The Internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts: from South Sudan to Darfur

Agenda setting, mobilization and qualifications

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Acronyms

AJWS: American Jewish World Service
AU: African Union
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
CAR: Central African Republic
CNN: Cable News Network
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
GoS: Government of Sudan
HRW: Human Rights Watch
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICG: International Crisis Group
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs: internally displaced persons
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (previously Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, IGADD)
IPF: IGAD Partners Forum
IRIN: UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NCP: National Congress Party
NDA: National Democratic Alliance
NIF: National Islamic Front
OLS: Operation Lifeline Sudan
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
UNAMID: United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
USHMM: US Holocaust Memorial Museum
SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
Introduction

The past few years, hundreds of college students in the United States have organized regular public events to raise awareness around the human tragedy unfolding in a remote province in Africa’s largest country. They have spent their pocket money to go to Washington, often traveling from afar, to attend protests and demonstrations in front of the White House. Hollywood celebrities have in turn traveled thousands of miles to be photographed and filmed in the desert dust while sharing testimonies of the human suffering they have been witnesses to. Western politicians have gone out of their way to make strong and concerned public declarations on the need for the killings to stop. Western governments and humanitarian agencies have spent tremendous amounts of human and financial capital in efforts to save the victims of the conflict, considerably more than for similar conflicts in the region. US government officials, and even the US President George W. Bush, have gone as far as calling the crisis a genocide, before any investigation had been carried out by the United Nations (UN). It was the first time the term ”genocide” had been used by a US president to qualify an ongoing conflict. What is it about Darfur? What is it about this conflict that has triggered this amount of international attention over the past few years? How does an internal conflict, in a remote region of an African country, not threatening any specific great power strategic interest, become an international affair?

The war in South Sudan lasted for two decades, before serious international efforts were set about to solve it. However, once it was ”set on the agenda” of several key international players, a movement that started in the late 1990’s but only gained real momentum in 2001, it became the number one opportunity for making a historic peace agreement that no one wanted to miss. The great international attention given to South Sudan even made the numerous alerts set out about the outbreak of the Darfur conflict in early 2003 become nothing but a distant echo for news editors and diplomats not wanting to jeopardize the ”historic” moment in Naivasha, Kenya, where the North-South negotiations took place. However, once the Darfur crisis reached the headlines in mid-2004, it did so with such an
astonishing force, that after giving the signing ceremony of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2009 a bittersweet taste, it put the following implementation of the Southern agreement entirely in the shadow of a massive international campaign to “Save Darfur”.1

It is these processes of internationalization of the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur that are the subject of this dissertation, and the aim is to understand the mechanisms, the trigger elements, and the role of the actors, or the social entrepreneurs, contributing to these processes. “Internationalization” will be understood as the process through which these two conflicts have "crossed borders", in the figurative sense, where internal as well as external actors have seized themselves of the issue and have advocated for the international community to take action in order to put an end to the conflicts. An important aspect of internationalization is thus how the conflicts have been placed on the “agenda” on an international level. At different periods in time, but with related causes and dynamics, the conflicts in the South and in Darfur have gone from being struggles over local and national governance to becoming issues of high-level international concern. The two internationalization processes will be analyzed to understand their specificities and their similarities, giving the opportunity to draw comparisons between the two as well as put into evidence some general patterns. A central focus will however be placed on the more recent and at the time of writing yet unresolved conflict in Darfur, which has given way to the most spectacular internationalization. The study of the conflict in the South and its internationalization however constitutes an indispensable background to better understand the international mobilization around the conflict in Darfur. This comparison notably puts into evidence some of the major changes the international arena has gone through since the early 1980’s, but also the importance of timing and international context in an internationalization process.3

But what does internationalization mean in the context of the development of internal conflicts? The international community has over the past two to three decades been faced with

2 The conflict in East Sudan, which was ended by a peace agreement signed in October 2006 under Eritrean mediation, has been the subject of much less international attention and is hence not studied here.
a dilemma of what to do in the face of internal and domestic conflicts, linked to the awareness that internal conflicts have become proportionally more numerous than inter-state conflicts. Indeed, international jurisdiction on the international community’s responsibilities when faced with armed conflicts or security threats, with the UN Charter as its cornerstone, is still weakly developed to face intra-state conflicts. Various types of responses have been attempted, from the “right to intervene” and efforts to legitimize “humanitarian interventions”\(^4\), yet always confronting the sovereignty and non-intervention dilemma. The most recent attempt to go round this dilemma is inscribed in the principle of the “responsibility to protect”\(^5\), redefining sovereignty as a responsibility, which is transferred to the international community when states themselves fail to ensure it. Despite the challenges that the implementation of the ”responsibility to protect” have faced since its adoption at the UN World Summit in 2005\(^6\), the concept however to a large extent reflects how internal conflicts and civil wars are largely viewed today: through the lenses of the rich and developed world, claiming a responsibility to intervene and protect, resolve and heal protracted or new conflicts in the developing and poor countries where civilians are often the main victims. Although the successes of the “international community” to restore peace from the outside are few, calls for this “international community” to intervene in conflict ridden countries are recurrent. I will argue that the very idea that the ”international community” (referring to different ensembles according to who speaks and the context) has a responsibility to ”do something” (referring to a large array of actions, anything that is the opposite of passiveness) is an emerging international norm. The principle also meets heavy resistance, both from within countries such as Sudan where international interferences are pushed forward, and from external actors refusing to interfere for different reasons, referring to the older and deeper-rooted principles of sovereignty and non-interference in states’ internal affairs. The international arrest order on President Omar al Bashir has put this cleavage particularly to the fore, where strong support and heavy opposition are to be found both inside and outside Sudan.

The puzzling aspect of the internationalization of various conflicts however, is that some devastating wars may go on and on for years, even decades, without any remarkable


international attention or efforts to try and solve the conflict, while others seem to grasp the full attention of the so-called international community rapidly after their outbreak, and do so over long periods of time. Two factors are often put forward to “explain” international interest in internal crisis: the presence of great powers’ strategic interests and the level of “gravity” of humanitarian suffering. Realist observers of international relations will write off humanitarian interventions or international efforts to solve a conflict as means for the great powers involved to access important resources or to build relations with a strategic political partner. Idealists and human rights activists however will usually refer to the level of gravity of a conflict to justify the need for action and intervention in this particular conflict (and thus, although rarely reckoned by the latter, why a given crisis should be given priority over another). Yet these criteria do not stand the test when applied to different cases. For example, one can wonder why Darfur has received so much publicity, while Congo, in many regards a more protracted conflict having reached higher levels of mortality than Darfur, has received so little attention. Some would argue that the presence of natural resources in Congo prevents the great powers from taking a tougher stance, however it does not explain why activist pressure has been so weak. “Strategic interests” are often said to be the reason for the US’ involvement in Sudan, followed by references to its rich oil wells, mainly present in South Sudan (although needs to explain US interest in Darfur have led to many speculations about the presence of oil in Darfur as well). However, the absence of US industries in Sudan for many years - the oil firm Chevron left in 1984 - in addition to the difficulties to extract and export the Sudanese oil, makes it impossible for this factor to be anything more than an indirect motivation. A second US “strategic interest” is the cooperation in terms of counter-terrorism between Washington.

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7 This term is borrowed from the juridical language of the International Criminal Court, and this rapprochement will be further explained below.

8 This argument is notably put forward in an article by Roger Winter, although he does not deny the humanitarian factor behind the interventions he studies in Kosovo and East-Timor. He however shows to “national interests” as a motivating factor behind the interventions in these two conflicts, and a general reluctance to intervene in African conflicts, notably the Sudanese. It is an interesting article, written in the spring 2001, notably in the view of the soon-to be solid US engagement in Sudan, adding to the “puzzling” aspect of what made Sudan become an issue of high-level interest. Roger Winter, “Are Some Lives More Valuable Than Others?”, Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues, 12, 2, (2001, 01-01), 43-50.

and Khartoum. One would however think that this would rather call for compliant relationship between the two, and that “Sudan issues” would be dealt with behind closed doors by US diplomacy. I will thus advance here that to understand the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts, we need to move beyond these factors. They will not be excluded all together, but they will be placed in a broader context where arguably more important factors intervene as well: (1) the presence of activist movements seeking to internationalize the cause, as well as whether one of the parties to the conflict also actively seeks to project it onto the international arena, (2) the timing and the context in which the first alerts about a crisis are set out, (3) the qualifications used to describe the conflict and the issues at stake.

