Acquiring and Exercising Citizenship: The New Second Generation in the United States

Renee Luthra
University of Essex
rrluthra@essex.ac.uk

Thomas Soehl
McGill University
thomas.soehl@mcgill.ca

Roger Waldinger
University of California Los Angeles (UCLA)
waldinger@soc.ucla.edu

www.sciencespo.fr/liepp
© 2016 by the author. All rights reserved.
Acquiring and Exercising Citizenship: The New Second Generation in the United States

Renee Luthra, Thomas Soehl, Roger Waldinger

This paper focuses on the ways in which the distinctively international aspects of population movements across borders affects the experience of the children of immigrants – whether born abroad and

---

1 This paper is a chapter from an in-process book, Second Generation Trajectories, written by Renee Luthra, Thomas Soehl, and Roger Waldinger, and to be submitted to the Russell Sage Foundation Press in fall 2016. The book is based on an analysis of two, exceptionally valuable, indeed unique, sources of data: the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York survey (henceforth, ISGMNY), conducted in 1998 and 1999, and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey (henceforth, IIMMLA), conducted in 2004. These two ventures were both funded by the Russell Sage Foundation as part of the Foundation’s long-term investment in the data and intellectual resources needed to understand contemporary immigration and its consequences. As the outgrowth of a single, ongoing effort, these two surveys overlap in significant ways: they both sought to answer similar questions and hence queried respondents in similar, sometimes, identical ways. Moreover, they both adopted similar methodologies, namely, telephone surveys of young adult immigrant offspring, either born in the United States to at least one foreign-born parent or born abroad but raised in the United States, supplemented by interviews with third generation (or more) respondents of white, black, and Hispanic background. Respondents’ ages ran from 18 to 32 in ISGMNY and 20 to 39 in IIMMLA. The pooled sample includes 7,914 respondents, of whom 4,523 were surveyed in the Los Angeles region and 3,391 were surveyed in the New York area. The bulk of this chapter draws on interviews with the immigrant origin respondents, of whom 3,309 were surveyed by IIMMLA and 2,430 by ISGMNY. Respondents originated in 76 different countries, in addition to those born in the United States to U.S.-born parents as well as respondents born in or originating in Puerto Rico. For further details about ISGMNY, see Kasinitz et al, 2008; for further details about IIMMLA, see Bean et al, 2015.
raised in the United States or born in the United States themselves. The international impinges directly on the acquisition and exercise of citizenship, the topics treated in this chapter. On the one hand, every emigrant departs as a home country citizen to arrive as a destination country alien, a status less tractable to individual initiative than was the initial decision to seek a better life in a new land. For those who enjoy the possibility of acquiring a new citizenship and successfully exercise that option, the acquisition of citizenship marks the transition from the old nationality to the new. On the other hand all immigrants in a democratic society can exercise citizenship, as mere territorial presence confers the right to engage in a broad, though not, full panoply of civic and political activities. Yet to access these different options for involvement, however, immigrants need the resources required for understanding a strange, new environment and for engaging with civic and political matters at least one step removed from the demands of everyday survival.

Acquiring and exercising citizenship are related, but nonetheless distinct. Formal citizenship is a status from which every new immigrant is excluded whereas the exercise of citizenship is an option of which any new immigrant can avail. However, the options for exercising citizenship are also regulated by the requirements for its possession as status, as only citizens can vote. As many citizens, sometimes most, don’t cast a ballot when they can, the right to vote may not meaningfully distinguish those who have crossed into the polity from those who remain outside. Yet it is precisely because the individual incentives to go to the polls are so weak that political organizations, parties, and candidates expend so many resources in the effort to cajole voters to do so. Hence, those lacking the potential to vote may find themselves, not just excluded from the exercise of the privileges that come with formal citizenship, but cut off from the processes that produce the exercise of citizenship itself.

Acquiring citizenship is a challenge for only some of the adult immigrant offspring with which this book is concerned: those born abroad,
but raised in the United States. Yet as at least one parent – usually both -- arrived as an alien, and that condition often proved enduring, non-citizen status is a background condition for the rest. Indeed, for all of these New Yorkers and Angelenos, the strangeness of the civic and political environment is part of the familial setting, albeit to varying degrees. In the pages to follow, we first seek to understand the processes affecting the acquisition of citizenship and then go on to ask how these two distinctively international aspects of population movements across boundaries – alien status and strangeness – affect citizenship’s exercise among these U.S.-raised, but foreign origin respondents.

**Acquiring citizenship:** As emphasized by the rational choice approach advocated by neo-assimilation theory, adaptation is driven by the rewards it yields. But the assimilatory power of the pursuit of the good life derives from its constant action, invisible effects, and compatibility with a range of migrant plans – should I stay? should I return? -- which is why settlement and assimilation so often happen whether wanted or not. Not so the acquisition of citizenship, for which a deliberate effort is required. Unlike mastering the dominant tongue – or at least enough of it to get by – citizenship is not a quotidian concern, as it can’t be reliably read from the everyday encounter. Indeed, it is often misread, to the dismay of the naturalized citizen whose accent gives away his or her foreign origin. Yet precisely because, in the near to medium term, citizenship provides neither much help nor hindrance, its acquisition is likely to be postponed.

Hence, immigrants may spend years – perhaps the entirety of their lives in the United States -- in that conceptual liminal zone between the territory of the state and the internal boundary of citizenship. Indeed, as we shall show, such is the experience of many of the foreign-born respondents studied in this book and even more so, of the parents of both the foreign and U.S.-born. Persistent non-citizen status seems anomalous, in light of the parents’ long tenure in the United States (on average, 21 years) and the young age of the foreign-
born respondents’ own arrival. As, with the exception of the Russian Jews, these are mainly people whose entire school experience took place in the United States, they are surely Americans in spirit and everyday life. Yet, as of the interviews, many were not citizens in fact, a status that many others acquired only after tarrying long.

The stickiness of non-citizen status is not an anomaly; rather it stems from the very nature of the institution itself. Encompassing more than a status and an activity, citizenship is also an identity – the symbol linking the individual to the nation or people to whom he or she belongs. While home country citizenship may not prove of much use, its emotional valence often makes it hard to discard. Hence, the reluctance to give up the citizenship of one’s native people may deter one from taking on the citizenship of a previously foreign people, although the passage of dual nationality laws diminish the conflict by making new and old allegiances compatible.

As status, citizenship is simultaneously a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, both an instrument and an object of citizens’ social closure, to borrow the concepts formulated by Rogers Brubaker (1992). Providing status citizens with a monopoly on the vote, on indefinite residence, and a handful of other benefits, citizenship no longer serves as the potent instrument of internal closure against resident non-citizens that it did during the mid-20th century era of low immigration. Yet if for nothing else than its symbolic importance, status citizenship remains a powerful object of closure, as even the U.S. – a state with a comparatively liberal citizenship regime – compels would be citizens to vault over an increasingly high wall. Needless to say, resources increase the likelihood of leaping over with success and diminish the relative costs that the effort requires. Since citizenship is for the deserving only, it entails a level of scrutiny that some potential citizens might prefer to avoid. Hence, aspirants have to decide whether the quest for citizenship is worth the gamble, a matter to which the answer is not crystal clear. While they
ponder the question, their residence within the territory but outside the polity persists.

Exercising citizenship: Thus, exclusion from the polity – both present and past, both direct and indirect, via one’s parents – comprises one of the central lines of variation among the immigrant offspring analyzed in this book. In turn, we seek to understand how the exercise of citizenship is affected by these varied experiences of exclusion and inclusion from citizenship as status. As suggested above, the experience of living on the wrong side of the bright line of citizenship will have an effect of its own, depressing political engagement, independent of exposure or other resources that might encourage political involvement.

The conventional approach, by contrast, understands the processes leading to the exercise of citizenship – political assimilation – as an extension and by-product of the processes entailed in social assimilation. In this view, the exercise of citizenship steadily grows as immigrants acquire the capacity to understand the world around them, gain the resources needed for attending to and engaging with civic and political matters that don’t produce immediate benefit, and develop proximity and ties to a more diverse network of established persons more likely to transmit political signals and stimuli. That process will be mediated by those differences at the individual and familial level that can make the new environment more or less strange or more or less easy to learn: immigrants arriving with higher levels of education are likely to find the environment both less unfamiliar and easier to learn, advantages that should be transmissible to their U.S.-born or –raised children. Similarly, differences in the pace of parental adaptations – the speed with which they master the dominant tongue and the degree to which it replaces the mother tongue both outside and inside the home – should facilitate or hinder the political and civic engagement of their children.
That political engagement often precedes citizenship, as demonstrated by the immigrant rights movement of the past several years, provides all the more reason to think that social and political assimilation can proceed hand in hand. The blurriness of social boundaries facilitates and possibly encourages political participation: aliens are exposed to explicitly political messages directed at the citizens among whom they live; they often belong to organizations that encourage them to activate their rights and search out those entitlements which they are due. Even though non-citizens lack the right to choose those who represent them in government, they are affected by government policies, providing further motivation both to attend to receiving society politics and to participate (Verba et al. 1995; Leal 2002). And like citizens, non-citizens can and do contact the officials elected by the citizens, efforts whose impacts are magnified when those contacts are made as part of a broader effort encompassing citizens.

However, it is not clear that the mechanisms producing the virtuous circle by which social leads to political assimilation can be fully triggered while standing outside the wall of citizenship. The motivations that might encourage political learning are different from those propelling the social learning entailed in the quest for individual progress. Non-citizens have good reason to discover how best to navigate the new environment and leverage whatever skills they might possess: even newly arrived undocumented immigrants need to learn where the day labor market is located, what wage one can expect, and which competencies a prospective employer is likely to want and reward. By contrast, non-citizens can’t vote, so why should they pay attention? As long as most neighbors or coworkers find themselves in a similar status they are unlikely to be the source of much information or encouragement however helpful they might be in solving a practical housing or work-related problem. Whereas an employer might be open, or perhaps even eager, to promote a hard-working, willing immigrant worker, regardless of status, political parties and candidates aspiring to office are less likely to waste resources on
persons unable to cast a ballot. Of course, immigrant children, as opposed to their parents, are unlikely to find the political environment equally foreign and, through schools, are instructed in how to engage with and understand it. Nonetheless, growing up with parents with little interest or understanding in politics, without partisan attachments or ideological attachments and with little, if any history, of political participation either before or after migration, is likely to yield offsetting, indirect impacts.

