The Politics of Islam in Europe and North America

December 2018
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The Project on Middle East Political Science

The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network that aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community. POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. For more information, see http://www.pomeps.org.

Sciences Po Centre de Recherches Internationales

Founded at Sciences Po in 1952, the CERI is today France's principal research center dedicated to the study of international/transnational relations and regional area studies. The Center has been directed by Alain Dieckhoff since the beginning of 2014 and has enjoyed the status of joint research entity (UMR 7050) under the combined auspices of Sciences Po and the CNRS, since 2002. For more information, see http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/.
There has traditionally been a wide divide between the study of the politics of Islam in the Middle East and in the West. Middle East-focused research in American political science has focused in great depth on issues such as political mobilization, social service provision, electoral performance, and Islamist ideologies. American research on Islam in the West, by contrast, has often focused on cultural conflicts, immigration, terrorism, and anti-Islamic campaigns.

The European media debate about Islam has for years been dominated by the disagreement among Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, and François Burgat. For Kepel, the challenge of Islam is rooted in religion, transmitted from the Middle East through networks of migration, and reshaping the Muslim lower classes in dangerous ways. For Roy, the rise of fundamentalism is an effect of globalization and the disconnection between religion and culture that makes religiosity more rigid and codified. Importantly, he argues, this transformation concerns all religions, and not just Islam (see the rise of Evangelical fundamentalism globally). For Burgat, the challenge begins from socioeconomic exclusion and political grievance due to the unresolved postcolonial trauma of migrant populations, with Islam providing the idiom for political dissent rather than the explanation.

But despite the focus on the media, the three positions have unequally influenced the academic production of younger generations of European scholars of Islam. While the scholarship of Roy and Burgat has inspired numerous studies of Muslims’ renewed modes of practice and Islamic mobilizations, very few scholars today endorse the approach of Kepel without qualifying it and contextualizing it. Today’s European scholarship on Islam distinguishes itself by a wide spectrum of methods, topics, and fieldworks, with a trend toward strong ethnographic research. Over the last two decades, a prolific and pluralist field of scholarship on Islam and Muslims in Europe and the U.S. has emerged and brought to the fore innovative perspectives and understudied topics.

One major trend of European scholarship, inspired by anthropologists Talal Asad and Saba Mahmoud and political theorist Charles Taylor, has used the study of practices and claims of second generation Muslims in Europe and the U.S to further interrogate the binary between religion and secularism. Rejecting exceptionalist treatment of Islamic practice, scholars have explored quotidian forms of religiosities, in various fields such as eating, fashion, arts, dating, school pedagogy, and fatwa issuance (Jouili, Peter, Shirin-Moazami, Fadil, Caeiro). A second major trend of scholarship has focused more specifically on the way in which European and American Muslims engage with politics. It has examined forms of mobilization, institutionalization, and authority production in the context of increasingly tensed relations with Western states.

There are good reasons to bring these divergent American and European literatures on the Middle East and the Western context into greater conversation. The divide in the literature is not necessarily reflective of the analytical overlaps across these very different contexts, however. In both contexts, Islam has become a vernacular of politics which has informed political organization, mobilization, and thought. Middle Eastern Islamism takes place within authoritarian, Muslim-majority systems, while in the West it involves Muslim minorities and democratic systems. Common questions emerge about the relationship between Islam and the state, the ability of Islamists to capture the representation of Islam within the political system, and the degree to which Islam offers organizational advantages for political and social mobilization.
On June 28, 2018, POMEPS and Sciences Po CERI convened a workshop with a dozen scholars of Islam and politics in Europe and North America to explore these similarities and differences. The scholars in this workshop engage with these various perspectives. Their work illustrates the richness of the field of the politics of Islam in Europe and the U.S.

Several key themes emerged from these discussions and papers.

**There is great diversity across Muslim communities.** For all the recent discussions of transnational and global Islam allegedly erasing local particularities, the papers in our collection suggest that national differences and identities persist despite the rhetoric of a global Islam. Both within and across countries, our participants observed significant differences in social organization, religious practice and political orientation along national lines. In some cases, those divisions overlap with sectarian differences, and can be exacerbated by rising global trends in Sunni-Shi’a tensions. In others, the divisions have to do with different rates and moments of migration, as with the persistent differences among Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Muslim communities in France. In yet others, the divide is ethnic and linguistic, as with the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany, or the South Asian-Arab divides in the United Kingdom.

**A generational divide can be seen almost everywhere.** Participants highlighted the importance of generational divides in almost every context. The new forms of religiosity and views of political authority emerging in younger generations challenged very different existing institutional structures in strikingly similar ways. The younger generations engaged differently with political parties and officially sanctioned Islamic organizations, showing less deference to putative leaders and greater initiative in seeking out their own authorities. The effects of such autonomy varied widely, however, empowering new leaders as different as the jihadists of the Islamic State, radical artists, and lifestyle-focused “soft” Islamic preachers.

**The state is deeply involved in regulating and shaping Islamic politics.** The role of the state in defining the terms of Muslim participation in politics emerged as a central theme in almost every essay in the collection. The alienation of Muslim communities from states has been a central theme in recent political discussion, but in fact the relationship between these communities and the state is far more complex. In some cases, national legislation or the politicization of Islam as a polarizing campaign issue directly affected Muslim communities. In others, it took the form of state actors changing the political organization of Muslim communities through their seeking out of – or, in some cases, active construction of – authoritative interlocutors. Seemingly mundane urban zoning regulations have had tremendously significant effects on the construction of mosques and the formation of collective identities around them. Terrorism has had a particularly acute impact, defining Muslim integration as a security issue and dramatically expanding the reach of the state into the policing and surveillance of those communities. This has generated cooperative relations between Muslim institutions and the state, in a common effort to police communities against extremism, but also new forms of youth activism and resistance to what is viewed as state overreach and drift into racist practices and rhetoric.
Islamic authority is rapidly evolving. The case studies in the collection demonstrate in evocative ways how the nature of Islamic authority has evolved and changed. New religious authorities have emerged, often from non-traditional sources. New media forms have been especially important for raising the profile and the authority of these new types of preachers and religious figures. The contest between traditional religious authorities and these new figures plays out across generational lines, with significant implications for political organization and ideological orientations. From a security viewpoint, these new Islamic authorities are often viewed as dangerous pathways towards extremism, and as such represent a force to be confronted and regulated. But from other vantage points, the new religious authorities represent positive forces of change from within challenged communities.

Politics can be a source of both integration and alienation. The case studies and empirical analysis in the collection reveal the dual edged nature of Muslim political participation in these Western democracies. Muslim communities able to organize effectively to win elections and influence state policy offer a traditional route for the political integration of minority communities. But that very success generates backlash, as can be seen in the anti-Muslim populist campaigns which have risen in prominence across Europe and the United States. The wide variation in political participation across these countries allows for useful datasets to test competing propositions about alienation and participation. Throughout different contexts, we see Muslims struggling with recurrent challenges and dilemmas. We observe similar debates about what exactly counts as Islamic mobilizations, institutions, or forms of authority in non-Muslim contexts where Muslims inevitably borrow from the methods and principles of existing groups such as leftist parties or civil rights organizations. Muslims’ various forms of political engagement also lead to internal disputes about whether engaging with local politics will lead to a dilution of the Islamic identity and cooptation or can actually subvert the current normative understanding of Islam as a threat.

The essays in this collection bring out some of the outstanding new research on Muslim politics in Europe and North America and offer an intriguing window into an emerging interdisciplinary body of scholarship. We are delighted to present POMEPS Studies 32, The Politics of Islam in Europe and North America.

Marc Lynch, George Washington University and Director of POMEPS
Nadia Marzouki, Sciences Po CERI
December 2018
French Muslim authorities as social troubleshooters

Margot Dazey, University of Cambridge

Anthropologists of secularism and sociologists of Islam have concerned themselves with the paradoxical governance of religion in secular states. Grounded in binaries of improper versus proper versions of Islam, state efforts of architecting domestic forms of Islam in Western Europe consist in discouraging “extremist” practices and encouraging “moderate” ones through a range of security pressures and political prescriptions (Agrama 2012, Fernando 2014, Laurence 2012, see also Aguilar, Khemilat and Talpin in this collection). This essay uses a case study of a French Muslim organization to analyze the ways normative expectations of a “civil Islam” (Peter 2006, Sèze 2016) both constrain and enable the political agency of actors claiming authority within French Muslim communities. It argues that while governmental demands incentivize Muslim authorities to adopt dominant scripts about a moderate and peaceable Islam, this process works both ways as Muslim authorities also draw on their own textual traditions to justify the civic role of religion in the public sphere. Revivalist Islamic actors, in particular, are well-equipped to posit the social appeasement functions that religion can serve in public life. In short, the promotion of a “civil Islam” in France can be, at times and quite paradoxically, the product of a converging agenda between state authorities and certain conservative Muslim actors.

This essay builds on an in-depth case study of the Union des organisations islamiques de France (Union of Islamic Organizations of France, UOIF)—a prominent Muslim umbrella organization in the French Islamic landscape, founded in 1983 and drawing its ideological and organizational inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood. It focuses on two significant episodes which took place in the mid-2000s and illustrated how the right-wing government then in office and UOIF activists coincidentally concurred in using religion as a tool for social and political quieting. Importantly, these episodes laid out the ambivalent roles of community brokers and social troubleshooters endorsed by some representative Muslim organizations in the context of the institutionalization of Islam into government-initiated Islamic councils.

The hostage crisis, summer 2004

The first episode that encapsulated these convergences in encouraging the peacekeeping role of Muslim authorities occurred when two French journalists were taken hostage in Iraq during the summer of 2004. In response to the captors’ demands to repeal the newly-passed law banning the wearing of headscarves in French public schools (March 2004), the reaction of the UOIF was threefold.

Firstly, UOIF leaders vigorously opposed the abduction, with the president of the organization Lhaj Thami Breze arguing that “today all Muslims are being taken hostage” and that “the abductors are enemies of Islam”,1 while participating in a solidary march in Paris. In the aftermath of a joint meeting with other Muslim representatives at the Ministry of the Interior, UOIF member Fatiha Ajbli eloquently declared that she was ready to volunteer to replace the journalists taken hostages. In her own words: “I am afraid that my headscarf could become associated with these people. I don’t want my headscarf to be stained with blood.”2 These various public interventions served a common purpose, staging UOIF leaders as reliable and obliging spokespersons of the Muslim populations in France.

Secondly, UOIF general secretary, Fouad Alaoui, suggested “out of a sense of responsibility” that a Muslim delegation

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1 Lhaj Thami Breze quoted in *Le Figaro*, 30 August 2004 “Ces ravisseurs sont des ennemis de l’islam”.

2 Fatiha Ajbli quoted in *La Croix*, 31 August 2004 “Les enlèvements en Irak”.
should be sent to Baghdad to help secure the release of the journalists. His proposition was met with enthusiasm by state authorities, and three representatives of the principal Muslim organizations in France were sent to Iraq with the mission of contradicting the religious arguments advanced by the abductors. Upon his return, Fouad Alaoui commented on his meeting with Iraqi Sunni authorities and underscored how the religious nature of his delegation had been politically expedient in the negotiations:

We were struck by the fact that all our interlocutors stressed that they were expecting our visit. They told us expressly that our initiative was likely to succeed, because we were Muslims of France and the abductors claimed that they were advancing the protection of French Muslims in their claims.

Thirdly, UOIF leaders turned the regular Friday prayer at the organization’s headquarters in La Courneuve into a “national prayer” for the release of the hostages (Bowen 2007: 145). In his sermon, UOIF preacher Mokhtar Jaballah sought to balance the hesitant mobilization of his organization against the law banning headscarves in public schools with a declared concern for national cohesion. To this end, he expounded on a Quranic verse concerning ethnic and national differences in order to call for mutual respect and understanding, while ranking the hostages’ right to life above the veiled students’ right to religious expression. This religious repertoire of action further epitomized the ways in which UOIF leaders couched their role of political mediators in Islamic terms.

Overall, the French government applauded the sense of civic responsibility displayed by UOIF representatives. The Minister of Education interpreted the reactions of UOIF leaders as a conciliatory move towards the acceptance of the banning of headscarves in public schools: “The UOIF had, until now, pursued a legal rationale to circumvent the law on the headscarf. In the aftermath of this weekend, the organization has embraced a republican rationale.” Meanwhile, the steps undertaken by the organization to solve the crisis strengthened its credibility as a reliable partner in the eyes of the Minister of Interior, while enhancing its legitimacy in the broader public sphere.

To summarize, the self-positioning of UOIF leaders as responsible representatives of the national “Muslim community”, taking seriously their role of religious mediators towards hostile extremist groups, won them some political credit—at least temporarily.

Suburb riots, autumn 2005

A second episode illustrating the coincidental promotion of “civil Islam” by government and revivalist actors was played out during the urban riots of 2005. The riots, which particularly affected marginalized urban territories in France (referred to as the banlieues in public conversations), followed the deaths of two French youths fleeing the police in the Parisian suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. As these events occurred, the UOIF leadership issued a “fatwa concerning the troubles affecting France.” With the objective of condemning the destruction of goods and violent actions, the fatwa—that is, an Islamic legal opinion—read as follows:

Every Muslim living in France, whether citizen or guest, has the right to demand the scrupulous respect of his being, dignity and belief, as well as to act for greater equality and social justice. But this action must never take place against the Islamic teaching and the law which regulates common life.

"The fatwa was issued on the 6th November 2005 by Dar al Fatwa, a Fatwa council attached to the UOIF and created in 1988.

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3 Interview with Fouad Alaoui, La Courneuve, 2016.
4 Fouad Alaoui quoted in Le Monde, 3 September 2004 “La visite du CFCM à Bagdad a été bien accueillie”.
5 Le Monde, 4 September 2004 “Prére nationale’ musulmane à La Courneuve pour concilier solidarité et revendication du voile”.
6 François Fillon quoted in Le Point, 2 September 2004, “Le nouveau visage de l’islam de France”.
7 Le Monde, 4 September 2004, “Avec la crise des otages et la rentrée, le Conseil français du culte musulman a assis sa légitimité”.
8 Bruno Etienne quoted in La Croix, 1 September 2004.
9 The fatwa was issued on the 6th November 2005 by Dar al Fatwa, a Fatwa council attached to the UOIF and created in 1988.
UOIF scholars hence deployed an Islamic grammar to condemn the rioters’ actions, drawing on their revivalist tradition which promotes Islam as a mode of social governance and code for moral citizenship (Caeiro 2006). A few days before the fatwa was issued, UOIF leaders had already sent a regional delegate to Clichy—a gesture that the secretary general of the organization defended along the following lines:

We cannot exclude religion from the social field. It can be a factor of appeasement. If all the laws and rules don’t achieve to control men [cadrer les hommes], religion can play its role more fully.10

This quotation illustrates the role of social control that the UOIF leadership willingly endorsed during the riots. In a similar way to the hostage crisis described above, UOIF leaders justified their political intervention in terms of an “ethic of responsibility”; they felt a duty to enlighten Muslim believers about the right course of action. In his introductory remarks to the Annual meeting of France’s Muslims, which took place a few months after the riots, UOIF president Lhaj Thami Breze further advocated the appeasing role that religion could play in the political life of the country:

[The waves of violence in the banlieues] have revealed a deep and multifaceted discontent which cannot justify violent action or the damage to property. In the light of this tragic event, a cooling off period is urgently needed. All actors concerned with peace and social cohesion have sought to contribute to a return to tranquillity. Religion, with its own approach and efforts, has answered the call through the directives and interventions of the organizations’ leaders. Shouldering its responsibility fully, the UOIF has endeavoured, through its fatwa, to engage those who identified themselves as Muslims among the youth participating in these events.11

With little impact on the ground, since rioters were driven by socio-economic motivations rather than religious concerns, the fatwa was well received by right-wing politicians who hailed the UOIF’s positive intervention in public affairs, suspending their usual suspicions on the organization. For instance, the spokesperson of the main right-wing political party in France stated in the weekly press conference of her party that it was “normal” that the UOIF “uses a fatwa to call youth for a calm down” in the banlieues.12 Their reaction illustrates the ambivalent interpretation of laïcité by French political elites, sometimes excluding religion as an unacceptable dimension of public life and sometimes invoking its supposed potential for pacification and social control (Galembert, 2016, p. 76). The entire political sequence came to exemplify how the social interventionism of religious actors could be encouraged by secular authorities and UOIF leaders simultaneously.

**Expedient community brokers?**

The hostage crisis and the urban riots took place in the context of the government-led institutionalization of Islam into the Conseil français du culte musulman (the French Council of the Muslim Faith), in which the UOIF was coopted by successive Ministers of Interior in the late 1990s and 2000s (Laurence 2012). This Council reflects the promotion of religion as a form of social regulation and the summoning of UOIF to contribute to this process (Zeghal 2005). It also elucidates expectations held by some French politicians that Muslim organizations should serve as channels for conflict resolution and social control with regards to Muslim populations of North African origins.

As outlined in this essay, both episodes of the hostage crisis and the riots hence offered opportunities for UOIF leaders to present themselves as “social troubleshooters” engaged in mediation work between unruly members of the Muslim community (both outside the national territory, in

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10 Fouad Alaoui quoted in *Le Monde*, 2 November 2005 “Quand les ‘frères’ musulmans tentent de ramener le calme”.
the case of the Iraq delegation, and inside, in the case of the suburb riots) and the broader non-Muslim society. In light of the process of institutionalization just mentioned, this self-positioning has to be understood within the long-term strategy of the respectability embraced by the organization in order to assuage suspicions about its Islamist filiation and establish its political legitimacy in the French public sphere. Enmeshed in what can resemble at times client-patron relationships between Muslim authorities and politicians (Geisser 2006), this strategy was not implemented without criticisms. Numerous actors active in the French Muslim landscape accused UOIF leaders of becoming “emissaries of the state” in the case of the delegation to Baghdad13 and “police officers of French Islam” in the case of the anti-riot fatwa.14 In the two instances, UOIF leaders were presented by their Muslim detractors as anticipating the state’s demands and serving the government’s interests.15 Most of these detractors, nonetheless, shared with UOIF activists a revivalist understanding of Islam and engaged with them in dynamics of co-operation and competition (Parvez 2017). Ultimately, in ways similar to those explored by Khalil in this collection, these intra-community criticisms underscored the delicate issue of Islamic authority-building in minority contexts, whether from top-down mechanisms or bottom-up processes.

Bibliography


13 Interview with Fouad Alaoui, La Courneuve, 2016.


What makes “Muslim representatives” representative?
Public policy attempts to build Muslim representation in France

Fatima Khemilat, Sciences Po Aix

The question of Muslim representation in France has been a recurrent issue in the French political debate since the late 1980s. Already present during the first “headscarf controversy”, both the media and the political class raised the question of who can and should speak on behalf of Muslims. It was then that the first attempt was made to organize the representation of Muslims in France. Until then, the Great Mosque of Paris had been the obvious institution public authorities turned to with questions regarding the Muslim community. However, the proliferation of Muslim associations led the State to widen the spectrum of potential representatives of Islam.

Pierre Joxe, then a member of the Socialist Party government, launched the first attempt to organize Islam in France (notwithstanding previous institutions in colonized territories) when he founded the Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France (CORIF). The relative return to power of the right wing during the “Cohabitation” (coalition government of 1993-1995) somewhat interrupted this initiative, as the Great Mosque of Paris took center stage again in the relations between Islam and the State. It took a few more years and another coalition government, this time in favor of the left wing, under Jacques Chirac’s presidency, for the process to be taken up. In the late 90s Jean-Pierre Chevènement started the “Ishtichara”, an extensive consultation of French Muslims. This resulted in the creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) in 2003 under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior.

However, the establishment of the CFCM, under intense criticism since its founding, did not put to rest the controversies related to the organization of Islam in France. Some of its critics question its effectiveness or lack of funding, while others highlight the tensions that exist between the Federations of the CFCM, each of them connected, loosely, to a different foreign country. In the face of the CFCM’s dysfunctions, in part due to its funding mechanism, another organization was resuscitated during François Hollande’s presidency. The Fondation des Oeuvres de l’Islam was created in 2005 when Dominique de Villepin was the Prime Minister and renamed for the occasion to Fondation de l’Islam de France (FIF). Hollande chose to appoint at its head the aforementioned Jean-Pierre Chevènement, historical figure in the organization of Islam. This choice to name a non-Muslim as leader of the FIF raised protests and was the opportunity to (re) interrogate the legitimacy of the State in picking the representatives of Islam in France.

A survey conducted in 2016 by the Think Tank “Institut Montaigne” concluded that two-thirds of French Muslims were unaware of the very existence of the CFCM, supposed to represent them. The author of this survey, Hakim El Karoui, is a member of the Fondation de l’Islam de France and one of Emmanuel Macron’s close advisors in the elaboration of a new public policy on Islam in France which was announced in January 2018. Topics such as the fundings of places of worship, the training of imams and the influence of countries of origin are, unsurprisingly, at the heart of this new initiative. Like his predecessors, Emmanuel Macron seemingly wants to act quick, since the upcoming reform is scheduled for this year. He will be surrounded in his efforts by Gérald Darmanin, current Minister of Public Accounts, who has argued for “a French Islam”, as well as Gilles Kepel, an Arabist expert several governments have turned to for advice, who many Muslims consider openly hostile to the consideration of issues which matter to them such as Islamophobia.

These top-down initiatives intended to build a representation for French Muslims are perceived by many Muslim associations as unwanted interferences in matters of worship and as attempts to control and infantilize Muslims inherited from colonial institutions. Among the Muslim leaders who share this feeling, Marwan Muhammad, the
charismatic former spokesman for the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), decided in May 2018 to launch an online consultation of Muslims initiated by civil society. To carry it out, he called for the support of former president of the CFCM Anouar Kbibech but was denied. Thus, it was on his own and without institutional support that he published on May 9th an article in Le Monde, in which he exposed his approach as follows:

“The successive Ministers of the Interior each chose their spokespeople for Islam by royal decree, dismissing entirely the principle of secularism, and Muslims have had to resign to it. [...] The authorities have appointed representatives from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey at the head of the institutions, and Muslims, who are annoyed, weary and disillusioned, have come to give up on expecting anything from them anymore.”

The lack of legitimacy of the CFCM finds its source in the “choice” of the voting system by the public authorities. Unlike in Belgium or Austria, members of the Council are not elected by direct suffrage but by an obscure voting system linked to the number of square meters per place of worship. This decision stems from the need to make the results of the election “predictable” to guarantee the monopoly of the Federations, themselves close to the emigration countries of the first generation of Muslim immigrants. The Great Mosque of Paris has links with Algeria, the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France (RMF) and the Unions des Mosquées de France (UMF) are close to Morocco, and the former Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), now renamed Musulmans de France, is known for its connections with the Muslim Brotherhood (see Margot Dazey’s essay in this collection).

The choice of the president of the CFCM was made from the very beginning, according to Dounia Bouzar, one of the only women of the institution at the time; she spoke up against the colonial implications of his selection from the top:

“Sarkozy spoke to me about Boubakeur (the current chairman of the Great Mosque of Paris) as the leader of my troops. He was telling me: ‘Follow the leader of your troops.’ It was a sort of Concordat, remixed with a hint of the good old colonial management, kind of like: ‘we get the Arabs to speak to the Arabs.”

Dounia Bouzar interrogates, in her own words, the supposed target audience of the “representatives” of Islam. Margot Dazey’s essay in this collection illustrates the way religion is expected to function as a social mediator. The representatives of Islam are expected to speak to the Muslim community, with the purpose to maintain order and preach the values of the Republic. In this context, Islam is understood and presented by the actors themselves as a factor of social cohesion. The Muslim representatives would be presented this way to the Muslim community, especially to encourage order and “preach the good word”, Republican moreover. The Muslim religious fact is then understood and presented by the actors themselves, as a factor of social cohesion.

But does it also work the other way around? Do Islamic religious institutions formulate specific demands, and do they lobby in the interest of the Muslim community? On paper, this level of representation is part of the CFCM’s mission, which, according to its statutes, is “to defend the dignity and interests of the Muslim religion in France by all legal means.”

However, it would be a mistake to believe that the relationship between the government and the Muslim religious authorities is a bilateral one with no other parties involved. This would imply that their relations take place behind closed doors, which is only true in part, as most of the attempts to organize Islam in France are made in plain sight.

Islamic representation in France is frequently put on the political agenda, especially after terrorist incidents. Rather than bringing the Muslim community’s needs and grievances before the public authorities, it seems to serve the purpose of representing and promoting a certain vision of Islam deemed acceptable by authorities, as well as reassuring the general French population. Following a terrorist attack, many public declarations are made
regarding the organization of Islam, which unavoidably establishes a connection between Muslim representation and terrorism.

The decree dated June 25th, 2018 is consistent with this understanding of the current context. In it, regional authorities are tasked with organizing by September 15th, 2018, the “territorial conferences of Islam in France.” Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, states that he “wish[es], in these times when our society is faced with radical Islamist movements that challenge the values of our Republic, and even call for the perpetration of terrorist attacks on our territory, to amplify the voices of the vast majority of Muslims in France.” Representative positions must be understood as authorizations to speak in the name of all Muslims. What is being requested here is for some voices to be heard louder than others. The officials of the state are the ones who get to decide whose voices should be heard.

It is up to the regional authorities to “identify who should be invited to participate,” or, in other words, to select their partners for dialogue. This selection must consider the necessity to “represent the whole diversity of French Muslims” by including “diverse, younger voices and more women” and “successful people from the civil society, whether in the economic, cultural or artistic fields.” Indeed, the Board of Directors of the CFCM, which is composed of over 200 members, doesn’t include a single woman. In the past two years however, the Council founded three informal institutions for dialogue with women, young people, and converts. They are only advisory bodies with no decision-making power or legal existence, but they illustrate the consideration given to external injunctions to include Muslim women in the representative structures.

What is framed as openness promoted by the French public authorities towards “Muslim civil society” is nevertheless immediately conditioned: to be allowed participation in the process, Muslim stakeholders have to pledge allegiance by acknowledging the “primacy of the laws and values of the Republic.” The idea of including women and young people in the official representation of Islam in France, who were until then absent from the representation of Muslims in France, is increasingly admitted. However, representation of the multiplicity of Muslims in France, including of the most rigorist branches (e.g. salafism, tabligh, etc.), is not being envisioned.