The first alerts and the origins of the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur

Some conflicts may never reach the big headlines of international media at all. Others are mentioned, or even covered over several weeks, only to slip back into the general ignorance as another event grasps the attention. To understand the internationalization process of internal conflicts, and their eventual agenda setting, it is necessary to trace the first alerts set out concerning these conflicts, in many ways the first seeds to a general international awareness, and the international context surrounding them.

The war in the South and the progressive emergence under the international spotlight

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and its political wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), was founded in 1983 after a unit of South Sudanese soldiers of the Sudanese army based in Bor mutinied. John Garang, then a colonel in the Sudanese army based in Omdurman, went to Bor, officially to mediate with the mutineers. However, as Douglas Johnson explains, Garang was already party to the conspiracy. After turning against the Sudanese army in Bor he joined the rebels in Ethiopia, while further desertions multiplied across South Sudan. It was the violation of the Addis Abeba peace agreement of 1972, by president Gafaar Nimery’s government that triggered this rebellion, and the new SPLA movement was officially founded by John Garang, Salva Kiir Mayardit, William Nyuon Bany

and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. They eventually joined forces with the remnants of the Anyanya movement from the first civil war, a 17-year long war that broke out on the eve of the independence in 1955, when Southern troops mutinied and eventually developed a secessionist movement. The peace agreement signed in March 1972 made the South become a single administrative unit and granted the region a relative autonomy. Then, in 1983, the government in Khartoum unilaterally imposed a new administrative division of the South, contrary to what was written in the agreement. Shortly after, the president also imposed the Islamic sharia law on the entire country, which although it wasn’t what triggered the Southern revolt, strongly symbolized the dominance of the central government over the deprived peripheries. The new SPLA movement was from the beginning drawn between two opposite visions of the change they wanted to create, while the older rebels stemming from the Anyanya movement sought independence, the new rebels and especially John Garang sought a “New Sudan”, unified and secular. For political, as well as strategic reasons (notably to keep Ethiopian support), the unity line became the official policy of the SPLA, however the initial opposing visions were to create internal divisions in the movement later on.

The second civil war in South Sudan was pretty much ignored by the outside world from its start in 1983 and up to 1988. Emerging in the midst of the Cold War, it went on for several years before Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was set up in the spring 1989\(^\text{11}\). Some first alerts were voiced in 1986 by religious leaders in the South, but it was mainly the great famine of 1988 in the Bahr al Ghazal region that triggered the beginning of the internationalization process. Relief agencies in the region as well as Unicef then pulled the alarm and called for international assistance. The following year, in April 1989, the OLS was launched, which remained the largest humanitarian operation of its kind throughout the 1990’s. The OLS ensured a regular stream of information on the situation in the South to the outside world, however as the humanitarian aid was flowing in and as the conflict itself became more complex due to internal fragmentations, the interest dropped in the early 1990’s. Hence, it was only in 1998, with the resurge of the humanitarian crisis, that it again became the center of international media attention. As a French journalist who followed the evolution of Sudanese politics for many years put it, like many other famines, this famine became “\text{a} \\

\text{11 Operation established in April 1989, following negotiations between the Sudanese government, the SPLM/A and the UN, authorizing UN agencies and around 35 NGOs to provide humanitarian aid to the populations in the South, independently of their political positions.}
But even as the conflict managed to attract the attention of the world’s humanitarian community, it took even longer before it became a ”political” issue on the international agenda. Evolutions inside and outside Sudan from the late 1990’s accelerated the internationalization process of the conflict and the idea that it could and should be solved by peaceful means.

Due to the Cold War context in which it emerged, the conflict was in the beginning seen as part of a bipolar game over regional influence. Douglas Johnson speaks of an ”internationalization of the civil war”, however it is understood in the sense of the support of the US to the Nimeiri regime. According to Johnson, it seems that some members of the US State Department reckoned that the war was not a regional affair, but publicly, US officials insisted that the war in the South was a result of Libyan and Ethiopian involvement and claimed their support to Khartoum to stop these interventions. However, until the early 1990’s, the conflict was merely non-existent as an item on the international agenda for conflict resolution. The new Islamist regime taking over power by force in 1989 conferred the country with a new international notoriety, however, Sudan remained until the end of the 1990s mainly a country that, in the eyes of the Western powers, had to be contained and isolated. Internal power reconfigurations and a new international climate following the change of administration in the US in 2001 opened up the ”window of opportunity” that eventually led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In other words, the war in Southern Sudan ravaged for nearly twenty years before sustained international efforts were made to find a solution. However, when the CPA was signed, on January 9, 2005, between the government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A, it was celebrated as a great success of international mediation and a big step forward for peace in Sudan. As Alex de Waal and Julie Flint write about the very special moment where a peace agreement was signed, while a war went on in another region of Sudan: ”The signing ceremony in Nairobi on 9 January 2005 was disorganized, behind schedule and, because of Darfur, anticlimactic. Yet it was a historic moment.”

12 Interview, Christophe Ayad, journalist at the French daily newspaper Libération, Paris, 09.03.2006
13 Johnson, op.cit., 66.
The war in Darfur, from slow emergence to sudden explosion

The conflict in the Western province of Darfur however was latent for many years before it gained in intensity in early 2003. The region was little known to the outside world at the time, which also explains the small number of sources on the recent history of Darfur. Although a range of publications over the past few years have analyzed the different aspects of the current conflict as well as what the international community ought to do about it, there are not many sources of information on the roots of the conflict and the situation prior to 2003. Alex de Waal, an anthropologist who spent considerable amount of time in Darfur in the 1980’s while writing his PhD, and Julie Flint, a journalist who has traveled extensively in the region are two authors with a rare knowledge of Darfur’s history. Their writings thus provide much of the background information for what relates to the origins of the Darfur conflict in this thesis. Other important pieces of scholarly work include the ethnographical writings of Marie-José Tubiana\(^\text{15}\) and the anthropological writings of Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and Leif Manger\(^\text{16}\).

The Darfur rebel movements

After increased tensions between nomads and sedentary populations in the late 1980’s, following the drought in the previous years and increased pressure on the sparse and shared land resources, the non-Arab tribes created self-defense groups to protect their villages, first the Fur tribes and later on the Masalit as well\(^\text{17}\). Most of the rebel commanders in the 2003 resurgence of violence were issued from these self-defense groups. In the mid-1990’s, tensions escalated, and government soldiers were reported as training Arabs who then attacked and burned villages in West Darfur leading to thousands of Masalits fleeing to Chad\(^\text{18}\). In 1996, three young Fur students, Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur, Ahmad Abdel Shafi and Abdu Abdalla Ismail, came together in Khartoum and created a clandestine organization, the very early beginning of what was to become the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). They gathered funds from the Fur community in and around Khartoum and bought

\(^{15}\) Marie-José Tubiana, *Carnets de Route au Dar For (Soudan), 1965-70*, (Saint-Maur-des-Fossés: Éditions Sépia, 2006), 223.

\(^{16}\) Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, Leif Manger (eds.), *Understanding the Crisis in Darfur: Listening to Sudanese voices*, (Bergen: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, 2006), 113.

\(^{17}\) Darfur literally means the land or the home of the Fur. Some thus refer to the areas in Darfur seen as predominantly Masalit or Zaghawa as respectively « Dar Masalit » and « Dar Zaghawa ».

\(^{18}\) Flint and de Waal, *op.cit.*
arms, and soon they had mobilized the whole area of Jebel Marra. As Julie Flint and Alex de Waal describe, the young Fur leaders were from the beginning concerned with making their resistance a broad-based movement, and not an exclusively Fur-movement, in order to constitute a real challenge to the central government. Some first contacts were made with the Masalits in the end of the 1990’s, but the latter had been declared outlaws by the Interior Minister and thus remained hesitant to take further action. The first alliance was made however with the Zaghawa in 2001, the third tribal group of Darfur considered as non-Arab but who had been in regular clashes with both Arabs and Fur in previous years. Overall, they had most often been aligned with Arabs and many Zaghawas were members of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in the 1990’s. The drought of the 1980’s however, altering the routes of the herdsmen and nomads, had sown the seeds to a new line of fracture between Arab tribes and non-Arab tribes. In July 2001, leaders of the Zaghawa and Fur resistance met in Abu Gamra and “swore a solemn oath on the Quran to work together to foil Arab supremacist policies in Darfur”. In November, they managed to associate Masalit leaders to their slowly emerging movement, and in February 2002 their first attack on a government garrison took place.

