they do not compromise on the secular syllabus set by the government, in a way these schools merge the site of imparting secular knowledge with religious forms of knowledge; in other words, the madrassa meets the site of the school. One of the authors, Sharik Laliwala’s dissertation on this specific subject opines on the changing face of Islamic activism in Gujarat:

Islamic activists […] have gone beyond the traditional way of building morality among Muslims through mosques, madrassas and istemas. Now, they focus on building capacity and skills among Muslims by starting educational institutes which combine secular syllabus with Islamic education. By doing that, these activists are challenging the understanding that scientific knowledge or temperament belong only to seculars professing rationalism.

(Laliwala, 2017, p. 36)

Several respondents who wish to remain anonymous on this particular issue note that while the private schools infuse a religious language into their curriculum, they do not provide quality education. Indeed, the aspirational middle-class and
elite residents of Juhapura prefer to send their children to well-known schools in Ahmedabad such as Mount Carmel, St. Xavier’s Loyola Hall, Udgam, Delhi Public School and Anand Niketan, which is evident from the visibility of some of these schools’ buses in the area.

2.2 Lobbying the State: A Mixed Space of the Private and the Public

The arrival of middle-class and elite Muslims during and after the 2002 pogrom not only contributed to new infrastructural facilities, including the establishment of new schools, but also resulted in the creation of more effective lobbies. These lobbies have been utilized to either negotiate with or put pressure on the state government and the municipal corporation—two entities which have neglected Juhapura given the Hindu nationalist bent of the state in Gujarat.

One of the first examples of these elite pressures occurred in 2010. Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, a member of the Planning Commission who collected testimonies of Muslim women victims of the 2002 pogrom, raised the issue of poor educational facilities in the annual meeting of the Planning Commission. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the Deputy Chairman of the Commission, pointed out that the ‘Muslim population in Gujarat was 9.1 per cent but enrolment data showed that only 4.7 per cent of primary school children and 4.8 per cent of upper primary school children were Muslims’ (Siddhanta, 2010). Narendra Modi, who was then CM of Gujarat, in the same meeting showed his dissatisfaction at Hameed joining protests in Juhapura. A month later, in June 2010, Saurabh Patel, the Minister of State for Planning in Gujarat, wrote a letter to Ahluwalia criticizing the commission’s focus on Juhapura and accusing Hameed of ‘build[ing] an entire case of activist-manufactured data’ (‘Saurabh contests plan’, 2010). Despite levelling these criticisms, the first municipal school in Juhapura was budgeted for in 2013 by the AMC (Sharma, 2013). A government secondary and higher secondary school serving 700 students was built only in 2016. While the area in total has seven grant-in-aid schools, it still does not have a public college (Yagnik, 2016). Private schools coupled with the existing public education system are still inadequate to cater to the educational needs of Juhapura’s residents.

The case of education shows that the arrival of middle-class and elite Muslims migrants to Juhapura has resulted in the mushrooming of some private initiatives and some level of effective lobbying. Nevertheless, as seen above, the outcome of these developments have has limited.

This mix of private and public ‘achievements’ is also obvious in health-related infrastructure. The first Urban Healthcare Centre (UHC) was inaugurated by Anandiben Patel, the then CM of Gujarat, in 2015. It clearly came very late in the day and is inadequate to serve a population of over 4 lakh Muslims. Therefore, healthcare is mostly undertaken by private clinics and charitable hospitals, such as Iqra Hospital and Amena Khatun Hospital. Besides, free healthcare camps have been organized by NGOs. For example, recently in March 2019, Hamari Awaaz organized a free healthcare camp for women in Juhapura. However, the public distrust of the emergency-related services at Juhapura’s private hospitals forces residents to visit the V. S. Hospital in Paldi or Jivraj Mehta Hospital in Vasna for emergencies—both of which are at least 3–4 kilometres away from Juhapura’s nearest entry/exit point.

The issue of healthcare in Juhapura is exacerbated by the high levels of air pollution. Juhapura is located near a sewage treatment plant run by the government. This plant releases effluent into Sabarmati River’s waterbody, worsening the air and water quality in the locality. The frequent passage of trucks on the National Highway 947, which passes through Juhapura, only adds to the air pollution. Since the ghetto is not very far from the Pirana waste dump, pejoratively known as the ‘mountain of Ahmedabad’ given its large and continually growing size, there are minuscule chances of the air pollution ever getting better.

Concerns exist about banking services, too, which had been largely absent until 2005. Bank
branches, mostly of public banks such as Bank of India, Dena Bank and State Bank of India, have come up only in the last decade—broadly coinciding with the arrival of professionals and elites in Juhapura. This trend points to a larger pattern of Muslim marginalization in the formal banking system in Gujarat, as Muslims are least likely to get a loan from banks, forcing them to procure funds from relatives or by other institutional or non-institutional means. The poor population relies on microfinance initiatives. According to a survey conducted by the NGO Saath in the poorer localities of Juhapura such as Fatehwadi, Sankalit Nagar, Ekta Maidan and Ronak Park, roughly 400 households have benefitted from their microfinance scheme. Most of these households’ earning members are active in vocations such as, inter alia, carpentry, automobile repairing, autorickshaw driving, plumbing, seasonal product making, weaving and casual labour.

The role of NGOs in the health and finance sectors suggest that the increasing presence of elites and Muslim professionals has left a mark on the civil society of Juhapura as well. New actors, such as Action for Juhapura Infrastructure Movement (AJIM), Ahmedabad Task Force (ATF) and Zubeda Seva Ghar, have added weight to civic participation and helped in mounting public pressure on the state. Zubeda Seva Ghar, for instance, helps the residents of Juhapura to fill and submit admission forms to schools under the Right to Education Act (RTE), as well as aiding in getting voting cards, ration cards, Maa Amrutam cards for free healthcare, scholarships, passports and PAN cards issued. The ATF is active on issues of encroachment removal, cleanliness and education.

On the other hand, AJIM has expressed its concern for Juhapura through a legal and rights-based approach. In 2017, AJIM approached the Gujarat High Court with a complaint against the AMC for not providing adequate basic infrastructure—street lights, traffic management, road infrastructure, removing cattle stray, etc. The High Court gave a favourable verdict and instructed the AMC to ensure the provision of basic services in Juhapura. It observed in its verdict that the ‘local authority is bound to see that the life of the persons residing in the city is made meaningful, complete and worth-living’ (2018, p. 39). Invoking Article 21 (the article on right to life) of India’s Constitution, the court gave 30 directives to the AMC to ensure, inter alia, construction of roads, maintenance of traffic and a solution to the cattle menace.