Thus, the institutions of French Islam were not designed to be representative of the actual Muslim population and reflect its diversity in terms of race, gender, age, occupation, origin or sect. Rather they are intended to promote a “good Islam” in a normative, prescriptive sense. The members of the CFCM themselves understand this, which is why its statutes mention that its purpose is “the representations of Muslim places of worship to the public authorities,” and not the representation of Muslim individuals. During an interview with Dalil Boubakeur, I asked him if he believed himself to be representative of Muslims in France, to which he replied: “I am representative of tomorrow’s Muslims.”

The question of representation has long divided the field of social science at a time when it is still difficult to clarify what the role of a representative is. In The Concept of Representation, Hannah F. Pitkin highlights four types of political representation, drawing distinction between what she calls “substantive representation” and “symbolic” or “descriptive” representation. Substantive representation amounts to representing the interests of certain parts of the population without considering the representative’s own personal attitudes. This is what Pitkin calls “acting for”. Descriptive representation, on the other hand, is to give a voice to those who voted for the representative. Thus, the representative must be and act like them. This is also known as “mirror” representation or “standing for” in which the different institutions of representation should represent society in its entire diversity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, occupation, etc.).

Once applied to Islam in French society, the questions that arise are: What type of representation do Muslim representatives carry out? Is their role to embody Muslims’ sociological diversity or various specific interests instead? Based on research findings, none of the two main types of representation are performed by Muslim institutions, beginning with the CFCM. This is likely the main reason...
the CFCM lacks legitimacy and popularity within its Muslim constituency (see Institut Montaigne, 2016).

**Descriptive representation:**

The semi-structured interviews we conducted with the leaders of various Muslim associations in France enabled us to highlight a number of shared recurring characteristics. Namely, they were born abroad in North Africa, Turkey or Sub-Saharan Africa; they emigrated to France in order to pursue their university careers; they hold postgraduate degrees in scientific subjects; they now hold prestigious positions in their respective fields and they are all over 50 years old. Moreover, the leaders also share that they do not have any university-level theological training, with their religious education being based on what was included in their regular school curriculum. However, several of them pursued more advanced religious education later in a self-taught or informal manner.

It is more difficult to establish a portrait of the ordinary Muslim in France. In contrast with essentialist stereotypes, Muslims present a great diversity, and it is challenging to account for this in France because ethnic statistics are forbidden by law. Thus, large-scale census figures are unavailable for the purpose of identifying the main characteristics of Muslims in France. Nevertheless, some studies can provide insight into the dominant trends. For instance, the survey conducted by Claude Dargent or “Trajectoires et origines” (TeO survey) reveals: a slight overrepresentation of men in the Muslim community, a young population (under 40), three-fourths of whom work in the tertiary sector or elsewhere, with low level qualifications or in areas of low value. The representation of Muslims in France thus suffers from the same biases as the representation of other segments of the population, namely, over-representation of men, with above-average cultural and economic capital, and with dominant status in the spectrum of social positions. However, the striking fact is that whilst most Muslims in France were born in French territory, all the leaders of the Muslim French federations were not, which may raise questions about cultural differences or even indicate a gap between the socialization of Muslim representatives and that of most French Muslims.

**Substantive representation:**

We could say that the interests of the Muslim community are poorly represented. First of all, because of the lack of representation of Muslim religious diversity (e.g. tabligh, Salafism). In addition, our qualitative surveys allow us to identify the existence of a certain number of Muslim issues or causes, understood as issues that would concern Muslims more than the rest of the population. These causes include mainly Islamophobia and foreign policy issues, such as the situation in Palestine or Syria. Yet, representatives of the Muslim faith, in an attempt to please French public authorities, speak very little about these sensitive issues. Marwan Mohammed (CCIF), on the other hand, chose Islamophobia as his battle ground and was thus able to make a name for himself by tackling this vexed issue. However, not many people answered the online consultation he launched (approximatively 30,000). Does this mean that this type of large-scale survey does not unite Muslims (for structural or logistical reasons, for example) or that French Muslims simply do not wish to be represented?

If the latter is true, it might be the sign of a “politics of refusal” (Hall), materialized here by an “empty chair” strategy. The absence of institutions that entitle representatives “to speak legitimately on their behalf” allows many people to express their own opinions about Islam without being specialists or Muslims themselves. In this context, Muslims themselves are the ones spoken for but few or none of them are in fact the ones speaking, which can lead to frustration and foster feelings of political alienation.

If the future of Muslims’ representation in France will likely include more women and more young people, the question of who is representative of Muslims today, however, remains unresolved.
The Hajj from a French perspective: The effects of the pilgrimage on collective identities

Leila Seurat, European University Institute

The Hajj, the pilgrimage that brings millions of Muslims to Mecca every year, has transformed significantly since the end of the 1980s. Mass transportation, the increase in world population, and the organization of tour groups have facilitated the journey to Mecca. In just half a century, the number of pilgrims has increased from 60,000 in 1946 to more than three million in 2017. To regulate this enormous flow, in 1989 Saudi Arabia imposed a strict regulation of the Hajj: in Muslim countries, a quota of 1 pilgrim per 1,000 inhabitants was imposed, while in non-Muslim countries there is no fixed quota.

Approximately 100,000 Europeans citizens now make the pilgrimage annually, a huge increase reflecting both immigration and conversion. Fewer than 3,000 Muslims made the journey from France in 1986. The number has now more than doubled, from 10,000 in 2010 to 20,000 in 2012. The sociological profile of the pilgrims has also evolved, being increasingly young and French. While often travelling with their parents, they are less and less familiar with their family’s country of origin. They share an individualistic approach to their religious practices and beliefs.

My research participates in two academic debates. The first of these is related to globalization and citizenship. Some consider that the intensification in migration has threatened the state, destabilized its territory and decreased national belongings. Yet, others have shown that the blurring of territorial state borders has led to the strengthening of a national frame and local identification. Following this second trend, I argue that the Hajj increases the pilgrims’ national belonging. By traveling with a group of national companions with no ethnic diversity, the pilgrim re-experiences a French sociability in Saudi Arabia. The concept of “transnational identity” reveals the diversity of spaces in which the changing identification emerges.

The second debate concerns the link between neoliberalism and religion. If there continues to be agreement that the former increases the latter, there is no consensus on its effects on believers. Contrary to the thesis arguing that the religious market strengthens a “Salafi norm”, this article shows that the Hajj market prevents the creation of a homogeneous group around the same ideological trend. Rather, this pilgrimage confirms that economic competition leads to religious diversity.

This paper is based on written and statistical sources as well as participant observation both in France and in Saudi Arabia between 2016 and 2018. In France, 60 interviews

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1 In Great Britain the number of pilgrims has increased consistently since the 1960s with approximately 23,000 pilgrims visiting these holy sites each year.”The Hajj and Europe” by Eileen Kane, Origins, vol.19, issue 12, September 2016, http://origins.osu.edu/print/4159
2 In 2014, and for the first time, more French citizens performed the Hajj compared to foreign residents. Among the 20,000 pilgrims travelling from France, 60% were French, when they have been only 30% at the beginning of the 1990s. Official sources.
4 For Anthony Giddens, the interpenetration of the local and the global leads to a weakening of social relations and decreases the importance of the territory as a source of identification, Anthony Giddens, Les conséquences de la modernité, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999.
were conducted from August 2016 to August 2017, with a wide range of actors: pilgrims, directors of travel agencies (accredited and non-accredited), institutional actors (Ministry of the Interior, Tourism and Foreign Affairs, diplomatic personnel). In Saudi Arabia, I conducted two different fieldtrips: one based on participant observation during the Haj season in August 2017 and another during Spring 2018 in Jeddah where I conducted interviews with Saudi actors implicated in the organization of the Hajj.

The Hajj and collective identities

What effects does the Hajj have on collective identities? By presenting itself as the expression of a strong religious identification, does the Haj lead to a decrease in national belongings? What role does the market play in collective identities? Does re-Islamization through the economic field reinforce the prevalence of a fundamentalist norm?

Both the organization of the Hajj and the Hajj market appear to impact collective identities by reinforcing national belongings and promoting diversified groups around different ideological trends. The two hypotheses testify to the importance of institutions and organizations contributing to the formation of collective identities.9

By offering a form of socialization outside the nation, participation in this pilgrimage contributes to the concept of “re-Islamization” and the shifting of “ethno-national citizenship”10 beyond the Wesphalian paradigm.11 The Hajj also offers us the opportunity to examine the role of the market on collective identities: by organizing the tour, putting together the group and choosing the appropriate guide, the travel agencies are key actors re-configuring the pilgrims’ belongings. Far from being simple commercial transactions, these agencies participate in the circulation of immaterial goods impacting the beliefs’ systems of the pilgrims.

The Hajj strengthens religious belongings. On their return, pilgrims increase their religious practices by reading surahs of the Quran on public transports, adding recitations (dhikr), invocations (duaat) or supererogatory fasts. If common sense leads us to believe that the Hajj is a threat to national belonging because it reinforces religious ties, I argue that reinforcing religiosity doesn’t mean a decrease in national belongings.

Saudi Arabia’s organization of the Hajj is built on nationalities. If you reside in France, for example, you are obliged to travel from France. This particular rule has important implications in terms of identifications: during your stay, you are always in the company of fellow nationals. Thus, contrary to the tendency to think that the Hajj transforms pilgrims’ identities by placing them with strangers or people from different backgrounds, the purpose here is to show the opposite. While pilgrims undergo a change, but this change is not related to an ethnic or cultural sociability with the Umma, but more to the contacts with their French fellows. This collective experience strengthens their national identity vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and pilgrims from other countries also for reasons of language. Indeed, for those who wish to meet the Saudi locals during the few chances they have (going to the Great Mosque, shopping in Medina), there tends to be language barriers for French pilgrims because many don’t speak Arabic. This lack of knowledge has an important impact on the way the pilgrim is being perceived by others and the way he perceives himself, stimulating or reactivating his sense of national belonging.12 Alongside

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9 In accordance with the assumption of the relevant literature, the impact of institutions may follow logics of appropriateness (W.R Scott, Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2001), by way of socialization or the reference to cognitive scripts (DiMaggio and Powell, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991). The claim that institutions contribute to shape identities necessarily relates to the broader debate about the origins of collective identities that opposes primordialists, instrumentalists and constructivists (A. Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, in World Politics (53), April 2001).


11 Peter Beyer insists on the necessity to go beyond the Westphalian model to read the « new arrangements » between nationhood and citizenship, Peter Beyer, “Questioning the secular/religious divide in a post-Westphalian world”, International Sociology 28(6), pp.663-679, 2013.

12 Frederic Barth showed that a group is often formed by external frontiers and languages are majors cultural marks to read groups formation; see F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Bergen/Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1969.
the literature dedicated to Pentecostalism in Africa or Latin America, which claims that religious tourism can build national identifications outside the nation, the Hajj effectively consolidates a group of nationals.

Contrary to the assumption that a group confronted by other nationalities automatically increases its cohesiveness, group consolidation doesn't imply any decrease in its internal divisions. While the Hajj maintains the cohesion of a group of nationals, pre-existing internal divisions remain.

The first cleavage is generational. Even if the young and the old pilgrims travel together—and sometimes the young teach the old how to perform the rituals correctly (e.g. cutting hair at the right moment or picking up rocks no bigger than chickpeas for the Jamarat)—it is clear that there is a huge breaking point between them. This generational gap, which often appears before traveling when parents show their dissatisfaction seeing their children travel so soon, is reactivated during the pilgrimage when the young enter into conflicts with their parents. A lot of pilgrims say that the presence of their parents ruined their Hajj, with parents wanting constant attention whereas they needed to focus on their prayers. These conflicts, particularly since the Hajj itself prohibits jidal, confirm the claim that Islam has increasingly disconnected from culture and in particular its culture of origins. This “standard Islam” has to be seen as a pure expression of globalization, leading to a new form of relations between religions, territories, societies and states.

A second cleavage separates the young pilgrims. Sleeping the third night of the three Tachriq days in Mina is a point that is often discussed: if there is no obligation to sleep the third night, some would stick to the example of the prophet (Sunna) and stay while others will leave Mina, preferring to return to their lodgings in Azizia or to go and sleep under the Kabaa. If one were tempted to read these differences following the different trends of Islam, no clear evidence confirms a relationship between ideology and practices. On the contrary, my observations show that it is impossible to establish a link between these choices and a clear ideological family. The distinct categories, often used by scholars but also by individuals themselves such as Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi, are not always effective for reading the complex and conflicting religious belongings of a single Muslim. By putting someone in such a category the major risk is to ignore the fact that religious identifications always evolves.

A competitive market governed by profit rather than ideology

In France, as in the rest of Europe, the Saudi authorities have organized participation in the pilgrimage according to a particular regulation: in 2006 a Hajj accreditation was distributed to 43 travel agencies, officially allowing them to sell and organize packages to participate in the pilgrimage. Each agency received a different number of visas: some benefited from a huge number of visas (more than 1,000), others a small quota (only 100). In recent years, young entrepreneurs have opened up new agencies to deal with the growing demand. Having similar preferences and being closer in age with the pilgrims, they are successfully competing with the traditional accredited Hajj agencies led by the older generations.

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14 Donald Forbes and his contact hypothesis, see Forbes, Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis, New Haven, Ct, Yale, University Press, 1997.

15 Jidal is a discussion that leads to conflict.


17 The 11, 12 and 13th days of Dhu al-hijja.

18 In the Summer 2018 and for the first time, the Saudi authorities have decided to give the Hajj accreditation to new travel agencies. The number of these agencies differs according to the sources but is around 25.
Most of the time, the pilgrim does not have a direct relationship with an accredited agency, and instead passes through a non-accredited young agency to buy his journey. These existing intermediaries have made the Hajj package more expensive in France than in other European countries, with an estimate of around 5,500 euros. With these high costs of participation in mind, the attraction of French youth to the holy sites can be seen as the result of globalization and the emergence of a Muslim middle class born and educated in France. It confirms that the increase in the standard of living does not necessarily weaken religious affiliation, as the theory of modernization suggests.

The accreditation system imposed in 2005 has profoundly changed the Hajj market. Only these 43 actors are theoretically allowed to sell a Hajj package. Far from this official rule, the reality of the market is different: aside these accredited agencies directed by the older generations, new agencies run by young entrepreneurs more familiar with the young pilgrims’ preferences have emerged. Using an Islamic ethos and adapting their strategies to their clients, they are challenging the traditional agencies.

The Internet has become a major tool for this new generation, active in social networks and using marketing language. It appears to provide significant support for the religious market, confirming that re-Islamization is a product of globalization and that religious communities are becoming religious enterprises capable of transmitting the values of ultra-liberalism. Without being accredited, these agencies are able to sell and organize packages to participate in the Hajj. Most of the time they buy the visa from the accredited agency and create their own package. This illegal trade of visas, supposedly free, is concluded through a “deal” between the accredited and non-accredited agency, two types of actors dependent on the same system: the first has the visa and the second has the clients. Thus, the Saudi organization has created a dysfunctional configuration where the accredited agencies are obliged to establish multiples partnerships with non-accredited agencies. Ignoring ideology, this collaborative business model allows for confessional diversity within the group and a wide range of different dogmas.

The circulation of the guides: how profit dominates ideology

Hajj management generates arrangements between accredited and non-accredited agencies that collaborate to gain more profit, disregarding religious preferences. If the non-accredited are more active on the Internet, offering effective products, they also offer opportunities to travel with prestigious religious figures known to young people. These figures, who follow the group and give religious classes during the Hajj can also be very active on social networks, posting on Facebook live, for example, during their tour in Mecca and Medina. But again, looking in detail at the guide’s route reveals the neglect of ideology in this market. Indeed, the guide doesn’t necessarily follow a non-accredited agency managed by his companions but travels with the agency offering the best deal. It appears that these well-known young preachers circulate easily between different agencies, both traditional and new. For instance, Youssef Abou Anas and Brahim Abou Talha, two famous preachers from the well-known Salafi association

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20 Either the Hajj or the ‘Umrah, the small pilgrimage. While the ‘Umrah is not an act of religious obligation and can be performed in Mecca at any time of the year, the Hajj has to be carried out once a year, at the same place and the same time.

21 During Summer 2018, 25 new agencies received accreditation (number not confirmed by officials).

22 Among the 43 accredited agencies I have mentionned, only two were managed by young entrepreneurs: Oscar Voyage and Arianne.


24 Sean McLoughlin has also noticed this double trend in the case of Great Britain. New agencies are no longer based on ethnic cleavages like the old ones. Although they represent a small but growing and competing segment in the Hajj market, this evolution seems to reflect “the hybridisation of a post-Islamist cultural turn towards consumerism”, Sean McLoughlin,”Organizing Hajj going from contemporary Britain: A changing industry, Pilgrim Markets and the Politics of Recognition, in Porter V. and Said L (eds) Hajj: Global Interactions Through Pilgrimage, Leiden, Sidestone Press and Rijksmuseum Volkenkunde, pp.41-64, 2013.

25 Olivier Roy insists on this ability to transmit the values of liberalism through social networks.
“la Voie droite” were both in partnership with non-accredited agencies before turning back to working with accredited agencies. The logic of markets is predominant among religious figures who go for the best offer following economical rules rather than depending on an “Islamic norm”. These men preserve their autonomy and can, when they wish, decide to change agencies, adding to competition.

Rather than familiarizing the pilgrims with another culture or with the larger Muslim community, as common sense would suggest, the Hajj reinforces the pilgrim’s sense of national belonging. As managed by the Saudis, the Hajj is built on nationalities and doesn’t facilitate meetings among foreigners, due to minimal opportunities and language barriers as previously noted. Analyzing the pilgrims’ identifications also means taking a look at the market. If the Saudis have officially given accreditation to only a few actors, non-accredited travel agencies also govern this market with a different brand of Islam. This particular management generates arrangements between accredited and non-accredited agencies, which collaborate to gain greater profits. The French authorities have also let a number of unofficial intermediaries gain further profit through a black market, considering the Hajj as a religious affair. This specific configuration doesn’t permit any homogeneous group based on ideology. The more liberal aspect of the market also follows this idea of a confessional diversity within the groups. If we look at the guides, it appears that these well-known young preachers circulate easily between different agencies, both traditional and new. I have shown that the Hajj keeps nationals all together, although they may have different ideological orientations. This can be explained by the particular regulation of the market and the market itself. However, valid though this is for the Hajj, this still needs to be tested for the ‘Umrah which has a different configuration and might therefore be different in terms of group-making and collective identities.
Constraining Muslim Mobilizations in France: Symbolic Repression and Disqualification as Demobilization Practices

Julien Talpin, National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS)

French secular and color-blind political culture has made it difficult for Muslims to organize on the basis of religious identities without being labeled as “communitarian,” i.e. to be seen as sectarian, self-segregating and divisive for the French Republic. Despite a long tradition of Catholic organizing where the question of “laïcité” or secularism was rarely raised, Muslim organizing is frequently presented as a threat to the French secular model. In this paper I investigate the ways in which local government and the press constrain the mobilization of Muslim groups in France. I focus on the city of Roubaix near the Belgian border where Muslims are numerically over-represented and concentrated. I show that repression and control of collective action takes the form of what I term symbolic disqualification, repressing political action by labeling these actors negatively as “communitarian” or “proselytes”. Symbolic disqualification also has a more material embodiment, limiting the types of financial resources available for organizing to fight discrimination. These subtle and infra-political constraints to collective action have to be understood within a broader history of relationships between the French state and ethno-racial minorities, where the latter have often been co-opted by the local political field, limiting most forms of contention. These different elements explain the relative weakness of Muslim mobilizations against discriminations in the French context.

Content analysis of the press at the national level may help investigate the forms that disqualification of Muslim mobilizations can take. But such methodological approaches only focus on the most visible groups, those who reach national attention, leaving under the radar the more ordinary forms of organizing that are the most widespread in the French context. A few young scholars have carried out research to study such mobilizations at the local level. Few point out, however, the symbolic and material constraints such groups face in their attempts to organize the Muslim population. While the social movement scholarship has emphasized the role of repression in the dynamics of contention, more systematic attention should be paid to the less dramatic and non-violent forms of repression that also shape the possibilities of organizing but often remain under the radar of the social sciences. This is one of the goals of my ethnographic study in Roubaix that focuses more broadly on the transformations of poor people organizing and mobilizations. This research is based on a seven-year ethnographic study, direct observation of collective actions, interviews with key actors (activists, elected officials and public servants), and archival work.

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3 See from this perspective Cinalli (M.), Giugni (M.), “Political opportunities, citizenship models and political claimmaking over Islam”, Ethnicities, 13 (2), 2013, p. 147-16.


A heterogeneous local Muslim organizational ecology

I cannot offer here a detailed account of the social, demographic, political and religious context in which this research takes place. Similarly, it will be difficult to present in detail the organizational ecology of Muslim associations in the city of Roubaix. It should be stressed, however, that Roubaix has an important Muslim population (hard to evaluate quantitatively, however), most of whom arrived in the 1960s and 1970s after the independence of former French colonies, especially from North Africa. This has led the city to be negatively labeled as “the Casbah” or “an Arabic city” or “the city of the Islamists.” The city is also infamous for having hosted one of the first French Jihadi groups in the 1990s, the Gang of Roubaix, and has often been associated with radical Islam. It nowadays counts six official mosques—with a total capacity of more than 15,000 seats—which is significant in a city of 95,000 residents. One of the mosques gathers Turkish residents. One is affiliated with the Algerian consulate. Another one—the largest—is often labeled as orthodox or ‘Salafi. Another is, in contrast, close to the Jeunes Musulmans de France and the Musulmans de France, a national organization inspired by the Muslim brotherhood. The others are unaffiliated. The context is marked by a relative fragmentation of Muslim institutions, despite the creation in 2010 of a “Collective of Roubaix Muslims” that has little existence apart from organizing the annual Aïd gathering in a large open space. The collective as well as most mosques’ presidents make little public appearances, rarely reacting to the frequent attacks on the city’s Muslim population.

This might be due to the unique institutional recognition that has known the Muslim faith in Roubaix. In a rare occurrence in 2002, the municipal council voted unanimously, with the exception of the Front National, in support of a “schema directeur des lieux de culte”, i.e. a framework allowing for significant support from the municipal institution for the recognition and development of religious institutions. The 1905 law on laïcité does not allow local governments to finance directly the construction of religious congregations. They can however grant, for a symbolic price of 1 euro, a public space for the construction of a mosque or any religious building. To pass such an ordinance, the municipality had to be highly strategic. While the goal was clearly to allow Muslims to build decent mosques—allowing them to “move out of the basements…”—the ordinance mentions all faith traditions present in the city: Buddhists (who also needed a new pagoda), Christians, and Catholics, whose churches would then be considered as historical patrimony of the city and could therefore be restored with public funding. The mayor’s advisor, who played a key role in the passage of the ordinance, explained, “The ordinance was passed somehow in ‘contraband’. It moves away from the question of laïcité, which by its sacred and transcendental nature forbids any real discussion on concrete means, to the question of discrimination, emphasizing the issue of equal treatment but transforming the very concept of equality by introducing special treatments that could be seen as affirmative action.” This official recognition of Islam favored the construction, that is for the most part still on-going, of four new or larger mosques in the city. Absorbed by the exhausting need to find the funds for such projects, as well as the relationships created by this official recognition, the associations running the mosques do not appear as important vectors of local-level participation or engagement for the Muslim population.

On the margins of these religious institutions lay a few associations with a more militant tradition. Three of them, interconnected and made up of the same small

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8 See Margot Dazey’s memo on this central organization for French Muslims.


10 For similar elements in another context, see Bowen (J. R.), *Can Islam be French?* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010.
group of activists, play an important role in fighting against Islamophobia locally. One is a local radio station, Pastel FM, created in the 1980s, that aims at valuing the diversity of the cultures of Roubaix’s population, and that occasionally organizes shows focusing on Islam, inviting imams or activists. The second is Rencontre et Dialogue, a space of public education programming, offering conferences and meetings around Islam, laïcité, and discrimination. Created in the 1990s, it is well known for its regularly organized conferences with the renowned Swiss Islamologue Tariq Ramadan, once attracting a huge crowd. The founder of the NGO is a member of Presence Musulmane, the collective created by Tariq Ramadan, and one of his close friends (he recently played an important role in coordinating the crowd funding to support his legal defense). Finally, there is the youth organization, Association Nouveau Regard sur la Jeunesse (ANRJ), mostly supporting the professional and educational integration of Roubaix’s teenagers, as well as civic engagement. Indirectly related to Islam, it has, however, been the target of recent attacks by the press and the municipality due to the supposed religious affiliation of some of its members (its founder is also the president of Rencontre et Dialogue).

Symbolic disqualification as a demobilizer of Muslim activists

While these actors have long endured symbolic attacks, I focus here on recent forms of disqualification they have faced. In a recent issue, the local newspaper targeted ANRJ, implicitly accusing it of Muslim proselytism and subtly fostering the ideology of Tariq Ramadan. In an article published on October 10, 2017 titled “The politico-religious mélange des genres of a youth association”, the journalist blamed the ANRJ for organizing a buffet aimed at collecting funds in support of Tariq Ramadan in the framework of a conference he was giving in the region. He also accused the association of collecting food for the poor at the time of Ramadan, as well as inviting members to share lamb with incarcerated youth from the neighborhood. The journalist questioned the legitimacy of such actions and the funding of the association by public institutions. While he did not directly mention the words “laïcité” or “proselytism”, the language of the article implies such. ANRJ did not deny organizing such events, but stressed in a reply shared on social media that they were organized in compliance with the 1905 law, stressing that these events were not aimed at supporting Tariq Ramadan but, rather, to fund a trip organized by the youth members. The association also emphasized that similar events had been organized with other actors, religious and not religious, including with Catholics, to show its open-mindedness. The article has nevertheless had a direct impact. The association was supposed to meet representatives of the State the next day to discuss possible funding, but the meeting was cancelled because of the article. The municipality also decided to cut ANRJ’s funding and refused to grant use of a public space in a municipal building. This contributed to a broader conflict related to the ANRJ’s participation in the mobilization against an urban renewal project planned by the local government. This had a direct impact on the activities of the association, namely, resulting in the firing of one of its staff members due to a lack of funding and, thus, the scaling down of its activities.