Another rebel movement was in formation at the same time, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), however its origins are more controversial. The strong presence of Islamists in the movement, and notably former members of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ruling party of Hassan al Turabi and president Omar al Bashir, have spurred suspicions that the JEM is nothing but Hassan al Turabi’s clandestine movement. However, both Turabi himself, and the leader of the JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, have continually denied this. Ibrahim himself held several regional positions in the government until he left in 1998. The JEM is perhaps most known for its publication of the “Black Book” in May 2000, a “political and economic anatomy of marginalization in Sudan”. Drawing on extensive collected data on various types of inequalities in Sudan, the report constituted the first political manifesto of the JEM, which throughout the conflict has had an advantage over the SLA in terms of political agenda. Alex de Waal and Julie Flint observe that the JEM is characterized not only by its strong component of Islamists, but also Zaghawas from the Kobe branch. This branch of the

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid, 76.
21 Ibid, 93.
tribe is mostly present on the Chadian side of the border, and other branches of the Zaghawa, such as the Tuer, have tended to rally the SLA. The cross-border connections of the Zaghawa have perhaps been the main trigger factor for the spread of the Darfur conflict into Chad. Roland Marchal however warns against seeing the troubles in Chad over the past few years as only the effects of the conflict in Darfur:

“One should not indeed be left to think that the Chadian crisis is, as president Déby pretends, nothing but the spillover of the Darfur crisis, just as it is unacceptable to claim, as the Sudanese security services do, that the Zaghawa, the ethnic group Idriss Déby belongs to, are the ultimate cause of the war in Darfur, based on their over-representation in the military apparatus of the Darfurian insurgents22.”

He argues that the internal crises in Chad and in Darfur and Sudan are distinct crises, with different origins, but that the cross-border alliances over the past few years have led to the creation of a “system of conflicts”. Similarly, Jérôme Tubiana argues that the great amount of coverage the Darfur crisis has received as well as the idea that the “Darfurian conflict is being ‘exported’ to eastern Chad via janjaweed militia23, has lead to a “Darfurization” of the interpretations of the instability in Chad. According to him this is a dangerous oversimplification of the situation, ignoring the internal political crisis in Chad.

*The outbreak of the war in Darfur*

The conflict in Darfur is often said to have started in February, when the Darfur Liberation Front (later the Sudan Liberation Army, SLA) attacked Gulu, headquarter of the district of Jebel Marra. Then, early in the morning on April 25, rebels from the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked government garrison of El Fasher by surprise. Few hours later, they had destroyed between four and seven Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships on the ground, killed 75 soldiers, pilots and technicians, including a Major General and commander of the base and captured 32 people24. Flint and de Waal note that: “In more than

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24 Flint and de Waal (2005), *op.cit.*
twenty years’ war in the South, the SPLA had never inflicted such a loss on the air force. The rebels were jubilant25.

The Sudanese army was deeply humiliated after the al Fasher attack, and experienced several more setbacks in confrontations with the rebels. Relying on its own armed forces would require heavy redeployment and training, in addition to the fact that the central government was reluctant to deploy its own troops with a strong component of Darfuri soldiers, fearing for their disloyalty. The Darfur file was handed over to Sudanese military intelligence, which put together a counter-insurgency strategy based on air attacks, military intelligence and the local Janjaweed militia. The latter were mainly composed of Arab Baggara herders, used to suppress previous rebellions in the 1990’s, notably a Masalit rebellion in the second half of the decade. The government continually denied its support to the Janjaweed, however the Arab militia continued to receive arms, artillery and communication equipment and soon gained the upper hand in Darfur. Similar strategies were used both during the war in the South with the Muraheleen militias, as well as in the Nuba mountains in the 1990’s, in both cases leading to massive human rights violations and displacements. The scorched earth tactic deployed in Darfur supposed to ensure that the rebels would not be able to revitalize themselves first and foremost led to massive killings and displacements26. In early 2004, thousands of people, mostly from the non-Arab tribes, had been killed and over a million were displaced. The months between July 2003 and the spring 2004 were undoubtedly the most violent period throughout the conflict.

The crisis generated several "alerts" in the first weeks and months of fighting, voiced by rebel groups, humanitarian organizations and members of the diaspora. However it did not generate any consistent media coverage during this early stage. The first alerts emitted in the first months of 2003 came mainly from the well-established human rights advocacy organizations with a long term presence on the ground, such as Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF), CARE, Amnesty International, and Oxfam, but also the Darfuri rebel leaders getting in touch with Sudanese exiles and researchers in London. In December 2003, Jan Egeland, the UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, characterized the

humanitarian situation as “one of the worst in the world”. However, the world did not seem receptive to this alert then, despite the alarming message and the high-level position of the UN official voicing it. The overall picture of Darfur in late 2003 and early 2004 was a picture of an isolated region. Ulrich Mans writes in January 2004, that as “the government has denied access to most of the relief agencies operating in the country, the Darfur region is in effect sealed off from the outside world, leaving displaced people with little chance of receiving food aid and medical supplies”. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), although with a long experience in reporting on the situation in South Sudan, “woke up” only later on. HRW mentioned the situation in Darfur in late July 2003, but only in passing in a briefing on the general freedom of the press in Sudan. The first briefing entirely devoted to Darfur came in early March 2004, and was entitled “Sudan: Rights Defenders in Darfur Detained”. The numbers of briefings however surged from April 2004 and throughout the following months, until August, with between eight and ten reports per month devoted to Darfur, compared to a usual zero to two reports per month in the previous year, devoted to South Sudan. The number decreased slightly in September 2004, but remained at a high level for a long period.

The period between end of March and beginning of April 2004 indeed constituted a turning point when it comes to the internationalization of the Darfur conflict. First of all, Mukesh Kapila, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Khartoum claimed in unusually critical terms for a UN official, that: “It is more than just a conflict. It is an organised attempt to do away with a group of people”. He also said it was the “worst humanitarian crisis in the world today” and qualified what was happening as “ethnic cleansing”. But perhaps more importantly, he told news channels such as the BBC and the UN Integrated Regional Information Networks

32 Ibid.
(IRIN) “the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved\(^\text{33}\).” Shortly after, on April 2, Jan Egeland described the conflict as one of “ethnic cleansing\(^\text{34}\)” in front of the UN Security Council. This was on the eve of the ten years commemorations of the Rwandan genocide, which had shocked the world public opinion, not only for its violence and its suddenness, but also for the international community’s incapacity to intervene and stop the atrocities.

**The interweaving of Darfur with the resolution of the conflict in the South**

As the first alerts emerged from Darfur, the mediators from the “troika”, a restrained group assembling the US, the UK and Norway committed to facilitate and assist the North-South negotiations, were present in Naivasha in Kenya. As Mans writes, “by late 2003 the crisis in Darfur gradually came to international attention\(^\text{35}\).” The main reason he invokes is the “grave deterioration of the situation”, which is “throwing a shadow over the peace talks in Naivasha in Kenya” leading “Western supporters of the ongoing IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A to acknowledge the seriousness of the escalating violence in Darfur\(^\text{36}\).” However, convinced that the CPA that was being negotiated in Naivasha would be the key to solve all other Sudanese conflicts, the diplomats of the troika attempted to appease the rebels and incite them to be patient rather than initiating any political process to address the Darfur conflict.

Mans explains that in “the absence of international pressure on the Sudanese government to start a dialogue on Darfur, most rebel parties do not believe that Khartoum will soften its line and are prepared to continue their fight\(^\text{37}\).” In early 2004, Western and Eastern rebels decided to join their forces in their common struggle against the central government, the latter being disappointed as they thought at first they would be included in the peace talks in Naivasha. Following this merger, they reportedly said: ”We think that the international community doesn’t intercede unless there are extensive losses of life, such as the two million in southern


\(^{35}\) Mans, *op.cit.*

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, 292.
Sudan. This might be the price that other groups have to pay to get their attention. In other words, violent resistance and a cross-regional alliance were seen as the ultimate way to internationalization. The rebel groups’ own contributions to the internationalization of their internal struggles will be further explored in chapter III.

