Co-auteur
  • GUILLOT Olivier, Bureau D'economie Théorique (1)
  • DAMETTE olivier (1)
  • JAWADI Fredj (1)
  • STANEK Piotr, Cracow University) (1)
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  • Article (4)
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This article provides precise and detailed insight into the mortality of French soldiers during the First World War, focusing on their survival time during the conflict. The article clearly contributes to the longpursued yet unfinished endeavour that is a thorough and definitive demographic assessment of this war. To provide a general framework for the article’s conclusions, it bears recalling certain multinational data on the losses incurred during what has often and rightly been referred to as the “hecatomb” or “the great bloodletting”. According to an overall average estimate, the Great War caused the deaths of nearly 10 million soldiers, including more than 2 million Germans, nearly 2 million Russians, just under 1.5 million Frenchmen, 800,000 Britons, and 650,000 Italians, although these figures remain subject to debate. Counts include men from the most fertile age groups, between ages 19 and 40, that also made up the largest share of their countries’ labour forces. They form the “sacrificed generations”. As a proportion of its total population and among Allied countries, France suffered the greatest number of military deaths after Serbia, slightly fewer than the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Central Powers. Deaths as tallied above correspond to troops killed in action. If we include soldiers who were wounded, taken prisoner, and who went missing, it becomes apparent that the Central Powers were the more grievously impacted side, with Serbia maintaining its tragic frontrunner status among the Allies. About 500,000 soldiers died after 1918 from wounds received or diseases contracted during the war

in Studies in non linear dynamics and econometrics Publié en 2018-10
DAMETTE olivier
JAWADI Fredj
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This paper investigates whether a variant of a Taylor rule applied to historical monetary data of the interwar period is useful to gain a better understanding of the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy over the period 1920–1940. To this end, we considered a standard Taylor rule (using two drivers: output gap and inflation gap) and proxied them differently for robustness. Further, we extended this Taylor rule to a nonlinear framework while enabling its coefficient to be time-varying and to change with regard to the phases in business cycle, in order to better capture any further asymmetry in the data and the structural break induced by the Great Depression. Accordingly, we showed two important findings. First, the linearity hypothesis was rejected, and we found that an On/Off Taylor Rule is appropriate to reproduce the conduct of monetary policy during the interwar period more effectively (the activation of drivers only occurs per regime). Second, unlike Field [Field, A. 2015. “The Taylor Rule in the 1920s.” Working Paper], we validated the use of a Taylor rule to explain the conduct of monetary policy in history more effectively. Consequently, this nonlinear Taylor rule specification provides interesting results for a better understanding of monetary regimes during the interwar period, and offers useful complements to narrative monetary history.

in Business History Publié en 2018-12
FARVAQUE Etienne
STANEK Piotr, Cracow University)
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We demonstrate that even though during WWII the interest rate was close to zero supporting the financing of the military effort, dissent inside the FOMC occurred with a similar frequency to other policy episodes. Our analysis highlights that the debates which resulted in dissents turned around two broad issues: the size of the Fed’s balance sheet as well as the functioning of and communication with financial markets. Thus, we argue that the conventional view depicting the Fed as merely accommodating treasury needs should be revised. Our detailed investigation of dissents emphasises the modernity of the objections raised by Fed officials.

Thomas Piketty dans Le Capital au XXIe siècle établit un premier principe de divergence fondamentale entre la rémunération du capital et du travail qui serait la source des inégalités dans l'Histoire. En même temps, l'accumulation du capital est le facteur qui historiquement a tiré la croissance. L'auteur aborde successivement ces deux aspects mais n'étudie pas les liens qui unissent ces deux propositions : les inégalités sont-elles un moteur ou un frein de la croissance dans l'Histoire ? Tel est le fil conducteur de notre analyse de l'ouvrage qui prend appui sur deux interrogations majeures : comment passer de l'énoncé d'une « loi historique » à un modèle de croissance dynamique ? L'épargne peut-elle être un frein à la croissance ? Nous suggérons dans une dernière partie que le recours à la cliométrie peut être un moyen d'éclairer sinon de trancher ces débats.