NGOs also combine private initiatives with lobbying efforts. In March 2018, social activists associated with AJIM and other organizations met Gautam Shah, the then Mayor of Ahmedabad, to present the concerns of Juhapura residents. As a result of AJIM’s legal actions and civic pressure, Juhapura is seeing some improvement in public infrastructure. At the Vishala Circle and Juhapura Cross Road, traffic police booths have been installed. These developments are in line with AJIM’s vision to ensure basic services in all parts of the ghetto in a few years’ time in Juhapura.

In June 2018, before any concrete plan for the traffic problem had been put in place, AJIM convenor Dawood Kothariya, frustrated by state inaction, personally managed the traffic in evenings at the Juhapura Cross Road during the month of Ramzan (Kothariya, 2019). Moreover, AJIM and Zubeda Seva Ghar actively help Juhapura residents fill the forms necessary to get themselves registered on the electoral roll. Gulmoin Khokhar, a member of Zubeda Seva Ghar, claims to have helped file 1,700 voter registration forms before the state election in Gujarat in 2017. AJIM claims to have helped over 1,500 residents, mostly from Fatehwadi, in applying for voter IDs in 2018 alone.

The social capital of elites has created a space for dialogue with the state government, which until now had shied away from engaging with Muslims. For example, in 2017, the Mega EduFest, an educational and career fair, was organized in Juhapura. Nearly 75 schools, tuition classes, universities and counselling agencies advertised their amenities to interested parents, guardians and children at the

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23 According to the Indian Human Development Survey (2011-12), out of eight major religious and caste groups, Muslims were least likely to get a loan from a bank in Gujarat, on par with the Adivasi population of the state.
fair. Although most of the institutes that participated specifically catered to Muslim children, there were a few exceptions, like Gujarat Vidyapith. Talks by eminent members from the Muslim community and educators were also organized. Bhupendrasinh Chudasama, the Education Minister of Gujarat, spoke at this event. A year later, the second edition of the Mega EduFest took place, on a bigger scale. In the second edition, politicians from both Congress and BJP were invited. In a way, such festivals also help with the utilitarian goal of acquiring government permissions to set up schools. Asif Pathan, an educationist and a co-organizer of EduFest, admits that the presence of the Education Minister will definitely create pressure on municipal officers to grant permission for a new school or on the education department to allow an increase in the intake of students in existing private schools (Pathan, 2019).

The state’s increasing yet inadequate presence in Juhapura is a recent phenomenon: highlights include Narendra Modi coming for the Ummat Property Show in 2014; opening of an UHC, an anganwadi, a few municipal schools, a new municipal ward-level office for Gyaspur-Maktampura; and Gautam Shah’s visit to Juhapura on an autorickshaw in 2016 (‘Mayor inspects Juhapura’, 2016). Moreover, a new flyover at Anjali Cross Road where Paldi and Vasna intersect—which is also an entry point to Juhapura—will reduce travel time and improve traffic management during peak hours. Recently, a proposal to build an English-medium government school has been sent by the District Education Office (DEO) to the Commissionerate of Schools (Dave, 2019). Some parts of Juhapura such as the Agriculture Produce Market Committee (APMC) Market and Gyaspur will soon be connected to the Ahmedabad Metro Rail project through a depot station at Gyaspur and a metro stop at APMC Market. The positive impacts that connection to the metro brings can be seen in the area around the metro station in road infrastructure and electricity and drainage lines. Other than that, a housing scheme for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) is about to be completed in Makarba, though as we highlight in the upcoming section, it may end up creating more troubles rather than helping poor Muslims.

In late July 2019, Kirit Solanki, Member of Parliament from Ahmedabad, raised the issue of building a few kilometres-long flyover at Vishala Circle, where Juhapura’s boundaries begin, in the Parliament. He insisted on constructing this overbridge to reduce the traffic of heavy transport vehicles in the ghetto and ease the movement of goods to and fro the Saurashtra-Kutch region. Moreover, Solanki wrote a letter urging Nitin Gadkari, Union Cabinet Minister for Road Transport and Highways, to solve this problem. Gadkari went on to acknowledge his letter and has promised necessary action from the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI).²⁴

However, relative improvements have not removed the tag of ‘ghetto’ from Juhapura or the pejorative public usage of ‘mini Pakistan’ when referring to it. The state’s anti-Muslim bias, too, has not gone away. A recent study comparing Juhapura with the nearby Yogeshwar Nagar, a Hindu-dominated slum, reveals that the Muslim ghetto receives far fewer municipal services, despite having a more economically mobile and socially influential population (Sahoo, 2016). More importantly, it must be acknowledged that the majoritarian nature par excellence of the State in Gujarat that has forced Juhapura’s residents to engage in lobbying efforts in the face of State hostility against Muslims; it is not a celebratory act of mutual engagement but one which is born out of helplessness and increasing marginalization. In fact, the gesture of inviting the BJP politicians to events in Juhapura does not evoke full-fledged support from civic groups. For example, Waqar Qazi of Urja Ghar, an organization actively spreading constitutional knowledge among schoolkids to inculcate active citizenship among Muslims of Juhapura, expresses his dismay at the penetration of the BJP in Juhapura. He opines: ‘Juhapura residents have started cosying up to the²⁴ His speech is available on YouTube. Bharatiya Janata Party (2019, July 31). Dr. (Prof.) Kirit Premjibhai Solanki raising ‘Matters of Urgent Public Importance’ in Lok Sabha. Retrieved May 15, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJaF1BjtAKg.
BJP because its opinion makers have allowed [it to happen]. If BJP politicians come to the EduFest, of course a resident may become inclined to support the party. For the party, it’s an open access to Juhapura!’ (Qazi, 2019).