The international mediators involved in Naivasha were aware of how sensitive the peace talks were, and their priority was to do everything in their capacity to avoid a failure of the negotiations by for example opening them up to other rebel fronts. There were fears that this would make the process unmanageable and even open up a Pandora’s box of a wide range of conflictual issues, and miss the much-awaited window of opportunity for the South. However, the rebel groups resorting to violent means also had internal aims: to ensure that their voices would be heard after an eventual peace agreement between the central government and the Southern SPLM, by increasing the stakes around their struggle. As Ulrich Mans writes, “several opposition movements are afraid that, once part of the transitional government, the SPLM leadership could be tempted to focus on southern issues and ignore the Darfurian struggle for political recognition”.

When the international campaign for Darfur gained momentum in 2004, the government in Khartoum was in the last phase of its negotiations with the SPLM in Naivasha. While Khartoum has since then generally been presented by international activists as incapable and unwilling to negotiate, it was actually at that time responding to international leverage and seeking to put an end to the long lasting war in South Sudan. Large concessions were granted to the Southerners, partly due to the pressure exerted by mediators, but also in large part thanks to a desire within a consistent part of the leadership in Khartoum to break their country’s international isolation and improve its relations with the West, and most notably the United States. However, because of Darfur, the perspective of such an improvement in relations was to become more and more distant over the coming years.

The origins of the international activist mobilization for Darfur

39 Mans, op.cit., 292.
The campaign for Darfur really started to take shape during the summer of 2004. Just as UN officials in late March and early April 2004 voiced severe concerns about the unfolding situation in Darfur, a journalist and a scholar picked up these alerts and soon became veritable activist and opinion leaders. First of all, Nicholas Kristof, a Pulitzer Prize awarded journalist from The New York Times\textsuperscript{40}, published his first op-ed on Darfur on March 24, 2004, entitled: “Ethnic cleansing, again”\textsuperscript{41} which included clear references to Rwanda. On the eve of the official commemorations of the Rwandan genocide, Samantha Power, a Harvard scholar who in 2002 had published the classic-to-be “A problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, published an op-ed too in The New York Times, carrying the title “Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan”\textsuperscript{42}. The message couldn’t better sum up what the activists in the coming months were claiming: Darfur was presented as the “new” Rwanda, and thus as the opportunity to make the words “never again” mean something.

After several protests in front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington in the early summer months, the most notable event took place in July. Ruth Messinger, president of the American Jewish World Service (AJWS) and Jerry Fowler, director of the Committee on Conscience of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), then organized a Darfur Emergency Summit in New York\textsuperscript{43}. During this meeting, the Save Darfur Coalition was created, then gathering mainly faith based groups, among which many were Jewish organizations. The coalition today includes more than 180 faith based, political and human rights organizations. In the UK, the large non governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam and Amnesty International mobilized around the Darfur issue. In France, the “Urgence Darfour” coalition was founded in February 2005. The level of mobilization went beyond the expectations, and government officials in these countries were pressured to come with public declarations on what they intended to do about the situation. During the months of June and July, the heads of diplomacy of the US, UK and France all went to the region to inquire on the state of the situation. In August and September, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell and president

\textsuperscript{40} Nicholas Kristof has published more than a hundred op-eds on Darfur and carried out six highly mediatized trips to Darfur between March 2004 and March 2006.


\textsuperscript{43} Rebecca Hamilton, Chad Hazlett, ”‘Not On Our Watch’, The Emergence of the American Movement for Darfur”, in War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, ed. by Alex de Waal, (Cambridge, Mass.: Global Equity Initiative, Harvard University; London: Justice Africa, 2007), 431.
George W. Bush in turn qualified the situation as “genocide”. Meanwhile, students started to organize information meetings in their respective colleges, while celebrities voiced their concern for the victims in Darfur in the media. A campaign called “A million voices for Darfur” was launched, where the goal was to reach one million signed postcards to be sent to the US President demanding a “stop (to) the slaughter of thousands of innocent men, women and children in Darfur”. A large rally was held in Washington on April 30th, 2006, and gathered a range of high profile personalities and rallied tens of thousands of people, some traveling from afar. Since September the same year, Global Days for Darfur have been organized in cities « around the world », even if the concentration of events is obviously far higher in Europe and North America. This is made possible not only thanks to democratic governance and a high extent of freedom of the press, but also older and newer versions of the discourse of the “responsibility to protect”, and the responsibility to rescue and save those less well-off in other parts of the world.

**Defining “internationalization”: moving from regional spillover to agenda setting based on internationalization as a norm**

Studying the internationalization of internal problems is constitutive to the field of international relations (IR), while also questioning some of the fundaments of the discipline. Indeed, the question of what is international and what is not has divided scholars of IR since the emergence of the discipline as such. While the realist school of thought may consider only the relations between states as international (in the sense of inter-stato-national), affairs that should be dealt with solely by princes and state leaders, newer schools of thought (liberal, idealist, transnationalist, …) argue that this vision is too restrictive, even obsolete. Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts have long argued for including other “spheres” of international relations, where non-state actors, networks and groups interact, across borders or

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45 “The second Global Day for Darfur was organized on December 10, 2006 to highlight the issues of rape and sexual violence in Darfur. Participants gathered outside Sudanese embassies around the world, where they set off rape alarms and blew whistles.” Quote from the Save Darfur homepage, under the section “About Us”, [http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns/](http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns/) (Accessed April 22, 2010)
even irrespective of borders, challenging or enforcing state authorities. The sociological approach they propose is at the core of the approach adopted in this thesis, where non-state actors and cross-border networks are as important as states in the process of making internal issues become international affairs.

Two recurrent understandings of the idea of “internationalization”, encountered in post-Cold War literature, as well as in the different interviews carried out in relation with this research project, are useful to demarcate what internationalization is (and what it is not) understood as in this thesis. First of all, several pieces of academic work, essentially from the early 1990’s, deal directly with the concept of “internationalization”. The term is however in these works mostly understood as the foreign interference into the conduct of domestic conflicts, assisting one of the belligerents against its adversaries, rather than helping to find a solution to the conflict - a type of internationalization reminiscent of the practices during the Cold War. Secondly, another understanding often encountered in more recent literature as well as in different interviews carried out in the framework of this research, and especially when it comes to Darfur, is internationalization in the sense of spillover into neighboring countries (flows of refugees, neighboring countries serving as shelter for rebel groups, leading to proxy wars between neighboring governments). This type of internationalization is not negligible, as it is from the moment an internal conflict is threatening to become a cross-border and thus an inter-national conflict, that it can also be seen as falling under the chapter seven of the Charter of the UN, mandated “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This second type of internationalization is most often referred to as a “regionalization” of the conflicts. I will come back to these two types of definitions, for the time being it is interesting to note here that the concept is in many circles understood as the internationalization of the conflicts per se. In this thesis I propose a third definition, that is internationalization as the international seizing of the responsibility to put an end to the suffering entailed by internal conflicts. Although the internationalization of responsibilities in

49 It is worth to note here that when carrying out interviews in the framework of this thesis, a consistent part of the actors met with would understand “internationalization” as the regionalization of the conflict.
the face of internal conflicts has in recent years become a field of study, and not the least of debates, with the appearance of the normative concepts of “human security” and “responsibility to protect”, the reasons and the mechanisms behind this process of externalization have not as such been the subject of extensive studies. Before moving on to frame the meaning of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts, in the sense of the externalization of the responsibility to “do something” to stop them, I propose to do a review of some of these works on the “internationalization” of domestic conflicts\(^50\).

**Internationalization of domestic conflicts through the meddling of external actors**

One of the earliest efforts to conceptualize the idea of internationalization in the context of internal conflicts can be found in the work of Damian J. Fernández\(^51\). In his book written towards the end of the 1980’s, he studies the internationalization of the Central American and Middle Eastern conflicts, or rather the intertwining of the conflicts in the Middle East into the conflicts in Central America. His starting point is marked by the context of the Cold War, as he seeks to distance himself from contemporary readings of international conflicts, carried out either through the East-West lense (bipolarity) or the North-South lense (based on dependency theories). He argues for the application of a “spiderweb theory” to understand domestic conflicts (observing an increase in these types of conflicts over inter-state conflicts) and their internationalization. He interestingly shows how groups contending state authority “usually have established international connections with other groups and governments\(^52\)”. Such connections can be based on different mutual interests, which is something that can be seen in the case of the Sudanese conflicts as well, groups internally establishing links with groups outside, either through the diaspora or through religious and ideological beliefs. The author argues that these connections blur the internal/external distinction of the origins of the conflicts, however the attention remains focused on the internationalization of the conflicts

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\(^50\) Some scholars place a central emphasis on the « internationalization » of the conflicts they study, without discussing further into depth what internationalization means. Yet, their reading is interesting to understand how the concept has been thought in different settings, see: Hyung-Kook Kim, *The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process: Internationalization of Internal Conflict and Internationalization of International Struggle, 1945-1948*, (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1995), 270 ; Samir Khalaf, *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 368.