A few weeks later, the radio station Pastel FM’s funding from the regional government was cut too, following a charge from the Front National (FN) that it was carrying out “religious proselytism” on air. This attack was based on the fact that imams were regularly invited as guests on some radio shows. The FN elected official noted, “It is the first time that the [right wing president of the Region, Xavier Bertrand] follows one of our proposals,” indicating the growing consensus on the matter among the French

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11 In France, community organizations and associations are mostly funded by public institutions (the state and local governments), private foundations representing in general only a small share of their budget. This is related to the specific state/civil society relationship in the French context, where the state keeps a dominant position. In particular, this financial dependency significantly reduces the autonomy of community organizations.


13 This per se is not contradictory with the law on laïcité, religious neutrality being only imposed to public servants and state officials. Thus, the main public TV station has organized for decades a show, every sunday morning, to broadcast catholic masses, islamic teachings or other faith traditions.
political class. The symbolic attacks endured by these associations have therefore resulted in direct financial impact for them, clearly reducing their organizational capacity. An interview conducted with a public servant in charge of funding decisions for associations fighting discrimination in underprivileged neighborhoods (at the Ministère de la Ville and CGET) shows how these mechanisms are underpinned by administrative practices: “There is a risk for me … I am observed very closely by the State, by the delegates of the Prefect, who are not necessarily allies (...) They reproach me financing only Arabs and Blacks, and Islamo-leftists (...) The bottom line is that the delegates of the Prefect do not want to work on this issue [the fight against discrimination].”

Muslim activists have not been passive recipients of these attacks, delivering responses via social media, mobilizing their networks for support, and fighting to keep being active on a local level. The number of events organized and the audience size has, however, significantly diminished since the reduction of the funding.

Symbolic frames as crucial determinants of minority mobilizations

While scholars have rightfully emphasized the role of the label “communitarianism” in the disqualification and stigmatization of Muslim and ethnic minority organizing in France, there seems to be an increase in the use and significance of the label “proselytism.” It is particularly fitting as it can be linked, even if misleadingly, to the legal framework of the 1905 law on laïcité and, therefore, has more than symbolic effects. While I have focused here on Roubaix, it seems that a similar phenomenon can be observed all over the country. To mention only two recent cases, with the first in Dordogne, the Caisse d'Allocations Familiales decided to cut funding to two social centers—about 300,000 euros annually—that were open late at night during Ramadan. It reproached them for not abiding by the principles of “neutrality and laïcité”. Similarly, but for a more militant association, the feminist group Lallab was denied its application to get "service civiques", i.e. interns partly paid by the state, following an on-line controversy where they were accused of being “Islamists”.

Lallab's president lost her job following this controversy. More generally, it becomes more and more frequent to require associations to sign a “charte de la laïcité”, as voted on by the Ile-de-France region last year and promoted by the gender equality minister recently. Such initiatives contribute to the diffusion of an extended version of the French 1905 laïcité law, initially created to ensure state neutrality but increasingly applied to society and, therefore, transforming into a weapon to secularize French society. A more systematic survey would be required to assess not only the discursive frames used to disqualify Muslim organizing, but also its material impact and the consequences of such criticisms on the mobilizations of the Muslim population in France. While such attacks may drive attention to the bigger organizations of the field, helping them in recruitment and outreach, for the smaller and more precarious actors such forms of

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14 Interview, Lille, July 22nd 2016. This indicates that the French state is not an homogeneous entity, and is marked by internal tensions between different actors. The public servant quoted here is clearly perceived as an "ally" by muslim associations.


16 While the category of “proselytism” is used at least since the 1990s to (dis)qualify women wearing a headscarf, the novelty of the phenomenon described here is the diffusion of this framing process to organizations, including those that do not qualify as muslim per se but only count a significant number of persons seen as muslims among its members.


21 As was the case for Lallab, mentioned earlier, of for the Collectif against Islamophobia in France (CCIF).
symbolic repression often leads to their weakening or disappearance.\textsuperscript{22} While these demobilization practices cannot be seen as a coordinated effort by the French state, stemming in contrast from various uncoordinated actions among local politicians and institutions, it is clear that Muslim organizing is not welcomed in the French Republic. While many public actors claim the organization of French Islam through the top-down creation of official representatives, such institutionalization should remain restricted to religious affairs rather than to the well-being of French Muslims. Faced with this double bind – that Muslims should have representatives but cannot exist collectively in the public sphere – French Muslims increasingly opt for more personal and individual answers to stigmatization rather than for collective action.

\textsuperscript{22} On the heterogeneous effects of state repression on social movements mobilizations, see C. Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” \textit{Annual Review of Political Science}, Volume 10, p 1-23.
Mosques and Political Engagement in Europe and North America

Aubrey Westfall, Wheaton College

As a site closed to non-Muslims and associated with foreign leadership, the mosque in Europe and North America is regarded with suspicion and the fear that terrorist networks and extremist ideologues are using them to embed themselves in Western countries. These perceptions persist despite the dominant reading of Islamic sources that suggests active citizenship within democratic society is permissible, even desirable (Peucker, 2018), and with many efforts by Muslim leaders to reassure their communities. With a desire to better serve their community, many Muslim political and civic leaders are looking for ways to build institutions that are compatible with social integration in Western contexts (Klausen 2005). As Dazey explains in this collection, these leaders seek ways to construct a “civil Islam” through a converging agenda shared by state and religious leaders.

The mosque demonstrates remarkable potential as a site for this convergence.1 Though the links between the mosque and political or social integration are complicated and variable, many states recognize the central nature of the mosque and adopt different strategies to either control mosques or harness their potential for the purposes of the state, increasing the sociopolitical integration of resident Muslims. The mosque plays a critical role in developing social cohesion by linking Muslims to others within their community, both inside and outside the religious institution. This essay discusses the role of the mosque in promoting political integration and engagement in Europe and North America, demonstrating commonalities in mosque effects even while theorizing areas of critical trans-Atlantic difference.

Mosques and political behavior in the United States

A well-developed body of research has explored the way religious institutions create political communities through helping congregants develop basic civic skills (Brown and Brown 2003, Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, Peterson 1992, Schwadel 2002, Smidt 1999, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) and expand their social networks (Putnam 1993, Putnam 2000, Schwadel 2005). Religious institutions also provide a venue through which congregants can get information about political issues and discuss public affairs (Brown and Brown 2003; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). The general consensus is that the link between religion and politics is not about a belief system promoted by the religious institutions, but rather the way the institution facilitates social interaction. The effect should theoretically transfer to any religious tradition that involves similar congregational dynamics. And indeed, a growing literature affirms the same mechanism at work in mosques in Western democratic contexts.

Evidence from the United States consistently reveals a positive relationship between mosque and political involvement. Read (2015) finds that those who are heavily involved in their mosques are more likely to be civically active in a number of secular community activities and organizations. Likewise, Jamal (2005) finds an association between mosque participation and civil and non-electoral political activities in New York, while Ayers and Hofstetter (2008) find a positive relationship between religious practice (mosque attendance, prayer, volunteerism) and political participation. The 2007-2008 Muslim American Public Opinion Survey (MAPOS) data reveals that respondents involved in mosque activities are more likely to identify as Americans and participate in politics than their counterparts who are not involved in mosque activities (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooi 2011). Using original data from a survey of Muslim Americans in 22 locations across the United States, Dana, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Barreto (2017) find that those involved in their mosques are over 50 percent more likely to become politically

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1 The designation “mosque” can mean different things in different contexts. Technically mosques are used solely for religious worship. In many Western contexts, it is more common for Muslims to be affiliated with Islamic centers, which are usually open to the public and include a number of facilities, including a mosque. They are therefore often colloquially called mosques. The behavioral survey data illustrated below refers to a “mosque or Islamic center” and leaves the interpretation up to the survey respondent.
active compared with those not involved in their mosques. Westfall (2018) demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between mosque attendance for social and religious activities but no relationship with attendance for prayer, suggesting that religious institutions must engage with social lives of their congregants in order to have a substantive political effect.

Figure 1 illustrates the effects demonstrated in the literature with frequencies of data on political participation from the 2011 Pew Muslim American Survey and the MAPOS referenced above. Both surveys measure mosque attendance for reasons other than prayer, capturing behavior less tied to ritual and more open to participation across class and gender. Both measures of mosque attendance and political engagement refer to the previous year and are all measured dichotomously, with the respondent reporting that they either did or did not do the behavior indicated. The Pew data samples 1,033 adult Muslims, 37 percent of whom attend mosque for reasons other than prayer, while MAPOS samples 745 Muslims, 65 percent of whom attend regularly mosque outside of prayer services. Attending mosque is associated with statistically significant higher rates of political engagement across all of the variables, with an especially marked difference in the MAPOS data.

Mosques and political behavior in Europe

Research on degree of Muslim civic engagement in other Western contexts is less conclusive but seems to indicate similar trends. Using World Values Survey Data, Norris (2013) finds that there are considerable similarities across the Atlantic in the positive effects of religious participation on strengthening civic engagement, measured through self-reported voluntary activism within religious organizations, membership in a broader range of secular community associations, and patterns

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2 Data from both surveys is included to demonstrate the effect across a wide variety of political indicators. The surveys sampled Muslims in different ways. The Pew survey includes data from phone interviews of 1,033 adult Muslims living in the United States using a probability sampling mechanism. The MAPOS data does not use probability sampling and was collected in-person as individuals of 745 individuals recruited with reference to a skip pattern as they left 16 mosques and Islamic centers in six cities (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009).

3 This difference is likely attributable to sampling method, as the MAPOS data sampled individuals as they left the mosque or Islamic center.

4 Statistical significance is determined through independent group t-tests, p<0.05. For full statistical analysis of these relationships using logistic regression models of the Pew data, see Westfall (2018).
of political activism. Oskooii and Dana (2017) find that mosque attendance by ethnic minority Muslims in the UK is associated with increased self-reported rates of electoral and non-electoral political participation, like protesting or signing a petition, compared to ethnic minority Christian adherents. Giugni, Michel and Gianni (2014) use original survey data of Muslims in Sweden to support the argument that religious associational involvement is a strong predictor of political participation and protest. Phalet, Bayso and Verkuytem (2010) find that the salience of Muslim identity is associated with different political goals and actions across different ethnic Muslim groups in the Netherlands and caution against simplistic assumptions about all Muslims regarding the relationship between religion and politics.

Despite this warning, Figure 2 demonstrates simple descriptive statistics of the effect using the 3,522 individuals in the Muslim sample of the European Social Survey (ESS) waves from 2002 to 2014, the same dataset used by Isani in this collection. Because this survey is not designed explicitly to sample Muslims, the question asks how often the respondent attends religious services apart from special occasions, which is recoded into a dichotomous variable of regular attendance (at least monthly). Forty percent of the sample reports regular attendance, and there is no differentiation between attendance for prayer services and other social or religious activities. Based on work finding that attending different types of services yields different outcomes for participation (Westfall 2018), the generic indicator of religious service attendance should dilute the effect of attendance on political engagement. In general, the results in Figure 2 demonstrate much lower reported rates of European Muslim political participation compared to the US data, with little differentiation based on attendance of religious services. The only significant differences are found in volunteerism, signing a petition (with a relationship in the opposite direction than hypothesized), participating in demonstrations, and participating in a boycott. It would be inappropriate

Figure 2: Rates of political engagement by regular religious service attendance across Muslims in Europe
to draw many conclusions from direct comparisons of these trans-Atlantic data sources due to differences in measurement of both the religious attendance and the political engagement variables, and also because the ESS data is pooled over multiple years and across countries with very different political systems. At most, the comparative data is suggestive, hinting at lower levels of engagement and potentially different dynamics at work in European versus American contexts.

**Explaining trans-Atlantic differences**

The remainder of this essay considers how these different dynamics might manifest through the central mechanisms linking mosque attendance to political engagement. The first is in the way the mosque is a source of information and mobilization through religious leadership. Most typically, European state intervention in the mosque has focused on the religious leadership and reflects a desire to increase the presence of homegrown European imams over foreign imams who presumably hold traditionalist and culturally informed views. For example, the French government has created initiatives with Muslim councils to develop training programs for homegrown imams. The Netherlands has started a certificate program for Islamic chaplaincy and has also developed a required acculturation program for imams through which they learn the language and the Dutch law that is relevant to their position. Some countries, like Sweden, Belgium, and Spain have provided funding for mosque construction and imam salaries. In general, however, these efforts are small-scale, because most governments want to avoid the public perception that they are encouraging Islam. Of course, some state intervention is more hostile. Denmark refuses entry to foreign imams, and Germany targeted Salafi mosques and organizations with raids and bans, in hopes of limiting the spread of the Salafist ideology (Erasmus 2016).

Whether inclusionary or exclusionary, even the small-scale public European state intervention in religious life stands in contrast to approaches in the US, where state involvement in religion is governed by norms developed with reference to the institutionally-embedded Christian faith. Recently these norms have been somewhat uncomfortably extended to non-Western religious traditions, though low-profile state incursion and surveillance of religious life is common in North American Muslim communities. Furthermore, as the North American Muslim community has grown, concerns over foreign-born imams are beginning to mirror those in the European context (Burnett 2013). Despite these trends, religious practice is legally protected in the United States and the American society is highly tolerant of personal religiosity.

Mosque leadership and information transfer is only one mechanism by which religious associational membership influences political and social behavior. The general consensus of the research on religious associational membership and political engagement demonstrates that the strongest effect is attributable to group dynamics and the development of social capital. Religious associational membership is theorized to creates social trust, which contributes to more generalized political trust and political participation. The effect works for other types of voluntary associations as well, and both ethnic and cross-ethnic voluntary associational memberships have been associated with a strong positive effect on political participation among immigrants in Europe (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). Ethnic networks are homogenous and primarily comprised of co-ethnics, while cross-ethnic networks refer to mixed associations, where membership is comprised of different types of people. The most important distinction between the two reflects the difference between “bonding” social capital, which reinforces group identities, and “bridging” social capital, which overcomes social cleavages (Putnam 2000). Translated to the mosque experience, those that

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7 The contrast between the foreign and homegrown imam is made obvious by Jonathan Birt (2006) in his essay “Good Imam, Bad Imam,” where the good imams and now governments have been eager to promote “civic religion.” “The good imam ought to acquire the skills to promote ‘civic religion,’ adopt an effective integrative pastoral role for Muslim youth, and challenge the extremism promoted by the bad imam. The bad imam works outside the ‘opportunity spaces,’ refusing the praxis and rhetoric of ‘civic religion,’ and may either be obscurantist and isolationist, or rejectionist, anti-West and possibly a supporter of violence and terrorism” (Birt 2006, 692-693).
promote bonding social capital would bind Muslims of the same ethnic or cultural identities in networks, while mosques promoting bridging social capital would promote links across Muslims of different cultures and ethnicities. The former might be useful for promoting political participation associated with affinity group promotion or ethnic grievances, while the latter might develop richer social capital that links the group to a larger civic community, or it may help stimulate pan-ethnic Muslim mobilization. There is some evidence for the stronger effect of bridging social capital among Muslims in Switzerland (Giugni et al. 2014) and the United States (Westfall et al. 2017), but the distinct migration experiences and concentrated ethnic Muslim populations in many European states may influence and limit the degree to which developing bridging social capital within the mosque is possible.

**Muslim reactions to Islamophobia**

Mobilization within the mosque through leadership and social networks is only part of the story. The way the larger society reacts to Islam and the presence of mosques can constrain or enable the political participation of Muslims, and it will likewise influence the way mosque leadership and the congregations conceive of their place within society. Islamophobia is widespread and increasing in both Europe and North America and largely driven by the same forces on both sides of the Atlantic (Ogan et al. 2014). Though trends in Islamophobia are similar, the degree to which the social and political environment tolerates the expression of these ideas, or the degree to which the state is seen as being complicit in promoting Islamophobic perspectives varies across countries, as do state-led efforts to encourage and include Muslim perspectives. The perception of social and official hostility could lead Muslim communities to distrust the political community and turn inward, as implied by the work of Isani in this collection, or it could motivate oppositional political mobilization. The latter effect was seen in black churches in the United States, where the exclusion of African Americans from civic and social life with Jim Crow institutionalized a racialized public sphere, which led to the development of a “black counterpublic” (Dawson 1994). The counterpublic includes religious institutions, communication networks, and a number of other groups and organizations that encouraged oppositional political tactics that challenged the white supremacist status quo, often through the “politics of refusal” discussed by Hall in this collection. In a context where Muslims are politically excluded despite Muslim feelings of political entitlement, a similar outcome facilitated by mosques is a distinct possibility.

Where society rather than the state is at issue, a hostile social environment could provoke societal withdrawal by Muslims, but it could encourage further engagement with wider society in an attempt to alter mindsets, especially if the Muslim presence is legitimized by the state. Djupe and Calfano (2012) provide evidence that personal experiences with discrimination constitute a form of civic education, and that these experiences are associated with higher levels of tolerance in Muslim Americans. The options and incentives associated with discrimination are important and highly contextual.

**Concluding Thoughts**

The very different state approaches to Islamic leadership, the social compositions of mosques, and variation in the social climate warrant comparative study that will help answer critical questions: Do the mechanisms linking mosque participation to civic engagement work in similar ways across countries? How does state intervention shape the way the mosque functions for its congregants? What role does the mosque play in divergent experiences with Muslim integration? However, answering these questions requires a fuller understanding of the comparative legitimacy felt by Muslims in the public sphere and of the experiences of Muslim individuals in their mosque environments. Rather than engaging with state and elite-

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8 In this collection, Seurat alludes to both bridging and bonding social capital mechanisms in her analysis of social networks effects created by the Hajj, suggesting that the nationalist dynamics may be creating more bonding social capital between co-nationals, undercutting the ability of the Hajj to create bridging social capital serving a pan-Islamist identity.
level concerns about how they fear Muslims will behave, it is more informative to engage with the actual behavior of Muslims and the connections that Muslims make between their behavior and their religious life.

This research requires rich cross-national data focusing on Muslim’s experiences within their mosques and social networks and covering a broad range of formal and informal political behaviors and opinions. Studies on the political engagement or integration of Muslims in Western contexts have typically focused either on democratic values (gender roles and equality, sexual minority rights, the boundaries of free speech) or on rather infrequent behaviors like voting. But, as Robert Putnam and numerous others have argued, civic engagement through informal participation or membership in social networks is just as critical as political participation for “making democracy work” (Putnam 1993). Conceptualization and measurement of “active citizenship” including indicators of both formal and informal participation within the existing political system is therefore necessary to capture the full possibilities of the political integration and engagement of Muslims in western democratic societies (Hoskins and Mascherini 2009). It is equally important to pay special attention to protest behaviors and the “politics of refusal,” like those activities documented by Hall in this collection, which capture an important dimension of active and engaged participation. While there are a few national data sets with rich questions about political participation and large samples of Muslims, they do not allow for cross-national comparison, and the international datasets dramatically under-sample Muslims. A concentrated effort must be made if there is interest in exploring the potential of religious associational life for enhancing the political engagement and integration of Muslims.

It is possible that, by the time we ask the right questions, the mosque will lose some of its importance in the lives of Muslims. There is evidence of declining attendance in formal religious services among Muslims in Europe. Of the Muslims sampled in the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2014, 26 percent report weekly attendance at religious services, and 22 percent report attending only on holy days. Among second generation immigrants only 18 percent attend weekly services. The rates are higher in the United States. According to the 2011 Pew survey of Muslim Americans, 47 percent of respondents, report weekly mosque attendance for prayer. Declining attendance could signal integration into secular modes of living, since there are similar trends in the non-Muslim population (Brenner 2016). Alternatively, declining mosque attendance could represent the loss of an important venue through which Muslims can develop civic skills and social networks and reconcile their religious and civic democratic lives.

Works Cited


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7 For example, the World Values Survey collects data in many countries in six waves from 1981 to 2014. However, they do not sample the same countries every year, and the Muslim representation within the countries sampled is remarkably low. The United States, with a population of about 300 million that is 1 percent Muslim, is sampled in four of the waves, and the total number of Muslims sampled is 19 out of 6,223 total respondents, or 0.003 percent. Likewise, Germany, a population that is about 6 percent Muslim, is sampled in three waves and yields a total of 87 Muslims out of 6,136 respondents, or 0.01 percent. The European Social Survey used here does not include North American countries and collects seven rounds from 2002 to 2014. They sample 1,000 Muslims only in waves 4, 5, and 6, and within the individual waves a country sample exceeds 100 Muslims only once (Belgium in 2012 with 110 Muslims).


The Politics of ‘Tradition’ and the Production of Diasporic Shia Religiosity

Avi Astor, co-authors Victor Albert Blanco and Rosa Martínez Cuadros, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Despite the progressive secularization of societies across Europe, the presence of religious symbols and practices in public space has become an increasingly prominent feature of cities throughout the continent. This is due, in large part, to the deepening of religious diversification as a consequence of rising levels of immigration and the growth of new religious movements for which public expressions of religiosity have special importance. For diasporic religious communities, public expressions of religiosity reinforce group cohesion and connection to the homeland. Yet they may also be a source of communal dissonance, as members are not always in agreement with regard to the form that such expressions should take, and the degree to which religious traditions should be adapted in light of contextual factors. Consequently, negotiations and decisions regarding public expressions of religiosity become imbricated with larger questions regarding citizenship and transnational identity in much the same way that Balkan highlights in this volume with respect to diasporic burial practices. Public expressions of religiosity may also generate challenges for municipal regulatory agencies, especially when they are perceived as threatening to local norms regarding the place of religion in the public sphere and other sensitive issues. The manner in which such expressions are regulated provides a revealing lens for identifying ‘local regimes of public space’ core to religious governance. Regulatory policies concerning public forms of religiosity also have important ramifications for the general visibility of religious diversity as a part of urban life, much like Tepe illustrates in this volume with respect to places of worship.

This project examines public expressions of religiosity among Shia in Europe and North America, with a special focus on Toronto, Paris, Barcelona, and Bonn, four cities strategically selected due to the innovative or distinctive character of public religiosity among their respective Shia communities. It focuses specifically on the cleavages within Shia communities surrounding the ritual commemoration of Ashura and other days of mourning, as well as the diverse models for regulating such commemorations that have emerged in each city. Our analysis centers on Shia of South Asian descent, as they place special importance on organizing religious processions in urban public spaces. We therefore use the terminology that is most commonly used among South Asian Shia for various religious statuses, practices, and organizational forms.

Ashura and public ritual commemoration

At various points during the year, Shia Muslims stage *julus* (processions) in open urban spaces. The largest and most visible processions are typically organized on the day of Ashura, which commemorates the death of Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of Mohammad, during the Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D. During these processions, participants customarily dress in black and carry flags and banners with religious inscriptions, as well as other symbolic artifacts (e.g. a coffin representing Hussein’s death). In many of these processions, participants engage in practices of self-flagellation called ‘*matam*’ to the rhythm of collective chanting. There are several different types of *matam*, including *sineh zani* (beating of the chest with one’s fist), *zanjir zani* (flagellation with sharp instruments), and *qama zani* (cutting of the head with a blade). The manner in which *matam* is practiced varies both within and across different territorial contexts.

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Many, though not all, influential Shia clerics—particularly those from Iran—have condemned zanjir and qama for violating the Islamic prohibition against self-inflicted injury. Ayatollah Khomeini was critical of the practice, and his successor Ayatollah Khamenei famously issued a fatwa prohibiting forms of matam that involve shedding blood in 1994. Ayatollah Sistani (Iraq) likewise voiced skepticism regarding zanjir, though his remarks on the subject have been interpreted differently by distinct segments of the Shia community. Criticisms of ‘blood matam’ have contributed to what Lara Deeb has termed “authenticated forms of Ashura and public piety” that eschew religious rituals perceived as ‘traditional’ or ‘backward.’ For instance, it is now common for Shia communities to organize blood drives in remembrance of the blood spilled by Hussein, rather than engaging in zanjir. Despite the controversial nature of zanjir, the practice is still widespread and remains central to the religious identity of many Shia, especially those of South Asian descent.

**Religious tradition as a descriptive and evaluative concept**

Debates about ritual practices like matam revolve largely around distinct visions and understandings of religious tradition. Religious tradition is typically understood as the symbols, meanings, and rituals that generate continuity among religious peoples and communities across generations. Along these lines, Riesebrodt defines religious tradition as “the historical continuity of systems of symbols.” He describes particular traditions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism as “cultural ways of life that no doubt contain systems of religious practices, but also transcend them.” As such, religious tradition is a “concrete reality” that should be studied contextually, keeping in mind all its “overlaps, syncretisms, and local peculiarities.”

Zubrzycki highlights how religious tradition, in Riesebrodt’s sense of the term, may be mobilized for political projects, such as the production and contestation of national identity. In analyzing recent debates surrounding diversity and national identity in Quebec and Poland, she argues that religious tradition becomes “a material and symbolic resource for identity building and is sacralized as a marker of the nation.” Understood in this manner, religious tradition is a cultural repository that may be used instrumentally for the purposes of circumscribing or expanding the boundaries of the national community, protecting the privileged status of particular religious groups and institutions, or justifying the presence of religious symbols in purportedly secular public spaces.

Religious tradition and related concepts like ‘religious heritage’ may also be used evaluatively for articulating notions of religious authenticity and obsolescence. For instance, religious authorities may declare a given practice to be an ‘innovation’ or ‘fabrication’ that runs counter to the established ‘tradition’ of the community as a means of calling into question its authenticity. Similarly, within progressive circles, labeling a given religious practice ‘traditional’ may serve as code for declaring it outmoded and contrary to contemporary values or sensibilities. Hence, in practice expressions like ‘it is part of our tradition’ or ‘that is a very traditional view of things’ are oftentimes not neutral but rather convey value-laden notions of authenticity or obsolescence that are central to debates over the ethics and desirability of various religious practices.

This use of the concept of religious tradition arises not only amid debates within religious communities about authentic religious practice, but also amid debates among public authorities about which kinds of religious customs merit

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5 Ibid., xii.


special measures of accommodation. If a given custom is recognized as part of a longstanding and established religious tradition, authorities are more likely to view it as authentic and hence worthy of accommodation. By contrast, if a custom is viewed as deviant with respect to recognized tradition, its authenticity may be called into question, and authorities will be less likely to offer special measures of accommodation.  

In the analysis that follows, we examine diasporic Shia religious traditions with these various senses of the term tradition in mind. That is, we analyze factors that have influenced the persistence or transformation of religious tradition, understood in an empirical and descriptive sense. However, we also examine how notions of tradition have themselves been invoked to claim the authenticity or obsolescence of contested religious rituals, most notably the ritual of matam.