Moreover, the exercise of citizenship is likely to be affected by long-term effects of disparities in the political systems in the countries of emigration, whether having to do with differences in the degree of democracy, the organization of the polity, or the integrity of the political process. Those disparities might well be greater than the inter-societal differences related to the practical matters entailed in settling down and moving ahead. Thus, a rural background can impart the skills that make a poorly educated migrant a well-suited worker on construction sites throughout urban America; but prior exposure to one party rule or government officials that only provide services when bribed may implant views and expectations that fit less well with patterns of political behavior or engagement prevailing in the new environment. Of course, for the New Yorkers and Angelenos whom we study, any such exposures are typically indirect, via their parents. But as suggested by theories of political socialization, since parents’ political orientations were acquired early they are likely to be resistant to change, with any tendency towards stasis reinforced by the lack of legal or citizenship status. While not all of the home country political orientations that parents acquired before emigration are likely to be transmitted to children, parents’ capacity to convey their own understanding of the new political environment is likely to be quite variable, with much depending on the degree to which resources, whether having to do with cognition, security, and citizenship, are available.
1. Crossing the boundary into the polity: Citizenship acquisition

Right from the beginning of its history as an independent country, the United States has offered immigrants easy access to citizenship while promising their U.S.-born children citizenship upon birth. Though not often noticed, these practices comprised a de facto immigration incentive program, reflecting the new republic’s need to attract a population that could fill up its land mass and help wrest territory from the indigenous population. While conflict over naturalization requirements emerged almost instantly – with the minimum wait period set at two years by the first Naturalization law passed in 1790, increased to fourteen in 1798, and then lowered back to five in 1802 – residence requirements have remained at that level ever since. From its outset and through the early 20th century, the procedures for naturalizing took ad hoc form, varying from one locality to another, with approval heavily influenced by the degree to which local political regimes perceived immigrants as likely friends or foes. Those practices were then transformed at the turn of the 20th century, when the growing wave of anti-immigrant animosity eventuated in the Naturalization Act of 1906, shifting responsibility to the national level, imposing requirements for rudimentary knowledge of English and American civics, and mandating payment of a $6 filing fee – the equivalent of $120 in 2016 currency (Ueda, 1980; Schneider, 2001; Bloemraad and Ueda, 2011). The contours of naturalization practices have since then remained roughly stable, though standardizing the naturalization test took protracted form (Schneider, 2010) and fees have fluctuated – most recently increasing from $60 in 1989 to $680 as of this writing, or 1.32 percent of median family income (Stringer, 2016).

By contrast, birthright citizenship, at outset an inheritance of English common law, took deeper hold during Reconstruction, as passage of the 14th amendment gave it constitutional status. And whereas only foreign-born whites and, since 1870, foreign-born blacks were
deemed eligible for naturalization until racial bars to citizenship acquisition were lifted in 1952, law has consistently guaranteed birthright citizenship to all children born on U.S. soil, regardless of their parents’ citizenship status. Hence, unlike many countries in Europe, where the children and sometimes grandchildren of immigrants were compelled to remain citizens of the country of emigration even when born and raised in the country of immigration, the native born children of immigrants have always entered life as status citizens -- an often taken-for granted and unacknowledged precondition of the multigenerational assimilation process.

Yet, a large and growing population of children, often described as the 1.5 generation, accompanies their parents as immigrants, thus arriving without the benefit of birthright citizenship. The 1.5 generation is socially similar to the second-generation, as the great majority enters the U.S. at a very young age: in our samples of immigrant-origin New Yorkers and Angelenos, for example, half of the foreign-born respondents arrived in the United States before the age of 7 and 90 percent before reaching the age of 13. Yet the social similarity produced by exposure to a common environment from a very young age co-exists with fundamental categorical difference: just like every other migrant, child immigrants start as aliens and therefore immediately confront the formal, political boundary separating citizens from aliens. Moreover, as aliens they are not of one type, but are rather separated from one another by the bright boundaries linked to their precise legal status. Unlike the formal equality among citizens, formal inequality prevails among non-citizens. Some statutorily enjoy most citizenship rights, occupying the conceptual space close to the boundary that citizenship as status demarks; others have a far more precarious hold, conceptually located just inside the territorial boundary.

By contrast, the U.S. born children of immigrants all share U.S. citizenship and hence begin life as formal equals. Yet, as the offspring of parents who entered the United States as aliens, they are likely to
grow up in environments where other family members lack U.S. citizenship. Moreover, given the great variance, both in parents’ legal status at entry as well as group-level policy contexts, even U.S.-born children are likely to come of age in households where the presence of citizens vary widely. Those differences are likely to be of particular import for the concern of this chapter, as adult political orientations and loyalties, as well as civic engagements, are at least partly passed on from parents to their offspring. But that process is likely to take different form, if parents to whom the political system is new and strange also find themselves barred from formal political involvement. Similarly, absence of citizens in one’s immediate circle may dampen attentiveness to political signals, even when the formal right to participate is in hand.

To capture these differences in citizenship density, we have created a simple measure of familial citizenship density by counting the number of citizens included in a parent-child trio, with the range varying from 0 to 3. In both New York and Los Angeles, an all citizen parent-child trio accounts for the majority of cases, though in the New York sample the fraction barely exceeds the fifty percent level. By contrast, citizenship density hits zero among just under nine percent of the respondents, with the higher fraction among New Yorkers reflecting the heavier presence of immigrant offspring who arrived in the United States at an earlier age. But among the foreign-born, the fraction of no citizen parent-child combinations more than doubles, while the proportion of all citizen parent-child combinations drops under fifty percent. And though the children in question are all adults, parent and child statuses seem intertwined: familial citizenship density falls to zero among 60 percent of those foreign-born respondents who have yet to become U.S. citizens but rises to virtually the same fraction (64 percent) among those New Yorkers and Angelenos who went through the naturalization process.
Disaggregating these statistics by country of origin highlights sharp inter-group disparities while also widening the differences between New York and Los Angeles. The contrasts reach their height among the 1.5 generation Angelenos: among Mexicans the average citizenship density barely exceeds 1, whereas among Vietnamese almost all (90 percent) parent-child trios have already gained citizenship. Though citizenship density rises among Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Mexicans with generation, Asian origin nationalities show higher levels of citizenship density in every generational grouping. Among the 2.5 generation Angelenos, every Korean and Chinese parent-child trio is an all-citizen trio; among Mexican 2.5 generation Angelenos, by contrast, 1 out of every 4 parents had yet to obtain U.S. citizenship.

In New York, as in Los Angeles, South/Central American origin groups exhibit lower levels of citizenship density, though disparities are far less marked among the foreign-born. Among those New Yorkers who arrived in the U.S. after the age of 5 citizenship density averaged 1.2 among Dominicans, a level not appreciably lower than that attained by Chinese at 1.3 or Jamaicans at 1.6. Only among the Taiwanese did density levels exceed 2, though the scores attained by
the Russians and the Ukrainians suggest a rapid, family-wide shift towards citizenship given the recency of this group’s arrival. By the second generation, almost every Chinese and Hong Kong parent-child combination was an all-citizen trio, with the Taiwanese and Trinidadians lagging only slightly behind. Ecuadorians and Dominicans lagged behind other groups, though as compared to Mexicans, the parents of Dominicans were far more likely to be citizens.

The cases of the Taiwanese and Chinese in the two cities demonstrate the distinct characteristics of these migration streams. Whereas citizenship density was low among the China-born New Yorkers, and especially so among those who arrived after the age of six, all-citizen parent-child combinations prevailed among the China-born Angelinos. Yet, contrasting second generation respondents shows greatly reduced disparities.

In part, these inter-group disparities reflect differences in the longevity of the various migration streams. As naturalization is generally possible only after 5 years of legal residence, the nationalities among which new arrivals are particularly prevalent will be prone to lower naturalization rates. But while time spent in the host society yields exposure and thereby directly facilitates language acquisition or socio-economic mobility, its impact on the acquisition of citizenship is far more conditional, as the clock only starts ticking with the acquisition of legal permanent residents. As most new legal permanent residents are not new immigrants, but rather persons who previously came to the U.S. in some other status – whether as legal “nonimmigrant” tourists, students, temporary workers, or intercompany transferees or as unauthorized entrants – differences in the policy context as well as disparities in the ties to citizens, permanent residents, and employers who can sponsor new arrivals will make for cross-group divergence in citizenship take-up rates.
Yet even among those eligible, few actually naturalize. For example at the beginning of 2010 of an estimated 12 million Legal Permanent Residents roughly 8 million were eligible to naturalize\(^2\) yet in that year just shy of 620,000 or 5% did naturalize\(^3\). This statistic underlines yet another difference distinguishing crossing the political boundary of citizenship from the crossing of social boundaries separating immigrants from natives: As conceptualized by Alba and Nee (2003) crossing the latter is a seamless unbounded process, beginning from the moment of entry into a new society, at which time the immigrant begins to make sense of the very different surrounding environment; as each new competency and each new insight generates some additional opportunity – if only by easing the difficulties of day-to-day survival – it continues ceaselessly and without notice. In contrast citizenship is not only a clearly defined unambiguous boundary, but crossing it is a discrete step requiring deliberate action. For those arriving undocumented and thus in the most vulnerable status, the trajectory is likely to involve a series of transitions across formal status boundaries. Each of those transitions is time-consuming, costly, and often painfully uncertain, thereby draining

---


resources that can be used for the effort to move ahead. And persons in an alien status can rarely cross these barriers on their own: unlike the process of social assimilation, where each step leads the immigrant to take another, moving from one civic strata to another requires expert help and even the experts are unable to ensure success.

On the most practical level applying for citizenship requires navigating a long bureaucratic process that – as famously summarized in the title of David North’s (1987) “The Long Grey Welcome” – may repel as much if not more than it appeals. As Irene Bloemraad (2006) argued in her comparative study of citizenship acquisition in the United States and Canada, as an agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) prioritized its enforcement over its integrative functions, with an organizational culture stamped by the preoccupation with control. While border and interior enforcement have since been spun off to a new entity, the ethos prevailing in INS’s successor agency is unlikely to have changed greatly. Among migrants the INS and its successor agency, US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) suffers from the image of an organization to be avoided whenever possible with stories about negative treatment abounding (Alvarez, 1987). Applicants need to ready themselves to take a test of English ability and basic facts about the United States. Although the vast majority of applicants passes -- almost 96% in FY2010 and 93% in FY2011 (USCIS) -- the ordeal may discourage some potential citizens, especially those with little or prior test-taking history. This factor likely weighs less heavily on the 1.5 generation -- most likely to be fluent in English and familiar with the basic subjects covered by the test – than on immigrants who arrived as adults. Since the process also entails a thorough review of an applicant’s immigration history and record, which in turn could uncover a problem, heretofore invisible, that could threaten permanent residence status – concerns over the negative consequences of close scrutiny clearly lead some potential citizens to stay clear of the entire process. Costs entail a further deterrent, one of ever greater weight since the late 1980s, when INS and then USCIS, were transformed
into agencies funded, not by the U.S. Treasury, but by user fees; between 1988 and 2015 fees rose five-fold in constant terms, with barely three percent of applicants granted waivers (Stringer, 2016:6-8).

