Type
Working paper
Titre
Corruption and Adverse Selection
Dans
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers
Auteur(s)
KOUTSOUGERAS Leonidas - The University of Manchester (Auteur)
SANTOS Manuel - University of Miami (Auteur)
XU Fei - Département d'économie (Auteur)
Éditeur
Paris : Département d'économie de Sciences Po
Collection
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-12
Mots clés
Corruption, Bribe, Adverse Selection
Résumé
EN
It is well known that in the presence of asymmetric information, adverse selection has detrimental effects on possible exchanges. We go a step further, and present a game-theoretic setup in which under such adverse selection effects there are uncertain benefits for bribing unknown players’ types (e.g., individuals, committees, or companies). A policy maker may then want to design indirect anti-corruption policies based on triggering failures for bribery attempts. In our stylized framework, we get a complete unraveling of bribes. This result can be extended to more complex environments under fairly mild conditions on players’ payoff functions.

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