**The politics of ‘tradition’**

Dogra has recently provided an illuminating analysis of how debates surrounding matam have unfolded among Shia elites in London. He frames the matter as a struggle between the ‘old guard’, who defend South Asian forms of ritual commemoration, and ‘reformists’, who favor the Iranian model espoused by Ayatollah Khamenei and those sympathetic to his perspective. While the old guard defends the practice of “severe and violent” forms of zanjir and qama, reformists advocate more restrained forms of matam or other forms of commemoration that do not involve self-flagellation. The categories of ‘old guard’ and ‘reformists’, however, are somewhat misleading, as they give the impression that Shia may be neatly divided into conservatives and progressives, those with rigid and those with flexible perspectives on tradition. The manner in which individuals and collectives on both sides of the debate position themselves with regard to tradition, however, is far from straightforward. For example, Dogra himself begins his article with a quote from a proponent of the so-called ‘old guard’ view in which the individual in question highlights his frustration with reformist discourses that portray qama as an ‘innovation’ that is just a hundred years old and therefore lacks authenticity.

An additional reason for exercising caution when using terms like ‘old guard’ and ‘reformist’ relates to the specificities of local context. Consider, for instance, the case of Toronto. During the mid-1990s, Schubel published an ethnography of a Shia community in Toronto composed largely of immigrants from East Africa of South Asian descent. He wrote that the julus (procession) organized during Muharram largely resembled a typical julus in Pakistan, though the practice of matam was conspicuously absent. Today, by contrast, matam is part of most julus organized in the city. In recent years, a matami group has even begun to practice zanjir in public space. The ‘old guard’ in the local context of Toronto thus appears to consist of those opposed to matam, rather than its defenders. My point here is not that temporality should be used as the main criterion for drawing distinctions between the old guard and reformists. It is rather that many of the criteria that we typically use to draw such distinctions (temporality, age, generation, etc.) may generate counterintuitive results at the local level, and perhaps at the global level as well.

Complicating matters further is the fact that, as in India and Pakistan, matamis in the diaspora are organized as semi-autonomous groups called sangats. While some sangats are affiliated with specific imambargahs (houses of ritual worship), others are not. It is not uncommon for

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10 Ibid., 170.

11 Ibid., 159.


sangat members, especially those who are unaffiliated with any imambargah, to bear conflictive relations with local clerics. Many see themselves as resisting, rather than seeking to restore, established traditions and hierarchies of authority as part of a broader effort to practice a more authentic form of Shia Islam. At the same time, however, tradition remains a key source of authenticity, resulting in clear tensions between the desire to remain loyalty to established religious understandings and practices, on the one hand, and the desire to reform misguided religious understandings and structures of authority, on the other.

AA, a young matami of South Asian descent who migrated to Toronto from Dubai, spoke to us of the tension that some matamis experience in resisting the dominion of clerics and other recognized authorities while at the same time embracing elements of tradition that reinforce hierarchical structures of authority. He said this tension was particularly apparent in relation to the structures of authority characteristic of sangats. While charisma, dedication, and initiative are certainly important for aspiring leaders (salars), ‘ancestral capital’ remains a critical source of their legitimacy. For this reason, many salars have the first name ‘Syed,’ which indicates direct descendence from the prophet’s family.

In the following quote, AA references two brothers who reside in Bonn and have gained notoriety as matami leaders, not only in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe and in India and Pakistan:

So if you look at Tossif and Tasneef, their first names are ‘Syed.’ You will notice that in some of the pictures they have on Facebook there’ll be a couple of people who when they’re taking pictures with them will actually kneel down in front of them and have their hand on their foot to sort of say you know… this is the ideal, you know they are descendants of the prophet, we love these people to no end… And most of the times what’s happened is that… these matami groups… often develop their own little leaders… These salars are folks like Tasneef, Tossif. And I, for a very short period of time – a very very short period of time – I was considered one when I began the matam in Toronto… but I’m not ‘Syed’ and neither am I Pakistani so it very quickly eroded off. So the salar of the matamis in Toronto is a Syed, the salars of the matamis in New York [are Syeds] – they’ve developed these leaders from within the community, within the matami group (personal interview).

Hence, while having the forename ‘Syed’ opened up leadership opportunities for Tossif and Tasneef, lacking this forename closed off opportunities for AA. The ongoing importance of ancestral capital to the structure of leadership among matamis speaks to the continued role of traditional sources of legitimacy within matami circles despite the fact that some matamis have begun to question the traditional sources of legitimacy of global religious authorities (marjas) and local clerics. Tossif, it should be noted, is the salar of an influential sangat, QBH, that is based in Bonn but has local branches in India. The somewhat controversial practice of organizing a julus and other events of ritual mourning commemorating the assassination of Ali ibn Abi Talib at the end of Ramadan, which is typically treated as a time of celebration, is something that QBH has played a role in popularizing, highlighting how diasporic leaders and collectives may influence religious practice among Shia in Muslim-majority countries.

Image 1: Individual with his hand on Syed Tossif’s foot as a sign of respect. Source: Facebook (personal page).
Transnationalism and diasporic religiosity

South Asian matamis are a rather mobile collective, as they travel from community to community to participate in rituals of mourning. Many make pilgrimages to Iraq or Syria during Muharram. In Europe and North America, matamis who have the financial means commonly travel to other cities in their countries of residence and abroad for major events in order to provide support to other sangats. Possessing the requisite economic capital to make such trips is essential for those who wish to make a name for themselves and achieve a measure of distinction within the broader field of matamis worldwide. Given the importance of mobility and its role in generating and reinforcing transnational and trans-local networks among Shia, Scharbrodt emphasizes the centrality of ‘multilocality’ to social and religious dynamics characteristic of the Shia diaspora.14

The centrality of mobility to diasporic religious practice among Shia is linked, in part, to their position as minorities within a (stigmatized) minority. Given that most diasporic sangats have relatively few members, they are often reliant upon outsiders to reach the critic threshold necessary to feel proud practicing matam publicly. The ideal is to go well beyond the critical threshold so as to display ‘strength in numbers’ and temporarily invert power relations between Shia and Sunnis.15 The religious character of Muharram as a period in which fresh perspectives are shared and new relationships forged reinforces dynamics of inter-community exchange. The circulation of matamis between cities and communities, in turn, sets in motion norms of reciprocity, which further contribute to the flow of matamis across local, regional, and national borders. Reflecting on this type of exchange, the president of the Shia community in Barcelona, Al Qaim, who is himself a matami, stated:

People come from India and Pakistan, people who live in Germany. They are young guys like me who were raised in Germany. They are friends of mine. We coincided in Syria or Iraq. We asked each other, “Where have you come from?” “I come from Germany,” “I come from Barcelona.” “I’m from Paris.” “I’m from Italy.” You always invite. “Hey, on this date why don’t you come here?”… Just as I bring people to Germany, they have come here. A little while ago, in August, we went to Paris, ten of us from the mosque (personal interview).

Such exchanges, along with the pilgrimages that that Shia regularly make to holy sites in Iraq and Syria, and the significant coverage of julus (procession) in various digital media, contribute to the general sense of belonging to a broader Shia umma. They also sustain the ritual of matam, which otherwise might not have sufficient practitioners to flourish in many diasporic contexts.

The sense of interconnectedness that exists between matamis results not only from their physical mobility, but also from the wide circulation of photos, video recordings, and live feeds of julus and matam on sites like YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook. In most, if not all, of the events that we observed in our cities of focus, there were individuals transmitting live video feeds via social media. We also noted the presence of Pakistani TV channels broadcasting several of the events. On various occasions during the course of our research, we were surprised by how Shia whom we knew in Canada and Germany were telling us about events happening locally in Barcelona prior to our becoming aware of them. A matami from Toronto told us that seeing videos of matam in Pakistan played an important role in leading him and his friends to question the previous absence of matam in the city and empowered them to resuscitate the ritual. This is an instance in which the internet and digital technology have led to a return to home country traditions. This ‘reterritorialization’ of Islamic practice may be contrasted with the ‘deterриториализация’ that Roy and others have linked to the proliferation of internet usage among Muslims seeking religious guidance in the diaspora.16

The politics of including politics in religious commemorations

Beyond the practice of matam, Shia residing in the diaspora differ in their views as to whether religious commemorations should serve as an occasion to use the memory of Hussain and other martyrs as inspiration for transmitting messages of universal justice and encouraging charitable acts, on the one hand, or whether they should be more apolitical and circumscribed in focus, on the other. In 2012, a group of London youth of South Asian descent began an initiative called “Who is Hussain?” that aimed to “to tell the world about an inspirational man” and to highlight how Hussain is a role model to whom everyone may relate.17 During the years following its creation, the initiative generated significant interest in the UK and beyond, and now has representatives in cities across the world. Those involved promote blood drives, food donations for the homeless, aid for war victims, and other charitable activities. There are, however, some Shia who are skeptical of the initiative, arguing that its promoters have sought to ‘sanitize’ longstanding and venerable traditions, and to replace them with activities that, while laudable, detract from the main purpose of Muharram, which is to mourn the death of Hussain and experience the suffering that he incurred.

Controversy has also emerged over the incorporation of political messages in ritual processions. In her ethnography of an Ashura procession in central London, for instance, Spellman-Poots noted a strong presence of political messages regarding injustices in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the form of speeches, placards, or symbolic attire. At the same time, she highlights how some participants felt that the procession had been “hijacked by political protesters.”18 Several of the matamis whom I interviewed likewise voiced their opposition to the inclusion of political messages that diluted the memory of Hussain, regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with the content of the messages.

Regulating azadari (mourning rituals)

While staging mourning processions in open public spaces has been officially banned in some authoritarian Sunni-majority societies, liberal democratic societies generally recognize the right of Shia Muslims to organize public processions and other forms of ritual practice in open urban spaces. Nevertheless, different cities have regulated Ashura processions and rituals in distinct ways. In Barcelona, for example, Shia who participate in the Ashura procession are required by the city government to wear shirts when performing matam. This is a measure that was put into place in 2007 after one of the very first public Ashura processions was organized in the city. Municipal authorities evidently came to the conclusion that covering the upper part of the body was necessary to ensure the compatibility of matam with local norms governing bodily praxis and exhibition in public space. The route of the procession has also been modified at various points so as to minimize interference with local businesses. In 2018, the route was adjusted so as not to interfere with events that were part of Barcelona’s traditional local patron saint celebrations, highlighting how majority traditions in the city take priority over minority traditions when the two enter into conflict.

Restrictions on dress such as those imposed in Barcelona are the exception, rather than the norm in European and North American cities. In Athens, zanjir (self-flagellation with sharp instruments) has been practiced in open urban spaces, generating a measure of public controversy in the city. Similarly, Shia in Toronto have recently begun to practice zanjir in open (though peripheral) urban spaces, having made arrangements with local authorities to have an ambulance and medical personnel on hand, and having agreed not to allow anyone under 18 to participate. Zanjir is also practiced in a limited number of open public spaces in New York City. In some cases, individuals and groups critical of the practice of matam or the communities who engage in the practice have written sensationalized articles

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17 For more information about the initiative, see: https://whoishussain.org/ (accessed 3 July 2018).
or posted decontextualized videos online as a means of stirring up controversy. Certain clerics have also made a name for themselves by criticizing the practice in their sermons. This has, in some cases, prompted responses from practitioners of *matam* eager to defend the practice. As a reaction to the proliferation of criticisms of *matam* in and around Toronto, for instance, *matamis* in the city created banners and t-shirts aimed at debunking misconceptions of *matam* as a barbaric or threatening practice (Image 2).

While it is rather common for Shia to organize processions commemorating Ashura in most European and North American cities where they have a relatively large numeric presence, in Paris they have been reticent to organize religious events in public space. 2017 marked the first year that Shia organized an Ashura event in the center of Paris. The event was framed as ‘cultural’ and took place in the Place de la République. Most of Paris’ Shia communities are located in peripheral areas of the city. The religious leaders with whom we spoke explained that their communities typically commemorate Ashura inside their respective mosques or in rented spaces. Some of them believed that attaining permission to organize a procession in the street would be difficult due to the general framework of *laïcité* and the stigmatization of Islam in France. Their understanding of *laïcité* and presumptions regarding the likely reaction among local residents to a religious procession involving *matam* has led them to opt for evading controversy by limiting ritual commemoration to spaces that are indoors.

**Conclusion**

While certainly not exhaustive, this short reflection on the dynamics of controversy surrounding Shia religious processions and the practice of *matam* in public space draws attention to the complex interplay between internal divisions and external constraints in shaping public expressions of religiosity in Western diasporic contexts. At the heart of local debates over ritual commemoration in public space lie sharply contrasting views on the authenticity of specific religious traditions and the appropriateness of such traditions to the local contexts in which they are enacted. As highlighted over the course of this article, the language of ‘tradition’ has itself become instrumental to the articulation of the distinct positions advanced in such debates. Future research should delve more deeply into local structures of religious power and authority, and the manner in which they both emanate from and challenge global structures of power and authority among Shia. This is critical for understanding the evolving development of Shia identity and practice in the diaspora and beyond.

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The Islamic Deathscapes of Germany

Osman Balkan, Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College

Anxieties about the place of Islam and Muslims in Europe underpin a wide range of contemporary debates over the meaning of secularism, democracy, citizenship, and national identity. Politicians and pundits across the political spectrum question whether Islam is compatible with European values and ways of life. Such discussions often focus on the visibility of Islamic signs and symbols in the public sphere. Although Muslim presence in Europe has been evident in urban landscapes for decades, the public visibility of Islam, as Nilüfer Göle argues, “disturbs the collective imaginary of European countries shaped by the secular values of freedom and a non-religious way of life.”

In attempting to understand why Islamic symbols have provoked backlash in various European countries, scholars have often focused on conflicts involving female headscarves or the construction of mosques. In this memo, I’d like to draw attention to a somewhat neglected site of public Islam that is, nonetheless, highly consequential for European Muslims: the cemetery. My discussion grows out my current book project, Dying Abroad, which examines how death structures political membership and identity among Muslim communities and ethno-religious minorities in Europe. In the book, I argue that families, religious communities, and states all have a vested interest in the fate of dead bodies and endeavor to show how in contexts where the boundaries of the nation and its members are contested, burial decisions are political decisions that are linked to larger struggles over the meaning of home and homeland. My findings are based on extensive fieldwork carried out in Berlin and Istanbul, during which I conducted interviews and participant observation with Muslim undertakers and Islamic funeral homes, bereaved families, government officials, religious leaders, and representatives of funeral aid societies.

With the long-term settlement of Muslim communities in Europe, there is a growing demand for local burial spaces where families can inter their dead in accordance with Islamic laws and traditions. In many European countries, including Germany, Muslims face a number of challenges with respect to the viability of Islamic burial, including the limited availability of Islamic cemetery sections, laws prohibiting coffinless burial, and mandatory (sometimes lengthy) waiting periods between death and interment. In the limited space that I have here, I’d like to offer some tentative thoughts on one specific dimension of Germany’s Islamic deathscapes—namely, the patterns of memorialization and the representation of ethnic, religious, and national identities on the tombstones of Muslim graves in Berlin’s Islamic burial grounds. Such graves are still a relatively rare sight in Germany (only 250 of the approximately 32,000 public cemeteries in the country have sections reserved for Muslims), yet they are, nonetheless, suffused with deep cultural and symbolic meaning. Generally speaking, cemeteries are exemplary sites of public memorialization where struggles over memory and collective identity occur. As places where the physical landscape is symbolically (re)inscribed and (re)signified, Germany’s Islamic cemeteries offer insight into the

3 Recall that the Nazis invested much energy into purging what they perceived to be foreign elements and racial outsiders from “German” cemeteries. The process of Aryanization and “purification” entailed, first, the systemic exclusion of Jewish communities from the right to burial in municipal cemeteries, and later, the destruction of Jewish burial grounds throughout the country. See Monica Black. Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
changing contours of political membership, belonging, and identity in an increasingly multicultural society. Moreover, they are sites where members of ethno-religious minorities assert and display their long-term communal presence and in the process, help normalize symbols of ethnic, religious, linguistic diversity in contemporary Germany.

Figure 1: Multilingual sign marking the Muslim burial section of Landschaftsfriedhof Gatow, Berlin, Germany

Writing and Seeing the Dead

As an amalgamation of person, place, text, image, and name, the grave is a particularly dense semiotic object. “While they are endpoints for migrants,” writes Engseng Ho, “[Graves] are beginnings for their descendants, marking the truth of their presence in a land.” My reading of Islamic tombstones focuses on three dimensions: the texts and images they contain, as well as the built features of the stone itself. Of the approximately two hundred tombstones surveyed, I found that the majority of textual inscriptions are monolingual and that Islamic referents are fairly prevalent. Furthermore, the stones display a range of symbols such as flags and crescent moons that place the deceased within broader ethnic, religious, or national collectivities. In some cases, the design of the stone itself mimics Islamic architectural styles. Through the choice of language, epitaph, symbolic imagery, and gravestone design, the living commemorate the dead and assert their membership in a variety of overlapping communities.

The graves of Berlin contain a multitude of different messages written in a myriad of languages including Arabic, Bosnian, Farsi, German, English, and Turkish. They are often addressed to the deceased herself but in many cases, speak directly to the living, inciting them to action. The most common appeal is for prayer. Variations on the phrase “Ruhuna Fatiha,” including “al Fatiha,” “al Fateha,” “el Fatiha,” or simply “R. Fatiha” or “Fatiha” were present on approximately one third of the tombstones, on the graves of the old and young alike (see figure 2).

Injunctions on tombstones for passers-by to pray for the soul of the deceased are not unique to Islam nor to the contemporary period. Such communicative acts create potentials for signification by delimiting a community of mourners and believers. The act of writing “Fatihah” on a tombstone marks the individual deceased as a Muslim but also situates her within a broader collective Islamic community by instigating communicative action between the deceased and other members of the community of faith. It signals the existence of a Muslim identity while simultaneously entreats other Muslims to profess their own Islamic identity through ritualistic acts of prayer. By acknowledging the deceased as a Muslim and by praying for the souls of all Muslims, the observant visitor reflexively produces the wider Islamic community through pious symbolic action.

Beyond references to religious beliefs and identities, the graves of Muslims in Berlin also contain secular histories in the form of epitaphs. The vast majority of the written

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2 The Turkish phrase “Ruhuna Fatiha,” translates to “Fatiha for his/her soul!” It refers to the Sura al-Fatiha, the opening chapter of the Qur’an, which is a central part of Islamic worship and an obligatory part of the daily prayers.

3 The practice dates back to Ancient Rome and is famously captured along the Appian Way. Roman Law required that the dead be buried outside human settlements and entering the city entailed passing through a community of the dead. Tombs called out to passers-by, asking them to stop, reflect, and remember with injunctions such as: “You are human, stop and contemplate my tomb, young man, in order to know what you will be. I did no wrong. I performed many duties. Live well, for soon this will come to you.”

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text on these grave markers is not in German. Of the tombs surveyed, 77 percent have monolingual inscriptions in Turkish, Arabic, or Bosnian. The remaining 23 percent incorporate text in two or more languages, including German. Although multilingual messages are present in some of the earliest graves surveyed here (from the 1990s), they are more numerous from the 2000s forward, reflecting a trend towards linguistic syncretism (see figure 3). Biographical information is conveyed through short inscriptions that contain a family’s genealogy, kinship terminology, places of birth and origin, and occasionally information about the deceased’s occupation, hobbies, or interests. Often these texts are paired with images and icons.

Approximately 75 percent of the graves surveyed bore images, a practice that is less common in Muslim majority countries. These visual markers can be classified into three categories: national or patriotic symbols, religious motifs, and personal portraits. While compiling this archive, I was struck by the existence of flags on the tombstones of civilians, a practice that is often reserved for soldier dead. The flag is a recognizable visual marker that has the potential to reach a wider audience than an epitaph or inscription, particularly if the text is written in a language that is foreign to the observer. It is a powerful symbol of national belonging and conveys a range of emotional attachments to a political community.

Among the different nationalities represented within Berlin’s Islamic burial sections, the Turkish flag appears far more frequently than others. While only 10 percent of the tombstones surveyed included flags, 90 percent of these were Turkish flags (see figures 4 and 5). One could read this as a sign of greater (real or aspirational) nationalist sentiment among Berlin’s Turkish population or as a strategy used by Turkish Muslims to distinguish themselves from other national groups. Skeptics might argue that the existence of a Turkish flag in a German cemetery evinces a lack of integration or assimilation to the dominant culture. Yet, there is a certain ambivalence at play, given that the deceased is buried in Germany and hasn’t been repatriated to Turkey for burial. While the flag might be Turkish, the body remains in Germany and serves as an anchor and reference point for future generations. Like the practice of marking a foreign birthplace, the flag simultaneously acknowledges a migratory history and the reality of the community’s presence in a new land.

Invoking the country of origin by referencing the place of birth not only offers biographical information, but simultaneously concretizes and makes explicit a migratory history (see figure 3). Although this tradition exists among “native born” Germans, it is usually to convey the fact that the deceased was born in another part of the country. In the Muslim sections of Berlin’s cemeteries, the practice is largely restricted to people who were born abroad. The decision to reference the country of birth makes clear that certain families seek to honor their ancestral roots and migratory routes. It also acknowledges the fact that the deceased is not buried in their natal soil, a practice that is still very common among first generation migrants.

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Finally, one of the most visually striking features of Berlin’s Islamic cemeteries are tombstones resembling mosques. The domed mosque with its pointy minarets might very well be the most widely recognized symbol of Islam. The mosque grave brings the mosque—a place of collective worship that might be located near or adjacent to a burial ground—into the heart of the cemetery itself, albeit in miniaturized form. Beyond the conspicuous visual effect generated by the existence of mini mosques scattered among the mortuary landscape, the mosque grave occasions a socio-spatial reorientation for worshippers and mourners. The lines between sites of worship, pilgrimage, and prayer become blurred as the gravesite is re-imagined as something more than a place for the deposition of human remains. The dead Muslim body, which endows the soil with Islamic qualities, is directly linked to the most recognizable symbol of Islamic faith. The proximity of the mosque to the dead also mimics the medieval Christian practice of burying the dead directly under the grounds of the church. This practice, usually reserved for the rich or the holy, is given new lease in the diaspora cemetery. If you can’t bury under the mosque, why not build a mosque over your grave? (see figures 6-7).

The landscape of the cemetery is transformed as it is imbued with new religious iconography. What is novel about the mosque grave as a cultural and architectural practice is how the built form of the mosque is deracinated from its original, everyday context and location and appears in a new and unexpected locale. It is an example of what art historian Christine Gruber has termed “Islamic architecture on the move.”

I want to suggest that the use of Islamic architectural elements like the mosque grave in the cemeteries of Berlin is, in part, a response to the political challenges faced by the city’s Muslim communities. The incorporation of religious architecture and design in the public space of the cemetery represents an innovative step towards the normalization of Islamic symbols in the German landscape. The visibility of such symbols has provoked controversy across Europe, and efforts to build actual mosques and places of worship have been undermined by municipal officials in a number of different countries (usually on technical grounds or with reference to zoning laws). The placement of miniature mosques in the space of the cemetery reflects efforts by Germany’s Muslim communities to express their religious identities and beliefs in the public sphere.

Rather than assuming that the expression of national, ethnic, or religious belonging is simply evidence of cultural retention, I think it is also helpful to understand these gestures as evidence for the changing horizons of German identity. Read in this light, expressions of Islam are not articulations of an outside, extraneous, or foreign culture, but, rather, they are part of Germany’s evolving and dynamic society. While mosques and minarets may currently seem out of place in the cemetery or the city, their proliferation might help neutralize their effect and make them as invisible and unremarkable as the crosses and church towers that are an integral part of Berlin’s urban landscape.

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“Do We Need a Minaret?":
Challenging Urban Contexts and Changing Islamic Theologies

Sultan Tepe, University of Illinois at Chicago

Religion’s dual potential to transcend or reinforce some well entrenched social, racial and spatial boundaries has been recognized in many studies. Yet, studies of Islam in many cities focus on Islam and Muslims’ impact on their respective cities or communities and questions how Islam reinforces preexisting shared identities and whether and how these identities can be better integrated. Such studies disregard the plurality of Muslims’ experiences and leave unanswered the question of whether and how the city impacts the experiences of Muslims. But the distinct ways in which urban governance is exercised is not extraneous to Muslims’ experiences. Instead, as noted by Avi Astor and Osman Balkan in this volume, urban governance plays a major role not only in defining the location and appearance of Muslim spaces but also in facilitating internal theological changes.

In order to illustrate how the treatment of religious assemblies makes inroads into Muslim experiences and theologies, this essay focuses on so-called mosque disputes, placing them in their urban administrative structure and tracing the theological questions they pose. An overall review of mosque disputes, public hearings, and subsequent discussions indicates that the cases discussed here are not aberrations but instead help us to understand a general trend. The findings show that any treatment of Muslim communities in a vacuum requires careful questioning and implicitly and explicitly advances the idea that the beliefs and practices of Islam are self-enforcing—they shape yet are not shaped by their environments. Such decontextualized studies risk generating self-confirming analytical narratives and missing critical aspects of these controversies.

Building a place of religious gathering may seem to be routine process, but such attempts have always been challenging for unorthodox and minority religious groups in the United States. A federal law was adopted in 2000 (The Religious Land use and Institutionalized Persons Act) to prevent religious groups from excessive burden on the religious groups. Religious communities, particularly Muslims, that strive to have their own places of worship have the option of buying a vacated temple or church, purchasing a building to be reused through a “special use” permit, or buying their own lots for new constructions. Zoning boards decide whether and how certain building types (commercial, residential or religious, etc.) can be built in designated areas. Each option poses different challenges. For instance, vacant temples are often located in areas with declining populations and gaining a special use permit can be challenging due to the limitations of existing structures and parking. Lots available for purchase are often located in unincorporated areas (which constitute unique administrative spheres in the U.S.) that maintain a level of autonomy and are governed directly by their respective counties.

This essay reviews several mosque projects in Chicago by focusing on one mosque project called MECCA, in the Chicago suburb of DuPage County, Illinois in an unincorporated area next to the village of Willowbrook. This case offers an excellent example of the overall process and its impact on diverse Muslim communities. It mirrors a pattern that has been seen in countries such as Spain of pushing new religious temples built by immigrants outside of residential areas and sheds light on the intra-community debates (see Avi Astor, 2017).