To sum up: Juhapura has changed after it witnessed a significant influx of Muslim elites and professionals who are in better positions to privately develop the ghetto and lobby the State. In some sense, it gave the ghetto an economically heterogeneous character while further solidifying its ethnically homogeneous constitution. These elites and middle-class professionals shifted to Juhapura for two important reasons. Firstly, as we discussed above, during the 2002 carnage in Gujarat, wealthy and influential Muslims were attacked on a large-scale for the first time. Hence, the question of safety became more important than before; naturally, migration to Juhapura followed. Secondly, the real estate boom—riding on the back of world-wide easy money inflow starting in 2004–2005 and India’s economic growth—was also seen in the Muslims-dominated localities of Ahmedabad, in line with Gujarat’s fast-paced urbanization. Since the spatial movement of Muslims is limited, it was Juhapura where a big portion of this money ultimately became visible. After the migration, given their relatively better social, financial and intellectual capital, these elites could negotiate with the state for improved public delivery, though it was a negotiation constrained by the majoritarian ideology of the state in Gujarat. This form of lobbying by citizens is forced by the state’s abdication of its duties to provide for a dignified life to its citizens. The success of lobbying efforts, though visible, has been limited to certain parts of Juhapura which house the relatively better-off Muslims, signifying the non-linear character of citizenship in the ghetto.

In the next section, we focus on how the elites compare with the non-elites in the ghetto by looking at the creation of class and sect-specific colonies in Juhapura and the resilience of gender-based activism, mostly by lower-class women, in resisting conservative elements and elitism in Juhapura.

3. What Muslim Community?: The Carving Out of ‘Citadels’

Marcuse, a theoretician of urban sociology who studied differentiation within American ghettos, describes what he calls a ‘citadel’ as ‘a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority, in power, wealth or status, in relation to its neighbours, congregate as a means of protecting and enhancing that position’ (1997, p. 247). Juliette Galonnier has applied this category to the Muslims of Sir Syed Nagar in Aligarh while Ghazala Jamil has examined similar patterns in Delhi’s Muslim neighbourhoods. Jamil, for instance, notes that ‘different classes within Muslims are treated differentially in the discriminatory process. The resultant spatial “diversity” and differentiation this gives rise to among the Muslim neighbourhoods, creates an illusion of “choice”, but in reality, the flexibility of the confining boundaries only serves to make these stronger and shatter-proof’ (2017, p. 27). The idea of the citadel is also more and more relevant in the case of Juhapura, where internal spatial differentiation on socio-economic (and sectarian lines) can be seen emerging in the form of an aspirational class who are given a voice through discourses on privatization and ‘Vibrant Gujarat’. This kind of socio-economic differentiation has somewhat united the elites, while restricting the scope of ‘class-blind’ solidarities, in Juhapura.

Juhapura, as we saw above, now accommodates a thriving middle class and elite section of the Muslim community, adding an economic variety to ghettoization. These class divisions are visible in the internal boundaries of sub-localities in Juhapura, through which the various classes distinguish themselves from each other. For example, elites and upper-middle-class Muslims reside in societies mostly located at the roadside of the national highway, parts of Makarba, and on both sides of the TPS 85 main road. Juhapura’s lower class and lower-middle class, on the other hand, stay in Sankalit Nagar, Fatehwadi, Gyaspur and in some parts of Makarba. On top of the already existing elite neighbourhoods such as Prachina Society, Samir Vihar,
Zainab Park, Sardar Smriti and Khurshid Park, various large-scale real estate projects such as Al-Burj (a scheme of roughly a dozen multistoried blocks), Al Muqaam, several properties on the TPS 85 road, and the still developing Himalaya Falaknuma project have come up in recent times.

The data collected by Abida Desai show that a square yard costs Rs. 50,000–60,000 in a large number of localities (about 15), including Samir Vihar and Prachina—even Rs. 70,000 in Sardar Smruti. The price is less than half these amounts (ranging from Rs. 20,000–30,000 per square yard) in a dozen of the intermediary neighbourhoods (see Appendix 1). Desai’s data on Muslim-dominated areas other than Juhapura in Ahmedabad show that the prices of Juhapura’s upscale colonies are quite similar to other Muslim-dominated middle-class localities such as Shah-e-Alam and Dani Limbda (see Appendix 2). Only two Muslim-dominated elite localities, i.e., Paldi and Navrangpura, have a somewhat higher land price than posh colonies of Juhapura. For the elites, Juhapura emerges as a lucrative option not just for living but also for investing. In the poorest localities of Juhapura, a square yard is worth less than Rs. 15,000. We will show that despite increasing gentrification, a large underclass of poor Muslims reside in Juhapura. The land rates in poor localities compare with Vatva, Narol and Naroda—three localities which are on the periphery of Ahmedabad, with a significant population of industrial working class and casual labourers, followed by riot victims and people displaced by the gentrification of Sabarmati’s riverfront.

These figures reflect a formidable socio-economic differentiation, which is a logical corollary of the transformation of Juhapura from a slum into a ghetto in the last two or three decades. In fact, real estate inflation has stemmed from a rise in demand vis-à-vis accentuating spatial constraints: Juhapura cannot expand geographically, not only because of the wall, the highway and the roza mentioned above, but also because of the colony housing police officers near Makarba—an indirect way to keep an eye on a ‘suspicious’ community. In 2014, a few months before becoming the prime minister of India, Narendra Modi inaugurated the Ummat Property Show in Juhapura. This show, a joint partnership between Hindu developers and Muslim financiers and builders, showcased properties meant only for Muslims. Moreover, new party plots such as the Kadri party plot, Lokhandwala party plot and Ghazala party plot have developed in Juhapura in the last five years as sites for social gatherings, showing the growth of the population as well as the presence of wealthy residents.

Images 4, 5 and 6: The Two Faces of Juhapura

Credit: Christophe Jaffrelot

There are growing signs of elites flourishing in Juhapura besides development of real estate. For instance, Nadeem Jafri, an entrepreneur based
in Juhapura, saw an opportunity in the absence of any competition in the supermarket business. His enterprise, Hearty Mart Super Market, launched in 2004 in Juhapura near Vishala Circle, caters to the growing Muslim middle class and elites for their daily grocery needs. The success of the store has motivated him to open another outlet in Juhapura, albeit a few kilometres away from the first one. Now, he also faces competition from a new player, the 1 Mart, which has opened shop next to Hearty Mart’s new outlet. Similarly, in the restaurant and food business, alongside existing players like Moti Bakery and Magic Chicken, new start-ups such as Fishtry, Hop Meal, Hyderabadi Hut etc. have begun. An established player like Moti Mahal has launched a new branch inside Juhapura. Consequently, food delivery platforms such as Zomato and Swiggy—which earlier did not serve Juhapura residents—have now slowly begun to penetrate the locality.