Though confronting potential citizens with significant material and informational barriers, the benefits conferred by citizenship have remained mainly symbolic, with limited concrete benefits. Naturalization provides the ticket of entry to the polity, an outcome that could yield significant effect if large numbers of naturalized citizens voted and even more so if naturalization numbers were to grow. Yet if some new citizens clearly prize voting – as suggested by Sofya Aptekar’s (2015) interviews with applicants waiting for their naturalization interviews – others prove indifferent – as indicated by the relatively low level of electoral participation among Asian immigrants, who naturalize at high levels but then only occasionally go to the polls. Beyond the vote, new citizens gain few opportunities in addition to those they already possessed as legal permanent residents: unlike the situation a half century ago, citizenship rarely serves a prerequisite for employment, a few branches of the government and selected grant programs excepted. By contrast, a US passport may offer both greater security when traveling and greater freedom of international movement, a question of importance to immigrants from countries whose passport holders need visas to enter the developed world. And whereas permanent residents need to return to the United States every six months, U.S. citizens can remain abroad indefinitely without risking loss of citizenship – a consideration likely to matter in the eyes of the 1.5 generation respondents whom we study, as many have parents and relatives abroad and indeed, have undertaken much foreign travel. A more powerful motivation may be the impact of U.S. citizenship on facilitating the immigration of close relatives still abroad – a goal substantially facilitated once citizenship is in hand, as there is no numerical limitation on the number of spouses, minor children, and parents sponsored by U.S. citizens.
Yet the most compelling of citizenship’s concrete benefits may derive from its quality as an insurance policy, guaranteeing against the risk of deportation. In contrast to citizenship, legal permanent residency is a conditional status, – revocable by the state without much legal recourse, with the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in conjunction with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) greatly increasing the number of violations that could trigger deportation. Indeed, the absolute number of permanent residents experiencing deportation has soared in the years following the acts, climbing from 15,539 in 1994 to 24,702 ten years later 2004. Yet, for the individual legal permanent resident, the risk of deportation remains very low. Given an estimated legal permanent resident population of 11.6 million in 2004 (Rytina 2004) this translates into a probability of just 0.2% per year.

But citizenship is not just a legal and political status – it also denotes nationality. Not only are national identity and self-identity deeply entwined; national identity is understood as relational, distinguishing “us” from “them.” As citizenship acquisition is called naturalization, that is, a result linked to the very constitution of a person, the now standard definition of assimilation as a decline in an ethnic difference can’t apply. Instead, given citizenship’s fundamentally symbolic quality, its acquisition involves the shift from one particularism to another, which is why it is conditioned by emotional and affective concerns as well as material costs and benefits. For non-citizens who arrived in the United States as children and attended schools where they saluted the American flag on a daily basis, the symbolic conflict between old and new nationality may exercise little effect. Yet those same considerations may weigh heavily in the eyes of parents and close relatives raised, socialized, and possibly still living abroad and whose feelings and opinions about naturalization may count. Just like the decision to leave home – which often reflects a family-level strat-
egy and not simply the migrants’ individual preferences -- the decision to take on a new national identity may be influenced by the actions and preferences of the migrants’ closest kin. Given the asymmetry between naturalization’s material and informational costs, on the one hand, and its largely symbolic benefits on the other, a family level decision to proceed together may be the critical element in tipping the balance toward naturalization’s favor.

We now proceed in two steps, to assess just how these factors affected citizenship patterns among the immigrant origin Angelenos and New Yorkers studied in this book. To probe the differences in citizenship density in families shown in tables 1 and 2 in greater detail we estimate an extended beta-binomial regression predicting the number of family members (respondent plus parents) possessing US citizenship at the time of interview – a variable ranging from 0 to 3. This analysis is summarized in table 3 and combines both the NYC and Los Angeles data and considers both 1.5 generation and 2nd generation respondents. As the ISGMNY data does not provide information on when respondents or their parents naturalized, we then turn to the IIMMLA data and employ an event history model to analyze the timing of naturalization decisions of the 1.5 generation respondents. Unlike the U.S. census and most other data sources used in the analysis of citizenship acquisition, IIMMLA survey asked respondents both whether they had naturalized and if so when U.S. citizenship had been acquired. We draw on this information, as well as responses to questions about the year of immigration to the United States to generate a variable for the number of years separating arrival in the U.S. from acquisition of U.S. citizenship. We then use a discrete time proportional hazard analysis to model the time it takes a 1.5 generation respondent to become a US citizen upon entry into the US.

The results for the key independent variables are consistent across the two analyses which gives us confidence that findings do not simply reflect a statistical fluke. Yet the two dependent variables also
place different emphases: The family level citizenship density variable is especially suited to family level processes and gives a broad picture of migrant families in the two cities. The naturalization timing variable on the other hand affords a more detailed view of the naturalization processes of 1.5 generation individuals.

1.1 Conditions of arrival: places of birth and legal status

As outlined above, the status with which family members arrived acts as a central determinant of naturalization. By default citizenship densities will be higher among families in which one parent was born in the United States (in the 2.5 generation) or in which the respondent (the second generation) was born in the US. In the family-level model we enter this information with one indicator variable identifying the place of birth of the respondent (U.S. or abroad) and another identifying a parent born in the United States. Not surprisingly, citizenship densities prove higher in families with members born in the US: holding other things equal, citizenship densities among the families of 2nd generation respondents average 2.5 (out of 3), but only 2 among those 1.5 generation families in which the respondent arrived before age 6 falling to 1.8 among the families of those 1.5 generations respondents who that arrived after age 6. Clearly birthright citizenship matters, but as we will see, the gap separating the 1.5 and 2nd generation families is of similar magnitude to a number of other differences.

We remind the reader that only legal permanent residents enjoy eligibility for naturalization (after passage of the 5 year waiting period). Unfortunately, we lack information on status at arrival for parents in the New York City data and thus cannot consider the impact of parents’ on-arrival status in the family level analysis. While that information is found in IIMMLA, the survey lacks data on the date when permanent residency was acquired and the citizenship clock began to tick. Nonetheless, since IIMMLA allows us to control for respondents’ legal status upon arrival, we can see that the naturalization tra-
jectories of those who arrived without legal permanent resident status diverge strongly from those who arrived with legal status, as shown in Figure 3. Whereas roughly half of the respondents who arrived in the U.S. as legal permanent residents naturalized after 15 years of residence, it took roughly 25 years of residence for the fraction of respondents arriving without lawful permanent residence to reach that same fifty percent mark. Adding a further variable now separating out those who entered as legal temporary “nonimmigrants” from those who arrived either without authorization or as unauthorized immigrants shows that those who entered the United States with as legally present, but temporary “nonimmigrants” actually experienced the slowest legalization trajectories.

Figure 3: Cumulative probability of naturalizing for 1.5 generation respondents (IIMMLA survey) by status of entry

1.2 Settlement and adaptation: Time in the US

Settlement (time spent in the US) is the second major predictor of both naturalization and of its prevalence among families. We focus on three aspects of settlement likely to spur the acquisition of citizenship.
At the most basic level, greater time spent in the United States yields greater opportunities for naturalization. In the family level model predicting the number of citizens we measure time by including the number of years the parents stayed in the US taking the maximum of both parents. For our individual-level analysis of naturalization of 1.5 generation respondents we include information on the age at which they arrived (expecting that those who arrived at older ages will be less likely to have naturalized by the time of interview) as well as the age at the time of the survey. Each respondent is considered at “risk” of naturalizing every year since entry to the US. The data has one case for each person-year until the respondent is naturalized. Once naturalized, the respondent is removed from the data (“risk set”) and no longer figures in the analysis. The model includes a 3rd order polynomial for time to control for the fact that those who have lived longer in the US will have had more opportunity to naturalize (baseline hazard).5

One issue in this type of analysis is the question when “the clock starts ticking” that is when does a person for the first time become at “risk” of naturalizing. As already (Bernard, 1936) notes, just because two persons have resided for the same amount of time in the US before being naturalized does not mean that they waited the same amount of time. One could have arrived as a child or undocumented and thus not been eligible for naturalization for several years while another arriving as an adult may have been eligible much earlier. Unfortunately the IIMMLA survey does not provide reliable data on these issues and so we “start the clock” as soon as a person enters the US. However, we do include several control variables for status at arrival and age at arrival. A significant share of respondents (26%) became citizens before their 18th birthday. Many of these naturalizations likely are “proxy naturalizations” that is children become citizens automatically as their parents naturalize. The decision making processes for these will be somewhat different - with parental involvement playing a much greater role - from those naturalizations where the 1.5 generation is of age. However omitting respondents who naturalized before age 18 is problematic as it again introduces censoring into the data this time omitting those who are most eager to naturalize. However, to test the robustness of our results we estimated these models also using only those respondents who naturalized at age 18 or later and note any significant differences.
In addition to opportunity, time spent in the US also creates eligibility: With the exception of the foreign-born spouses of U.S. citizens – a category to which, as immigrant youth, none of our respondents belong -- immigrants need spend at least 5 years in the US before becoming eligible for naturalization, a factor that explains the large difference between the most newly arrived respondents and those living in the United States for 5 years or more. Indeed, the family-level analysis shows that, other things equal, the model predicts just one citizen (on average 1.2) among families in which the first parent arrived less than 5 years before the survey, but predicts 1.7 for all those in which parents spent 5 to 10 years in the US. However, even once legal hurdles are cleared, not all that are eligible naturalize right away. Accordingly our model predicts a significant increase in citizenship density for those with 11 to 20 years of parental residency – a predicted citizenship density of 2.15 (out of a possible 3). However we see no statistically significant increase in citizenship density for further increases (21 years or more) in US residence.