The MECCA Project

MECCA’s request to build a mosque was declined by the DuPage County when a board member noted the area

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was “saturated by religious institutions.” Also noted was that unincorporated areas are meant to maintain a rural structure in urban environments and that such construction projects were threatening the expectations of residents.

These objections did not stand up to initial scrutiny. Despite the references to “oversaturation,” Willowbrook’s population has been on the decline since 2010, yet the area has maintained a median income of $70,000 and an average home value of $227,000, placing itself well above the state average. The village’s foreign-born population (25%) put it well above the Illinois State average (13%).

The temples close to MECCA included a Macedonian Orthodox Church, a rare Anjumen e Saifee center, a Dawoodi Bohra center (a largely unknown small unorthodox Islamic group with members from South Asia and Ethiopia), and a Buddhist Wat Buddhadamma center.

Objections to MECCA echoed those against other mosque proposals—the uncertainties regarding the precise number of people who will use the facilities; expected traffic congestion, especially during Friday prayers and religious holidays; depreciation of home values in the immediate vicinity; the increasing likelihood of flooding in the area; and compromises to the well and septic systems.

An application for another center, the Islamic Center of the Western Suburbs (ICWS), that sought to use an existing house near West Chicago as a prayer center and chose not to build a new place faced exactly the same list of objections. Although the concerns about Islamic identities played a role, the public statements against the reuse argued that the real issue was “the right to protect private property” and potential property tax increases to support infrastructure problems caused by non-profits which take over private homes for broader use.

What makes the MECCA case unusual is the visual aspect of the project. MECCA’s architectural structure included a 69-foot-tall dome and 79-foot-tall minaret. The plan exceeded the county’s height restriction of 36 feet, a restriction that was often waived for religious places.

“What is important however is not only the community’s reactions to a minaret as visually unacceptable but also diverse reactions to the proposal from the community.

The mosque applicants considered a dome and minaret to be the sine qua non of an Islamic prayer place, and argued that the permit needed to accommodate it. Building a mosque without a minaret would be akin to building a church without a steeple. For the proponents of the mosque it was not the height constraint but the increasing visibility of Islamic ideas and presence that created the reactions. The minaret became the symbolic locus and triggered debate on Islamic symbols especially among suburbanites who argued that such places needed to maintain rural life with a familiar religious landscape.

For the proponents of the minaret, the real issue was not treating MECCA as a regular temple and approaching it as a disruptive appearance in a rural landscape. Two of the three existing religious structures in the area exceed the county’s height restriction of 36 feet proving that exceptions were granted to others. More important, due to the increased buffer zone between the building and surrounding buildings, the minarets would be noticeable.

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2 Barry Ketter, Zoning Appeals Board member “In good faith” Chicago Tribune, February 27, 2011.
3 DuPage County, Zoning Board of Appeals, T-3-10, August, 26 2010
5 Dawoodi Bohras are Shia Muslims, an off shoot of Ismailis. The community believes that the 21st imam went into seclusion in Yemen in the 12th century and appointed a deputy, called a dai-e-mutlaq, to lead the community. Many Dawoodi Bohras first moved to Gujarat, northwestern India and now have branches in 40 countries.
6 DuPage County, Zoning Board of Appeals, T-3-10, August, 26 2010
7 Du Page County Zoning Board Of Appeals Minutes. July12 -August 26, 2010
8 ibid
9 Interview with Mark Daniel, Zoning attorney, April 12 2016.
only to visitors. Thus the issue of visibility was more the issue of having a disruptive presence.

The reception may also have been shaped by a recent increase in the number of permits requested by Muslim communities (DuPage Country received five applications from Muslim communities between 2009 and 2014) marking an unprecedented number in its history. While zoning and permit decisions often involve prolonged processes with polarizing debates and negative decisions, they still offer a useful venue to voice concerns. DuPage County revived one of its earlier amendments to restrict the construction of new places of assembly in unincorporated areas and to move all new places of assembly to industrial or commercial zones, a trend that has been marking many U.S. cities. 10 Defenders of the proposal to move places of worship outside of residential zones present it as a market-driven solution to the perturbing financial influences of new places of assembly. But while market-driven language may justify zoning changes, a systematic review of existing research does not indicate what financial prospects and projections prevail. Proponents of the zoning practice present it as a strictly property-based decision as the highest level of increase (above 500%) of newcomers in many cities is constituted by Catholics (due to migration from South America) and not Muslims. Neglected in such discussions is that such groups can receive services from existing churches while an Islamic landscape and places of worship are completely missing in many areas.

The DarruSalam Mosque as a comparison

The MECCA experience can be useful compared to another recent mosque project in the area. DarrusSalam followed the county’s idealized pathway of having a temple beyond the eyes and ears of communities in commercial areas. The project was successfully completed in 2013 and the new mosque was located on an interstate highway and in a commercial and industrial strip surrounded by a fast food chain, gas stations, a warehouse, a set of factories, and hotels.11 While this mosque exemplified “the move-assemblies-to commercial/industrial zone model”, the mosque proved itself to be distinct in its reaction to urban marginalization, exemplifying the cost of uprooting mosques from communities and the risk of depleting spiritual civic capital, a capital that is often defined as a set of ideas and actions stemming from religion and available for use in inclusive economic and political practices” (Berger & Redding 2010).12

Unlike other mosques, DarrusSalam commits itself to hosting only American-born and raised Imams by stating that, “now the time has come to raise up a new wave of learned Muslims who have been born, bred, and educated at home to address Islamic legal and social issues and challenges unique to the American context.”13 Paradoxically, while DarrusSalam is physically separated from many communities, its teachings address the unique needs of groups in the U.S. and tackle very controversial questions, such as if Islam can be lived best under an Islamic state, or if a Muslim group can pay attention only to their own ethnic issues (e.g., the Palestinian cause) if such interests lead them to neglect others (e.g., Rohingya Muslim). Addressing the questions of radicalization or a

11 DarruSalam purchased a 6.5-acre parcel of land at the intersection of I-355 and North Avenue.
specific ethnic outlook is especially important considering that such issues are left unaddressed in many mosques due to their effort to create completely a-political neutral places, thereby limiting their spiritual capital and depriving the mosques’ contribution to civil society as noted by Aubrey Westfall in this volume.\textsuperscript{14}

Representing Islam - Reactions to or appropriating essentialization?:

MECCA’s experience captures a broader historical patterns of how zoning and special use permits are appropriated to control and manage urban spaces and minorities within those spaces. The Nation of Islam reported the impact of zoning on their projects as early as 1968.\textsuperscript{15} Yet what is neglected in many accounts of so-called mosque disputes is the impact of such discussions on the communities themselves. More often than not, zoning related issues pose many theological questions to the community. As the county discussed height limits, the same question arose in discussions in the community. Given the variety of mosque designs, what was traditional in Islamic architecture? Was a minaret an indispensable part of a mosque or was it a necessity when the first mosque was built? What was the meaning of a minaret, without having a public call for prayer? Since minarets were originally meant to create an elevated structure to make the call for prayer accessible and audible to many, could such a structure be easily eliminated when many had cell-phones that reminded them of prayer time?

Discussions in the community regarding architectural adjustments were intense yet very muted—many debates took place quietly as members tried to balance the demands to create a place that the community would find acceptable and would meet the demands of the county. One of the first Syrians to move to the US explained the discussion as a “reverse essentialization” of Islam--what was considered as a “traditional” symbolic representation of Muslims was actually appropriated by Muslims based on their perception by others, without engaging critically with authentic Islamic ideas. A minaret served a function (expand the sound as a reminder of the time of prayer) and was not a main pillar of Islam; it was no longer needed due to the prevalence of watches and cellphones. Only uncritical decisions to assert Muslim identity, not missing minarets, would hollow Islamic practices. A careful engagement with so-called Islamic tradition would be much needed as Islam was practiced in new places. Some felt that given that minarets are always associated with Islam and religious places of assembly, not having one would be complying with the expectation of the majority that wanted to promote a watered-down Islam without a commonly accepted theology and symbols. Regardless of the debates, the center was eventually built without a minaret and its carefully developed website included the designs for the original project without any explanations for the omission of the minaret.\textsuperscript{16} Meanwhile, the first newsletters and sermons focused on the deeper implications of Islamophobia, which might not mean much to those who did not know the history of the place.

From External to Internal Transformation of Mosques: balancing the power of boards, bylaws and imams?

Building a mosque might appear challenging, said a mosque president who engaged in a several-year long battle to get the required construction permits in another suburb, but the real challenge is to find an Imam who

\textsuperscript{14} For more on the relation between civic culture and the restriction on Islamic practices see Aubrey Westfall’s Mosques and Political Engagement in Europe and North America, Wheaton College.

\textsuperscript{15} Sultan Tepe, Building Faiths, forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{16} http://meccacenter.org/about/history-of-mecca/ (retrieved on December 11, 2018)
would not only lead but also understand the community. Imams conventionally maintain a level of autonomy in controlling a mosque’s services and teaching. Perhaps the most important questions facing many mosques include recruiting and defining the responsibilities of Imams, as noted by Nancy Khalil in this volume’s analysis. While many mosque communities try to maintain traditional Islamic practices, they also seek to reach out to the younger generation who are not familiar with the traditions their parents have experienced firsthand. Many mosques with two different constituencies—Arabic, Urdu or Farsi etc.-talking elderly immigrant generations and English-speaking younger generations—try to bridge the difference. Among American born Black Muslims the generational gap issue remains with different manifestations.

Linguistic and generational gap questions are intertwined with theological questions. While some communities uphold conventional methods and do not make fluency in English a requirement for an Imam, many communities strive to find bilingual Imams who can bridge the generations. In the case of MECCA, the mosque found a solution by creating a two-tier system that has been adopted by many mosques. While the Imam at MECCA came from the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the youth leadership was entrusted to a local sheikh. However, indicating emerging hierarchies in the newly formed mosque communities, both Imam and youth leader were required to submit regular reports to the board. As many mosque decisions are scrutinized and contested by members, one of MECCA’s first newsletters urged members to vote in both national (presidential) and board member elections. Such practices are new as many mosques were conventionally run by ad hoc decisions and Imams. The changing context required the adoption of bylaws and changed the internal hierarchy of the mosque in favor of boards, said a community member. For many mosque attendants, the shift from an Imam-led mosque to a board-led mosque with bylaws changed the entire structure of the mosques, including the content of sermons. When Imams’ independence is curtailed, boards and committees emerge as platforms to discuss and resolve different ideas and interests, forging new practices.

In Zoning We Unite: urban entropy, rules and institutionally induced identities?

While many studies reduce mosque disputes to a contestation between well-knit communities (Muslim groups and anti-Muslim groups), such processes often include multiple stakeholders. Instead of pitting well-defined groups against each other, such disputes often help to consolidate ties across and within Muslim communities. “We had a rather vague sense of unity before we tried to have a learning center,” said a member of an Islamic center. The center experienced a multi-year, highly contested process of attaining a special use permit. Paradoxically “it is the zoning decisions and public hearings that turned us into a community—we coordinated our participation in hearings, raised funds, took time off from work to go to the court, baby-sat for children etc.” More importantly, statements such as “we did not know the process, we received help from an Islamic center that we had no ties with before” are echoed by many mosque members noting the lack of understanding of the local regulations and the emerging collaboration across various groups that would have theological differences otherwise. Such statements are not outliers. Instead, interviews with different Muslim communities show that it is not the communities that build mosques, but rather the decision to build a mosque that brings together and consolidates Muslims’ identities, thereby creating the community. The reactions of neighbors and committees (e.g., development, zoning and county boards) differ significantly. When

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17 Nancy Khalil’s chapter.
18 “Mecca Center Youth Coordinator” October 23, 2016
19 Ibid
20 Author’s interview with a member of the Mosque Foundation, April 12, 2017
21 Author’s interview with a member of Irshad Learning Center, April 12, 2017.
22 Author’s interview with a member of Irshad Learning Center, March 8, 2016.
23 Ibid
public hearings are scheduled, a small, well-organized community can change the tone of the debates, while how the zoning and development committees are formed and the individual experiences of members might create completely different results. While some communities that experience contested zoning issues limit their discussions to in-group conversations, others make it one of the main pillars of their call for unity and fundraising efforts. Additionally, these disputes are internalized and even in some cases instrumentalized, reinforcing a distinct identity, emphasizing the existential crisis in a hostile context where Islam is demonized.

Zoning restrictions serve as a US-specific demobilization strategy and treat all Muslim identities as similar, but inside the mosque communities one can witness changing power dynamics as well as increasing room for creative expressions that view the moment as one of change and construction of a new identity. What makes such expressions important is that they are framed as a result of the externalization of Muslim identity in many countries and also from the perspective of Muslims’ position among other minorities. The accommodation of such questions shows that, once established, mosques become the realms of newly emerging exegetical practices with substantial implications:

The entire world is waiting to see,
Just what this Ummah might be,
But can we tell them who we could be,
When we ourselves cannot see...
Who we are.25

Are we foolishly left holding shattered dreams
And battered lands with which to go galumphing back?
Are we rabid wolves part of the pack?
Is the only word we know -attack? 26

While collective identities are used to express zoning and special use claims, the expressions exemplified in the above poem capture the ongoing individuation of Islam that addresses a range of question from code-switching to being Muslim while struggling with some Islamic injunctions. Such faith-rooted critical questions as well as challenges to stereotypical approaches to Islam appeal to the younger members of the community who deal with rejection by mainstream Muslim and non-Muslim groups as well as the older generation and want to connect with other groups who are critical of the historical and past marginalization.27 “We are a minority within a minority,” said an Ismaili. “For instance, some Muslims do not think I am a Muslim, but a client did not want to work with me after he found out I am a Muslim, yet I strive to get myself recognized as Muslim at my school by the Muslim groups. I am marginalized in every community.”28

**Changing Theologies in and Beyond Mosques.**

Although mosque debates are often forgotten after their permits are granted or denied, many mosque communities seek to create a viable financial structure and loyal congregations once they are built. As a result, how they approach current questions surrounding them and how they conduct Friday sermons help to modify and construct new Islamic theologies. It is not surprising that MECCA’s first issue, for instance, focused on Islamophobia, but this group does so by focusing on the very early years of Islam by isolating such issues from their current context. The discussions indicate how early Muslims were described as liars and madmen, and how they reacted to such accusations with patience and prayers. Such discussions also describe Muhammad’s activities in Mecca and Medina as “activism” to emphasize the importance of debate and discussion.29 While such calls are rooted in the familiar

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24 Please note how disqualification and demobilization strategies of the states differ depending on their political administrative context see Julien Talpin’s *Constraining Muslim Mobilizations in France: Symbolic Repression and Disqualification as Demobilization Strategies* in this volume.

25 https://meccacenter.org/2016/02/28/who-are-we/

26 https://meccacenter.org/2016/02/28/who-are-we/

27 For a more detailed review of individual expression of Islam see Bogumia Hall’s *Art and activism of the ‘war on terror’ generation: British Muslim youth and the politics of refusal in Britain.*

28 Author’s interviews with Zahra April 2018.

29 The Mecca Center Newsletter, November 2016
Islamic historical accounts, they take new terms such as Islamophobia and activism and ground them in early Islamic practice, turning engaging with Islamophobia into a religious practice. One address given by MECCA’s Imam concludes, “Coexistence instead of dependency and fusion should be the way of Muslims anywhere. We should avoid blind imitation of others, Muslims or non-Muslims.”

Inside the mosques there is a range of different questions that were not previously tackled by communities, especially in Muslim majority countries. A lecture on diversity, for instance, does not focus on the plurality of identities in the US but the plurality of identities within the Islamic community and the implications of privileging one ethnic-Islamic group or cause (Syrian refugees, etc.) over others. Likewise, the question of how the community can respond to excessive individualization generates different answers. *Fitrat*, human nature, requires individuals to protect themselves not only from Hollywood but also from Bollywood, says an Imam; *dawah*, spreading Islam, is most useful because it reflects what the Qur’an has said about human nature and its inclination to discern bad, do good and how Islam’s approach to human nature differs from others, raising a set of ontological questions in relation to other theological traditions that is not posed in many Muslim majority countries.

**The Transformation of Urban Space and Muslim’s Identities**

The building of a mosque in the west challenges Muslim communities “who never raised funds to have a mosque,” said a mosque executive board member of a Chicagoland Mosque. The lack of an established tradition to finance a mosque requires residents to adjust to a new tradition (a new practice of building a community’s own mosque), to raise the necessary amounts while finding a place to build a mosque. As new places are built, there are objections, often reduced to the precarious ideas of Islam and its followers; it is an unsettling process. Some members leave right away and go to established communities. Contested urban spaces, the increasing tendency of local governments to use zoning to manage their tax revenues and growth, and increased property values compel many new Muslim communities to look for buildings or lots, especially in unincorporated areas or suburbs where urban governance is less present and can be more accommodating, yet such regions often have a populace that reacts to mosque communities more vocally. The reluctance of local governments to accommodate new identities, especially when they are seen as symbolically and economically destabilizing, and the increasing tendency to move mosques to industrial zones risk creating spatial isolation and limiting their spiritual capital. Many mosque communities embark on their mosque construction process without much information about zoning and other requirements as well as with limited financial capacities and fundraising abilities; thus they are transformed throughout the process more drastically—not only in their Islamic identity, but also in the ways they approach local and national governance.

As the size of local communities gets smaller, it gets easier to organize opposition against mosque construction projects. Thus, building mosques actually becomes more difficult in small communities where sometimes one or two oppositional votes can prevent construction. At the same time urban centers with large populations often do not offer enough space for the construction of new temples, and Muslims are moved to suburbs. The struggle over the very location of the mosque becomes an important area of contestation that not only alters Islamic identities but changes the formation of U.S. cities and suburbs. Suburbs and unincorporated areas risk becoming increasingly fragmented due to reactions to new places of religious assembly and relegating new temples to commercial/industrial zones, thereby increasing the

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33 Author’s interview with an Orland Park Mosque Member, April 2016.
social distance among communities. Financially struggling mosque communities refer to the costs of their rejection to raise funds; Islamophobia becomes the raison d’être for many collective actions that risk putting important debates about accountability and critical engagement with conventional practices on the backburner as divisive issues while many express declining trust in institutions.\(^34\)

Nevertheless, new theological questions are posed due to voluntary and imposed adjustments in response to the demands of urban environments. Meanwhile multiple emerging novel answers reinforce the pluralization of views and theologies within the Muslim community. Behind the so-called mosque controversies or minaret disputes is the intersection of urban transformation and theological questions that allows communities to create internationally focused and locally rooted Islamic theologies, suggesting that a vernacularized Islam marked by American urban space is in the making.

\(^34\) For a more detailed discussion between feeling discriminated and trust see Mujtaba Isani and Jolanda van der Noll’s *The Effects of Discrimination on European Muslim Trust in Political Institutions*
Security issues are only one aspect of the Muslim experience in Europe, but an aspect which receives a disproportionate amount of media attention. The idea that the integration of Muslims is related to security has been vocally articulated after each recent terrorist incident and urban rioting (Bleich, 2009; Bleich et al., 2010). Political responses to the 2001 riots in Britain and the 2005 banlieue riots in France linked social unrest in segregated Muslim communities to perceived shortfalls in national approaches to integration. For example, in 2006, UK Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair remarked that the 2005 bombing of the London Underground – perpetrated by “well-integrated” Muslim British citizens – threw the dangers of multicultural Britain “into sharp relief” and formally ended his support for multiculturalism. Conservative UK PM David Cameron has insisted that multiculturalism prevents citizens from truly integrating and called for an emphasis on teaching British values (Mattei and Broeks, 2016). Similarly, French Prime minister Manuel Valls linked the November 2015 Paris attacks to the “social, territorial, and ethnic apartheid” of French minorities while maintaining the unity of the Republic as the only answer (Le Point, 2015). In response to the November 2015 Paris attacks, he stated “We will improve integration – not least by inspecting and shutting down any educational institutions that are teaching intolerance” (Cameron, 2015).

As evidenced in political rhetoric, the integration process is a form of statecraft should be understood as a reflection of the contemporary socio-governmental context among seemingly unrelated initiatives. More than promoting economic opportunity or better education, the definition of integration holds important implications for the very definition of national identity and social stability. The almost natural coupling of integration outcomes with national security outcomes marks the rise of an important conceptual framework long overlooked in academic research. Far from a natural occurrence, concerns over increasing crime, urban rioting, and most recently terrorism directly link integration challenges to not simply immigration policy but also to how states perceive their own security. The important result of this coupling is the normalization of integration outcomes as an indicator of national security. This relationship indicates that poor integration outcomes represented a significant security risk. The establishment of this relationship also reflects the increasing weight of security-based analyses and institutions in driving decisions and introduced international security risks into the domestic arena. Such research focuses on the emergence of the rise of transnational Islam as a key driver of poor integration outcomes and political strife (Kepel, 2012, 1997; Obin, 2004).

Existing research has not yet identified the effects of developing social integration policy to strengthen security. Recent policy developments in Britain and France reflect an increased focus on Muslim citizens through policing initiatives and counterterrorism strategies. The security field, comprising intelligence services, the policing infrastructure, and counterterrorism experts in academia, occupies an important role in the implementation of policy attempting to improve structural deficits in important socioeconomic indicators. “Securing” these citizens against the threats of religious fundamentalism occupies a top concern for the Interior Ministries of these countries. For certain Muslim citizens, this increased scrutiny could be contributing to higher feelings of discrimination, lower levels of trust in national institutions, and withdrawal from public debate (Hall, 2018; Isani, 2018). How and to what extent did “security” become a factor in the development and implementation of integration measures in France and the United Kingdom regarding its Muslim citizens? What are the state processes that contribute to this process, and what have been the resulting outcomes of such initiatives?

Reassessing Integration Models

Prior integration literature has juxtaposed Britain and
France to typecast two distinct integration models. The literature has described France as an “assimilationist” society and Britain as a “multicultural” society in their approaches to integration (Hill, 2013). In these terms, the Republican integration model (modèle français d’intégration) prioritizes individual integration over group ethno-religious identities, while the British model accommodates difference and allows individuals to retain community identities (Long, 1988; Schnapper, 1991; Haut Conseil à l'intégration, 1991; Modood, 2005). These countries occupy the extreme end of a spectrum in which other European countries are placed to compare Muslim integration approaches (Goodman, 2014). Scholars have reified political assertions rooted in specific national histories in an attempt to explain how policy initiatives fit within or contradict their respective ideologies rather than understanding the sociopolitical context driving these decisions (Favell, 1998; Kastoryano, 2002).

Rather than buttressing theoretical debates on national models, integration as a concept holds important implications in assessing how states view administrative promotions of social cohesion. After identifying a list of 14 different topics encompassed in integration research in the early 2000s, Adrian Favell astutely asked “how and why this disparate range of state policies, laws, local initiatives, and societal dispositions – which could in theory be implemented by all kinds of agencies and at all kinds of levels – comes to be thought of and described as a single-nation-state’s overall strategy or policy of integration” (Favell, 2015). In this question, Favell identifies the important assumption that “integration” is a construction used to facilitate analyses among disparate state initiatives.

Such claims should not discount the importance of local contexts in Muslim-focused integration initiatives. Many of the papers in this collection underscore the national contexts in which state actors, local policies, and Muslim associations operate. Shia communities attempting to practice religious self-flagellation rituals face city ordinance regulation and actively refer to other foreign communities to help push their permits through (Astor, 2018). Many Muslim associations in the United States prioritize the 501(c)3 tax-exempt status to increase their philanthropic reach, and others interpret Islamic theology to account for the limitations in finding a stable place of worship (Merriman, 2018; Tepe, 2018). In Germany, tombstones assert migrant identities such as a national flag or a mosque in an attempt to redefine public debate on the role of these religious symbols in public (Balkan, 2018). These approaches, however, should not be forced into a static integration model and then assessed on its compatibility with the model. The complexities of contemporary integration challenges warrant a wide range of responses within a single national context. National integration themes such as multiculturalism or assimilation offer guidance to local level policy implementation, but local level administrative challenges often require negotiation on seemingly hardline ideological discourse.

Security, Immigration, and Integration

The security studies literature has developed an influential framework for understanding how states view domestic policy as a manner of strengthening their security. Though originally focused on the sources of state-based conflict, the literature evolved in the 1990s to understand how domestic policy could impact the security of sovereign states. The biggest implication in this argument was the incorporation of policy outside of the defense sector in assessing a state’s overall security. The Copenhagen School identified a series of threat categories and their role in defining a state’s security agenda (Buzan, 1983; Waever et al., 1993; Buzan et al., 1998). Such views asserted that states fully controlled the issues comprising the security agenda. The term “securitization” referred to the rhetorical ability of state elites to make any issue a security issue. Their interpretations hinge on a coherent view of the state, an approach similar to the one found in integration models literatures and convey security in a static zero-sum perspective.

Increasing migration in Europe during this period also prompted reflections on immigration policy and its increasing role in expressing state sovereignty. Its implications on issues such as border control, asylum
policy, and citizenship provided scholars with a compelling argument on the increasing influence of security concerns posed specifically by Muslim migrants. The Salman Rushdie incidents of 1989 and the first affaires du foulard effectively mobilized public discourse on a number of citizenship and immigration policies in light of social integration concerns and the potential for physical violence (Bowen, 2007). In sum, concerns over which migrants and how spurred debate regarding more restrictive immigration policies in Western Europe throughout this period to prevent anticipated instances of urban tension.

More recent security literature has begun re-assessing the static security perspective through assessments of immigration policy practice such as border control at both the national and supranational level (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2006; Rudolph, 2006; Chebel d’Appollonia, 2012). While these scholars have offered a preliminary approach on moving away from a static security perspective, they have kept their analyses rooted in immigration policy and the practices of security institutions. With increasing concerns arising from domestically-produced terrorism, addressing the root causes of disintegration has become an important assumption in strengthening overall security.

**Proposing A New Approach to Security-Integration**

In contrast to a static security-integration model, I propose framing security as a competing administrative paradigm within key integration policy areas. I argue that security concerns and their accompanying institutions are increasingly present in both grand policy designs and in the implementation of such policy. Through shifting the analytical frame to incorporate both integration initiatives and security institutions, the interactions among them can be observed to understand the new day-to-day interactions among various state institutions, Muslim community members, and media outlets. Other papers in this collection have raised important examples in which the two areas overlap. The French Muslim association Union des organisations islamiques de France has in certain cases collaborated on the promotion of a “civil Islam” with state authorities in response to security incidents (Dazey, 2018). French authorities in Roubaix have increasingly relied on Muslim “proselytizing” rationales to deny public funding to certain Muslim associations (Talpin, 2018). Such examples allude to a new governing baseline in the execution of social policy but should not be oversimplified into asserting that security is the end-all issue.