\(^51\) Damión J. Fernández (ed.), *Central America and the Middle East: The internationalization of the Crises*, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990), 239.

\(^52\) Ibid, 6.
per se, and not the internationalization of the “need to solve internal conflicts”. P. Sahadevan, in an article dating from 1998, proposes a similar definition of internationalization. He however chooses to delimit internationalization to the “definite conflict-related actions”\(^\text{53}\), and explicitly exclude political diplomatic expressions of “concern” for a given conflict. I will however defend the view here that even such discourses of concern should be taken into account, notably because they too alter the conflict dynamic by modifying the expectations of the belligerents.

Around the same time as Fernández wrote his book and as an increased distance was generally being taken with bipolar readings of contemporary conflicts, a new “field” emerged within conflict analysis: the study of internal conflicts through the lense of “ethnicity”. In a book edited by K.M. de Silva and R.J. May and published in 1991, *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, emphasis is put precisely on the role of ethnic groups and their cross-border linkages in contributing to the internationalization of internal conflicts, in this case various conflicts in South and South-East Asia\(^\text{54}\). The approach thus follows the same line as Fernández, however putting emphasis on the “ethnic” character of the contending groups and thus often limiting the externalities to regional connections (such as where colonial borders were traced haphazardly), but sometimes also including linkages with overseas diaspora groups. In this dissertation, the relevance of the delimitations of “ethnic groups” and “race” (the former being more used by the West to describe the realities, while the latter is more used by Sudanese themselves) will be handled with great precaution and a certain distance. The terms, whether used in the context of a conflict or when observing it from the outside, tend to communicate a sense of ethnic/racial groups as fixed and “natural”. However, the delimitations are often fluid and carry a much larger socio-political and cultural dimension than what is often believed. As Jok Madut Jok underlines in the Sudanese context:

> “While various Sudanese communities may categorize each other in the same way that racial groups are popularly categorized in the Western world, i.e. in terms of physical characteristics (…), the Sudanese popular notions of race are not based on phenotypes alone, and they are not fixed. (…) This means that racial boundaries are very fluid in Sudan, and there are many ways in which people who may be classed as blacks could also pass as Arabs, while those who have been


known to be Arabs could decide to label themselves as African or black if their political circumstance demanded and allowed it.\textsuperscript{55}

However, as I will come back to, the very use of the term “ethnic conflict” is interesting in the study of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts, as communicating about “ethnic violence” has a much larger echo in the world today than speaking of “political violence”.

The most interesting aspect put forward in the work of de Silva and May is however that internationalization is envisaged as a resource in the search for an end to the conflicts, at least in terms of support to the minority groups: “Internationalization of a conflict confers visibility and therefore a great or greater measure of protection where a minority faces repression, deportation or even extermination. In this way internationalization provides new sources of sympathies, material resources and even organizational skills to the affected minority groups.\textsuperscript{56} The authors however do note, as will be shown in this present study on the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts, that internationalization, even when sought by one of the parties, does not always have the consequences the parties anticipate and is not necessarily beneficial to them, since it may contribute to prolong the conflicts. A similar approach is proposed in the book edited by Manus Midlarsky in 1992, who it also places a central emphasis on the increased potentiality for internationalization of ethnic, or what he calls “communal”, conflicts due to the international linkages of the groups involved.\textsuperscript{57} The book however also includes contributions on third party mediation as another aspect of internationalization.\textsuperscript{58} This approach is pursued by Neil MacFarlane, in his analysis of the internationalization of the “ethnic” conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{59} He also shows that internationalization can take the form of spillover into neighboring countries, and that precisely because of this spillover international powers may become concerned with stopping the conflict. He furthermore points to the difficulties of international efforts to stop such conflicts, where organizations such as the UN see their capacities “depend so strongly on the


\textsuperscript{56} de Silva and May, \textit{op.cit.}, 4.

\textsuperscript{57} Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), \textit{The Internationalization of Communal Strife}, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 306.


inconstant commitments of major member states, a number of which are deeply sensitive to
the prospect of taking casualties in such operations. We thus see a move towards
internationalization as efforts to put an end to the conflicts, however such efforts are in this
context mainly understood as military interventions.

Another scholarly work on the issue of “internationalization” was published by David P.
Forsythe in 1991, although it analyzes not so much the internationalization of conflicts as
such, but *The Internationalization of Human Rights*. It is worth to note that his main focus is
not on the concept of internationalization as such, but on the evolution of the place of human
rights in international relations since the creation of the UN. This evolution is however
interesting for our understanding of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. He
observes a movement within the UN from a *promotion* (“standard setting and education and
dissemination”) to a *protection* of human rights (“implementation and enforcement action”).
In other words, a more proactive approach has been adopted, moving away from a mere
announcement and definition of human rights as norms to concrete action seeking to actively
protect these rights. As Nicholas J. Wheeler puts it, for a long time there was a “gap” between
the right to “scrutiny” on the domestic conduct of governments by other governments, human
rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations as written
down in the UN charter and the “weaknesses of its enforcement mechanisms.”

He proposes to look at how the normative context surrounding humanitarian interventions has changed, to
understand their evolving legitimacy. And in many ways, the very norms related to the
internationalization of internal conflicts have followed the same path as the human rights
analyzed by Forsythe; that is from a promotion of the “oughtness” to internationalize conflicts
to an increased demand for effective insight and interference into other states’ internal affairs
and practices (with the “Responsibility to Protect” being a notable example).

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60 Ibid, 143.
61 David P. Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights*. (Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books,
1991), 209.
62 Ibid, 57.
64 See notably: Ghassan Salamé, “A clash of norms”, A speech at the UN on the 60th Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, December 10, 2008
Indeed, a central argument in this dissertation is that the different ideas and norms putting forward the “oughtness” of the international community to do something in the face of internal armed conflicts affecting human lives constitute an emerging set of norms. Nicholas J. Wheeler studies the legitimacy of different humanitarian interventions, in order to see whether this type of intervention, by force, but for humanitarian reasons, is an emerging new norm. The approach chosen here is close, but rather consists of saying that the “need for the international community to take action” in the face of humanitarian crisis is an emerging norm, however it affects the internationalization of different crisis and conflicts differently.

By “taking action”, I here understand a much broader scope of interferences than simply humanitarian interventions by force: humanitarian aid, advocacy, diplomacy, mediation efforts, peacekeeping, and so on. Hence, the question is what is it that triggers the internationalization of a conflict, beyond the existence or not of strategic interests and beyond the gravity criteria?

It will be put forward that internal conflicts leading to mass killings are increasingly seen as international responsibilities, and something everyday citizens worldwide should pressure their governments to take up on their agendas. This idea will be further elaborated upon below, in the meantime, it is worth noting that the application of human rights and the internationalization process of internal conflicts have another point in common: their direct action depends on the cooperation of states. Even the most direct form of action on behalf of the UN Security Council in terms of implementation of human rights can do little more than calling on the UN member states to take certain types of action. Just as internationalization, as a set of norms, can provide impetus and incentives for belligerents in order to help them find an end to a conflict, advocates of internationalization can never force belligerents to make peace, at least not a sustainable one. Also, while the “oughtness” of the international community to “do something” is the normative background for internationalization, we will see how internationalization as a process is pushed forward by a variety of actors on the international arena seeking to lobby and pressure respective governments and international organizations to take action. As such, internationalization is also the study of the mechanisms and logics of lobbying and pressure as tools of change, whether on a national or international level.