1.3 Competencies and skills

Although taking the discrete, conscious step to apply for citizenship, with all of the temporal, informational, and material burdens it entails, fundamentally differs from the seamless process of social assimilation, the competencies that immigrants acquire in the pursuit of socio-economic mobility almost surely matter for citizenship acquisition as well. Proficiency in English ranks especially high among those competencies, not simply because the citizenship exam tests for familiarity with English, but because that skill makes the US political and institutional environment accessible. Hence, immigrant parents possessing higher proficiencies in English will find the hurdles entailed in applying for naturalization lower and the benefits of citizenship more tangible. Similarly those possessing more formal education may be less hesitant to engage the bureaucratic process that citizenship acquisition involves and will on average have more experience with host country political life. Our analysis shows that
on the family level parental knowledge of English language is important. With other factors held equal we predict a significantly higher share of the family (2.5 out of 3) to be naturalized where both parents speak English as compared to families where none do (2.1 out of 3). Whereas parental proficiency in English clearly matters, parental educational attainment yields a more modest effect: Although the coefficient is statistically significant, substantively the association is small. The difference in the expected number of citizens in the family between the those with the lowest and the highest levels of English ability translates into a difference of more than 28 years of education – a gap not commonly found, the highly unequal levels of education among immigrants to the US notwithstanding. The association with respondent’s education is somewhat stronger. But we should emphasize here that this is strictly an association as time order or causality cannot be inferred from the data we have.

The event history model of naturalization timing in the 1.5 generation confirms these results and sheds further light into these processes. Again we don’t see an effect of parental education, a finding that suggests that parental English ability shapes the naturalization trajectories of families via parental naturalization, but exercises little direct effect on the citizenship trajectories of the 1.5 generation.

Parental English-language ability may constrain the degree of engagement with US politics and institutions and thereby delay children’s naturalization. Yet once controlling for parents’ English-language competency, language practices at home may not yield any direct relationship, as those practices may reflect an effort to transmit home-country language to the next generation and not necessarily an ability to engage host-country politics. Indeed, the analyses shows

---

6 The coding of this variable varies across the two analyses. To assure comparable answer categories we collapse this variable into three distinctions when using the combined dataset but use the full range of four options when analyzing only the IIMMLA data.
that the practice found in respondents’ childhood home – whether using English only, English in combination with a foreign language, or another language mainly – yields no impact on citizenship take-up rates.

1.4 Social and political context of reception

The decision to naturalize is also embedded in the larger social and political context; while this context clearly varies across countries (see Bloemraad 2006) it may also vary within countries. In our case, once we account for control variables, we find no effect for the local context, as there are no significant differences in the citizenship composition of the families of the New York and Los Angeles respondents. Of course, these two capitals of immigrant America provide a supportive environment, both as a result of local administrations that have become increasingly immigrant friendly – with New York leading the way – and because of the density of social service agencies that can provide citizenship training (Mollenkopf and Pastor, 2016). By contrast, local context might emerge as a more powerful factor, were we able to extend the comparison to a broader set of places, in particular, the cities and particularly towns that emerged as “new destinations” for immigrants since the 1990s, many of which shifted to a more aggressively anti-immigrant stance after the great recession of 2008.

While our datasets, as surveys of two places, are ill-suited to assess the importance of geographic context, they contain immigrant offspring from a myriad of country and thereby provide traction on the ways in which national-level differences in the reception context affect the naturalization decision. For acquisition of citizenship, the policy context, which we define as the prevalence of more (refugee) or less (undocumented) advantaged statuses, is likely to be a factor of particular importance. In general, we anticipate that prevalence of more advantageous statuses – in particular, refugee statuses – will facilitate the acquisition of citizenship, though the mechanisms link-
ing policy context to naturalization decisions may vary. Prevalence may yield a direct effect: the greater density of persons with more advantageous statuses means that a higher fraction is eligible to naturalize, increasing the likelihood that more will take advantage of the opportunity, in turn providing examples for others and thereby diminishing the informational costs and uncertainties entailed in naturalization. Since peer judgments typically matter, independent, but parallel decisions to opt for citizenship might indicate a community-wide consensus, thereby the symbolic dilemmas entailed in acquiring a new nationality. Prevalence could also yield influence through its communicative effect, with more commonly found advantageous statuses signaling that membership in the new nation would be welcomed and more commonly found disadvantageous statuses portending rejection. While our data do not allow us to identify the precise mechanism, the regressions nonetheless point to the impact of our policy context measure. Controlling for all other variables, the analysis predicts citizen density rates of 2.6 (out of a family of 3) for nationalities with the most favorable policy context as opposed to 2.1 for those with the most negative policy rating. Even though the event history analysis includes individual-level controls for status upon entry, we nonetheless observe that respondents from groups that face a more favorable governmental reception context naturalize substantially faster than those who face a negative context. In contrast we do not find significant effects for our measure of social reception (average skin-tone of national-origin group). Similarly resources of the co-ethnic community (as indicated by average level of education) do not yield significant effects.

1.5 The sending context

While the decision to naturalize concerns engagement with the polity “here”, in the host country, the imprint of political socialization “there” - the society of origin will likely matter as well. Controlling for features of the receiving context (see above) we can now examine features of the sending-country context. As our analysis focuses on
persons born abroad but raised in the United States, we anticipate that any sending country influences will mainly take place through the indirect effects of socialization in the parental household and exposure via the co-ethnic community, though visits to the country of origin may be an additional source of direct influence.

For our analysis we draw on two measures from the World-Values Survey that have been linked to both the level of economic development and the functioning of liberal-democratic institutions: the sending country’s position on the traditional vs. secular-rational dimension and the position on the survival vs. self-expression dimension. Both variables contain items that are potentially relevant for the acquisition of citizenship. On the dimension from traditional to rational/secular orientations those on the traditional end of the scale exhibit higher national pride and respect for authority, higher religiosity and obedience. The second dimension, survival vs. self-expression, contains items that speak to the willingness to express political opinions and social trust. Higher self-expression values are also strongly associated with more progressive attitudes towards gender equality.

While our regression models find no association between a country’s position on the traditional vs. rational-spectrum and either naturalization or family-level citizenship densities; the analysis does point to the influence cast by the survival/self-expression axis. Citizenship densities are higher among families originating in societies more inclined towards survival-values; likewise, 1.5 generation respondents from these same societies show steeper naturalization trajectories as compared to those from societies where political self-expression was more highly valued.

These results clearly show that origin influences matter, even after controlling for different dimensions of the reception context as well as individual characteristics. While the associations allow for a number of interpretations they seem to rule out the most obvious hypothesis, namely, that immigrants coming from societies where political
self-expression is valued are more likely to opt for citizenship in the United States. Rather the results point to a channel between a survival orientation, inclining persons towards risk- and uncertainty-reduction, and the strategy that Gilbertson and Singer have described as protective naturalization, in which the goal of insuring against adverse changes in the social and political context and guaranteeing continued residence in the United States motivates the decision to acquire U.S. citizenship (Gilbertson and Singer 2003). Alternatively, the survival orientation may influence outcomes through its impact on familial cohesion, with families stemming from more solidaristic societies more likely to naturalize as a unit. Further analysis, interacting the coefficient for the policy context with the coefficient for location on the survival/self-expression shows that among respondents from countries confronting more adverse political reception contexts the association with higher survival values is especially strong, further suggesting a direct link from home country survival orientations and naturalizations.

2. Bright versus blurry boundaries: Exercising citizenship

Conventional perspectives approach immigrant political behavior as if it were just like other aspects of assimilation, whereas we contend that initial formal exclusion exercises deep and long-lasting effects. We therefore begin the empirical inquiry at exactly this point, comparing how social assimilation affects political participation as opposed to at-entry formal exclusion. As in the preceding chapters, the logic of the analysis builds on our knowledge of time order: we want to see how the conditions under which our respondents grew up influence their later behavior as adults. Because only IIMMLA provides information on respondents’ and parents’ status at time of arrival, as well as the timing of naturalization, we confine this portion of the analysis to the Los Angeles respondents only.

If political incorporation is an extension of social assimilation, then the same rational choice processes emphasized by neo-assimilation
theory should lie behind second-generation engagement with politics. Gaining competence in the dominant language develops just as the conventional approach insists, growing with time and exposure as language learning is impelled by the need to acquire competencies rewarded and valued by the destination society. In turn, a greater capacity to comprehend and make sense of the world around one should facilitate exposure to political signals and increase one’s ability to make sense of political matters. By contrast, the more a foreign language dominates, the more foreign the political environment will appear. For that reason, we take language in the parental household as a window for seeing how social assimilation could yield political impacts. Since differences in parent’s ability to speak English should affect their capacity to first absorb political information and then transmit those lessons to their children, we hypothesize that foreignness will be negatively related to political and civic engagement, which will rise instead with greater parental English language capacity.

But as we have argued above, the experience of living on the wrong side of the bright line of citizenship will have an effect of its own, depressing political engagement, independent of exposure or other resources that might encourage political involvement. We hypothesize that past and present formal exclusion from the polity, net of all other factors including our measure of foreignness, will yield negative effects on a broad range of political and civic involvements, including those for which citizenship is not required. We measure past and present political exclusion with a five category variable distinguishing birthright citizens – all with at least one foreign-born parent and comprising two-thirds of the sample -- from foreign-born respondents, who are in turn classified into four categories, those who became citizens between ages 0 and 16, those who became citizens between ages 17 and 20, those who became citizens between the ages of 21 to 38, and those who had not acquired citizenship by the time of the survey. A little over 7 percent (7.27 percent) of the respondents became US citizens by age 16; those acquiring citizenship be-
tween ages 17 to 20 and 21 to 38 each comprised roughly 8 percent of the same (7.93% and 8.43% respectively); those who never naturalized accounted for 10 percent of the sample. Recalculating these percentages using foreign-born as the denominator tells us that fully 30 percent of those Los Angeles respondents born outside the U.S. had not yet obtained citizenship as of the time of the survey, as compared to just under 20 percent who had naturalized in childhood or early adolescence.

In our view, naturalization represents the activation of the political self in the country of reception. Consequently we seek to draw further insight from theories of political socialization, a literature which has long focused on the role of age in the socialization process. Some scholars in this field have argued that the age period from preteen to early adulthood is the time during which one's political perceptions crystallize and maturate (e.g. Alwin 1991, Merelman and King 1986, Merelman 1972). Several studies demonstrate that behavior during the formative years has a strong effect on the political involvement during adulthood (e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, McFarland and Thomas 2006, Merelman and King 1986) and that, after these formative years, individuals' political attitudes (and, presumably, behaviors) are highly stable throughout lifetime (e.g. Prior 2010, Stoker and Jennings 2008, Jennings and Markus 1984).

In this light, not just if, but when, naturalization occurs is likely to yield a long-term effect. When this self is activated prior to the age at which most youth begin to form their own adult political identities, greater engagement should ensue. By contrast, individuals who approach the formative period of early adulthood while remaining outside of the polity are less likely to engage and create a US centered political self.