Map 3: Socio-economic Differentiation: Lower Class, Middle Class and Elite Muslims and Sectarian Differences in Juhapura’s Colonies

Middle-class and elite Muslims are coming to Juhapura in large numbers for many different reasons, as we have seen. First, safety remains a priority in the context of a rising sense of insecurity due to the continuous campaigns ranging from re-conversion attempts by the Sangh Parivar to ‘anti-love Jihad’ activism and mob lynching in the name of cow protection. Second, to find a place in mixed neighbourhoods has become more and more difficult, because of both law and the undeclared fight against ‘land Jihad’ that Hindu vigilantes are waging. Thirdly, protecting one’s culture in the context of the growing Hinduization of the public space has become a priority for some families. This last motivation is precisely one of the root causes in the making Marcuse’s ‘citadels’ in Juhapura, socio-topographical constructs which combine cultural and socio-economic features.

However, the search for identity for Juhapura residents does not end with internal reorganization on class lines. In fact, it only begins with a renewed vigour as Muslims who used to live in walled parts of Ahmedabad broke their socio-communal bonds by shifting to Juhapura. In turn, they had to anchor themselves to new markers of identity beyond ethnic connections with their shift. For instance, Waqar Qazi delineates this feature of Muslims living in Juhapura:

Old [city] of Ahmedabad has its own culture. [In] pols [housing colonies of Old Ahmedabad], people had their social bonds since [a] long time. Juhapura broke these social connections. Who would serve in your weddings? [In] pols, your neighbours did. In Juhapura, you have to hire servers. So, this culture [of social networks] is missing [in Juhapura].

(2019)

This characteristic is another paradoxical trait of ghettoization in Juhapura, where an ethnically homogenous community destroys the old connections of society, leading to a new search for identity on not just class but also on sectarian lines. Rampant sectarianism is manifest, as shown in Map 3. Shias, who are numerically minuscule in Gujarat, have separate housing societies as a result of discrimination against them and their need to distinguish their identity from other Muslims. The Cheliya com-
community—a Shia community with Sufi traditions, mainly occupied in the restaurant business—have societies such as Haidri Bagh in Juhapura, whereas Khoja Muslims—a trading community that follows the Aga Khan—can be found in Karimi Society.

Sectarianism is most visible in mosques. For example, Deoband and Tabligh jamaat oriented Muslims believing in reformism based on originalist/fundamentalist religious discourse have penetrated Juhapura from the 1990s—in fact, they have only deepened their network with each successive riot (Jasani, 2008, pp. 431–456). They have developed over a hundred mosques and at least a couple of huge madrasas with accommodation facilities in Juhapura. Their emphasis on praying directly to Allah, not seeking an intermediary in the form of a Sufi saint buried at a dargah, seeks to demolish the hold of aristocratic upper-caste (Ashraf) Sufi families over the Muslims. In turn, frustrated Sufi Muslims in Gujarat have begun to rally around political power by joining the BJP to protect their dwindling privileges among Muslims.25

Another element of differentiation—on which we have not sufficiently focused—is of caste within Muslim societies. In Juhapura, colonies meant for specific jatis such as Chhipa Society, Mansuri Society etc. can be found. Moreover, a quick look at the names of residents in elite housing colonies (for instance, Sardar Smriti or Prachina) reveals that most of them come from Ashraf castes such as Saiyeds, Pathans, Mughals, Bohras, Memons, Khojas and upwardly mobile OBC Muslim castes such as Chippas and Mansuris. On the other hand, some of the gender-based activists we interviewed are not only from a low-caste background [mainly Ansaris] but they are also migrants who came to Gujarat in search of a better life from other parts of India. To our mind, a separate, full-scale study must be devoted to the caste question within Juhapura’s Muslims.

The trajectory of Juhapura somewhat calls to mind that of Pakistan’s: first, the Muslim League mobilized Muslims against Hindus; but after Pakistan was created, Sunni activists criticized Shi’ism and Ahmadiyas as practising wrong versions of Islam, though many influential Shias and Ahmadiyas led the movement for Pakistan. Then, the Deobandis started to say the same thing about the Barelwis, showing that the quest for a core identity is as vain as peeling an onion!

Nonetheless, the making of sectarian, caste and class-based ‘citadels’ needs to be qualified because of the growing assertiveness of women in Juhapura, especially those from lower-class and lower-caste backgrounds.

3.1 Towards a Merger of Class and Gender?

After 2002, the gender dynamic in Juhapura witnessed a significant shift as the riot robbed the community of many menfolk, and women stepped in to fill their ‘traditionally masculine’ roles. From demanding clean drinking water, organizing protests and working on rehabilitation to demanding accountability from the government, the women of Juhapura successfully managed to skew the notion of gender roles in the ghetto. Waqar Qazi, activist and founder of Urja Ghar, remarked that Juhapura owes most of the positive changes brought amongst its residents to the women of the community (2019).

Women activism did exist prior to the 2002 riot, a case in point being the Mahila Patchwork Design Anya Udyog Co-operative Society, started by Roshanben Shaikh in the late 1970s. Roshan, who moved to Sankalit Nagar in Juhapura with other slum dwellers affected by the 1973 floods, was offered support by Kirti Shah, the architect of Sankalit Nagar. With his help, she was able to enrol herself in the National Institute of Design in Ahmedabad and learned handicrafts and fashion designing. Building on her skill set, she mobilized the poor Muslim women from Sankalit Nagar to form this collective to make and sell handicrafts and patchwork products—in turn creating a means of income and employment for women in the ghetto. This initiative, now run by her daughter Farzana Shaikh, has seven self-help groups (SHGs) with over 270 members. Many women associated with

25 For more on the Sufi support to BJP in Gujarat and its implications on intra-Muslim relations, see Laliwala (2019). Good Muslims of BJP: Sunni-Shia convergence in favour of BJP in Gujarat.
these SHGs, Farzana tells us, became assertive after suffering in the riots and are now able to earn Rs. 1,500–2,000 per month (2019).

Such activism for women empowerment, and more importantly, their participation in the public sphere, received a boost after the 2002 riots as women attended public interactions, meetings, dharnas and workshops in and outside Juhapura. In some sense, it has resulted in growing signs of cultural modernization, leading to assertion of more women in the public spaces. For instance, one can see more women, including those observing hijab, driving cars and two-wheelers in Juhapura. ‘It was a women’s movement; they led it! Women came together to become the torchbearers and travelled throughout the country to spread what was happening (in Gujarat)’, says Zakia Soman, founder of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) (2019). While some women fought to escape the purdah, others led democratic protests in burqas, exemplifying multiplicity in the fight against patriarchy. Although the women had to fight against resistance from the society around them, often coming from their own families, the changes they delivered were perhaps the most radical.