Asking the question of how policy is translated reveals the importance of policy-implementing individuals and even more importantly the context through which they base their decisions. Policy analysis literature has outlined three key levels of analysis: the philosophies or ideologies that describe a general society, the “policy solutions” proposed by policymakers, and general programs that underpin these solutions (Schmidt, 2008). Scholars have proposed several models to contextualize the ideas and actions of public actors considering changing events (Muller, 2005; Béland, 2009). Literature focusing on local-level implications of integration policy stresses individuals left outside of the national models spectrum – political councilors, mayors, non-profit leaders – who hold responsibility for the actual implementation and outcomes. These individuals often form part of an institution that is the direct tool of integration policies such the school (Mattei, 2012; Zanten, 2004), the hospital (Sargent and Erikson, 2014), and the city government (de Galembert, 2006; Garbaye, 2005). How do these officials obtain their security knowledge? What is the relationship between social policy institutions and security institutions? How does the need for “increased security” intersect with the democratic need to ensure equal opportunity?

Policy assessment literature has long noted the disconnect between a policy’s stated intentions and its resulting outcomes. The unintended effects of policies have varying effects at different levels of state governance and daily life that are often in contradiction with one another. Moved by spurs in public opinion, politically charged analyses, and inefficient administration, governments design and implement policy in ways counter to their perceived intentions. This unevenness is a crucial variable to assess in the extent to which security concerns can
ultimately influence policy implementation (Evans et al., 1985; Skocpol, 2008). Security in this sense must not be viewed only as a grand strategy but also observed in how it contributes to implementation unevenness. I am specifically interested in whether security institutions and rationales influence the ultimate success of social integration policies across a wide range of government ministries. I suggest that security concerns can result in a series of conflicting policy recommendations in the development and execution of integration policy focused on Muslim citizens.

One compelling example of this trend is occurring in the education system. The French and British governments have embarked on extensive de-radicalization programs in the school to combat the threat of homegrown terror (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Hill, 2013; Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2015). The development and evolution of the CONTEST strategy in Britain has focused on the school as a place to both identify symptoms of radicalization and a way to best mitigate them. This strategy constitutes part of a larger security outsourcing approach to many aspects of British society.

In France, the education system has been the institutional arena in which debates regarding religious symbols, most specifically the hijab, have played out. The famous 2004 ban was passed in part to limit the influence of radicalized grand-frères on young girls (Mattei and Aguilar, 2016). The school was also central in the French response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks where laïcité was further stressed as a core Republican value. Indeed, new positions within the Education Ministry dedicated to security and radicalization prevention reveal the prominence of security within traditional integration institutions. The shift to an implementation-oriented approach will illuminate how such policy was effectively implemented and examine the day-to-day concerns of Muslim citizens and government officials.

An analysis of the security-integration nexus therefore offers numerous avenues to understand a prominent decision-making context in France and the United Kingdom. The novelty of identifying “security” as the end result of “integration” places social institutions such as the school, local government, and workplace, at the core of the 21st century security debates regarding homegrown terrorism and social stability. But it also raises the questions as to the extent to which they are participating in integration policy implementation. Such questions offer an important reflection in an era of increasing state surveillance and rising social suspicion of Muslims in Western democracies.

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Towards an Autonomization of Jihadism?
The ideological, sociological and political permeability between contemporary quietist Salafism and Jihadism in France

Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Georgetown University

Grounded in several years of fieldwork on French Salafism and Jihadism, this essay advances the thesis of the emancipation of Jihadism. By this, I mean that the violent career represented by Jihadism must first be conceived of as a form of socialization. Entering into a Jihadist trajectory from the possible starting point of quietist Salafism (the main form of Salafism in France) must be understood on the basis of objective criteria, namely through a certain number of connections and social ties with the main actors and contexts of French Salafism. More specifically, it is important to raise the question of quietist Salafist socialization as a potential prior step in Jihadist engagement. Is it possible to verify this relationship? Another question must also be considered: if this link is not observed between quietist Salafism and Jihadism, how is it possible to explain that the violence expressed by certain Muslims takes on a symbolic, even practical language of the Salafist matrix (despite its diversity)?

I call the autonomization of Jihadism the convergence of three more specific dynamics. The first is the clear disconnection, in sociological terms, between French Jihadists and quietist Salafist communities. Put differently, here the question concerns the lack of permeability between Salafist quietism and Jihadist violence, with the two forms of socialization being totally disconnected. The second is the polarization between quietist Salafism and Jihadism. By this, I mean a phenomenon of increasingly clear separation, even clear-cut competition, between the two branches which, nonetheless, claim to come from the same doctrine. Put differently, these two sides of contemporary Sunni fundamentalism are more different than they are similar. The third concerns the emergence of a form of political violence which echoes, ideologically speaking, the Salafist imaginary, but lacks fundamentalism in terms of religious practice.

Jihadism is thus becoming an independent branch of Islam, with no real attachment to religious and social puritanism. It organizes itself increasingly as a religious branch that is above all violent, but without the claim to orthodoxy which is the very raison d’être of Salafism. In other terms, Jihadism, by putting the emphasis on the pressing need for violent struggle in the name of Islam and oppressed Muslims worldwide, imposes itself above all as an ideology of combat, while religious practice (in terms of worship) is put in the background. This extreme form of dissenting and revolutionary politicization thus replaces the preaching characterizing Salafist ethics. This element nonetheless forces us to evoke an important feature in current debates on Jihadism, in that the absence of the claim to orthodoxy or sociological permeability between quietist Salafism and Jihadism does not make it possible to omit the cultural domination of revivalist discourses constructed on the paradigm, echoed by Salafism for nearly a century, of the need to return to original Islam. There is thus an essential question that must be raised, namely the juxtaposition of a double reality: the promotion of the Salafist imaginary in the context of a lack of connection between Salafist communities and Jihadist trajectories in contemporary France.

Methodology:

I have shed light on these three dynamics through long-term fieldwork. From 2004 to 2011, I aimed to study the

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1 I am borrowing the concept of career from the symbolic interactionism within sociology and particularly Ervin Goffman for whom the career is both the reflection of an actor’s official situation and a moral itinerary by which she assimilates a given personality. See Ervin Goffman, Asiles, 1968, Paris, Ed. de Minuit, Le Sens commun, [1963] 1975, p.179.
various forms taken by socialization within French quietist Salafist communities. Although, during this work, I met a number of Jihadists (or sympathizers with Jihadist theses), the latter didn't represent the core of my work. Since 2013 and the emergence of a form of political violence legitimized by a Jihadist vision of Islam (even though attacks had been prepared and committed before) in the wake of the Syrian crisis, I conducted field work in several countries, including France, among populations that I met during my PhD in order to shed light on their trajectories since 2011, and immersed myself among Jihadist actors and sympathizers (in prisons, in neighborhoods where people have left for Syria, etc.). I have tried to dissect their trajectories and, through this, analyze their prior socializations in order to observe (or not) the existence of a Salafist influence or determinism.

The first field primarily concerns the sociology of quietist Salafism in France. In geographical terms, I conducted around one hundred interviews with French Salafists in Mantes-la-Jolie, Les Mureaux, Stains, Argenteuil, Saint-Denis, Nanterre, Villeneuve-la-Garenne, Montreuil, Levallois-Perret, Athias-Mons, Corbeil-Essonnes, Sartrouville, La Courneuve, Clichy-sous-Bois, Montfermeil, Asnières, Gennevilliers, Colombes, La Garenne-Colombes, Maisons-Alfort, Courbevoie, Vitry-sur-Seine, Draveil, Juvissy-sur-Orge, Epinay-sur-Seine, and inner Paris. In addition to this, I conducted research in mosques in cities across France, starting with my home region, Normandy. Finally, I did a research stay in the North of France in 2008 in Lille. In all, I did interviews as well as a number of hours of neutral or participant observation in over 50 places of Muslim worship. The content of these exchanges primarily concerned the reasons of their religious engagement, their vision of political events, the place of Islam in France and in the world, their conception of religious otherness, their relationship to their country of origin, and family relationships.

The field work that I started in 2013 is rooted in two dimensions. First, I returned to the cities and neighborhoods where I did work for my PhD in order to analyze possible changes in the religious, social, and political landscape, under the effect notably of the conflicts in the Middle East, in the context of which a change of scale relating to Jihadism has occurred over the past several years with the emergence and bolstering of movements that are among the main actors of these conflicts (Syria, etc.). Secondly, I conducted research within Jihadist circles, primarily in some French prisons (Fresnes as well as other prisons in the Paris suburbs) where I met with a dozen people incarcerated for acts of Jihadist terrorism. Additionally, in certain neighborhoods of some cities in the Paris suburbs (Trappes, Sevran, etc.), I also met a few dozen people over the past few years whom I consider sympathizers of Jihadist theses even if they committed no acts of violence nor declared any direct allegiance (synonymous for now with a promotion of the Jihadist imaginary, and nothing more).

A clear disconnection between Salafist socialization and Jihadist engagement

On a macro-territorial level, the map of Jihadist engagement is the same as that of Salafist mosques, but also of communities which are not Salafist, as shown by the map of consular mosques (linked to the states of origin of several immigrant communities such as Morocco and Turkey). Such an observation cannot demonstrate that Salafism and Jihadism are causally linked. This cartography rather illustrates the presence of various forms of identification with Islam on territories where the population is largely Muslim. It is thus necessary to reason at a much more micro-sociological level.

Thus, the analysis I conducted after returning to the field I had investigated from 2004 to 2011 clearly shows the

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3 This second field owes a lot to several interviews I conducted in prison for several years, as well as to sociological research done by myself and my colleagues specialized in the study of Salafism and Jihadism as part of the International Panel on ways out of violence implemented by the Fondation maison des sciences de l’homme with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New-York: [http://www.ipev-fmsh.org](http://www.ipev-fmsh.org).

absence of a Jihadist metastasis among all of the people I had previously met. None of the quietist Salafists that I met and followed for all these years (and up until today) turned towards Jihadism. Moreover, as I will show, there is no legitimation of Jihadist theses, as violence is clearly and absolutely rejected for religious reasons (the killing of civilians, ineffectiveness, immorality, and the abandonment of preaching in the name of political revolution). Although the Assad regime is never defended (unlike Saudi Arabia for instance which is considered to defend the true Sunni Islam), Jihadists are fought through preaching and stances within these non-violent Salafist communities as shown by the different contents of preaching that I observed at regular intervals in a number of mosques known for housing puritan groups.

Although members established within Salafist communities do not evolve towards Jihadism, my empirical research conducted in the past years among a dozen imprisoned Jihadists also makes it possible to see the lack of sociological correlation between these two fundamentalist branches. Even though the latter clearly say that in the Muslim religion they see the only true faith, as well as the justification of extreme violence against any actor (the French state, the Syrian regime, Shias, etc.) deemed to have attacked the “Truth” and Muslims worldwide, thereby reactivating a discourse that can be found within quietist Salafist communities, the various forms of socialization that characterize their trajectories only sporadically rely on religious institutions. The identification with original Islam is real in terms of a desired model for society, but there is no trace of any continuous passing through Salafist mosques over a given period. Their prior socialization concerns interest for illegal activity (various forms of trafficking) and often gang life. Visiting mosques is trivial, and does not show a specific rooting or inclusion into the puritan community that would incite the followers to read specific Salafist works or become familiar with web sites that have popularized theses of clerics located in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, etc.). The stories told by the people I met in prison moreover show the absence of religious education within the family as well as an emphasis on Islamic reference in terms of identity which happens rather late in life. The age of the sample, between 21 and 29, shows that it is during adolescence, as well as in the first years of adulthood, that a religious quest occurs, without real participation in a given community. Rather, most seem to be fluttering around in sociological terms. No specific Islamic structure characterizes these profiles, whose aspiration to reconnect with Islam is real but is not accompanied by a specific socialization within an established community built on identified principles and norms as is the case with quietist Salafism.

A growing polarization between these two radical forms of Islam

Beyond the lack of sociological permeability between quietist Salafism and Jihadism, the trend also shows an increased polarization between the two branches in terms of doctrinal and social issues. Even though since the beginning of the 2000s, both Jihadist and the quietist Salafist approaches exclude the other in their respective messages, the last few years have shown an increasingly large distinction, and even a veritable symbolic war, for hegemony over the definition of “authentic” Islam. Today, this takes the form of an increasingly clear and intended demarcation in the presentation of the two branches. The disqualification of one branch by the other conveys not only a growing emancipation of fundamentalist discourses compared to others, but also and especially a greater difficulty, today and undoubtedly in the future, to pass from quietist Salafism towards a radical and violent form of Islam such as Jihadism.

A Jihadism without orthodoxy: the primacy of the paradigm of insecurity

The thesis of a Salafization of social ties is as interesting as it is problematic. Indeed, the analysis of quietist Salafism communities and that of Jihadist profiles (whether in

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prison or non-violent sympathizers) reveals a dynamic that can seem contradictory, but which is understandable in reality if we don’t focus on the paradigm of linearity. Quietist Salafism contains an undeniable part of symbolic and even social violence while rejecting the use of violence in terms of doctrine and preaching in favor of a strategy of a psychological separation (but not necessarily economic given what we know about the emphasis on entrepreneurial and commercial careers within these puritan communities). This leads to the question of the impact of the sociological separation, which, as we saw earlier, doesn’t lead to Jihadist-style violent engagement, but also that of a type of social break that can facilitate violent strategies despite the ideological opposition to them contained in the principles of quietist Salafism.

Thus, based on these various empirical findings, an additional disconnection must be mentioned in the analysis of Jihadist profiles (which naturally deserve a number of additional and more diverse studies). The religious quest takes the form, primarily and above all, of a struggle to bring down what can be seen as a paradigm of insecurity. Muslims are considered to be a religious and political nation that is in danger and can only be helped by a violent and transnational movement (with of course some local ramifications). Religious purification through education and classic preaching are not included (at least not as a priority) in the Jihadist prerogative and imaginary. This is another instance of the emancipation of this religious branch, which is increasingly oriented towards combat for the safety and dignity of the Umma notwithstanding the need for orthodoxy which is still at the heart of the Salafist ethic. In this sense, there is no social homology between quietist Salafism and Jihadism. The concepts mobilized may certainly be close, even identical, but what matters is the understanding and the meaning of a discourse in a given context.

Moreover, the proximity and even the identity of doctrinal themes addressed both in quietist Salafism and in Jihadism cannot hide the diversity of practices; in sum, the sociology of religious principles put into practice. In this respect, considering the ideological infrastructure as primary seems a faulty way of understanding violent engagement and specifically the violent careers that define contemporary Jihadism (in France or elsewhere). Violence seems to be an independent and disconnected element of orthodoxy which replaces the latter. Salvation through a strategy of purification over the long term seems to be a major contradiction with the Jihadist principles of permanent revolution and continuous combat in the name of defending oppressed co-religionists. The Jihadist paradigm is indeed one of the Umma in danger, namely a consideration of security and in fine politics (in the modern sense of the word). Within quietist Salafist communities, politics is not theorized other than as a call to good mores in a limited framework, that of stability and the preservation of social order. It is therefore not surprising that even if the doctrinal matrix seems to be the same, Jihadism is an ideology of urgency where quietist Salafism is de facto content with the existing social structures. Violence is thus in this case a profoundly political category as it relates to the arsenal of solutions enabling Jihadists to restore the security and dignity of Muslims worldwide, whereas the aim is largely different within quietist Salafism (ensuring the Islamness of their faith, belief and practice).

A final question remains: why are Jihadists, despite their lack of alacrity for orthodoxy and orthopraxy (shown in my interviews, both among those I met in prison as well as those sympathizing with these theses without being engaged in violent acts), choosing a fundamentalist, radical, vehement and revolutionary religious narrative? Specifically, how can one explain the appeal of an ideological offer historically rooted in Salafism, without any common lifestyle and social trajectory with forms of contemporary Salafist practice (absence of linearity between religious socialization and violent engagement as seen above)? In cultural terms, it thus seems that there exists a form of domination, and even within certain social groups (primarily young generations of Muslims) a kind of hegemony, of Islamic radicalism. The most revivalist branches, but also those which are the most at odds with the social order in the name of Islam, are experiencing a form of real but diffuse success, which although difficult to question from the macro-
sociological point of view, is impossible to interpret in a linear way from a micro-sociological perspective. Thus, a kind of primacy of Salafist narratives exists, although it is difficult to see a rigorous ideological connection, but rather a sort of re-appropriation by certain social groups of the potential for opposition contained in this religious matrix (which, moreover, cannot summarize it since it also contains a strong conservative potential). It seems, therefore, more than ever, that ideological offers must be subject to in-depth sociological inquiry. The issue of a social construction of Salafism seems like it should be put back into center stage. The conditions and factors of identification with one form of identity rather than another must therefore replace more normative questions about the essence of a religious imaginary whose imitators often do more for its interpretation and definition than the fundamental sources.
Sunni Jihadism and Religious Authority: Its Transformative Character and Effects

Tore Hamming, European University Institute and Sciences Po

“kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State.”¹

When Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the late spokesperson and a senior leader of the Islamic State, uttered this call to action in September 2014, it had an impact. In the following months, and escalating throughout 2015-16, multiple terrorist attacks on Western soil were executed and claimed by the Islamic State as a response to the launch of the military coalition against the group and arguably as a reaction to an intra-Jihadi power game.² Why would anyone listen to the words of al-Adnani and act on his words?

The influence of the Islamic State and its most prominent leaders such as al-Adnani has been dependent on a continuously transforming nature of religious authority within Islam.³ Unlike in Christianity or Shiism, Sunni Islam has never benefited from or been limited by a central religious authority like that of the Pope or the imam (or more precisely the marja e-taqlid). Since the early days of Islam, after the Prophet passed away, religious authority has been decentralized. But this does not imply that no traditional sources of religious authority existed. In her paper in this volume Nancy Khalil demonstrates how scholars have disagreed on the sources of Islamic authority, whether it is derived from the Islamic textual corpus or reserved for the ulama or the elite that implements Islamic law. Political authority most often remained in the hands of the Caliph, but religious authority was delegated to the ulama, people specialized in the religion as narrated by the Prophet and his actions.⁴ Ever since, the ulama’s authority and level of institutionalization has fluctuated. This has allowed certain groups to challenge mainstream Islamic interpretations and, more recently, the sources that qualify religious authority. Religious authority has traditionally been closely associated with the discipline of ijtihad (the effort of interpreting), concretely through so-called commentaries on the Qur’an and hadith.⁵ As several scholars have noted,⁶ traditional sources of Islamic authority have changed dramatically over time with Zaman, arguing this is partly due to changed conditions of ijtihad (where there is no longer scope for ‘absolute ijtihad’, but only ‘limited ijtihad’ meaning expanding the boundaries of a school of law in accordance with the principles of that school), modern means of communication, mass higher education, and the spread of liberal thought.⁷ These factors, he argues, have facilitated a challenge to the ulama’s privileged access to authoritative religious knowledge,⁸ making religious authority less dependent on

3 For a thorough examination of Islamic authority, see Wael E. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
7 Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism, 181–82.
8 Ibid., 1.
knowledge and more related to practice and piety. This change, however, should not be considered a structural break with previous practices, but rather an “intensification of a tendency towards decentralised authority” that has fostered the emergence of a new group of ‘Islamist intellectuals’ in the words of Olivier Roy.

The Salafi and Jihadist claim to authority

Salafists and Jihadists have been at the forefront among those taking advantage of changing structures of religious authority. While Salafists in the 1980s emphasized the importance of education, Jihadists such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi did not just claim that education was unnecessary but even discouraged it. This disconnect between Jihadism and Salafism is further elaborated in Mohamed Ali Adraoui's contribution to this issue in which he discusses how Salafi ideologues have taken education from the outset worked to undermine any established authority or hierarchy through promoting an individualization of ijtihad. In fact “jihadist leaders have downplayed the status of religious and political leadership, including their own, and empowered jihadists to assume ownership over the interpretation of Islamic teachings of social justice and to take up jihad on their own initiative.” Religious loyalty, they argued, should not be to a certain sheikh or institution, but only to God. Telling of this attitude, Uthman bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi, a former official of the Shariah Committee in the Islamic State of Iraq, quoted a hadith by al-Bukhari in which the Prophet said, “Listen and obey, even if the Abyssinian slave whose hair is as kinky as a raisin is appointed to rule you, as long as he is governing you according to the book of God.”

Modern Jihadists have thus sought to capitalise on the waning influence of traditional religious authorities. While not the first to succeed in obtaining a platform partly founded on religious authority, al-Qaida under the leadership of Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri nonetheless took this endeavour to an unprecedented level within the Jihadi movement. What remains certain is that none of the two al-Qaida leaders had the religious credentials to speak authoritatively in religious matters (even their senior shari’ figures such as Abu Hafs al-Mauritani and Abu Yahya al-Libi would be regarded novices by most traditional ‘ulama). They, nonetheless, still managed not only to challenge established Sunni authorities in the form of prominent Saudi and Egyptians ‘ulama but also to redefine what was considered legitimate Jihad. While Bin Laden came to personify the fighter-scholar persona despite being neither, it was the broader message al-Qaida espoused that was key to its authoritative standing in the eyes of potential supporters. Abu Musab al-Suri theorized this in his famous statement ‘a system of operations and not an organization for operations’ (nizam al-amal wa laysa tanzim lil-amal). Al-Qaida’s status was not to be dependent on its leaders or the organisation itself, but on the ideas and ideals it represented.

Although this individualisation has been an integral part of Jihadists’ – and particularly al-Qaida’s – success, it has also been a constant source of internal contestation and

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11 Roy, The Failure of Political Islam.
14 Uthman Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi, "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq", Al Furqan media, 6. Traditional versions of the narrative differs slightly from that used by al-Tamimi, e.g. see http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/bukhari/bh1/bh1_664.htm
15 Nelly Lahoud, 'Beware of Imitators: al-Qaida through the lens of its Confidential Secretary'.
volatility. Late Jihadi ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki said, “It is important that we encourage Muslims to respect their scholars. It is to no one’s benefit to put down the men of knowledge who represent the religion of Allah. But when some of our scholars - no matter how knowledgeable they are - divert from the straight path, we the Muslims, need to advise them.” The challenge from an internal Jihadi perspective is that different Jihadi groups lay claim to be representatives of this correct methodology (\textit{manhaj}), or straight path, thus instigating intra-Jihadi contestation and competition. Trotsky once said that “Every group representing a new trend excommunicates its predecessors. To those who come with new ideas the previous period seems to have been but a crude deviation from the correct road, an historical misunderstanding…” This seems to apply to the Jihadi movement as well. The Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in Algeria opposed the presence of other Jihadi (or Islamist) groups, and on one occasion it even threatened Bin Laden, claiming other groups were inferior.

A similar argument has been promoted by the Islamic State after its rise from the ashes and its organizational break with al-Qaida in early 2014. As al-Adnani announced the caliphate on 29 June 2014, he simultaneously decreed that all other groups were null. In the group’s 	extit{Dabiq} magazine from February 2015 it was explained how the grayzone between good and bad had ceased to exist with the caliphate’s establishment, the argument being that if other Jihadi groups do not join the Islamic State then they deviate from the correct path. In their claim to authority the Islamic State embarked on a mission to appropriate the legacy of Bin Laden while vilifying living senior al-Qaida figures like al-Zawahiri. Besides al-Adnani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the main proponent of such fierce attacks against former superiors and brothers-in-arms were the 30 years-old Turki al-Binali while other senior shar’i (legal) figures for the Islamic State included Abu Bakr al-Qahtani, Abu Malik al-Tamimi, and, most, prominently Abu Ali al-Anbari. While they did have training in theology, these figures were young and inexperienced (except al-Anbari) compared to senior al-Qaida figures and ideologues sympathetic to al-Qaida. In the case of al-Binali, it was even an example of a student going against his most prominent teacher (the teacher being the influential Jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who remains supportive of al-Qaida).

The Islamic State in its propaganda and shar’i arguments stressed that loyalty was not to a group (e.g. al-Qaida) but to God alone, and since the Islamic State, rather than al-Qaida or any other Jihadi group, followed the true prophetic methodology (\textit{manhaj al-nubuwwa}), allegiance should be exclusively to the caliphate. Just like al-Qaida 20 years earlier, the Islamic State was successful in its challenge for authority, but this time the victim was al-Qaida itself. Al-Zawahiri’s group found its position within the Jihadi movement severely challenged between 2014-16 as most Jihadi newcomers in addition to some veterans joined the ranks of the Islamic State and in some instances actively fought al-Qaida groups. What the Islamic State did was to take advantage of the authority structures within Sunni Islam, the opportunity structures offered by the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, and the leadership vacuum after the death of Bin Laden, thus further illustrating how detached religious authority has become from traditional sources.

\footnotesize{16} Nelly Lahoud, 	extit{The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction}, 245.
\footnotesize{17} Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, ‘\textit{Inspire magazine Vol 2}, Al Malahem Media, 11 October (2010): 33
\footnotesize{19} Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ‘This Is the Promise of Allah’, Al Furqan Media, 29 June 2014: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-e28098adnc481nc4ab-al-shc481nc4ab-22this-is-the-promise-of-god22-en.pdf [accessed 7 June 2018]
\footnotesize{21} Interestingly, when the Islamic State’s fortune was turning and the group experienced setbacks, it began to emphasise the necessity (and religious obligation) to obey its leaders no matter what. Furthermore, one was not simply allowed to leave the group, even if one found it to be diverting the correct methodology.
Al-Adnani and other challengers for authority

This process of individualization and detachment is what enabled al-Adnani in September 2014 not just to call for attacks in the West but also for his message to actually resonate among Islamic State soldiers and sympathizers.

According to his biographer, Turki al-Binali, al-Adnani was in fact well-read in several Islamic disciplines including tafsir (interpretation), hadith (prophetic tradition) and fiqh (jurisprudence). He allegedly also authored several written works, among those one dealing with fiqh al-Jihad (jurisprudence of Jihad), and he taught fellow Jihadists in Islamic sciences. But at the time of his call to action against the West, al-Adnani was just 36 or 37 years-old. He had no formal education of note and his experience included little more than Jihad. But these seeming deficiencies according to classical sources of authority within Islam were in fact his foremost advantages. Al-Adnani was an early joiner of the Jihadi project in Iraq when he in 2002 left his native Syria to join ranks with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. His image was that of a fighter and a religiously savvy leader, which – together – combines to be a powerful resource within Jihadi circles.