Furthermore, for the 1.5 generation the circumstances under which naturalization occurs varies with biographical time. Among our foreign-born respondents, naturalization prior to the age of 16 was
closely synchronized with the naturalization of their parents (occurring at the same time or shortly thereafter). Therefore, these early naturalizers grew up in households where parents had recently undergone the civic and political education needed to gain citizenship status and who possess the resources needed to acquire citizenship for themselves and their children and so value in doing so. Hence, as young citizens, these second generation youth are likely have been primed for political socialization: knowing that the polity is open and that civic participation is expected, they should be more receptive to appeals to protest, petition, voting, and contacting local and national elected officials.

By contrast, later naturalization may therefore yield weaker causal impact than the earlier, family centered naturalization process. When naturalization occurs later in life, it is more likely to be the consequence, rather than the cause, of socioeconomic integration and political and civic engagement. Acquisition of citizenship when an adult is much more likely to be one’s own decision and not one directly resulting from or related to those of one’s parents. Individuals with higher levels of education, who are interested in US politics, and whose friendship and familial networks encourage political and civic participation, might choose to naturalize as adults in order to participate more completely. Thus for these individuals naturalization is more likely to be endogeneous to political and civic outcomes, as suggested by likely future of the undocumented immigrant rights activists who have been mobilized through informal channels outside the mainstream political process and have gained political awareness well before they are even eligible for citizenship.  

---

The results presented in the following pages derive from a series of regressions, entering variables for parents’ legal status at the time of arrival; respondent’s legal status at time of arrival (separate dummy variables for entered undocumented and entered with a temporary visa); citizenship status (birth or alien) and age at naturalization; language spoken at home while a child; parents’ English language ability; whether parent returned to homeland when respondent was a child; whether parent
2.1 Political participation

We first examine civic and political participation, such as belonging to an organization, contacting a government official, whether by telephone, email, or in person; attending any political meetings, rallies, speeches or dinners in support of a political candidate; and taking part in any form of protest, such as picketing, a march, demonstration or boycott. We also look at electoral participation among current citizens, such as being registered to vote and voting in the past election.

In the literature, politics typically begins and ends with status citizens. To be sure, not all status citizens are of the same class: formal barriers to participation and lack of rights can effectively create a second class citizenry, whose collective engagements – whether waged under the banner of equality on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual preference, or what have you -- involve citizenship struggles.

But in accepting the arrival of foreigners from abroad, states simultaneously accede to the growth of a population that lives on the territory but lacks status citizenship. In a democratic society, exclusion from the polity does not imply exclusion from politics. Non-citizens enjoy the core civil rights of freedom of expression and assembly: they can engage in a variety of nonelectoral political and civic activities, whether in their capacity as parents, neighbors, or political actors who might demonstrate in the street or might even directly pressure politicians. However, relatively few actually do so, only eight

sent home remittances when respondent was a child; whether a parent never moved to the United States; years of education for parent with highest years; respondent’s years of education; respondent’s age. In addition, the regressions include six contextual variables, the nature of which is fully explained in prior chapters.
percent of the Los Angeles respondents reported participation in at least two of the three different forms of civic participation mentioned by the interviewers. Moreover, political participation significantly overlaps – in other words, group of engaged second-generation men and women who belong to organizations are also more likely to participate in non-electoral politics.

What might predict immigrant engagement and political participation? As discussed in the introduction, some aspects of political life are exclusively reserved for citizens, but others are not. While non-citizens can’t vote or run for elected office, they can contact elected officials, participate in protest or join organizations, just like everyone else. And while politicians may not be interested in reaching out to persons who can’t vote, non-citizens are nonetheless affected by politicians’ decisions, news of which are broadcast to anyone who cares to pay attention, legal or citizenship notwithstanding. In short, while the electorate is clearly bounded, the boundary between society and the polity is fuzzier, with many aspects of political life accessible to all.

Some aspects of the social environment, however, may discourage non-electoral participation. Political life has a fundamentally social core, with participation responsive to the level and intensity of political involvement in one’s own social circles, through which political information also flows (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The timing of naturalization may affect these social triggers of political engagement, as non-citizen youths and young adults remaining outside the electorate may be isolated from the social pressures that ignite political participation. Context is also likely to matter: if non-citizen immigrant offspring mainly live among other aliens and if receiving society politics still remain alien to those immigrant neighbours who are citizens, then foreign-born, but US-born persons are likely to find themselves in an environment where politics is of low, if any salience, which reinforces detachment. And exposure to messages directed at voters may not be enough to stimulate participation: since
political mobilization often triggers political interest and knowledge and those efforts are directed at likely voters with ever-greater pinpoint efficiency, the informational or motivational spillovers that campaigns inherently generate may not reach those residents outside the polity. 1.5 generation members lacking citizenship when crossing the threshold of adulthood may also ignore US centered politics in favor of homeland events or focus their attentions to other elements of their social world and community.

Formal exclusion of non-citizens not only impedes political engagement; it heightens the barriers inherent in the immigrants’ status as newcomers from a foreign polity unfamiliar with the practices and institutions of the polity where they now reside. Low as they may be, the incentives to acquire citizenship are far greater than those motivating an engagement with a strange political system; the obligatory detachment from political participation produced by alien status may long persist, even after citizenship has been acquired.

To be sure, the children of immigrants are exposed to political ideas. But the relevant information and ideas about politics, political parties, and government may stem from the parental place of origin rather than their own current residence; whether any such exposure encourages or discourages political participation will vary greatly depending on the state and polity of origin. Furthermore, the informational component of that package is likely to be of limited use, given the particularities of each country’s political structure. Finally, as emphasized by the rational choice approach advocated by neo-assimilation theory, adaptation is driven by the rewards it yields. But attending to politics, especially when it entails learning the details of an entirely new system, is unlikely to do the immigrant much good. The years spent in alien status are unlikely to help illuminate the mysteries of the new political environment for immigrant parents. Making sense of that environment will also be affected by the political legacy imported from abroad, as learning how to orient oneself towards politics after immigration may entail unlearning of the
similar lessons absorbed before emigration. Insofar as the most important imported lesson taught immigrants that politics is a dirty game rarely or never yielding results, the impediments to learn and attend will be all the higher. Such parents are unlikely to pass an ethos of participation and engagement to their children.

Of course, even in the absence of family political socialization, these barriers to participation faced by immigrant parents may be overcome by the broader socialization process in US schools and US society for the immigrant offspring. But as many of the immigrants’ children are themselves immigrants, the obstacle of noncitizen status may inhibit participation in a similar fashion. And as argued above, whether native-born or not, whether citizens or not, the immigrants’ immediate descendants are unlikely to receive the same political socialization as those of their peers who are both native born and children of the native-born. Most importantly, political signals received from parents may differ in both quantity and quality, as parental disengagement, and even more so, exclusion from the polity is likely to transmit messages of both an explicit and implicit kind.

Indeed, IIMMLA data show that time spent outside of the polity exercises significant effects on a broad range of political and civic outcomes. Moreover, those impacts appear regardless of whether the outcomes require formal membership or not. Thus, participation in civic life and non-electoral political activity is open to all residents of the United States, regardless of citizenship or legal status; the environment is likely to have been all the more open in the increasingly liberal, increasingly immigrant-friendly region where the IIMMLA respondents resided. Nonetheless, civic life is more likely to elicit engagement from citizens than non-citizens; even among the naturalized, time spent outside the polity is likely to have a negative impact on involvement in non-electoral politics and civic matters, activities legally open to all.
As Robert Putnam (1995) famously lamented, Americans are increasingly bowling alone. Nonetheless, bowling clubs are generally open to each and all, with rarely a requirement for status citizenship. The answers provided by the survey’s respondents suggest that there may indeed be a good deal of bowling alone in southern California: just over 80 percent of the respondents answered negatively when
asked whether they belonged to any community organization, work organization, sports team, or some other non-religious organization. This share varies only slightly by immigrant status with just under 17% of the 1.5 generation and 20% of the second generation reporting any memberships in contrast to almost 22% for those born to native parents. By contrast, late naturalizers and non-citizens were significantly less likely to report any organizational membership (16% and 11% respectively) than either citizens or earlier naturalizers, even though the list of possible organizations includes sports teams and soccer is surely an immigrant passion. Beyond these associational activities of a conventional sort, likely to interest people regardless of immigrant or ethnic background, these immigrant offspring were also asked about participating in organizations linked to their parents or their own country of origin; with this form of associational involvement added in, almost one of every four respondents could be classified as a “joiner”. Although this augmented definition curiously points to expanded differences, as 26 percent of the native born and 28 percent of young naturalizers reported belonging to some organization, as opposed to only 13 percent of the non-citizens, status lost some of its salience with the application of controls, only proving significant at the .1 level.

Larger gaps emerge when we look at the three forms of non-electoral politics -- contacting a government official, whether by telephone, email, or in person; attending any political meetings, rallies, speeches or dinners in support of a political candidate; and taking part in any form of protest, such as picketing, a march, demonstration or boycott – in which respondents might have engaged in during the 12 months prior to the survey. Participation is a minority phenomenon: 66 percent of the 1.5 generation respondents have no involvement in any of the three types of activities measured by the survey as do 61% of the second-generation respondents, and even among the 3rd generation control groups the share is 58%.
Disaggregating the children of immigrants further, the impacts of prior and/or current exclusion as well as foreignness are readily perceptible. 1.5 generation non-citizens were the most likely not to engage in any one of the three different activities (71% no activity), closely followed by those respondents who naturalized as late adolescents or adults (ages 17 to 20 and 21 to 30) where around 65% report no activity. A somewhat larger gap emerges when comparing respondents with parents who spoke no English (71% no activity) with those whose parents were English-speaking (59% no activity). Probabilities predicted from the final model show that controls diminish these disparities by about half though they remain statistically significant – with levels of civic activity 5 percent higher among citizens than among the non-naturalized and 7 percent higher among the children of English-speaking parents than among those whose parents without English proficiency. Interestingly, the answers to the survey suggested that respondents were more likely to engage in protest activity (11%) than to attend a political meeting (7%); while parental language ability had no effect on protest activity, non-citizens and late naturalizers and those who naturalized as children lagged behind birthright citizens in this activity, even after all controls in the final model.