More specifically, Muslim women from lower-class backgrounds participating in rights-based activism in Juhapura highlights two key elements of activism in Juhapura. First, activism from lower-class Muslim women signifies a merger of class and gender on issues of affordable housing, skill development, basic infrastructure facilities, women’s rights, etc. Second, the combination of class with gender in activism is a result of the failure to produce solidarities between various classes, especially between elites and the non-elites. In a sense, the citadels for the socio-economically well-off Muslims not only provide a way for elite Muslims to secure a lavish lifestyle while maintaining the status quo but also allow them to remain aloof from the rest of the ghetto. On this point, Zakia Soman offers, ‘Middle-class Muslim women do not want to align with lower-class Muslim women. Giving back cannot be about Zakaat [charity for poor Muslims] and Islamic schools but [should be] about democratization among Muslims’ (2019).

Assertion by the subaltern population in poor sub-localities of Juhapura highlights this fractured unity. For instance, residents of Fatehwadi do not receive drinking water from the AMC despite the area’s inclusion in municipal boundaries in 2006. The middle-class and elite societies of Juhapura either do not face these concerns or are financially capable to build private borewells whereas Fatehwadi residents have to rely on private tankers as well as borewells controlled by local strongmen. Rukaiya Shaikh, a resident of the locality since 2005, paid Rs. 10,000 as a one-time installation fee to a local strongman to develop a borewell, even though the actual construction was done by Rukaiya’s husband, who is a plumber. On top of that, she pays Rs. 300 per month to avail this facility. In 2018, frustrated by their constant water problems coupled with harassment by the local water mafia, residents of Fatehwadi, including Rukaiya, sought the help of Hamari Awaz, an NGO run by Kausherali Saiyed to organize a Paani Andolan (Movement for Water). Later that year, in October, Kausherali organized a ‘Jal Vimarsh’ dialogue with Fatehwadi residents, in which Professor Sandeep Pandey, a Magsaysay Award winner, local politicians and NGO workers participated. Though this mobilization has not resulted in any success yet, during the general elections in 2019, Hamari Awaz put up one of its grassroots workers, Shahinbanu Shaikh, as an independent candidate to contest from the Gandhinagar constituency, under which Juhapura falls.

A few kilometres away from Fatehwadi, TPS 84a awaits final government approval. As part of the scheme, an 18-metre-wide road has been planned through Alif Row House, a colony of mostly lower-class and lower-caste Muslims staying behind the posh Al-Burj housing scheme. In turn, this road will destroy over 100 houses—each having a carpet area of roughly 35 square yards—as the government maintains the colony to be an illegal one. Here, too, Hamari Awaz has intervened to lead a Vasvaat Andolan (Movement for Housing) and assisted the residents of Alif Row House to draft replies to the eviction notices served by the state government. Like Paani Andolan in Fatehwadi the movement for housing in Makarba, its convenor
Kausherali Saiyed tells, is led by women, attesting to the mix of class and gender in Juhapura.

Muslim women mobilized for the Vasvaat Andolan under the local leadership of Sabina Ansari, who is from the low-caste Julaha community of weavers and whose ancestors migrated from Uttar Pradesh to Ahmedabad to work in the textile mills. She, along with her Ansari, Shaikh and Mansuri women neighbours living in Alif Row House, who are otherwise homemakers or housemaids in the elite residencies of Juhapura, have been most vocal on the question of housing rights. Sabina complains that officials from the government had first visited them around 2015 to conduct a survey claiming that their colony would be made legal; and thus they would finally get water and sewage facilities. However, a few months later, they were served eviction notices (2019). In January 2019, Hamari Awaz led a 11-kilometre long walking march from Alif Row House to AMC’s headquarters in the old city of Ahmedabad in which over 100 women from the colony took part. Though they were not allowed inside the headquarters, the state government has now amended the plan and reduced the width of the road to 12 metres from 18 metres.

Next to Alif Row House, the state government is currently building a housing scheme for EWS. Sabina claims that though she and her neighbours applied for housing in this project, their applications were rejected. She added that mostly non-Muslims have been allotted houses. Kausherali calls the TPS 84a a classic case of crony capitalism and land grab from the poor at a prime residential location (2019). Indeed, the colony is divided on class lines: Sabina Ansari told us that the trustees of Shafilala Dargah, located at the entrance of the colony, do not wish to engage with the colony residents and have been in talks with municipal officials to save their land. Similarly, the builder of the colony, who stays in a nearby elite colony, or the residents in the houses where Sabina’s neighbours work as housemaids, have not come out in support (2019).

Women are leading a few key initiatives in personal fronts too, such as relationship problems and cases of separation. Juhapura has more than a dozen sharia adalaats (courts) run by women. Regular workshops for women’s health, education and skill development are also set up by various organizations, and more than 15,000 women have successfully started their microfinance businesses. Even as women in Juhapura are leading the fight against triple talaq and discrimination of women in religious places, while fighting for access to water and education, there still is not a place for women in any active social body unless they are co-opted. Mehrunissa Desai, a member of the Ahmedabad Muslim Women’s Association (AMWA), remarks that Muslim women need a special quota within social organizations to do more. (2019)

Noorjehan Dewan, an activist formerly with the BMMA and now works with Act Now for Harmony and Democracy (ANHAD), has worked on the issues of divorce, women’s rights, menstruation health, domestic violence, rape and education for over a decade. She expressed her concern about the high dropout rates that challenge education for girls in the ghetto. Despite increasing focus on women’s rights issues, the ground reality in Juhapura is very far from the ideal scenario (2019). Juhapura has no all-girls’ college, which makes it significantly harder for girls to access higher education. Although many organizations offer counselling services, advocate for education and conduct skill development workshops, lack of access remains a significant barrier for progress. Mehrunissa Desai, however, draws attention to the changing perception of education in the ghetto. She explains that in the past, maulanas used to sermonize that the maximum a girl should be educated was till the tenth standard. Now, they subscribe to the idea of girls studying as much as they want. Desai goes a step further, claiming that contrary to popular perception, Islam is a feminist religion. She says the religion champions women’s rights and that she uses Islam as the basis to fight for rights, merging the language of rights with religious imagery (2019).