Al-Adnani and the Islamic State more generally were, in the eyes of the constantly expanding pool of Jihadi sympathisers, considered authoritative to interpret Islam and what methodology should be followed. The examples of al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State illustrate how decentralized authority has both benefitted the Jihadi movement and evolved into a source of internal conflict. But an equally important point is what it implies for the movement and evolved into a source of internal conflict.

An interesting case example is that of Thomas Barnounin (Abu Umar al-Madani), a French Jihadi ideologue who rose to the top of the Islamic State after he migrated to Syria in 2014. Barnounin grew up outside of Toulouse in southern France and converted to Islam in either 1999 or 2000. He was a serious student of Islam and this eventually took him to Medina in Saudi Arabia to enhance his Arabic and study Islamic sciences. Despite his enthusiasm for learning, he never finished his studies as he became attracted to the Jihadi cause and finally left for Iraq in 2006. Barnounin did not get further than Syria, however, where he was arrested and later sent back to France where he served a three-year sentence from 2008 to 2011. When he was released, the convinced Jihadi started to hold lectures on issues central to the Jihadi ideology, but in early 2014 after the Islamic State expanded to Syria – even before declaring the caliphate – he migrated to join the group. As a member of IS he was a well-respected figure, especially among his compatriots, and he appears to be one of the only foreigners to obtain a senior ideological position within the group. Another example is the Americans Yahya Abu Hassan (real name John Georgelas) and Abu Sulayman al-Shami (Ahmad Abousamra). Although Barnounin was eventually arrested by the Islamic State due to internal theological disagreements, he is nonetheless reported to have been a central figure in the group’s terrorist campaign in the West. Of note, he allegedly took part in organizing the November 2015 attack in Paris, thus showing the potential security ramifications of people like Barnounin obtaining positions of authority despite not living up to the classical sources of religious authority. Barnounin, Georgelas and Abousamra have all been dedicated to Jihad and the specific politico-religious project of the Islamic State, and while they all appear to have engaged in learning several Islamic disciplines, none of them are to be considered scholars and certainly not graduates of respectable learning institutions.

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23 In 2011 al-Adnani was appointed spokesperson of the Islamic State of Iraq and at some point he became a member of its shura (consultative) council.


In fact, time and again the Jihadi movement has witnessed a younger generation emerge ever more ‘pious’ and radical in their expression, always pushing the boundaries of takfir (excommunication) and whom it should be considered legitimate to kill. This happened in Afghanistan, Algeria, and Iraq. The Islamic State-executed attacks in the West differ qualitatively from al-Qaida’s early attitude to legitimate terrorist attacks in that the Islamic State promote a much more indiscriminate and liberal attitude to such attacks. Unlike al-Qaida, the Islamic State deem no targets in the West illegitimate, and the group has shown an immense propensity to claim responsibility for any attack carried out in its name. Perhaps these experiences will provide indications for what to expect in the future in terms of new Jihadi actors emerging with ever more radical ideas. At least the field of religious authority, a resource of essential importance to Jihadists, is now wide open if only one knows how to exploit it.
The Effects of Discrimination on European Muslim Trust in Governmental Institutions

Mujtaba Ali Isani, University of Muenster

European Muslims and Discrimination

European Muslims face marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion based on being seen as an out-group with a different culture, identity, religion, ethnicity and worldview (Landman, 2006: 19; also Crowley, 2001; Sidanius et al., 2004). They therefore encounter restrictions in accessing economic and political opportunities. As a result, European Muslims might become skeptical of the political context they are living in and of political institutions which are seemingly unable to prevent or protect them from discrimination (Caldwell, 2009; Maxwell, 2010a, 2010b).

This essay hypothesizes that Muslims who face discrimination are significantly more likely to distrust their domestic institutions. Indeed, survey data of European Muslims, who participated in the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 2014, reveals that around one-third of the 3,601 respondents indicated that they feel part of a discriminated group in their country. As a comparison, among the non-Muslim respondents of these surveys, less than six percent indicated they felt discriminated against (see Table 1).

Table 1: European Muslims Compared to Non-Muslims Who Feel Part of a Discriminated Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel Part of Discriminated Group</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>33.22% (1,153)</td>
<td>66.78% (2,318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim</td>
<td>5.90% (11,877)</td>
<td>94.10% (189,462)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS 2002-2014. Authors' own calculations. Absolute numbers in ().

As shown in Table 2, a majority European Muslims who feel discriminated against perceived themselves to be discriminated against because of their religion (62 percent), and this surpasses all other reasons for discrimination. Discrimination based on religion can take various forms including the harassment of women who wear the headscarf (Sauer, 2009), no formal recognition of Islam by the state (Joppke, 2013), and just a general characterization of Muslims being foreign to the land (Alba et. al., 2003). Westfall (2018) points out that Muslims who attend mosque regularly may be seen as suspiciously, as mosque attendance is inaccurately attributed to participation in terrorist activity. On the contrary, as shown by Westfall (2018) and others, mosque engagement is more likely to have positive effects such as participation in secular community activities. This ties in well with the starting point of this essay, as it seems as though practicing Muslims are more likely to feel discriminated against on religious grounds, as some in the host society may see their appearance and certain activities as suspicious. An often highlighted problem faced by practicing Muslims in the West is a lack of praying space and problems in getting permission to build mosques. The problems faced by US Muslims with mosque construction highlighted by Tepe (2018) may even be more severe in Western European countries like Spain, Germany and France (see, for example, Cesari, 2005; Astor, 2011). Muslims, especially mosque-going Muslims, are therefore more likely to feel discriminated against if they cannot adequately practice their religion in their country.
Table 2: Self-Identified Sources of Discrimination Among Discriminated Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for discrimination</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Color or Race</td>
<td>30.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>43.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>61.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>16.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>23.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexuality</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Grounds</td>
<td>6.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS 2002-2018. Authors’ own calculations.

Perceived Discrimination and Governmental Trust

It can be argued that people who feel discriminated against become skeptical of the political context they live in and the political institutions of their country. Governmental trust may be defined as an individual’s confidence that the executive would attend to their interest even if governmental authority were exposed to little supervision (Easton, 1975). Trust is considered to be essential for the stability and legitimacy of institutions (Gibson, 1997; Klingemann, 1999; Seligson, 2002). Moreover, it is seen as indispensable for institutional endurance and effective functioning (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Norris, 2002; Putnam, 1993). As shown above, European Muslims feel especially discriminated against, and the question is whether this makes European Muslims more unfavorable and more skeptical of the political context they are living in and the political institutions of their country, which are seemingly unable to prevent or protect them from discrimination. I expect that European Muslims who feel part of a discriminated group are less likely to be trusting toward their governmental institutions ($H_1$).

Other factors that may affect trust institutions as theorized in the previous literature are utilitarian factors such as satisfaction with one’s economic situation (Maxwell, 2010a), satisfaction with democracy, government, and one’s health situation (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). Since the population of European Muslims is predominantly composed of immigrants, whether they are first or second generation immigrants, may also be an important factor to determine their trust in political institutions (Alba & Nee, 2003; Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; de la Garza et al., 1996; Maxwell, 2013; Röder & Mühlau, 2011, 2012; Waters, 1999). Finally, demographic factors such as age, education, sex, religiosity, and political interest could also affect political trust (for an overview, see Isani and Schlipphak, 2017).

Data

To test the hypothesis that it is perceived discrimination which is affecting trust among Muslims, while controlling for other important factors mentioned in the literature, I analyze the pooled dataset of the ESS from 2002-2014. This dataset contains 207,432 respondents without considering any missing values on the dependent or the independent variables. Among these respondents, 3,601 self-identified as Muslim. Around 95% of the European Muslims in this dataset are immigrants, of which approximately 71% are first-generation immigrants.

I operationalize political trust through trust in four domestic institutions, namely, the national parliament,
police, politicians, and the legal system, all measured on a 0-10 scale. I use each of these “trust in” variables as dependent variables, but also combine these variables into one general trust variable which adds all of these scores. Descriptive statistics as well as the operationalization of the other variables is shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of Descriptive Statistics and Coding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean (European Muslims)</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in National Parliament</td>
<td>5.40 (3304)</td>
<td>0-10 scale of increasing trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Legal System</td>
<td>6.05 (3421)</td>
<td>0-10 scale of increasing trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Police</td>
<td>6.42 (3523)</td>
<td>0-10 scale of increasing trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Politicians</td>
<td>4.33 (3376)</td>
<td>0-10 scale of increasing trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Trust</td>
<td>22.13 (3172)</td>
<td>0-40 scale of increasing trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>5.15 (3476)</td>
<td>0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Satisfaction</td>
<td>6.39 (3403)</td>
<td>0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Satisfaction</td>
<td>6.97 (3549)</td>
<td>0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Satisfaction</td>
<td>5.17 (3341)</td>
<td>0-10 increasing scale of satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>7.11 (3589)</td>
<td>0-10 increasing scale of self-perceived religiosity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminated Group</td>
<td>0.33 (3471)</td>
<td>Coded 1 if an individual feels part of a discriminated group in the country of residence and 0 if otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>0.68 (3601)</td>
<td>Individual and parents not born in country of residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>0.25 (3601)</td>
<td>Individual born in country of residence and at least one parent is an immigrant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>2.25 (3585)</td>
<td>1-4 increasing scale of political interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11.64 (3601)</td>
<td>Number of years of formal education top-coded at 26.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.46 (3601)</td>
<td>Coded 1 if individual is a female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.91 (3601)</td>
<td>Calculated age of respondent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

I estimate four models to test the hypothesis. For the combined trust dependent variable I estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS), and for each of the other variables I estimate ordinal generalized linear models (OGLM) as the ordinal logit models violate the proportional odds assumption. Table 4 presents only the results of the combined institutional trust model due to space considerations.\(^3\)

Table 4: Explaining Trust in the Political Institutions among European Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>(SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discriminated Group</strong></td>
<td>-1.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                          | 2,742    |
| R\(^2\)                    | 44.36%   |

Source: ESS Rounds 1-7. Own calculations. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimated with country-fixed effects and clustered standard errors, including controls for ESS waves 1-7, not plotted here. Standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at the 0.05 level ** = significant at the 0.01 level *** = significant at the 0.001 level.

Discussion, Further Analysis and Conclusion:

The results as seen in Table 4 show that if European Muslims perceive themselves as part of a discriminated group, they have significantly less trust in domestic institutions. Substantively the coefficient for the “discriminated group” shows it has one the strongest effects on the trust in institutions. This is a discouraging trend as discrimination can lead to problems in political integration as well political participation of Muslim citizens as shown by the works of Adda et al. (2016) and Erisen (2017) in the French and American contexts.

Further analysis of the ESS as reported in Table 5 depicts that European Muslims are overall quite trustworthy of domestic institutions. However, it is the perception of being discriminated against that makes European Muslims more skeptical of the government. Future signs do not seem promising, as additional analysis showed that second-generation European Muslim immigrants are more likely to perceive themselves to be part of the discriminated group than first-generation Muslim immigrants, and they are less likely to trust domestic institutions. Currently, most Muslims in Europe as well as in my sample are composed of first generation immigrants, so prospectively trust and feelings of discrimination are likely to worsen.

A recurring theme in this POMEPS series is that there might be significant generational differences in how Muslims respond to conditions in Europe and the USA. Hall (2018) depicts how a group of second-generation British Muslims engage in the politics of resistance and refusal. Seurat (2018) and Hamming (2018) point out that second-generation Muslim immigrants may reject certain cultural practices of their parents to follow more orthodox forms of Islam. The analysis done for this memo reinforces the generational differences present among Muslim immigrants in the West. Not only are second-generation Muslim immigrants more likely to feel discriminated...
against, but they are also significantly less trusting of government institutions.

Table 5: Mean Combined Trust in Domestic Institutions by Religious Denomination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Denomination</th>
<th>Trust in EUP (0 to 40 scale)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>24.30 (n= 36,080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Orthodox</td>
<td>17.65 (n= 9,404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>19.19 (n= 59,162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td>20.30 (n= 2,253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>22.13 (n= 3,172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>20.87 (n= 198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Religions</td>
<td>21.36 (n= 775)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Christian Religion</td>
<td>19.81 (n= 530)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to No Religion</td>
<td>20.23 (n= 76,687)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS Rounds 1-7 (2002-2014).

In conclusion, this essay’s primary finding, that the perception of being discriminated against has a negative effect on trust in political institutions suggests that more needs to be done by the respective European governments and the European Union to reduce feelings of discrimination among its Muslim population. These could be but are not limited to, for example, an increase in mosques and praying spaces for Muslim residents or programs that develop understandings (or remove misconceptions) of Muslim practices such as the wearing of headscarves. Eliminating feelings of discrimination may be crucial in maintaining cordial European Muslim relations with domestic institutions and the society at large.

References


He’s Not an Imam, lol He’s a Postal Worker: Locating the Imam in the USA

Nancy Khalil, Yale University

Where does Islamic authority come from? Is it from the law, and the texts from which it is derived, as Hallaq argues (2009)? Or from the scholars, or ‘ulmaa, who are institutionally and governmentally authorized and interpret the texts, as Malika Zeghal’s work depicts (2007), or the mediums they use to disseminate it, as Charles Hirschkind teaches (2006)? Does authority come from those who implement the law, like judges’ interpretive methods in times of legal doubt, as depicted in the work of Intisar Rabb (2015)? Is it from the state and its role in supporting and establishing religion, as Johnathan Laurence’s work in Europe suggests (2012)? Does Islamic authority emerge from knowledge, as Patrick Gaffney’s work with Egyptian preachers argues (1994)? Or is Islamic authority derived from the faith’s adherents and the multiple ways in which they authorize it, interpret it, and practice it, as supported by the work of many anthropologists including Gilsenan (1982), Geertz (1968), and Mahmood (2005)?

If there is one attribute one can extract from the various theories on authority present in social theory, it is that authority is not static. The larger project this essay draws from is not a search for Islamic authority, but instead for understanding how that authority emerges informed by local cultural, legal, historical, and bureaucratic norms. Effectively, it is better titled Muslim authority, not Islamic. The idea of a Muslim authority contends with dominant theories in the anthropology of Islam. It seeks to re-center the role of the anthropologist from invoking texts without engaging them, giving the text more life than is bestowed to those uttering its words. It does not deny the idea of an “Islamic authority,” but seeks to contextualize it through the lens and experiences of those who call on it, without making “Islam’s” authoritative role hegemonic.

This short paper aims to depict a portion of the larger project’s argument, which is that through the identification and professionalization of the imam, religious authority for Muslims in the US emerges as much from Muslim recognition as it does from religious cultural norms in the US, and from the regulatory frameworks that inform the directions religion takes in this time of rapid institutionalization.

The Imam and the Priest

Shortly after the 2016 presidential election in November, Amazon began airing a unique advertisement. The ad was widely viewed as a political message, despite the company’s insistence that they had no such intent, stating that work began on it months before the election. It featured a priest and an imam, or so the media identified them. Sitting down at tea, the two faith leaders wince from knee pain when rising to stand, independently proceed to their Amazon Prime app to purchase their tea-drinking friend a knee brace and deliver each other identical gifts. After embracing, the imam and the priest are shown in their houses of worship painlessly prostrating and kneeling, respectively. According to advertising professors at Boston University, this is the first time an imam has been featured in a major network broadcast ad, although other faith leaders have been portrayed (Weise 2017).

The ad inspired discussion on its relationship with reality. On a Whatsapp group of Muslim leaders from around the US working in a variety of non-profit, media, academic, and public service industries, including several chaplains and imams, one person shares the ad and another chimes in that his family member knows the imam. “He’s not an imam lol,” he messaged. “He’s a postal worker.” An approximately 38-minute video online with almost one million views, posted by Al-Jazeera English, features the imam and the priest answering viewers’ questions (“Live With: A Priest and an Imam from Amazon’s Viral Ad” 2016). They assure the audience multiple times that they...
are now good friends despite only having met on the set. They argue that the reason Amazon cast them was because their personal connection appeared genuine on film, and that the authenticity was a reflection of interfaith work that was already a regular part of their lives—a contrast to the forced-looking rapport among actors vying for their roles. The imam identifies himself in the video as the principal of an Islamic school, but never seeks to shed the title imam either. So, what is he? Is he a postal worker? Is he a principal, or is he an imam?

The actor’s appearance in the ad reflects general public expectations for how such a religious authority looks and dresses. The imam, a man of South Asian descent, appears to be middle-aged, in the 50- to 70-year age group, with a thick, long beard and olive-colored skin. He smiles warmly throughout the ad. He is dressed in a long beige thawb, a floor-length dress robe commonly worn in much of the Arab world. On his head rests a topi or kufi, best translated as skull cap. To those familiar with Muslim clerical attire, the garment provides clues to his professional identity. The long thawb, while common attire in many parts of the Arab world, is less so in South Asia. On the subcontinent, the more common traditional attire among men is a shalwar kameez, a knee or shin-length dress shirt and matching pants combination. The thawb is worn commonly there only among religious leaders such as mawlanas (honorific title with an etymology rooted in stewardship), muftis (jurists), ‘ulamaa (scholars), or qadis (judges).

It is unclear whether Amazon ad directors were attuned to such clothing nuances, or whether the man cast elected to don the thawb to depict a religious vocation. Either way, there are implications to the portrayal. It is evident from the topi, age, beard, and attire that, at least for the commercial’s purpose, he is being fashioned, or is fashioning himself, as an imam, and that there is some common imagined figure of an imam to fashion him into. Depicting him alongside a priest also helps us see that the term imam is under no one’s authority or control. Unlike the priest, who, even if working as a principal, would be ordained by his church and assigned by that church to any related work, the imam lacks such a process or parallel on authority and leadership within Muslim traditions and Islamic development. Meaning, are an imam and a priest necessarily professional peers? Or, does American society need them to be so we reform them to meet what is comprehensible? Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the priest would also work as a postal worker; a principal, perhaps. Which raises the question, can an imam also be a principal? Can he also be a principal and a postal worker? Who decides, and why do we care so much about what an imam can do or who can hold that title? And, what are the Muslim repercussions of the title of the imam becoming synonymous with that of minister, priest, or rabbi?

To those familiar with Muslim leaders, it would not be surprising to learn that the imam does work in fact as a postal worker, securing benefits and a stable salary from that position. In addition, he may also be serving as a principal of an Islamic weekend school. He may still also be a man versed in the reading and recitation of the Qur’an, and a regular leader for the five ritual prayers in his local mosque, as well as an occasional speaker at the pulpit. If the mosque does not have a hired imam, that title is often granted to men’ with ability to perform some of the imam’s duties. This ad, produced by one of the largest global corporations today, and aired to broad audiences on both sides of the Atlantic, depicts the imam, his presumed image, and his assumed professional peers. The ad is one of many mechanisms contributing to the professionalization of the imam by offering an implicit fashioning of his image, his professional peers, and his ritual.

The individual cast in the role also helps us see that the occupation, regardless of how strong of an analogue it is or the implications of appropriating such a professional parallel on authority and leadership within Muslim traditions and Islamic development. Meaning, are an imam and a priest necessarily professional peers? Or, does American society need them to be so we reform them to meet what is comprehensible? Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the priest would also work as a postal worker; a principal, perhaps. Which raises the question, can an imam also be a principal? Can he also be a principal and a postal worker? Who decides, and why do we care so much about what an imam can do or who can hold that title? And, what are the Muslim repercussions of the title of the imam becoming synonymous with that of minister, priest, or rabbi?

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The individual cast in the role also helps us see that the term imam is under no one’s authority or control. Unlike the priest, who, even if working as a principal, would be ordained by his church and assigned by that church to any related work, the imam lacks such a process or central institution to legitimize his authority. He can also

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1 A female can be an imam, and there are women who hold that role in some all-women mosques. In its most classic understanding and ubiquitous use, ‘imam’ is the individual who leads the prayer, not a particular job, role, or title. Accepting that, any time a women leads others in prayer, she is, in that function, the imam.
be a postal worker, and in fact, may need to be in order to secure healthcare and retirement benefits, which, until quite recently, were almost impossible to find while working at a mosque [Bagby 2012].

**Professional dissonance among Imams**

Imams employed or volunteering in mosques across the US expressed a mix of emotions. Many love their jobs, while others are unable to fulfill the expectations of their congregation, or ones they place on themselves. A congregation has many needs, and when one person either perceives that it is their duty alone to fulfill them, or has those expectations placed on them, it can lead to consistent cognitive dissonance. Geoff Harkness and Peggy Levitt call this response “professional dissonance” and argue that it can frequently arise in transnational occupations, as those who work in them negotiate their imagined roles from “back home” with the expectations of their new locale (forthcoming). The idea of professional dissonance becomes even more pronounced in the case of imams in America, where the profession is not regulated or clearly defined. Many come from societies where the title of imam refers to men in sovereign leadership, or founding jurists of major theological schools of thought, or, more simply, the individual leading a congregational ritual prayer at any given prayer time. Borrowing duties from foreign homelands, along with Christian-centric religious leadership norms in the US, the imam in America is forming into a vocation, one that is emerging from a hybrid of these forces.

More recently, that hybrid also encounters state bureaucracies, as Muslims seek to institutionalize and produce imams locally. Finally, this dissonance can occur as imams get caught up in everyday pastoral needs of their congregations. These commitments can make them unable to invest time in the spiritual development portion of their work, one that rests on their own spiritual experiences first and foremost. These pastoral needs emerge from a local understanding and expectation of the role of religious leadership within their congregation and society at large, both socially and legally. Clergy operate under a set of norms particular to them and their duties, including both privileges and responsibilities. In order for those to be applied, one needs to be recognized as “clergy.” The end result for the imam in the US is a term that is technically a multiple indicator, referring either to individuals employed by mosques serving as the central religious leader, or an individual leading any congregational prayer, or as an honorific title used to address an individual identified as someone with some level of knowledge and/or influence emerging as one that refers to the spiritual leader of a mosque.

Professionalization has historically been tied to regulation. Absent direct government control (which is precluded by our first amendment principles), locating a regulatory gatekeeper in the US, as has been done in other countries, is perceived as a solution to existing problems. However, our politics here preclude the emergence of typical regulatory patterns. The ideological diversity of the Muslim community, the various sites of immigrants’ places of origin, and the various visions for religious presence in the US have made even fledgling attempts to establish recognized sites of Muslim authority unsuccessful. This is now slowly changing. A recognized authority may emerge in the future, and in so doing, will alter the roles of Muslim religious leaders. I argue that such a regulatory site to emerge successfully will require institutionalization that routinizes the historic authority of Muslim charismatic figures, but also makes more explicit other competing occupations to the imam, such as that of the mufti (jurist) and the ‘alim (scholar). In this sense, the profession of the imam will not, and cannot, regulate its own boundaries, but rather those boundaries will sharpen in form as emerging Islamic seminaries offer space that anchors conflicting occupations. I use the term “conflicting” here hesitantly because it is not the occupations that are in conflict but their boundaries. An individual can be trained as a scholar and have produced a substantial peer-recognized body of scholarship and yet elect to be employed as an imam. Such a case indicates that there is no conflict between occupations; however, conflicts emerge in the ways one can move between them, or gain access to them at all.
At this moment in the US, there are no recognized gatekeepers or authorizing mechanisms for any of these occupations. The process of granting authority to imams and other leaders is thus done on a comparatively ad hoc and individualized basis. Some strongly condone this decentralized structure, pointing to it as one that fosters true freedom of religion. Others remain wary that lack of any regulation creates excessive space for community vulnerability and lack of an ability to unify congregations. More recently, Islamic seminaries have been emerging relatively rapidly across the country, with a strong push for pursuing accreditation. The process of institutionalizing Islamic seminaries on par with broader US higher education standards, however, shifts the authorizing mechanisms from relying on an (often singular) charismatic scholar who legitimizes an institution to ones that are built on an administrative structure that includes a range of leaders and scholars, and a life and identity for the institution beyond a single individual.

As they institutionalize, Islamic seminaries, bound by state governed degree-granting requirements, can and will offer requirement boundaries and expectations for their scholars, educators, theologians and jurists. Defining these occupations through institutions offers professional paths for those aspiring to such careers, allowing individuals interested in scholarship to distinguish their work and pursuits from the increasingly pastoral expectations of mosque boards hiring imams. This results in the potential professionalization of the imam surfacing not through structure introduced by organized imams, but through the relegation of certain skills and expertise to the domain of the Islamic seminaries. As this category of local *`alims* and *`muftis* becomes well defined, and the routinized institutions accepted as legitimate by Muslims through the broader US higher education authorizing mechanisms, mosques may further come to trust their provision of training, credentialing, and authorizing individuals deemed qualified to lead congregations.

The emerging change highlights the difference between top-down and bottom-up authoritization. Top-down decision-making originates within regulatory frameworks, and, as seen when governments like those in many Muslim-majority and some European nations have explicit roles in managing religion, is dictative, not authoritative. Bottom-up authorization begins with charisma, and that is precisely where the Muslim community began. However, this charisma is not uniform, nor unchallenged. In order for the charismatic figure to emerge, stigmatized identities—as many imams contend with—become a necessary contrast. Furthermore, owing to the loud politicization of Islam, this process is not happening internally to the community, but in conversation with, and exposure to, a broader public with a vested interest in its outcome.

There are many stakeholders who have an interest in the American imam. First and foremost, the primary stakeholders are Muslims around the country seeking spiritual guidance and religious leadership. Second are the various non-Muslim faith groups interested to know their neighbors and develop meaningful relationships with diverse groups within their broader community. Third are various state apparatuses, including federal and local law enforcement, elected politicians, and public servants who are interested broadly in community leaders, their organizing capacity and their activities as they intersect with other municipal events and life. Government interest can sometimes be cause for concern, reinforcing stigmatized associations with security concerns, including the deputization of imams to seek out potential perceived threats. The imams themselves need not be forgotten, along with other Muslims who work in nearby fields, such as chaplains, scholars, mediators, and counselors, each of whose occupation is impacted by their local imam and his vocation. Thus the question of who determines who is an imam, who decides how one can get there, has meaning for all of these stakeholders and their various intents and interests in locating a US source of Muslim authority.