Unlike learning the dominant language – the rewards of which are sufficiently large for individual immigrants do so on their own, without urging or support – the individual rewards of political involvement are too scanty to provide much motivation, which is why mobilization by parties, interest groups, neighbors or friends proves so crucial, with the latter two possibly providing both reinforcement and moral example. Answers from IIMMLA respondents indicate that only a minority (barely over a third) received encouragement of this sort from people whom they knew. Encouragement from the politically active turned out to be significantly less common among all foreign-born respondents, whether having naturalized or not. Not surprisingly, non-citizens were the least likely to have had any contacts with the politically active, reporting a rate at just over 60 per-
cent of the native born level (25% vs 41%), after controls. Likewise, parental foreignness had a negative impact on respondents’ contacts with politically active persons, though with effects not quite as depressive as those of non-citizen status.

Not only are the once excluded and the formally excluded less likely to engage in activities with no formal, citizenship bar; the once excluded, notwithstanding their own prior success in clearing the citizenship hurdle, are less likely to engage in political activities for which citizenship is a prerequisite. Among those respondents possessing US citizenship, 80 percent report that they registered to vote. However, the late naturalizers and the young adult naturalizers were less likely to do so than either the birthright citizens or the early naturalizers, a statistically significant difference that even increased after all controls were applied. Similarly, a somewhat smaller proportion (57 percent) of all naturalized respondents actually voted in the most recent election conducted prior to the survey than those who had birthright citizenship (59%). Again applying control variables increases this discrepancy: our model predicts a turnout of 50% among those who naturalized as adults as compared to 63% among the native born second generation. In contrast foreignness, as indexed by parents’ English-language ability, had small and inconsistent effects, moderately reducing the likelihood of registering to vote, but having little effect on actual voting.

---

8 Our model predicts that with everything else held equal, those who naturalized as adults had a registration rate of about 70% while it is 82% in the second generation.
2.2 Political efficacy

Thus, formal exclusion from the polity – whether prior or ongoing – impedes participation, across numerous forms of engagement and regardless of whether involvement entails electoral activity or not. But do those same factors lead the immigrant offspring to view the U.S. political system as so distant as to be incomprehensible and impervious to input from below?

Answers to these questions stem from queries designed to tap into two dimensions of political efficacy: one internal, related to feelings of personal political effectiveness; the second, external, related to the view that authorities, institutions, and elites respond to popular preferences. In the first case, one perceives oneself to have skills and information needed to influence the political system; in the second, one sees that system as responsive. The IIMMLA survey tapped into these two dimensions with two statements to which respondents were asked to answer on a 4 point scale ranging from strongly agree to strong disagree. To assess external efficacy, the survey requested
responses to the statement: “Elected officials don’t care what people like me think;” to assess internal efficacy the survey asked interviewees to react to the statement “I have a good understanding of politics.”

Controlling for background variables, timing of naturalization was not related to the level of understanding. By contrast, respondents were more likely to report a poor understanding of politics when they had grown up in households characterized by higher levels of foreignness (as indicated by parents’ English ability and the use of English at home during childhood). By contrast, social ties to the parental home country were associated with a higher level of internal efficacy. Respondents from transnational families, where one (or more) parents were abroad, were more likely to claim a good understanding of politics than those who had no social ties (parents or relatives) abroad. Differences in perception of external efficacy take a similar form, as again, the variable indexing entry into the polity had no effect after controls. However, respondents whose parents lived abroad were less likely to see elected officials as responsive, with, after controls, 22 percent endorsing a view that elected officials don’t care as opposed to 17 percent among those without relatives back home. Respondents whose parents sent remittances were similarly negatively inclined, with 20 percent endorsing the view that elected officials don’t care versus 17 percent among all others.

Other influences: education and home country connections

The SES model of political participation features prominently in the political science literature, though a summary statement found in Verba and Nie’s canonical 1972 Participation in America – “Citizens (emphasis added) of higher social and economic status participate more in politics (125)” – suggests why this generalization may not fully hold for the population of interest to us. To be sure, there are good reasons to take this view seriously: as political participation is costly, in terms of time, information, knowledge, and money, those
with more resources are better positioned to defray these costs. Education figures as a resource of particular importance, as it conveys knowledge about politics, generates the skills needed to make sense of complex issues and gain access to the ballot, and imparts the proficiencies required for more the more demanding activities of contacting a politician or attending a meeting that we have already reviewed.

Respondents’ own education yields positive effects on every outcome of interest. However, as we have seen, schooling among IIMMLA respondents was heavily affected by parental legal status as well as the other resources that parents were able to transmit to their children. As we are also interested in following the causal chain, the degree to which outcomes were influenced by parents’ education is the more relevant variable and one more comparable to the factors that we have discussed so far. In fact, parents’ education has quite modest effects on participation, yielding increases at the .01 level on the probability of organizational membership and attendance at meetings as well as conviction in elected officials’ responsiveness, while increasing the probability of engaging in any civic activity and in protest at the .1 level. However, even at its strongest, parental education yields effects roughly comparable to those that we have reviewed so far. Thus, going from the 10th percentile (6 years) to the 90th percentile (16 years) of parents’ schooling moves the probability of organizational membership from .16 to .21, which tells us that probabilities of organizational participation are roughly the same among offspring of the least educated parents and late naturalizers, on the one hand, and birthright citizens and offspring of the most educated parents, on the other.

Whereas the literature tells us to look for the influence of education, providing quite precise predictions, we have much less guidance

---

9 The distribution refers to the population under discussion only: foreign-born or foreign-origin offspring in Los Angeles.
when thinking about the effects of home country connections. Some of the literature on transnationalism contends that home country connections are compatible with host country political engagement and that the former may actually facilitate latter. However, these assertions suffer from shortcomings from two types: the prediction lacks any rationale; and since the data report on political and cross-border activities like remitting or travel that take place more or less simultaneously with the political behavior being queried one doesn’t know whether it is transnationalism or participation that is cause or effect. Here, we find ourselves on more solid ground, as our indicators are based on reports about parents’ cross-border engagement at the time when respondents were still residing in the parental home. Interestingly enough, respondents whose parents earlier sent home remittances report higher levels of current political participation on all of the indicators reviewed in this chapter, with the sole exception of external efficacy, as noted above. Though the impacts are much less consistent and more modest, we also find a tendency for return travel to be associated with higher levels of political participation (with the exception of voting where there is a negative association p<0.1). As we have emphasized in chapter 3 and in the pages above, we anticipate that attachments – whether to the home country or to an ethnic group – are transmitted from parents to children, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. While that hypothesis sheds no light on the relationship between parental home country attachment and children’s subsequent host country engagement, there may be indirect links of a variety of sorts. As we shall see in the next chapter, the children of remitters are highly likely to remit themselves; perhaps by remitting parents also conveyed the significance of the action and of the relationship to their offspring. But the giving of scarce resources is both a moral action and an indicator of one’s embeddedness in social relations. If we think that remitting is an aspect of familial cohesion, we may then understand why parental remitting is linked to children’s later political engagement.
3. Finding a place in the political landscape

Whether proceeding from the viewpoint of neo-assimilation or segmented assimilation, sociologists focus on the boundary between minorities and the mainstream, in which ethnic origins are supposedly of little or no importance. In politics however, no such thing as a mainstream exists. In a democracy, politics is inherently a domain of conflict (Pearson and Citrin, 2007) in which participants, whether citizens or not, have to take sides. From the perspective of the receiving polity the political alignment of newcomers can play out in two different ways. One path would lead the political counterpart to social assimilation to entail, “the replacement of ethnic division over time by cleavages based on class, gender, generation, or other categories that cut across ethnic lines, as suggested by Pearson and Citrin (222). Another trajectory, better captured with the term “political incorporation,” would see ethnic categories and political cleavages continuing to overlap to a significant degree. From this perspective, an association between of ethnic identity with party identity would be a persistent feature of immigrant political incorporation in the short as well as medium term. Either way, participation in politics must first entail orientation to the cleavages dividing the polity and then the decision of the faction with which to throw one’s lot. But what are the factors that shape the political orientations of the second-generation?

At least some of the features impeding political participation are also likely to stand in the way of understanding partisan divides and developing partisan loyalties. As political scientists have argued, partisan loyalties are transmitted from parents to children, a scenario unlikely to be repeated in immigrant families, where parents often lack detailed knowledge of the political system, participate at much lower rates, and even when knowledgeable rarely possess the intense partisan loyalties that would breed similar attachments among their children. Entering without knowledge, immigrants have a significant informational threshold to surpass. Thus, even though immigrant
offspring will almost certainly absorb information about the political system as part of everyday socialization, they are likely to enter the polity with a lower stock of knowledge and weaker political convictions than those possessed by their peers born to citizen parents. Hence, as Hajnal and Lee (2011) have argued, immigrants and their offspring may lean towards independence, experiencing difficulty in making meaningful differentiations among the parties and finding it hard to determine the relevance of ideological differences to their own concerns.

Alternatively, loyalties may be the result of a process of ongoing information collection, in which voters identify with one party or another based on their evaluation of a party’s cumulative performance. In this process, existing political cleavages may give immigrant and immigrant-origin persons all the information they need to decide on partisan and ideological loyalties. To begin with, immigration policy is everywhere a source of conflict, for reasons that are bound up with the existence of nation-states themselves. Conflicts over “who gets what” presume that the boundaries of the state define the limits of the parties contending over who will get “what”. Conflicts over foreign policy similarly assume that there is a national interest to be defended or protected. By contrast, immigration policy is inherently about “them” – the actual and potential immigrants, a category that includes both the persons of foreign origin already living on domestic soil as well as the foreigners currently living in foreign states, but who might want to immigrate. Since immigration policy involves both selection and exclusion, decisions about how many new immigrants to accept and of which type inevitably entail judgments about the desirability of those immigrants already in place. Because once over the territorial boundary, “they” have the opportunity to become part of and thereby change the national “we” questions about numbers and types of immigrants inexorably take on a cultural cast.
Thus, while immigrants are unlikely to endorse open borders, their preferences for closure are unlikely to match those of the native-born, whose opposition to immigration might also be read as opposition to immigrants, whether naturalized citizens or not. Moreover, that fraction of the native-born population upset by tendencies towards greater self-expression on behalf of any number of groups is unlikely to sit comfortably with the type of multicultural, liberal nationalism that fits the immigrants better. And once made an issue of controversy, immigration policy is likely to generate further feedbacks that influence immigrant partisan loyalties, as has often been the case in the past. While immigrant preferences can be ignored as long as they remain outside the polity, threats to immigrant rights change the costs and benefits of citizenship in ways that motivate eligible immigrants to cross the barrier of citizenship. Once inside the polity, immigrant voters can make their voices heard, a potential that motivates political elites and office holders to either gain immigrant votes and immigrant loyalties or make it difficult for immigrants to gain citizenship and if naturalized, to find a way to exercise the vote. When anti-immigrant voters comprise a core electoral block, politicians and office holders may be stuck between a rock and a hard place, unable to swivel toward immigrant preferences for fear of alienating the base, but therefore sacrificing a group of voters whose importance is only likely to grow with time. While those incentives rise with the extent to which immigrant votes can swing an election, not every party or politician can respond with equal ease. On the national level the Democratic Party seems to be poised to attract the large majority of votes from naturalized Americans and their children. The repelling effect of anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to be most salient among those who feel that their “group” faces discrimination from the national majority population. In this way, for some immigrants and their children at least, the development of immigrant partisan loyalties may be endogenous to the politics and process of immigration itself. On the other hand, those immigrants greeted by welcoming, possibly supportive policies and fleeing repressive, left-wing regimes may find that their natural home
lies in the Republican Party, especially as Republican leaders proved repeatedly willing to open doors for immigrants in flight from Communist regimes. The waves of Cuban refugees who arrived in the years between the Cuban revolution and the earlier 1970s, and the immigrants from the ex-Soviet Union who began entering the United States in the 1970s exemplify this alternative pattern.