26 We have not independently verified this claim with the AMC.

27 See Laliwala (2020). How Muslims are creating a new vocabulary of secularism for Indian democracy.
4. Recommendations

After attempting to understand Juhapura and its paradoxes, here we look at a few ways to possibly unravel the problems it is plagued with. While these recommendations are in no way comprehensive solutions for the multitudes of problems residents face every day, they constitute the first stepping stones in the right direction.

We recognize politics as the primary means of social justice. Therefore, first and foremost, the reorganization of municipal ward boundaries by AMC and the boundaries of Vejalpur Vidhan Sabha constituency by the Election Commission of India is necessary. Gerrymandering by the state government cages the Muslim voter base within set boundaries to diminish the value and efficacy of their votes. A lack of strong political leadership, facilitated by procedural undermining of democratic outcomes, hurts Juhapura in seeking solutions for its multitudinous problems. Restructuring boundaries will effectively reflect Muslim votes in truth, allowing Juhapura residents a better chance at representation, which may ensure that their problems, particularly about access to civic amenities, are given a voice at the legislative assembly level. Political representation is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for improving the substance of social democracy. Kausherali Syed, a social worker in Juhapura, believes the same: ‘Till we have 18 Muslim representatives in [the] Vidhan Sabha, not much will change (2019)’.

An inter-linked hurdle for Gujarati Muslims is the difficulties imposed by the Disturbed Areas Act on the freedom of their movement within the state. A senior BJP worker, who wishes to remain anonymous, alluded that the act has been used for electoral gains (2019). He remarked that the act, coupled with the delimitation order downsizing the number of municipal wards from 64 to 48 in 2015, have been used to segregate wards in such a way that no Muslim candidate could effectively form a majority and get fair representation in the Legislative Assembly (‘Delimitation order announced, 2015’). Murtuza Khan Pathan, the Congress candidate from Vejalpur constituency in the state election in 2012, agrees with this (2019). If the act is removed, the Muslim population would be able to disperse and, perhaps, more MLAs from the community may emerge.

Apart from restricting the representation of Muslims by pushing them to Muslim-exclusive enclaves or ghettos, the act effectively turns them to second-class citizens with limits on their fundamental rights, such as the freedom to buy and sell properties in major parts of urban Gujarat. We acknowledge that this law enables de jure Hindu Rashtra in Gujarat, contradicting the secular, plural character of the Indian Constitution which guarantees equal rights for everyone and special protection rights for religious and cultural minorities. In 2018, Danish Qureshi and Nishant Varma, two social activists based in Ahmedabad, filed a PIL in Gujarat High Court urging the judiciary to declare this law as unconstitutional. While the matter was still subjudice, the Gujarat government decided to amend the law and make it more stringent (and almost impossible) for a Hindu and a Muslim to buy or sell properties from or to each other in urban Gujarat (‘Disturbed Areas Act’, 2018). It is clear that the state in Gujarat stands steadfastly behind this law. Therefore, the abolition or even dilution of the act remains highly unlikely. In that case, only the court of law remains a sound avenue to strike down

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28 In an interview with the authors on February 17, 2019
or read down this legislation, though introducing private members’ bills to revoke the law may be a useful symbolic gesture to kick-start a mainstream debate on the subject.

Another issue the chapter covered was that of the TPS sprouting up in Juhapura. These schemes generally involve a voluntary giving up of some parts of one’s private property to build wider roads, parks, healthcare facilities, sewage systems, street lights, educational facilities etc. In August 2019, the Government of Gujarat approved the first TPS, TPS 85, in Juhapura. Its finalization had been pending for almost a decade. Yet, the other TPSes in the pipeline, particularly TPS 84a, will end up destroying a significant number of illegal colonies occupied by poor residents. As we noted, there are allegations of crony capitalism and land grab by the builders in an alliance with municipal officers. The AMC must address these concerns and should consult the residents of the colonies which will be affected before approving the schemes.

A plan to build 75 flyovers in Gujarat was announced in February 2019, of which Ahmedabad bagged the lion’s share with 20 flyovers. The government allocated 2,000 crores to ease traffic flow and all flyovers will be built with state government funds. Moreover, the state also proposed a budget of Rs. 250 crores to address traffic at railway crossings by proposing to build 37 railways flyovers and underbridges (‘75 flyovers’, 2019). A flyover for Juhapura, which appears in a dire need of one, remained overlooked, until very recently. The main road which passes by the area is a part of the National Highway and hence sees a lot of traffic from heavy-duty vehicles such as trucks and carriers. Not only is this road plagued by heavy traffic, the traffic often leads to several life-threatening accidents. AJIM members approached the mayor several times regarding the issues of lack of traffic police, narrow roads and the need for a flyover, Daud Kotharia, one of its members, said, but to no avail (2019). In July 2019, Kirit Solanki raised the requirement of a flyover in Juhapura in a zero-hour debate in Lok Sabha, and the Government of India has begun a preliminary study to look into this possibility.

Lack of public infrastructure in Juhapura is not limited to the need for a flyover on its main street. The municipal authorities must build pucca roads and supply drinking water in poorer sub-localities of Juhapura such as Fatehwadi and Ice Factory Road in Gyaspur. Other than that, the lack of street lights in parts of Fatehwadi raises a serious concern over the safety of commuters, especially women. Slowly, the infrastructure for electricity and sewage has developed in Fatehwadi—the most backward part of Juhapura—which is a much delayed but welcome change. In the same sub-locality, the supply of drinking water by the AMC is abrupt and most poor residents have to rely either on a community borewell or private tankers. Gautam Shah, incumbent mayor, in early 2018 insinuated that the reason they do not get services was because Juhapura residents do not pay taxes. He informed this to a group of civil actors from Juhapura. However, an informal survey by AJIM found that around 90 per cent residents do pay taxes, according to Daud Kothariya, who attended the meeting with Shah (2019).

‘Civic amenities neglect is the result of [a] discriminatory mindset,’ says Zakia Soman, an activist who has worked in Juhapura (2019). This stigmatization results in isolation, which makes it easier to overlook the ghetto and its problems. Inter-community dialogue and education on civil and constitutional rights is hence essential to weave Juhapura back into the Ahmedabad cityscape. One such initiative was the Ekta Maidan, situated between Yash Complex and Zalak Apartments on the Juhapura boundary (also known as the ‘Border’). It was meant to be a symbol of Hindu–Muslim brotherhood. But, as a resident remarked, it now seems more like a reminder of a hollow promise:
‘I remember going to meet one of my friends, Subhasbhai, on Diwali days,’ Bapu said. ‘He used to live in Gokuldham, across the road. He came to my house every Eid. But now Ekta [Maidan] seems to have lost its charm.’