65 Forsythe, op.cit.
Humanitarian crisis and spillover in neighboring countries as potential triggers for international attention

In many of the previous academic works cited, internationalization is first and foremost understood as the international inference in the conflicts, often spurred by the international connections of the communal groups at war. Several of these also analyze the development of proxy wars between neighboring countries, and the regional spillover of conflicts, either through the existence of cross-border “ethnic groups” or as rebel groups find shelter and sanctuaries in the neighboring countries. Due to the importance of cross-border alliances in both of the Sudanese conflicts studied here, and especially in the Darfur conflict, “internationalization” is in this context often understood as the mere spillover of the Sudanese crisis. Although the spillover of conflicts will not be excluded from this analysis, it will rather be analyzed as an element potentially contributing to the international agenda setting of internal conflicts. Indeed, “internationalization” will here be understood on two levels: first as a process (internationalization as agenda setting), and secondly as a normative idea that international “norm entrepreneurs” gather around. Hence, although the focus is on the more global agenda setting process, to the detriment of cross-border spillover, it is undeniable that the latter often increases the chances for increased international attention. In Darfur, it was not only the humanitarian aspect of the crisis that initially placed it on the international agenda (as was the case for the conflict in South Sudan), the regional spillover played a particularly important role in increasing the conflict’s visibility. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal’s account of how the Darfur crisis emerged on the international arena is telling:

"For many years the tragedy of Darfur, a wholly Muslim part of Sudan, developed unseen, screened off by the government and overshadowed by the long civil war in the largely non-Muslim South. It was only in 2004, as government violence plumbed new depths and terrified survivors began straggling into Chad, that Darfur became impossible to ignore any longer.”

Two interesting points can be drawn from this brief summary of Darfur’s emergence onto the international arena: 1) what in the beginning kept the crisis away from international attention, and 2) what eventually made it “impossible to ignore”. The reason why the conflict remained in the shadow of international attention is attributed first of all to the Sudanese government

66 Khalaf, op.cit.
67 Zartman, in Midlarsky (ed.), op.cit.
68 Flint and de Waal, op.cit., xii.
and its efficient efforts to "screen off" the conflict, and secondly to the international community, which was distracted by the more "internationalizable" conflict in the South, being fought along the religious divide between the Muslim North and Christian and Animist South. Furthermore, the reason why the conflict moves out of the shadow of international attention is explained by the escalation of the violence and the spillover of the symptoms of the conflict into Chad, through flows of refugees. As a close advisor to one of the Sudanese opposition leaders puts it:

“If you have a problem today, the world is connected, you cannot be isolated. If there are problems in Chad, then France and the EU will become involved. If there are problems in Libya, then Italy and the US will be involved. No problem can remain internal today (...). Any problem transcending the borders and involving another country will be international\(^{69}\).”

Escalation of violence and effects of spillover are certainly crucial elements of internationalization. Escalation of violence increases the “newsworthiness” of a conflict, and spillover brings a conflict across an international border and thus inevitably draws a neighboring state and society into the conflict dynamics. However, I will argue here that such elements are often important, but not sufficient to provide a sustainable place on the international agenda, nor to understand the very process of internationalization. The spillover of a conflict into a neighboring country can be said to constitute a “physical internationalization”, in the sense that it consists of the physical and graspable manifestations of the conflict – rebel attacks or flows of refugees - that transcend the borders and then impose the conflict, as a political and securitarian affair, on the neighboring country. The process of agenda setting on the international level (and not only on a sub-regional or regional one), which is of interest here, can be triggered by a “physical internationalization”, just as it can be triggered by many other processes. As Badie writes, in today’s globalized world:

“National defense becomes purely chimeric: the security of each depends from now on on everyone’s security. Peace within a nation cannot be built by setting aside the turmoil and the violence that affect a neighboring nation or even a distant one\(^{70}\).”

\(^{69}\) Interview, Bashir Adam Rahma, First Advisor, Popular Congress Party (PCP), Party headed by Hassan al Turabi, Khartoum, 14.11.2009

Such statements gain their full meaning when foreign terrorist groups attack inside another nation-state’s territory. An underlying assumption in this thesis however is that even conflicts that do not physically affect or threaten anyone beyond its regional sphere, may still touch a broader international audience, in the sense that it makes them feel “concerned”. These other processes constitute the other side of the internationalization of internal conflicts, consisting of less visible and less “photographable” elements, but which is nonetheless as real when it comes to projecting the conflicts onto the international agenda. The “non-physical” internationalization includes the different calls for an international response to the conflict, voiced by internal stakeholders or external observers. It may take the form of social activism defending the interests of one specific group in a conflict or advocating for humanitarian aid to be sent to the conflict torn area, or it may consist of diasporas raising their voices and claiming justice, media putting focus on a conflict or diplomats publicly voicing their concern, and so on.

Each actor pressuring and calling for an international response to the conflict situation aims to place the issue on a national foreign policy agenda or on an “international agenda”. As will be further explored in chapter I, “set on the agenda” is often used to describe political national or international issues that receive considerable amounts of attention from decision makers, but ideas of what this attention and what the process leading to agenda setting consist of is often vague. Agenda setting will here be understood as a complex and non-linear process, while distinguishing, as Roger W. Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross propose in their definition, between the public and the formal agenda. According to these authors, a public agenda consists of issues that have achieved a high level of public attention and interest, and the formal agenda refers to the issues that decision makers have formally accepted for serious consideration.

**Internationalization of intra-state conflicts as the “oughtness” to externalize conflict-solving mechanisms**

The issue of the “internationalization” of the responsibilities to solve and heal internal conflicts has been increasingly dealt with in more recent academic works, although more

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indirectly and without referring to the very term “internationalization”. Topics such as the international mediation of conflicts, “new” humanitarianism, “human security” as well as the role of transnational advocacy movements have been widely discussed in recent publications and all treat in different ways the question of what international responsibilities should consist of in the face of internal conflicts. In fact, advancing that internationalization as such has become a norm on the international arena is largely based on the observation of the normative character of most of this literature. What I propose here is on the contrary to study how internal conflicts come to be seen as international responsibilities, in other words, the coming into being of the norm of internationalization in the context of the Sudanese conflicts. In order to approach this question in the most objective manner possible, tools of analysis have largely been drawn from the fields of international relations and political science, as well as from sociology. The originality of this work relies on the in-depth study of the internationalization of two different conflicts occurring in the same country and unfolding at different periods, in the light of the effects of the norms on the “oughtness” of the international community to take action. This enables a comparison in time (and to some extent in space, as different sets of neighboring countries have been involved in the two conflicts), but most importantly a deeper understanding of the multiple trigger mechanisms of the process of internationalization of violent conflicts in the world today.

The central problem explored in this thesis is thus how, in the sense through what mechanisms and on which grounds, have the internal armed conflicts in Sudan been internationalized and placed on the “international agenda”? Before answering this question, I suppose that no conflict today is entirely ignored by the international community. What is of interest here is therefore why some conflicts trigger a high and sustained international attention and become issues of conflict resolution72, while others generate just a few alerts or a certain level of international attention over a short period. Several underlying questions should be raised in order to answer this central question. First of all, to what extent are these internationalization processes driven forward by external actors versus actors internal to the conflict, and non-state versus state actors (part I and II)? Secondly, what importance does the general international context have for the internationalization of an internal conflict, the

72 “Conflict resolution” will here be understood in the sense that “the deep origins of the conflict have been understood and made inoffensive. It implies that the conflict disappears, as the manifestations of violence. The term contains an ambiguity in the sense that it refers both to the result and the process (or the intention)”. Jean-Luc Marret, La fabrication de la paix: nouveaux conflits, nouveaux acteurs, nouvelles méthodes, (Paris: Ellipses, 2001), 158, 16.
likeliness and the outreach of the internationalization, and the place it will receive on the international agenda (part I, II, III)? Thirdly, how do states, the states called on to “do something” and the state concerned by the conflict, respond to pressure “from below” to take the matters related to an internal conflict up on their agendas and to an international level (part II)? Fourthly, how have these internationalization processes affected the internal conflict and conflict resolution dynamics (part III)?

These questions will be further examined throughout the dissertation. Three main determining variables can however be listed here, influencing the process of internationalization. First of all, “internationalization” is viewed here as not only a technical process of agenda setting, but as a normative tool for the international community to respond to internal conflicts. Hence, I argue that the “norm entrepreneurs”, and their perceptions of the “need to internationalize” conflicts leading to human suffering, play a crucial role in making some conflicts reach the top of the international agenda. These entrepreneurs include here as well human rights activists, journalists, diplomats, political and civil society actors within Sudan. Secondly, I find that the timing and the international context in which the first alerts on the conflict situation are set out matter for the reach of these alerts and the calls for the international community to seize itself of the issue (occurrence of other international or domestic crisis at the same time for example). This variable is indeed closely connected with the two others, as context alone will not trigger internationalization, but it may facilitate the coming into being of the two others. Thirdly, I argue that the qualifications used to describe the conflicts and the issues at stake largely determine the level of internationalization, as well as the international responses adopted (whether they refer to a familiar imaginary for the international audience, and whether it refers to “ethnic” conflicts and “genocide” rather than political crisis).