In moving into the American polity, immigrants encounter a system structured around lines of race and ethnicity, divides which in turn are likely to influence partisan preferences and ideological loyalties. The ethnic social ties that migrants rely on in the migration and settlement process can be translated into political loyalties, as the social ties that help migrants find jobs, housing or social services, can extend into the electoral process. The urban political machines of the 19th and 20th century were masters at the game of building political loyalties by easing the pains of settlement. Political entrepreneurs provided material assistance, access to government services and jobs as well as symbolic recognition and new Americans in turn delivered a dependable block of votes. While these urban political machines may have lost much of their influence since their heyday a century ago, local party organizations still exercise considerable influence, overlapping with ethnic networks. In some cases community based organizations (CBOs) that deliver social services in immigrant neighborhoods also engage in electoral politics thereby effectively re-creating the patron-type exchange relationship that characterized urban machine politics (Marwell 2004).

The district-based election system in the U.S. in combination with patterns of residential concentration by ethnicity or national origin, provides further opportunities for ethnic politics, especially at the state and local level where electoral districts often closely track “ethnic neighborhoods” and ethnic segregation thereby produces majority-minority districts. Districts that align immigrant neighborhoods include citizens as well as non-citizens and thereby “…reinforce the linkages of interests in these populations” offering newcomers “the
opportunity to develop and awareness of U.S. politics that is shaped in an ethnic context.” (DeSipio 2001: 97). On the other hand elected representatives from these districts also represent populations in which a relatively high share is under the age of 18 or non-citizen and thus ineligible to vote (de la Garza & DeSipio 1993). Depending on the competitiveness of elections, incumbents may be better served simply mobilizing their core support rather than mobilizing the entry of new voters whose loyalties and behaviors may be hard to predict.

Apart from shaping the electoral mobilization of immigrants, these features of the political system also influence how immigrants and their children align with party politics. For example as political parties become less active in mobilizing new voting constituencies and non-party institutions such as labor unions and civic associations become relatively more important, partisanship among new voters may decline and the share of those choosing not to align with a party, but rather identifying as independents may increase. Political geography may similarly matter as larger political districts, which make narrowly targeted ethnic mobilization less useful could also dampen partisan alignments.

As documented by Louis DiSipio and others, nationwide, political parties have lost a good deal of their capacity to pull newcomers into electoral politics is a nationwide phenomenon (DiSepio 2001). Still there are significant differences across contexts. Though certainly much diminished as compared to its heyday, the Democratic Party still is the dominant force in New York City politics and has significant organizational capacity. In contrast non-partisan elections in otherwise Democratically-leaning Los Angeles further diminish the influence of party organizations.

Similarly the political geography of Los Angeles will diminish not only mobilization but also the dominance of one party. Whereas the city of New York also is the relevant political unit, Los Angeles County is fractured consisting of 88 separate political jurisdictions
with only a third of immigrants living in the City of Los Angles (Mollenkopf et al. 2001, p.36). The county of Los Angeles in turn, though an important political unit is governed by only 5 supervisors each representing more than 2 million people and are elected in districts that cover very large and diverse districts. In New York in contrast though the City Council is the only local legislative body for the more than 8 million inhabitants of the city, the city council districts are relatively small and often closely track ethnic neighborhoods. As Mollenkopf, Olson and Ross (2001) point out in their comparison of immigrant politics in New York City and Los Angeles, the overall political context in New York City promotes immigrant participation to a much greater degree than does the political structure of the Los Angeles Metropolitan region. These differences in context also shape how those growing up in immigrant family align themselves in electoral politics.

3.1 Political identity

Our discussion of partisan loyalties begins in the next section; here we follow Hajnal and Lee in insisting on a logically prior question, namely one’s capacity to orient oneself to the prevailing political divides. One indicator comes from a response to questions about partisan loyalty, from which we create a variable distinguishing those who answer either Democrat, Republican, or Independent from those respondents who say they don’t know, refuse to answer, or respond by saying that they don’t think of themselves in partisan terms. On this measure, the U.S. born children look much like their third generation counterparts born in the United States and socialized by U.S.-born parents: in both cases, a large majority identifies with at least one of the conventional, U.S. partisan categories of Democrat, Republican, or Independent. Finding a place in the partisan spectrum proved harder for the foreign-born respondents, however: a quarter of the non-naturalizers and one sixth of the late naturalizers do not connect with any of the conventional partisan identities, being significantly less likely to give any one of three conventional partisan la-
bels, a gap that persists in the full model. Though respondents who grew up in the linguistically most foreign environment were about as likely as the late naturalizers to report a partisan identification, the relationship between parental linguistic ability and possessing a conventional partisan identity was only significant at the .1 level.

A related question about ideology provides yet another clue about the capacity of immigrant offspring to orient themselves to the relevant divides in a political system that either they or their parents encountered as foreign. Though the conventional left-right divide derives from the French Revolution, respondents found it easier to categorize themselves on the liberal-conservative spectrum than to identify an appropriate place in the party line-up. 91 percent identified as either conservative, liberal, or moderate, with no significant differences related to either generation or citizenship status or experiences. In the regression, late naturalizers were less able to situate themselves ideologically, whereas that option was more readily selected by the offspring of undocumented immigrants and of respondents whose parents remitted, and of those with a parent residing abroad.

As a last effort to capture respondents’ capacity to make sense of the political system, we combine responses from the questions about both partisan loyalties and placement on the left to right spectrum to create a three category variable: one corresponds to the very few respondents (4%) to whom prevailing political divisions seem to make no sense, unable to identify both a partisan identity and an ideological placement; a second reflects the answers of those – nearly one fifth – selecting either a partisan or an ideological placement; a third corresponds to the great majority providing a politically appropriate answer to both questions. Whereas almost all respondents were able to find some bearing on the political system, lack of citizenship nonetheless made for greater uncertainty, as only 69 percent of the non-citizens were able to identify both an ideological placement and a partisan identity as opposed to 78 percent among the citizens. Net of controls, not only the non-citizens (p=.76), but also the late natu-
ralizers (p=.7) fell short of the birthright citizens (p=.8) in their capacity to clearly situate themselves on the political spectrum.

3.2 Partisanship

To examine partisanship we look at the subset of respondents who possess citizenship and are also registered to vote. We first continue our analysis of the Los Angeles survey using the same set of control variables as above. We then include data from the New York City survey which not only increases sample size and variance on origin country characteristics but also allows us draw comparisons across receiving contexts. To facilitate interpretation we use so-called ternary plots which position groups according to their three-party registration in a triangle whereby the position in the space represents the share of a group (or probability of a particular respondent) being registered in each party.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Since the answer categories to the question about party registration were slightly different in the LA and NYC surveys, we restrict the sample to those who register either for one of the major parties or as independents. This omits a small number of respondents in both surveys.
The most striking finding from the regression results entail the absence of any robust associations between party registration, on the one hand, and any of the individual level measures of language competency, arrival- and citizenship status, on the other. As the left panel in figure XX below shows, the 1.5, 2nd, and 3rd generations hold very similar positions in the party-space, a pattern that remains unchanged after applications of controls. By contrast, only the demographic controls of age, gender and parental education prove consistently significant. With controls applied, moving up the age spectrum from our younger respondents (20) to the older end (35) yields a significant increase in Republican Party registration (from about 19% to about 35%) and correspondent decreases in both Democratic and Independent registration.

Figure XX, ternary plots 1,2: *Ternary plots of* predicted probabilities of party registration by generation and age.
Yet these demographic differences are overshadowed by the gaps in partisan loyalties separating both ethnic/national origin groups and the two metropolitan places. In Ternary Plots 3-6 we plot immigrant groups in black, native minority groups in red and native non-Hispanic Whites in blue. Comparing across places we see that both native and immigrant groups alike are significantly more Democratic and less Republican and less Independent in New York as compared to Los Angeles. In Los Angeles the spectrum of political allegiance is bounded by native Whites on the conservative / Republican end and native Blacks on the progressive Democratic end of the registration spectrum. In New York City, Taiwanese, and the two national origin groups from the former USSR, Russians and Ukrainians, are more likely than native whites to identify as Republicans.

*Ternary plots 3 to 6: Ternary plots of partisan registration in Los Angeles and New York City. Native whites are plotted in blue. Native minority groups (Puerto Ricans and Blacks in NYC; 3rd generation Mexicans and Blacks in Los Angeles) are plotted in red. Immigrant groups are plotted in black. Grey areas indicate areas of detail in figures below.
A regression model that includes both individual level and our group-level variables lets us explore some of this variation. We see that respondents from darker skinned national origin groups, who likely experience a more adverse societal reception, are much more heavily Democratic (p<0.05) while those from more traditionally oriented origin societies are more heavily Republican (p<0.1). As Ternary Plots 7-9 show, the differences are in fact not trivial: a move from the lighter end of the skin color distribution (2 on the 10 point scale; minimum observed is 1.4) to a 7 (the maximum observed in our sample is a 7.4) is associated with an almost 40 point increase in Democratic registration (from 39% to 75%), a significant decrease in republican registration and a small decrease in probability of registering as independent. Though differences on the rational-traditional axis yields somewhat smaller effects, move from the most secular end of the scale as measured in the World Values Survey (2) to the most traditional end (-2) translates into about a 10 point decrease in
registration as Independent and an almost corresponding increase in share registered as Republican.

In this larger sample we do find that counter to expectations about the lack of political socialization in immigrant families, some evidence for an influence of parental familiarity with the host country, as measured in their English ability, on children’s political alignments. The substantive impact of these differences is small however with a 5 point decrease in Democratic registration when comparing parents with the least language ability to those where both are well versed in English and corresponding small increases in Republican and Independent registration.