(Shaikh, 2016)

To promote Hindu–Muslim unity and, more importantly, to prevent violent episodes of ethno-religious conflicts, everyday civic engagement between communities is crucial, according to Ashutosh Varshney’s oft-quoted research (2013). However, Ahmedabad remains an exception to this rule as sufficient evidence exists to show that neighbours with strong social bonds participated in violence against each other in the 1980s, 1990s and the 2002 pogrom (if not in the 1969 riot). Hence, though we recommend building new initiatives to cultivate religious harmony, we are uncertain about its actual impact in preventing ethnic rioting, given the biased role of the state during riots and the deep penetration of the Hindutva ideology inside the minds of people in Gujarat.

Likewise, we recommend that the Muslim community must look internally at some of the paradoxes highlighted in this research. For example, lower-class Muslim women are asserting themselves in Juhapura without the support of elite, well-off Muslims. Not only are their issues different from those of elite Muslims, but their vocabulary of expression is also quite unique: these women, as we highlighted, use the vocabulary of rights and often take to the streets. This fractured state of unity needs to be addressed by influential political and civic actors among Juhapura’s elites. Again, here, the mindset of the Muslim community’s financial and political elites as well as its intelligentsia needs to change to accommodate the concerns of lower-class and lower-caste Muslims and women. This form of solidarity will not only enhance the numerical strength to tackle Juhapura’s problems but also, as we noted above, democratize the character of the Muslim community.

5. Conclusion: a Model for Hindu Rashtra?

Juhapura, presumably the largest Muslim ghetto in India, is remarkably complex. In its early phases, Juhapura was primarily a refuge which grew when victims of floods were resettled in its midst. However, the locality expanded mostly in relation to the anti-Muslim violence in Ahmedabad, India’s ‘riot-city’ par excellence. Gradually, it attracted poor Muslims, along with a limited number of elite Muslims, who fled the mixed neighbourhoods of the old city and its industrial belt throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

The 2002 pogrom made a difference to the composition of the ghetto. For the first time, middle-class and elite Muslims were systematically targeted on a massive scale in different parts of the city. In turn, they left mixed residential areas of West Ahmedabad to find refuge in the only place where Muslims were in a majority and where there was enough land to build new, lavish houses: Juhapura. This migration flow transformed the slum-like character of Juhapura into a ghetto, a social construct where the rich and poor gather together because of their ethno-religious identity and the stigma it carries. Thus, Juhapura became an area developed purely on the grounds of ethnic homogeneity by a vulnerable community in search of safety, with its own set of economic divisions.

Paradoxically, this process has resulted in some development as the newcomers have enough social, intellectual and financial capital for initiating private undertakings, including the building of the schools, clinics and roads they needed—and which were to some extent accessible to the poorer Muslims. Besides, this new elite are in a better position to lobby the state administration for getting the public facilities the taxpayers of Juhapura are entitled to. They also created NGOs which were committed to both social work and lobbying as pressure groups. Yet, this transactional relationship with the State to ‘negotiate’ for better public facilities in Juhapura, as we noted above, has not resulted in full-scale development of public services in the ghetto,
given the state’s anti-Muslim bias and majoritarian character.

However, internal boundaries within Juhapura are represented by citadels where rather affluent Muslims are carving out large colonies for themselves. Moreover, the price of land and real estate is increasing quickly because of the ratio between demand and supply of square yards: applicants are many, whereas the availability of land is limited. As a result, the poor are pushed to the periphery of Juhapura, forming new slums or crowding into old ones such as Fatehwadi, Gyaspur and parts of Makarba and Sankalit Nagar around elite citadels.

Besides this socio-economic differentiation, sectarian identities also undermine the unity of Juhapura. If the post-2002 trauma had temporarily fostered solidarity among the Muslim minority, the gradual relaxation of the threat has allowed schisms from within to surface. However, the new assertiveness of women from poorer backgrounds, which took shape in the aftermath of the pogrom, has created changes in different parts of Juhapura. It is not only a form of resistance against socio-economic and sectarian differentiation within the ghetto but also a quest for social democratization, merging identities of class and gender. We have not adequately studied the caste angle (Ashraf, Ajlaf, Arzal differentiations) within Muslims, which is a crucial avenue for future investigations.

While the last sections of the chapter highlight the inner life and dynamics of Juhapura, showing that the citizenship experienced by Muslims in a ghetto is not linear for different sections of the population, the first section has described a state-facilitated process of exclusion which continues to prevail even today. In Ahmedabad, Muslims are marked ‘unwelcome’ through the technique of anti-Muslim violence (repeatedly used by the Sangh Parivar since the late 1960s), state hostility, marginalization and cultural deepening of the Hindutva ideology. This modus operandi of driving Muslims out reached its culmination point in 2002. Moreover, two other factors have played a consolidating role: first, it is almost impossible for Muslims to live in Hindu-dominated colonies due to the vigilante groups that operate with a certain level of State backing and which fight against ‘land jihad’, something that has been observed elsewhere in India as well (Vatsa, 2017). Second, the State has adapted, amended and implemented the Disturbed Areas Act 1991 in such a way that Muslims cannot live in mixed neighbourhoods. This law not only covers an increasingly large number of localities in Ahmedabad, but it has also been used in Bharuch, Godhra, Himmatnagar, Kapadvanj, Surat and Vadodara. In this sense, Gujarat, the first laboratory of Hindutva politics, has transformed a de facto Hindu Rashtra into a de jure one with legal sanctions restricting freedoms of Muslim communities.