To understand “on what grounds” internationalization is triggered, a comparison can be done with the “grounds” on which the system of international justice is built. Indeed, the existing international conventions on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, on which the Rome status is based, define certain crimes as international, on the basis of their gravity, and not on the basis of whether the crimes include a cross-border dimension or whether they are committed by foreign citizens on another state’s territory73. Although I will not seek here to define any “magic” threshold of conflictuality beyond which an internal conflict

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automatically becomes an international affair, I will nevertheless seek to trace the elements in and around the conflicts that makes international observers and activists “pick up” and “seize themselves” of the conflict. Behind the argument of the “need” for an International Criminal Court (ICC) lies notably the idea that some of the worst crimes are often not punished within the state in which they have been committed. Today, the ICC is supposed to intervene only where national jurisdictions are for different reasons incapable of dealing with the crimes committed74. Similarly it will be argued here that internal conflicts that seemingly cannot be solved internally are often internationalized on these grounds. Real or perceived internal weaknesses are important triggers of internationalization.

International spillover of internal conflicts and the occurrence of international crimes are thus two technico-juridical triggers of internationalization. This is also why internationalization entrepreneurs seeking to internationalize an internal conflict tend to refer to one of these factors in order to justify the need for international action. If a conflict triggers large flows of refugees into neighboring countries, this might be put forward as a threat to international peace and security. More remarkably, human rights reports concerning internal conflict situations tend to extensively use the language of international criminal laws (emphasizing for example the “intention” and the “organized” aspects of attacks, directed at “civilians”) in order to internationalize the responsibility to take action in the face of such conflicts. To mobilize public opinions and policy makers around the fate of victims of a conflict, to trigger international solidarity, focus is generally placed on the legal injustice rather than political affairs that can arguably be said to be issues of internal affairs. With the development of the concept of the “responsibility to protect”, attention is also often been placed on the incapacities of the state authority in the countries where such humanitarian crisis occur, so as to trigger the international responsibility.

Although conflict resolution is still dominantly a state business, or at least something that cannot be done without states, non-state actors and especially Western civil society actors, have played a central role in the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. This research hence grants a particular attention to the role played by non-state, national and transnational “norm entrepreneurs” in advocating for an internationalization of the conflicts in South Sudan and Darfur in order to solve them. Pressure from Western civil society actors, mainly in the

US but also in Europe, have played a central role in forging the solid place for these conflicts on the international agenda. Not only are these societies democratic societies, which provides the possibility for internal grass-roots movements and the general public opinion to influence the making up of foreign policy priorities - directly through votes, or indirectly through public protests, petitions, policy debates and polls. These same societies have also undergone a double evolution since the end of the Cold War: a continually increasing amount of and access to news from distant conflict areas, combined with a growing sense of "concernedness" of regular citizens for the fate of victims of distant conflicts (Badie, 2002; 2007, Wheeler, 200075). These citizens, not directly affected by the suffering they are witnesses to, have not only developed a sense of solidarity with the victims projected on TV-screens, but have at the same time claimed their responsibility to "do something" (Luc Boltanski, 1993; Neil MacFarlane, 200276). Various strategic and political considerations made by government officials are inevitable elements to understand the final making up of foreign policy and will not be overlooked here, however it will be argued that pressure "from below" has had a much larger influence than simply drawing attention to an otherwise potentially forgotten conflict. The way the international community has responded to these conflicts, and especially the war in Darfur, has been strongly influenced by the mobilization of activists, citizens and human rights organizations and their way of understanding the issues at stake.


Internationalization as an emerging norm

Debates on humanitarian interventions and the “responsibility to protect”, as well as condemnations of the international community’s failure to intervene in various devastating conflicts, have made the need to “lift the silence”, to “do something” and to internationalize internal conflicts, become a set of emerging international norms.

Theories of norm emergence

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink agree with a common definition of norms as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”. The authors also distinguish between individual norms and sets or collections of norms (which sociologists would refer to as “institutions”). They name “sovereignty” as an example of a set of international norms (implying a series of individual norms: respect of international border, non-intervention, etc.). The “oughtness” to internationalize internal conflicts can also be seen as a set of norms (implying the need for humanitarian aid, the responsibility to protect, a certain recognition of the special role of the UN, the role of international justice – not excluding that these different norms can go against each other). Yet, the simple idea that “something” should be done in the face of humanitarian crisis can also be seen as an individual norm, although more vague. Responding in some way to internal conflicts creating massive human suffering is anyhow an expected and appropriate behavior from the “international community” and more particularly from the rich, peaceful and democratic states. The existence of the norm is visible in the calls for internationalization, both by national and transnational advocacy movements in the West and by rebel groups and civil society actors in the countries affected by such conflicts. Internationalization as a norm seems to be at an emerging stage, that is the level where it spreads, but is still contested. It has however reached the internalization level, where its appropriateness is no longer questioned, among some social entrepreneurs. Indeed, among the transnational advocates of internationalization (human rights activists, UN officials promoting the “responsibility to protect”, humanitarians, etc.), the norm seems to be accepted to such an extent that questioning its relevance is seen as “norm deviance”. As Keck and Sikkink write, when new

norms emerge, they automatically enter in competition with other already established norms in order to gain recognition, which in this case would be notably the norm of sovereignty. They also see the increasing emergence of international norms as related to overarching processes of globalization:

“Although norms have always been a part of international life, changes in communication and transportation technologies and increasing global interdependence have led to increased connectedness and, in a way, are leading to the homogenization of global norms.”

Similarly, some of the concepts used to describe the norm life cycle are useful to describe the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. Finnemore and Sikkink refer to the “tipping point” as the moment where the norm moves from emergence to a generalized acceptance. Similarly, the Sudanese conflicts have gone from levels where they attract the attention of a few different types of international actors to a level where they have become subject of attention of stakeholders from across the entire spectrum of international actors: the UN (Security Council and agencies), great powers, middle powers invested in peace efforts, humanitarian and human rights NGOs, activist networks, national and international media channels, etc. Is it possible to trace the “tipping point” between a middle level internationalization and a high level internationalization of the two Sudanese conflicts? It will be argued here that a process of internationalization can contain one clearly distinguishable tipping point, as it can contain several tipping points over time together eventually creating a momentum. The Southern war clearly came out of the shadow following the famine in 1998, triggering large-scale media coverage. Then, political restructurations, both within Sudan and within several international powers, eventually lead to an international momentum ready to support the peace talks. The internationalization of the war in Darfur seems to have reached a tipping point in the month of April 2004, following declarations by high-level UN officials, then picked up by journalists and scholars, comparing Darfur to Rwanda on the eve of the ten year commemoration of the genocide of 1994.

In the globalized and post Cold War world, it is difficult to imagine an internal armed conflict that would receive no international attention at all. The speed with which news are propagated thanks to internet, and the multiple sources through which these news are diffused, on the contrary makes it difficult for an internal conflict reaching a certain level of gravity to not

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78 Ibid, 909.
attract any international attention. Thus, what will be studied here is not so much why the Sudanese conflicts attracted international attention at all, but what made them become high-level international priorities for which a range of international actors become engaged in order to find a solution to the crisis. Therefore, the search for the “tipping points” are important, as they help understanding the evolution from low or middle-scale to high-scale internationalization.

**International solidarity, responsibility to protect and the “new” humanitarianism**

The international community’s scrutiny into other state’s handling of their own citizens has been part of international relations since the end of the Second World War, written down in the UN Charter and the formalization of human rights in the Universal Declaration of 1948. The dilemma of how to bridge the right to scrutiny and the principles of sovereignty and of non-intervention is summed up by Nicholas J. Wheeler as follows: “[Doing something] to rescue non-citizens facing the extreme is likely to provoke the charge of interference in the internal affairs of another state, while ‘doing nothing’ can lead to accusations of moral indifference.” Badie, in his book entitled *Diplomacy of human rights* (*La diplomatie des droits de l’homme*), argues that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty is changing: human rights are no longer protecting the sovereignty of nations, rather attacking the latter and requesting a right of inspection into states internal practices.