References


Trust and Giving for the Sake of God:
The Rise of the Bureaucratic Non-Profit in American Muslim Charity

Katherine Merriman, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Muslims in what is now the United States have engaged in explicitly religious giving for over four centuries. From enslaved West African women offering saraka or devotional rice cakes on Georgia Sea Islands to a turn-of-the-century Bosnian benevolent society in Chicago, charitable giving has been a cornerstone to build religious community and forward social and political causes inspired by Islamic values.

The ritualized collection and distribution of charity by American Muslims in the form of zakat and sadaqah (obligatory and voluntary charity) create moral dispositions towards justice and care — what Chris Taylor calls an Islamic virtue ethics of “obligatory voluntarism” (2016). Over the twentieth century, tangible manifestations of these collective acts built American mosques and schools; funded relief efforts for Muslim majority regions affected by war or natural disaster; and sustained resource redistribution programs by economically marginalized Muslims. However, despite its ubiquity and impact as a religious practice, the terrain of charitable activity only came into public and scholarly visibility briefly after post-9/11 raids of several charity organizations accused of assisting terrorism (Siddiqui 2010).

Perhaps one reason why American Muslim practices of charity — as giving and service — exists below the radar is that historically it has not been organized under a centralized beit al-mal (treasury that distributed charity for public works) or dominated by a singular form, such as waqf (charitable endowment) as it was in Muslim majority regions. However, in the last three decades I argue that the 501(c)(3), faith-based nonprofit relief and development organization has become a dominant form to institutionalize Muslims’ collective obligations of care. While personal, private giving continues to support an ailing neighbor and mosques are built one sadaqah envelope at a time, Muslim nonprofits have positioned themselves as the central institution — as both a set of practices and space — to fulfill a pious duty and the ethical commitment to socio-economic stewardship in Islam.

Muslim non-profit charities promote a normative discursive model for American Muslims to construct and enact charitable activity, which adapts Euro-American humanitarian rights-based logic and neoliberal development practices into religious ethics. Muslims are simultaneously directed to purify their wealth and assist the needy for the sake of God while also called to protect the human rights of beneficiaries, maintain political neutrality, and fund neoliberal development projects tied to individual “empowerment” and economic growth (Mittermaier 2014). The commitment to humanitarianism is bolstered by mainstream American beliefs in self-reliance and capitalist free enterprise — enhanced by tax write-offs — where the structural nature of indigence is acknowledged but second to individual-focused assistance and assessment.

And yet, adoption is not necessarily imitation. While Muslim charities’ use of humanitarian logics and optics can be a means to find acceptance and reinforce dominant American values, they also often challenge its semiotic limits to what constitutes human suffering or moral truth. Organizations serving abroad subversively insist on the value of Muslim life in a global order where they are not grievable — existing only as “potential combatants” or collateral damage — and also proclaim Muslim values as worthy and admirable in the service of all people, regardless of race, citizen status, or creed (Butler 2004). In the United States, Muslim charities have quietly brought attention to poverty, including the greater burden poor Muslims bear of surveillance and criminalization as “potential extremists” (Beydoun 2016). Moreover, they declare a belief in the right to healthcare, food, and shelter under a government that outright privatizes services or does not guarantee them beyond bare subsistence.
These charity organizations express interpretive control and regulate apt performance of Islamic mandated charity, through their social media, publications, and facilitation of charitable activity through fundraisers, programming, and volunteer opportunities amid less powerful but competing religious reasoning and action. Despite incredible similarities in official publications and programming, staff, volunteers, and donors across organizations engage in a far wider debate regarding the deserving and undeserving; obligations of the privileged; responsibilities of the structurally marginalized; and the necessity or danger of political mobilization.

This underlying diversity of thought makes clear that charities are not the teleological end to US Muslim charitable practice. They emerged from conjunctural historical developments including but not limited to wealth aggregation, professionalization of preexistent practices in a context of what Nancy Khalil describes as “authority without people who authorize it,” and the need for bureaucratic structures in response to state surveillance (Subrahmanyam 1998). Moreover, Muslim non-profit humanitarian charities exist in a larger multi-scalar ecosystem of informal and local small-scale Muslim community service and social justice organizations on one end as well as the larger fields of American faith-based humanitarian charities and global Muslim charitable activity on the other.

The driving question then is why has this particular form—the humanitarian non-profit—come into dominance as a key administrative institution and ritual space for American Muslim charity?

**A Strategic Logic to Adopt Humanitarianism**

Humanitarianism, born in the 19th century from European philosophy and Christian ethos, took earlier forms of communal care and transformed them into organized non-partial service to human need on a global scale (Barnett 2011). Foundational organizations, like the Red Cross, in the United States and Europe were nonetheless grounded in Eurocentric conceptions of social order and morality, including a racialized ontology of the human (Weheliye 2014). Over the course of the twentieth century, Euro-American humanitarianism became increasingly entwined with nation-states, international organizations, and corporations in their respective drives for security, development, and profit at the expense of the Global South as well as marginalized populations within their borders.

Even with these critiques of humanitarianism’s ties to state violence or (neo)imperial projects of control, the humanitarian nonprofit is the most acceptable way to collect and distribute charitable funds, in-kind donations, and services. When American Muslims began to form benevolent associations in the first decades of the twentieth century and increasingly faith-based non-profits to send funds abroad to assist Muslim majority regions, they adopted the humanitarian framework in part to avoid what Julien Talpin calls the “less dramatic and non-violent forms of repression” of symbolic attacks against Muslim transnational financial activity as inherently seditious. Like marginalized religious groups in the United States before or alongside them, Muslims’ use of seemingly secular humanitarian language and the concomitant formation of service organizations was a means to enjoy conditional acceptance and express religious positions on society within the confines of cultural alienation and political suppression (Nichols 1988, Corbett 2016).

In this genealogy of humanitarianism, Muslim populations have historically been raced as less human and then subjected to domination and violence by Euro-Americans, all while being treated as the aggressors. As part of this dehumanization, suspicion around American Muslim financial and political activity began far before the “War on Terror” or even the Iranian Revolution with covert government efforts to dismantle the Nation of Islam in the 1960s because they stood against racial capitalism (Felber 2017). Therefore Islamophobia was and continues to be a dominant external force that makes the outwardly neutral moral language of humanitarianism attractive, as a means to express a sincere belief in a universal aim towards the elimination of human suffering.
Turning to internal community discourses, mostly non-black American Muslim communities in the late 20th century already gave of their labor and money to construct mosques and schools, oversaw strong national fraternal organizations, continued to build wealth, and were looking to formalize religious charity beyond bundled remittances abroad. Those who pioneered these first modern humanitarian charities found the legal category of the 501(c)(3) expedient to their goals and adopted this format beginning in the late 1980s. At this time, programs of privatized development in place of state welfare was on the rise, and Muslims followed other US faith-based charities in adopting the economic values of what Mona Atia calls “pious neoliberalism” (2013).

African American Muslim communities are part of this story, even as they are often segregated out, but also hold longer trajectories of community-based organizations for resource building, collective relief mechanisms, and entrepreneurial black capitalism to “do for self.” The Nation of Islam (NOI) was the largest of these groups and commanded millions in revenue in the mid-twentieth century at the height of their business and institution-building—despite covert, illegal sabotage efforts by the federal government. Once W.D. Muhammad took the mantle of NOI leadership in 1975 and dissolved the Nation’s holdings, his new organization, the Mosque Cares, preaches pious neoliberalism coupled with nationalist rhetoric but retains its message of African American communal uplift.

**Contemporary Landscape**

By the early 21st century, the incorporation of collective acts of religious charity into Muslim nonprofits became so widespread and commonplace that large-scale charities began to be seen as discrete institutions to regulate and offer means for proper Islamic giving and service. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, national Muslim humanitarian charities such as Islamic Relief USA, ICNA Relief, Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Life for Relief and Development, and the Zakat Foundation of America became household names and now collectively command over two hundred million USD in donations each year.

They emerged as a ritual service provider, an administrative site for religious giving facilitating zakat transactions and sadaqah jariyya (continuous charity) for e.g. a school in Haiti or prosthesis production in Pakistan. But in their presence at national organizations’ annual meetings, ads in Muslim publications, and in the opportunities they provided for employment and volunteering, they also became a dedicated physical and discursive space specific to charity, making them not third spaces but a new institution altogether.

Therefore, while making no definitive claim to be sources of religious knowledge, presenting instead as humble servants to God, American Muslim nonprofits are nonetheless sites where authoritative religious discourses, affective orientation, and ritualized practices are produced regarding charity and the establishment of justice in human society (Hirschkind 2006). By reading and interacting with online and print media; sending donations; attending fundraising events; and participating in direct service work as staff or volunteers, American Muslims’ moral subjectivities are shaped by their relationship to these dominant charities.

And even for those who do not donate or interact with said charities, national Muslim nonprofit charities’ growth and financial power has allowed them to develop strong brand recognition at major conferences, in pamphlets at mosques, or as sponsors at local charitable events. Their narratives and methods have a thick theological presence not as an inevitable but a powerful normative force without direct engagement with an individual.

Muslim supporters most often invest authority into a charity not because they read it as a theology-producing institution, but because of its bureaucratic rationality (Maurer 1998). This is bolstered by pithy endorsements from famous male scholars such as Omar Suleiman, colloquially referred to as “celebrity imams,” who are often invited to make an appearance for fundraising events or
narrate commercials for the larger charitable organizations (Kapoor 2013).

Ramadan charity fundraisers are a particularly potent example of an expected, ubiquitous, and highly structured ritual activity of charities that demonstrates what Bill Maurer calls, “charisma of form”: the legitimization of religious authority through bureaucratic form in place of theological argument. These events bring together Muslims to reaffirm shared beliefs and commitments as an ethical community that are simultaneously framed by the goals of the charity. Religious values are not inculcated here by mere cerebral activity, but exist in an epistemology of embodiment that demands presence and participation (Ware 2014).

Though not acknowledged in formal material, over the last thirty years national charities also obtained greater legitimacy through local branches and interpersonal networks of staff, their friends, family, and local supporters who share WhatsApp volunteering group texts or enjoy frequent socializing through service to avoid the loneliness of retirement. In this way the charity brand becomes a symbol into which local communities can pour their own religious meaning and aspirations. This might translate into programming specific to local needs or fundraisers run in a heritage language of a large local ethnic community.

Broader Complexity: African American Muslim Resistant Traditions of Care

American Muslim perspectives on religious charity, however, do not fall precisely along demographic lines of race and class, which is partially due to matters of faith. Moreover, because Islamic charity is a call to duty and not paternalistic care, Muslims from all socio-economic backgrounds participate in programming and giving. In fact, African American Muslims have shown much higher rates of community service than other racial and ethnic groups regardless of income level (Bagby 2004).

Participants offer diverse explanations for their charitable work that often complicate and sometimes exceed the moral horizon of liberal humanism. For example, some volunteers portray charity as an act to ensure their spiritual wellbeing exclusive to the transformation of society. In other instances, participants do not measure their work according to development metrics but insist on an “ethics of immediacy” where the present moment of human connection is the focus of charitable service (Mittermaier 2014). Nonetheless, the authoritative theological power of charitable organizations dictates the public and dominant explanation for Muslim charity in the United States— for now.

Right outside the spotlight is the aforementioned longstanding, robust, and yet marginalized tradition of collectivist liberatory theology from within African American Muslim communities. It is the strongest and most visible challenge to dominant Islamic charities’ discursive authority even as African American Muslim community service work has had to work against both anti-black economic structures and Islamophobia.

Best known through the programs of the Nation of Islam but present across different African American Muslim communities, black epistemologies and practices to resist racism in American society and Arab and South Asian ethnoreligious normativity are propelled by a “loop” of building self-knowledge, developing ethics, and acting in the service of social justice (Abu Khabeer 2016). While African Americans are present across the larger US Muslim charity landscape, it is this alternative tradition of care and justice that has actively pushed against humanitarian and neoliberal objectives centered in normative American Muslim charities.

This historical alternative points to the future of American Muslim charitable work, in which these African American critiques and collectivist perspectives are finding wider circulation, mainly in three camps. It informs Muslim charity among more recent Muslim majority refugee communities who do not fit the upwardly mobile stereotype of American Muslims and also among Muslim youth who find rights-based language limiting in its critique of American imperialism and violence at home (Maira 2016).
It also has found wider circulation within multiracial Muslim communities at varying levels of the socio-economic ladder who have grown disillusioned with the American promise of universal prosperity and respect under the law. This is the case especially as economic inequality widens, Black Lives Matter opened new conversations on racism, and the War on Terror roars into the late 2010’s. It is a transition from what Bogumila Hall identifies as a politics of recognition to a politics of refusal. This position is best embodied by the Inner City Muslim Action Network (IMAN) in Chicago and the recent Believers Bail Out Initiative of Ramadan 2018 that uses zakat funds to free people from the bondage of bail debt.

**Conclusion**

Emboldened, the newest stage of American Muslim philanthropy is more horizontal, decentralized, and entrepreneurial. It is also decidedly committed to local issues and does not shy away from public political commitments, protesting unjust wars and policing, or working to change state policy on affordable housing. New modes of collective charity have emerged in the form of crowdfunding, philanthropy foundations, and small-scale donation models. As much as resistance-based charitable work has grown, so have the dreams of entrepreneurial, wealthy American Muslim philanthropists who are inspired by Elon Musk to socially engineer communities out of poverty. Because of the financial power and community trust enjoyed by the Muslim humanitarian charity industry from American Muslims, I argue it is still secure as an institutional space and administrative force amid these shifts in the ways Muslims in the US use their charity to build a society they believe pleases God and serves all.

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Art and activism of the ‘war on terror’ generation: 
British Muslim youth and the politics of refusal

Bogumila Hall, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence

“I did not intend to allow the white people of this country to tell me who I was, and limit me that way, and polish me off that way.”

James Baldwin

In the shadow of the war on terror, British Muslims, and in particular Muslim youth, have become the prime targets of the UK’s government anti-terrorism legislation and its de-radicalization agenda. Perceived as being apart from the nation—here but not of here—Muslims have been called upon to show their commitment to ‘British values’ and to denounce extremism. A poem by a young Muslim slam poet, Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, captures brilliantly what it is like to be on the receiving end of governance that aims to delineate the acceptable parameters of “Muslimness”. Written in the aftermath of the London Bridge attack in June 2017, her “This is not a humanizing poem” is an intimate account of how British Muslims are forced to find ways to display their ‘conditional’ humanity:

“write something upbeat for a change, crack a smile, tell them how you also cry at the end of Toy Story 3 and you’re just as capable of bantering about the weather in the post office queue like everyone, you have no idea how to make the perfect amount of pasta, still”

However the poem, which boasted millions of views on social media, is not a mere interrogation of the state-crafted dehumanization of Muslims. It is also a radical statement of resistance to the modes of subjectification that construe Muslims as threatening and alienated, and demand that they prove themselves otherwise. If some Muslim representative bodies and organizations, responding to the pressure, have been eager to condemn terrorism, prove Muslims’ contribution to British society, and challenge negative perceptions of Islam, the young poet refuses to consent to the binary identities (moderate vs. radical Islamist) imposed on Muslims by the state:

“Instead, love us when we’re lazy, love us when we’re poor, in our back-to-backs, council estates, depressed, unwashed and weeping. Love us high as kites, unemployed, joy-riding, time-wasting, failing at school. Love us filthy, without the right colour passports, without the right sounding English (...) When we’re wretched, suicidal, naked and contributing nothing.”

Her refusal to be constituted from the outside, or to be reduced to the narrow modalities of being, brings to mind the work of writers and activists of the black radical tradition. But it also speaks to the changing landscape and idioms of Muslim collective political expression, situated at the intersections of art and activism. In this short piece, I shed light on a larger milieu of which Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan is a part: a young generation of British Muslim art collectives and grassroots activists, zine makers, spoken word poets, writers and curators, who disavow politics of respectability.

This article addresses the social life of the art practices, their epistemic production, and their political meaning. My focus on the vernacular, the popular and the mundane aims to shed light on sites of struggle that are too often eclipsed in the accounts that privilege the ‘governed religion’ and mainstream engagements with the

1 Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, This is not a humanising poem, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9Sz2BQdMf8 (23 June 2017).
2 Ibid.
3 In Hurd’s rendition ‘governed religion’ is a manifestation of religion authorised and defined by those in power. While this brings into being, and circumscribes, new political actors - representatives and spokespersons for recognized faith communities, it also marginalizes ‘nonestablished, unorthodox, nonconforming ways of being religious’, or what Hurd frames as ‘lived religion’ (2015:112).
state by Muslim representative bodies. The initiatives and aspirations I look into are not tied together by a narrow identitarian logic, but by a shared insistence on Muslim self-affirmation and self-definition, against the required self-erasure (Morsi 2018). Instead of relying on the state’s validation and proving their worthiness, as they are urged to do, young creative Muslims carve out their ‘free spaces’ where they can exist and speak on their own terms, and not in a mere reaction to dominant discourses. By doing so, they prefigure radical alternatives, and turn their back on the state projects of co-optation, while also rejecting neoliberal consumerism and individualism.

From politics of recognition to the politics of refusal

It has been argued that neoliberalism and Islamophobia killed the UK’s radical anti-racist youth movements of the 1970s and 1980s and working-class racial solidarity (Ramamurthy 2013). Recent research on Muslim political participation in the UK has described how faith-based activism, the Islamic revival, and mobilization for ‘Muslim causes’ have gradually replaced the anti-racist politics of previous decades (see for example Elshayyal 2018). Others have focused on the changing repertoires of action among Muslim youth, pointing to the engagements that oscillate around everyday politics, horizontal networks and new technologies (O’Toole, Gale 2013). Broadly speaking, different strands of literature tend to understand Muslims’ civil and political engagements in terms of ‘politics of recognition’, whereby those who have their identities demeaned and distorted challenge the demonization of Islam, claim their ‘right to difference’, and demand inclusion and representation. Indeed, since the 1990’s many Muslim organizations have sought equality through the state and managed to secure some gains, such as protection from discrimination, government funding for Muslim schools, and formal recognition as a faith group (Elshayyal 2018). But these are also forms of engagement that derive from, and are constrained by, the terms of the governing doctrines (Hurd 2015).

While recognition is often construed as a remedy to historical injustice, my reading of the milieu of creative young Muslims draws attention to another logic of action, which is not driven by the desire of acknowledgment by the “white man” (Fanon 2008). My analysis is informed by perspectives from indigenous and decolonial scholarship, black feminism, and in particular Audra Simpson’s (2014) rendition of ‘politics of refusal’. Writing in the context of Mohawks’ struggles within the settler colonial state, Simpson theorizes refusal as an alternative to recognition politics. Rather than seeking the state’s validation, refusal is about disengaging from state projects, disavowing cooperation and questioning the legitimacy of those with the power to recognize. Refusal is also different from outward acts of resistance that articulate claims and presuppose audiences. Refusal is not merely a ‘reaction to’—it is a turn inward, rooted in oppressed communities’ vernacular and embodied knowledges. Carol McGranahan (2016) calling upon Simpson, emphasizes that the act of refusal is generative, social and affiliative, hopeful, and willful—bypassing the state, it introduces new political spaces and builds new collectivities.

Understood this way, the notion of refusal provides a useful lens through which to consider a wide range of artistic practices that reclaim unrepresented narratives and undermine the state’s presumed authority to flatten Muslim lives and fold them into an official narrative of threat and alienation. They manifest, as articulated by Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan, Muslims’ refusal to negotiate their identities, to justify who they are and prove what they are not. This stance could be discerned in the words of Madani Younis, artistic director of the London Bush Theater, when at an event organized by Khidr Collective, a group of Muslim art practitioners, he declared:

“I don’t want to live a life where someone else thinks they have a moral authority over me… the government has this arrogance to think they have a moral authority over the Muslim men and women who live in this country. And I
am done with it (...) I am done with accepting the idea that somehow I have to barter for my equality."

**DIY (do-it-yourself) cultures, Muslim art collectives and zine⁵ communities**

While Muslims in Europe are often posited as ‘outside of modernity’, determined by their allegedly archaic and rigid culture, to which scripts they conform, rather than which they actively produce (Mamdani 2002), grassroots articulations of Muslim youth culture forcefully question these assumptions. Over the last years, a vibrant scene has emerged in the UK of Muslim art collectives, spoken word poets, writers, curators and activists, who assert their voice as political subjects, affirm Muslim creative expression and racial consciousness, and offer new languages and avenues to address British Muslim condition. Self-published zines by Muslim arts collectives, such as Khidr Collective or all-female OOMK, have become one of the platforms for the young members of the community to express themselves and interrogate issues of Islamic faith, traditions, spirituality, art, and activism. In a context where Muslim identities and politics are policed and reified, and where Muslims’ Britishness is constantly tested, these zines are also a testimony to what is usually obscured: the lived experiences of Muslims in all their complexity, the connections between the colonial past and present, and a myriad of forces that shape Muslims’ life trajectories, from poor quality council housing and austerity, to everyday racism and government counter-terrorism policies such as Prevent.⁶ In what follows, I highlight how young Muslims turn to each other to reclaim, celebrate and archive what is drowned out in dominant narratives, and how they articulate and enact their visions of community and justice.

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⁵ Zines are cheap self-published and small-circulation magazines.
⁶ First created in 2003, and statutory since 2015, Prevent policy - as one strand of the UK counter-terrorism strategy - charges public sector workers with the responsibility to monitor and report ‘signs of radicalization’, expanding surveillance to spaces of state schools, universities, and healthcare.
⁷ This does not preclude however their contribution to more organized forms of resistance i.e. campaigns against Islamophobia and the war on terror led by grassroots organizations such as CAGE and the Islamic Commission for Human Rights (IHRC), or student campaigns against Prevent and for the decolonization of the university.
⁸ Author interview, 11 January 2018, London.
⁹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IcUmIP2bDqs&t=91s&frags=pl%2Cwn

**Decoloniality and self-affirmation**

The new generation of Muslim artists refuse to speak in language, and on terms, dictated by the outside. Although their artwork disrupts dominant narratives, they do not necessarily aim to produce a counter-narrative to the mainstream Islamophobia. Rather, deeply aware that inclusion and diversity are not an end itself, they seek to create spaces of living, self-affirmation, and care, where Muslims can tell their own marginalized stories, and nurture themselves and their faith. This shift inwards prioritizes creativity over outward protest⁷, and aims at generating conversations within the community. As Sofia Niazi, speaking of her own OOMK collective, explains: “OOMK is more about creating space for people to exist within, as opposed to a space for people to be outwards; instead of trying to communicate to the world, it’s about having internal conversations.”⁹ In a similar vein, a young woman present at the launch of the Khidr Collective’s zine called it, “a space for the community just to exist, not to have to fight or defend it.”⁹

Self-exploration and efforts to reclaim their own languages, narratives, and subjugated knowledges are central to the young Muslims’ cultural production. For example, the second issue of the Khidr Zine focuses on healing and restoration (shifaa’) in a way that moves away from the commodified understanding of wellness, to think about care in Islam, healing through art and resistance, but also to address mental health as tied to the larger power structures that make Muslims disproportionately at risk of vulnerability and living in harm’s way.

These artists also work against forgetfulness, archiving
what would otherwise be lost or ignored. They record stories of ‘insignificant’ individuals; recall the names of young black men killed by the police; celebrate Islamic figures and movements from the past; and document the quiet histories of immigrant communities in the UK, as exemplified by the work of the Numbi Arts collective, which unearths historical presence and heritage of British Somalis in the East End of London. By excavating what is buried in silence, these initiatives contribute to a re-writing of historical narratives from below, in ways that re-center marginal (often female) voices, cultures and faith, and which articulate an alternative vision of nationhood and belonging.

**Prefiguration and new networks of solidarity**

The ethos of DIY, zine culture, independent publishing, and autonomy is central to young British Muslims’ art practices, standing in opposition to mass-produced and commodified forms of cultural production. Whereas the DIY scene in the UK, stemming from the anarchist, feminist and punk movements, has been traditionally predominantly white and secular, in recent years there has been a growing number of initiatives organized by, and giving a central place to, communities of faith and color. These events, such as small print workshops, festivals and zine fairs, offer material spaces for collective experimentation, exchanges, and personal encounters, emphasizing the collaborative aspects of art production and consumption. With a scant online presence, they also act as free spaces where discussions are held away from the gaze of the state, which, through policies such as Prevent, aims to contain Muslim civil dissent. For example, the annual DIY Cultures Festival—alcohol free and including a praying space—brings art and grassroots activism together to interrogate power structures in creative ways and to build solidarities that extend beyond the timeframe of the festival. But the festival also enacts utopian alternatives in the present, as it defies the logic of neoliberal capitalism and its celebration of professionalization, consumption and individual success. With talks given by the unemployed and introverts, and discussing issues such as disability and mental health, the DIY Cultures Festival praises knowledge from the margins. In this vein, the festival does not invite solely Muslim audiences, but racialized communities and other subaltern voices more broadly. As the co-founder Hamja Ahsan explains, zine fairs like this are driven by the “demand for friendship, things that are not based on competition but cooperation, things that are not profitable…”11, and as such signal the world their participants want to live in.

**Conclusion**

If the politics of multiculturalism and Islamophobia have encouraged narrowly understood identity politics, and to a large extent stabilized boundaries between groups emphasizing their distinctiveness (Ramamurthy 2013: 184), British Muslims involved in the DIY art scene teach us about modes of solidarity and community formation, which do not have to be framed in narrow religious terms. Articulating class, race and religion together, these artists and activists recognize broad commonalities among those at the bottom of the system, those whose voices and histories have been erased, and whose skills and knowledges are deemed of little value and disposable. The communities they envision thus are not distinct, unified or bounded, but based on cooperation, exchange, and common experiences of marginalization.

Although not necessarily making demands on the state, these young British Muslims scrutinize oppressive power structures, create inclusive platforms for building collectivities, and through their creative expression, recast the meanings of ‘Britishness’. Thereby, they invite us to expand our understanding of the margins, not as mere markers of Islamophobia, racism and dispossession, but also as sites of creativity, resilience and faith.

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10 DIY Cultures Festival has been held every year since 2013, with a break in 2018. It is a one-day festival composed of exhibitions, talks, workshops and zine fairs, co-organized by Sofia Niazi, Helena Wee and Hamja Ahsan.

11 Author interview, 10 January 2018, London.
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The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network that aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community. POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. For more information, see http://www.pomeps.org.