Ternary plots 7 through 9: Predicted marginal probability of party registration varying average national origin group skin color and sending country traditionalism.
Party Registration by National Origin Traditionalism

Scale of Skin Color Darkness
Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, a paradox lies at the heart of the encounter between international migration and democratic citizenship: immigrants and their offspring find citizenship at once easily accessible yet also persistently elusive. The immigrant offspring with whom we are concerned have had the good fortune of growing up in a democratic society where civic and political participation is open to all comers, whether the newest arrivals off the plane with foreign passport still in hand or nationals who can trace their presence on U.S. soil back for centuries. Although the majority of the second generation New Yorkers and Angelenos studied here possessed U.S. citizenship by birthright, 9 out of 20 had been born abroad; as of the surveys, 3 out of 20 remained foreign nationals, lacking U.S. citizenship. And while the non-citizens, like their citizen counterparts, often abjured from participation in civic and political life, they also frequently engaged — evidence that passage across the external boundary at the territorial line can suffice for partaking in the communal affairs of the people among whom one lives, even if one stands outside the formal, internal boundary of that community.

But just how to understand the sources of that engagement, as well as the factors that constrain it, is quite another matter. Extending assimilation theory from the sphere of social to civic and political life provides but limited illumination. The individual search for the better life may account for why immigrants and their offspring might pick up the dominant tongue or acquire new skills that offer greater reward, but it cannot possibly explain civic and political engagement: in the short run, at least, investing in any communal effort yields individual costs outweighing the benefits; and the need to work with others to pursue some collective goal implies that individual effort alone doesn’t always secure that better life. To be sure, the quest for that better life yields by-products that can foster engagement with political and civic life, as when the acquisition of dominant language skills increases one’s ability to understand an initially foreign politi-
cal environment. As we have seen, one channel from the social to the political aspects of assimilation does indeed seem to lead from higher levels of parents’ own capacity in English to their adult children’s greater involvement in civic or political affairs of varying types. And yet the lessons likely to be learned from enhanced comprehension of the political environment are unlikely to be compatible with the assimilation framework, since the environment in question lacks an established, consensual mainstream. Rather, because the political world is characterized by conflict, in which opposing groups and parties contend over how the mainstream is to be divided and by whom, enhanced learning takes the form of gaining orientation to the relevant divides and positioning oneself appropriately. Moreover, those divides are endogenous to immigration itself, resulting from profound disagreement related to the appropriate degree of openness or closure to ongoing and future arrivals from abroad as well as disputes linked to expectations for conformity as opposed to pluralism after the immigrants have arrived. As both sources of division reflect other deeply rooted conflicts, especially those related to equal rights, protection, and treatment of ethnic minorities, these prior struggles as well as their resolution affect the pathways to political incorporation followed by immigrants and their offspring.

Segmented assimilation, the most influential alternative approach, appears still less useful. To begin with, extrapolating from the social to the political sphere does not yield clear predictions: the different segments into which this approach forecasts assimilation bear no relationship to the ideological and partisan cleavages along which the polity is divided; while the theory contends that groups differ in their policy reception, it simultaneously contends that all non-European immigrants experience societal reception, which leaves one wondering which contextual factor will affect political and civic engagement and why. Nor is it clear whether home country language use in the parental household – an indicator of ethnic retention and therefore selective acculturation – should increase or decrease civic or political engagement and if so, what might account for any such effect.
In any case, our analysis provides little support for the factors on which segmented assimilation places greatest weight. Thus, group differences in skin color yielded no effects whatsoever, as the coefficient for this variable failed to reach statistical significance across all of the civic and political outcomes reviewed in this chapter. The indicator of policy reception barely fared better, yielding positive effects on only two outcomes – involvement in a home country organization and being encouraged to support a candidate or political party – suggesting a channel from the greater density of persons with legal status to participation, net of individual legal status, though why such effects are not more widespread is not clear. By contrast, higher levels of education at the group level had statistically significant, but negative effects on civic participation and organizational membership, pointing to the possibility that greater resources at the group-level, independent on individual resources, reduced the need to pursue common solutions through collective action. Finally, use of the mother tongue in the parental household positively increased the probability in engaging in at least one of three forms of civic participation and also proved to have a positive association with respondents’ claim to have a good understanding of the political system. Yet, a standard assimilation variable – parents’ own understanding of English – generated far more consistent and powerful effects.

By contrast, the analysis developed in this chapter demonstrates how a cross-border perspective can illuminate the ways in which the distinctive features of migration across state boundaries yield long-term impacts on political and civic engagement. While international migration brings strangers into a strange environment, strangeness diminishes with time and social learning, facilitating movement across the internal boundary of citizenship as well as greater involvement in civic and social life. Yet, as we have emphasized, the migrants arrive, not just as strangers, but as citizens of the foreign polity that they left and also as aliens in the society that they have joined. Moreover, whereas citizens are formal equals, the de jure and de facto policies that govern migration controls produce formal inequality
among non-citizens, who vary in status and corresponding entitlements.

Those differences matter for transitioning across the internal boundary of citizenship. As the history of U.S. citizenship shows, the permeability of that boundary is a by-product of U.S. history, as the relatively low barriers to naturalization – most importantly, the five year eligibility term – are best understood as a policy designed to attract the population needed to seize, control, and settle the land taken from the indigenous inhabitants of North America. While the reaction against the explicit use of racial and ethnic criteria in both access to entry and eligibility for citizenship has in some ways led to increased permeability, that impact is offset by a counter-trend involving the imposition of racially-neutral, but resource demanding, and hence class-biased, criteria for eligibility. Dating from the Naturalization Act of 1906, the counter-trend has entailed a combination of fees, examinations, and ever-more careful scrutiny of the prospective citizens’ background. Indeed, the 1988 decision to convert the Immigration and Naturalization Service (and later Citizenship and Immigration Services) into an agency funded entirely by user fees ensured that naturalization would become the financially daunting endeavor it is today. And though there are tentative efforts to ease up on some of these financial demands – for example, by allowing applicants to pay with credit cards, rather than in cash – conflict over access to what remains a privileged status has thus far constrained efforts at encouraging immigrants to become Americans.

Hence, the barriers to naturalization, which discriminate against those potential Americans lacking the material and informational resources needed to leap over this hurdle, confront the immigrant offspring studied in this book with a significant challenge. Although the U.S.-born among them enjoy citizenship by birthright, many grow up in households where non-citizenship status proves persistent among one or even both parents. That pattern is all the more prevalent among the 1.5 generation of persons born abroad, but raised in
the United States, for whom the acquisition of citizenship is often a protracted process. As shown in the family level analysis, respondent’s foreign-birth depresses family-level citizenship density, net of controls, indicating that the 1.5 generation respondents remain in intimate environments where the presence of citizens is low. While citizenship densities rise with years of settlement, the strong coefficients for parents’ and respondents’ years of education point to the importance of material resources in conditioning the capacity to clear the impediments to citizenship; likewise parents’ acquisition of English language skills underlines the centrality of informational resources. Material and information resources are also highlighted by the individual-level analysis, which, like the family-level analysis, shows a resource spillover from the group level, as citizenship density and acquisition become increasingly common as average levels of education grow. The individual level analysis also demonstrates the influence of another factor that most analyses have previously ignored: namely, legal status upon entry: as the individual-level analysis showed, among our 1.5 generation Los Angeles respondents, those who entered the U.S. either as temporary “non-immigrants” or in an undocumented status were significantly less likely to gain citizenship than those who arrived as lawful permanent residents. Thus, in addition to factors related to social stratification, the civic stratification by status produced by policies directed to control movement across the external boundary yields subsequent effects on mobility across the internal boundary.

As we have seen, barriers to the acquisition of citizenship serve as impediments to the exercise of citizenship, even though non-citizens and citizens share the very same rights to many forms of civic and political citizenship. The widespread effects of current and prior non-citizenship status are all the more striking in light of the fact that in its overwhelming majority, the 1.5 generation respondents grew up as de facto Americans, as 50 percent report coming to the U.S. at age 2 or under, a fraction only marginally lower among those respondents who still lacked citizenship as of adulthood. Yet the experience
of life as de facto Americans frequently failed to produce the level of political and civic involvement enjoyed by the de jure Americans, with the disparities observed before and after the application controls generally the same. Thus, for many of the de facto Americans, simply understanding the basic contours of the U.S. political system proved challenging, as both the late naturalizers and the non-citizens were less likely to select any conventional partisan loyalty and were least likely to be able to both place themselves on an ideological spectrum and select a partisan identification. While the competencies generated by social assimilation unquestionably contribute to the capacity for understanding the political environment, the signals provided in one’s immediate environment also help. However, those signals are precisely what many of the de facto Americans lack, as they were significantly less likely to be encouraged to support a candidate or political party – a result possibly related to their higher tendency towards civic detachment, as the non-citizens, as well as the adolescent and later adult naturalizers showed the least propensity to engage in civic or associational activity open to all comers, citizenship status notwithstanding.

Thus migration controls have a far longer reach than established perspectives allow, constraining civic and political participation well after both external and even internal boundaries have been crossed. Nonetheless, the path dependent results of America’s early development remain deeply influential, which is why the great majority of the adult immigrant offspring studied in this book found that the door to engagement with public issues nonetheless remained open. Yet their options for political engagement were shaped by prior histories of political development and conflict, reflected both in differences between New York and Los Angeles – with the former tilted more heavily towards affiliation with Democrats than the latter – and in the political preferences of third generation whites, blacks, and Latinos, each with a distinctive position in the political spectrum. Of course, the picture we present is one that we see by looking backward and the political developments that have transpired since the turn of the
millennium when these two surveys were conducted have likely made for somewhat altered levels of engagement and changed affiliations. Any such changes, we suspect, are less affected by the factors related to origins, context, and strategies of adaptation highlighted in this book, but are instead driven by the conflicts over the very presence of the immigrants and immigrants offspring we have studied and the increasingly deep cleavages that these conflicts have riven.
References


Le LIEPP (Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques) est un laboratoire d'excellence (Labex). Ce projet est distingué par le jury scientifique international désigné par l'Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR). Il est financé dans le cadre des investissements d'avenir.

(ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02)

www.sciencespo.fr/liepp

Directeurs de publication :
Bruno Palier & Etienne Wasmer

Sciences Po - LIEPP
27 rue Saint Guillaume
75007 Paris - France
+33(0)1.45.49.83.61
liepp@sciencespo.fr