The making of Muslim ghettos across India reflects a sociopolitical development: the making of a de facto Hindu Rashtra (Jaffrelot, 2019). The anti-Muslim bias of the Indian state has been particularly legitimized with the recent nation-wide rise of Hindu nationalist politics, especially in North Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, etc. In this new dispensation, or the so-called ‘new normal’, religious minorities—mainly Muslims—are not welcome in mixed and Hindu-dominated neighbourhoods. The poor (and low-caste) Muslims have faced the brunt of these changes, through rising hate crimes leading to mob lynching in multiple parts of India. This craze for obliterating the Other is not only directed towards Muslims’ accommodations, but also their very presence in the public space. For instance, in Gurgaon, Muslims have been prevented by vigilante groups and the state government of Haryana from offering Namaaz out in the open, whereas Hindu processions are allowed and the RSS runs shakhas in public gardens and university campuses across the country. Whatever the method, the objective remains the same: to render Muslims invisible (Ali, 2008; Dayal, 2018; Chatterjee, 2018).

After solidifying its national position in the 2019 general election, the BJP has begun to emulate the de jure model of Hindu Rashtra, on the lines of its successful implementation in Gujarat. For instance, the recently passed Citizenship Amendment Act 2019 offers Indian citizenship to individuals
from all religious groups, except Muslims, from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, inserting an ethnic criterion to qualify for India’s citizenship (Jaffrelot & Laliwala, 2019). When this law is read alongside the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC), or its diluted counterpart, the National Population Register (NPR), purportedly meant to drive out ‘infiltrators’, it exemplifies the transformation par excellence of India into a legally sanctioned, or in other words, de jure, Hindu Rashtra.

Appendix 1: Land Rates per Square Yard in Juhapura, 2013–2014 and 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of the Housing Society</th>
<th>2013–2014 (INR)</th>
<th>2019 (INR)</th>
<th>Class (Lower Class, Middle, Upper Middle/Elite)</th>
<th>Dominant Community (Shia/Sunni)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fazle Rehmani</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lovely Park</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sanjar Park</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hariyali</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nasheman</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Samir Vihar</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Prachina</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Javed Park</td>
<td>22,000</td>
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<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Royal Park</td>
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<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
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<td>Amir Park</td>
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<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>Union Park</td>
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<td>42,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Amane-Gulistan</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chhipa Society</td>
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<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>SBI Colony</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Noor-e-Burhan</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>Shaheen Extension</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Near Moti Bakery</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Shia/Khoja</td>
</tr>
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<td>Shia</td>
</tr>
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<td>Khurshid Park</td>
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<td>70,000</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Lower Price</td>
<td>Upper Price</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Zenab Residency</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Zenab Park</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Baghe Firdaus</td>
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<td>45,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kajal Park</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Chinar</td>
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<td>48,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Arshad Park</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Fatehwadi B/h Canal</td>
<td>7,000–8,000</td>
<td>10,000–15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Al Burooj (per flat)</td>
<td>45,00,000</td>
<td>60,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Royal Akbar</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Bostan Gulistan</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Bagh-e-Nishat</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Himmat Jigar</td>
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<td>35,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Al-Farooq</td>
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<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Ekta Maidan</td>
<td>7,000–8,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Sharifabad</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Sankalitnagar</td>
<td>7,000–9,000</td>
<td>10,000–15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Green Park</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Shia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Park Land Khoja</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Khoja/Shia</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Shia Boys Hostel</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>Shia</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Nalsarovar Vasahat</td>
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<td>12,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Naseem Parlour area</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Haidri Park</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
<td>Shia-Cheliya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Ice Factory area</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Rizwan Row House</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Saleem Nagar</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Hazrat Khwaja Society</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Al Ameen Society</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 2: Land Rates in Muslim-dominated Localities (Excluding Juhapura) in Ahmedabad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Locality or Colony</th>
<th>Current Prices (per square yard except for Flats, Shed Houses) (INR)</th>
<th>Class (Lower Class, Middle Class, Upper Middle Class and Elite)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shah e Alam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Opposite Shalimar Theatre</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammadi Society</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rajasthan Society</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Near Mira Cinema</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Flats Near Shah e Alam gate (2 BHK)</td>
<td>20,00,000</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|     | Dani Limbda               |                                                                   |                                                                 |
| 1   | Shakti Society            | 50,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 2   | Danilimbda Village        | 50,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 3   | Sardar Society            | 70,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 4   | Vinay Kunj                | 70,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 5   | Nirbhay Nagar             | 70,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 6   | Kirti Society             | 70,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 7   | Memon Society             | 70,000                                                            | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |

|     | Jamalpur                  |                                                                   |                                                                 |
| 1   | Jamalpur Business Area    | 80,000–1,00,000                                                   | Business Area                                                  |

|     | Vatva                     |                                                                   |                                                                 |
| 1   | Saiyed Wadi (NA/NOC clear)| 15,000–20,000                                                     | Lower Class                                                    |
| 2   | Canal area - Aluminium Shed Houses | 5,00,000                                   | Lower Class                                                    |
| 3   | Canal area - Brick Shed Houses | 7,00,000                              | Lower Class                                                    |
| 4   | Flats - Baghe Burhan, Classic Park | 35,00,000–45,00,000 | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |

|     | Narol                     |                                                                   |                                                                 |
| 1   | Interior Plots            | 10,000–20,000                                                     | Lower Class                                                    |
| 2   | Front Side Plots          | 30,000–40000                                                      | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |
| 3   | Aluminium Shed Houses     | 4,50,000–5,50,000                                                 | Lower Class                                                    |
| 4   | Duplex -35 square yard - Brick Shed | 7,00,000–8,00,000     |                                                                 |

<p>|     | Naroda                    |                                                                   |                                                                 |
| 1   | Naroda Patia - Aluminium Shed | 4,00,000–5,00,000     | Lower Class                                                    |
| 2   | Naroda Patia - Bricks Shed | 5,00,000–7,00,000                                                | Lower Class                                                    |
| 3   | New Flats                 | 35,00,000–45,00,000                                               | Upper Middle Class and Elite                                   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Price Range</th>
<th>Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paldi</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aashiana Flats</td>
<td>50,00,000–60,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tagore Flats</td>
<td>50,00,000–60,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rajnagar Society (Flats)</td>
<td>65,00,000–70,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kashmir Society (Flats)</td>
<td>65,00,000–70,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Faiz Mohammed Society - Residency Flats</td>
<td>75,00,000–80,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Varsha Flats (New)</td>
<td>80,00,000+</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navrangpura (Muslim Society)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Old Flats near Railway Track</td>
<td>50,00,000–70,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Old Flats inside</td>
<td>80,00,000–1,00,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Road facing Old Flats</td>
<td>1,50,00,000+</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>New Flats</td>
<td>3,00,00,000–5,00,00,000</td>
<td>Upper Middle Class and Elite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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