New forms of interventionism have developed in the post Cold War period, commonly referred to as “humanitarian interventions”. As Andrew Williams explains, such interventions are based on the idea that “under certain circumstances it is legitimate for the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states.” Although critics will often refer to the intervening powers national interests as motivating the interventions, it is in practice difficult to determine whether national interests or uninterested solidarity lie behind different international interventions. In fact, both types of motivations often co-exist as trigger factors towards different types of interventions. As Jean-Pierre Derriennic argues, it would be much more difficult today to adopt a policy dictated by national selfishness than what it was

80 Badie (2002), *op.cit*.
some decades ago. According to him, “the international reactions towards civil wars are thus
today influenced by a new universalist ideology, humanitarianism, where the central idea is
that it is neither honorable, nor advantageous to remain indifferent in the face of the
misfortune of others”.

Over recent years, there has been a debate over not only the fundaments of
“humanitarianism”, but also on the development of a new version of the ideology, the “new
humanitarianism”, or “rights-based humanitarianism”. Adam Branch argues that this new
form of humanitarianism has developed in response to critiques against the traditional form of
humanitarianism in the 1990’s. The older version of humanitarianism was based on mere
relief efforts, in order to alleviate suffering, but it did not seek to make the reasons for the
suffering disappear. In fact, traditional humanitarianism carries with it a tendency to de-
politicize the situations in which it interferes and to victimize the subjects in order to justify
foreign aid. It was however criticized either as contributing to continued warfare (when relief
aid is manipulated by the belligerents) and as not addressing the causes of the suffering, or
as “too naïve, philanthropic and for its purely emotional character”. The new
humanitarianism thus seeks to introduce elements of “politics” in the relief efforts, in the
hope of treating the underlying causes of the suffering. Branch shows that in view of this
objective, “new humanitarianism” has based itself on an introduction of human rights into the
doctrine of humanitarianism:

“In this way, the place of justice came to the fore of humanitarian discourse:
whereas traditional humanitarianism is motivated by a moral imperative to relieve
suffering, new humanitarianism is motivated by a moral imperative to help fulfill
people’s human rights.”

translation)
83 Adam Branch, “The Political Dilemmas of Global Justice : Anti-Civilian Violence and the Violence of
Humanitarianism, the Case of Northern Uganda”, PhD Dissertation, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
Columbia University, 2007, 596.
84 Ibid.
85 Michael Schloms, “Le dilemme inévitable de l’action humanitaire”, Cultures & Conflits, 60, (hiver 2005),
86 “Politics” here refers to the fact that the new humanitarians do not simply provide humanitarian aid while
closing their eyes before the causes of the suffering, they also seek to prevent the suffering from
continuing. It does however not refer to “politics” in the sense of seeking to resolve the causes of the
conflicts through political means, notably negotiations, as shall be demonstrated later on.
87 Branch, op.cit., 357.
The international mobilization around the conflict in Darfur has clearly demonstrated this evolution in the humanitarian discourse, calling on international justice to punish the perpetrators of the violence inflicted on the victims. I will however argue that another aspect of the contemporary humanitarian discourse has also been manifested in the international efforts to “save Darfur”, and that is the concept of “Protection of Civilians”\(^88\). The concept, although inherent in the humanitarian discourse since the early days of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the following Geneva Conventions, has been popularized in the last ten to fifteen years, by the prevalent view that new warfare increasingly targets civilians. New concepts have been put to the fore, such as the ”human security”, seeking to divert attention away from security as exclusively a state affair\(^89\). Attempts to define the novelty of contemporary wars often emphasize the role of civilians as supposedly “new targets”, and this has triggered an intense debate among scholars and practitioners on the existence or not of ”new wars”\(^90\). The most recurrent characteristic of the so-called “new wars” is indeed the fact that they appear to make more civilian casualties than ”old wars”. An often-quoted and simplified statistic is that in wars in the beginning of the 20th century, one out of ten casualties were civilians and nine out of ten were combatants. Reportedly, at the end of the 20th century, the numbers were inversed. Such statistics are however difficult to compare over time, as the criteria to count civilian casualties may have changed over time and as the different conflicts compared are very different in nature. Also, if most conflicts studied in the beginning of the century were inter-state wars, and most conflicts at the end of the century were intra-state conflicts, the relevance of the categories “civilians” and “combatants” can be questioned. First of all, the criteria to count ”combatant” casualties


among non-state armed actors, directly or indirectly supported by “civilian” populations, remain unclear. Human rights reports also have a tendency to portray “civilian” populations as “purely” civilian in character, but in the field however, there are many grey zones between civilians and armed insurgents. Secondly, inter-state wars may play out along international borders, whereas civil wars play out inside the country, and thus necessarily affect the civilian population to a greater extent.

As shown by Lie and de Carvalho, there is little consensus as to what exactly the protection of civilians, referred to in UN jargon as "PoC", entails, both among scholars and practitioners. While a broad definition of the concept may include development aid and humanitarian assistance, a more narrow definition will focus merely on the physical protection of civilians against attacks. While the broader definition may guide the work of UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan) intervening in a post-conflict context in South Sudan, the narrower definition has certainly been given priority within the framework of UNAMID (United Nations African Mission in Darfur)\(^91\). The activist mobilization for Darfur has also strongly emphasized not only the need to punish the perpetrators, but also to protect the civilians, still largely presented as innocent and apolitical subjects, from attacks from criminal perpetrators. As will be emphasized in chapter VII, the debate among humanitarians and human rights activists around ”what to do” in the face of the situation in Darfur has also put to the fore the very ”conflict” between traditional humanitarianism and new humanitarianism. While aid workers in the field argue that the most important is that the aid reach those who suffer, activists outside Sudan have argued that relying on humanitarian aid is only a ”band aid on a cancer”\(^92\), in other words, something barely useful and not preventing the atrocities from continuing. These activists are the ones who have advocated for an international intervention or a UN peacekeeping operation, as the only viable means to ensure protection and safety for the victims of the conflict. Paradigmatic of this new humanitarianism, combining ”punishment” with ”protection”, is the doctrine developed by the Enough project, which they refer to as the ”Three P’s”. The three ”P’s” stand for: peace, protection and punishment\(^93\). To

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91 Lie and de Carvalho, *op.cit.*


sum up, the new humanitarianism thus seems to argue for two lines of remedies: protection of the victims and prosecution of the perpetrators.

The protection doctrine has however received most attention in the past few years through the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect" (and just as well known by its acronym: the "R2P"). Towards the end of the 1990’s, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, invited the member states to reflect on the contradictions that might appear between the imperative of sovereignty and massive and systematic violations of human rights. The Canadian government, and a range of other organizations, announced during the UN General Assembly in September 2000, the creation of an International commission on intervention and state sovereignty (ICISS). A report was presented in September 2001, by the two chairs of the commission, and champions of the cause of the R2P, Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and then president of the International Crisis Group, and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General and senior Algerian diplomat. The report proposes to redefine sovereignty, not as something states can hide behind, but as something that calls for states responsibility to protect its own civilians. When the state fails to or is unwilling to protect its population, this responsibility shifts to the international community. The principle of the responsibility to protect was included in the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the final document of the UN World Summit in September 2005 and adopted by all member states. The then formal recognition by all member states of the principle gave way to a certain euphoria within the UN and the humanitarian community. However, several cases since then, where the international community has failed to successfully apply the principle of the responsibility to protect, and most notably the Darfur crisis, have led to the concept losing much of its momentum. Some have written obituaries for the R2P, while others still try and figure out how the concept can win (back) some relevance as a guiding principle in the face of humanitarian catastrophes. The Darfur crisis, the topic of massive international attention when the R2P was adopted in New York, has indeed often been presented as the test case for the new concept. While Darfur has put to the fore the many weaknesses of the principle of the responsibility to protect, the principle has in turn shaped the way the Darfur crisis has

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been portrayed on the international level, as well as the tools advocated to put an end to the suffering.

Mahmood Mamdani, an anthropologist who has written extensively on Sudan and the internationalization of the war in Darfur over the past few years, generally with a highly critical approach to the Western activist movements and their claims, also introduces the issue of protection into what he calls the ”new humanitarian order”. He defines this new order as characterized by a movement from international law to rights, by an apolitical language and finally by a perception of the subjects of internal conflicts and ”humanitarian crisis” not as citizens but as ”humans”. According to him:

“If the rights of the citizen are pointedly political, the rights of the human pertain to sheer survival; they are summed up in one word: protection. The new language refers to its subjects not as bearers of rights—and thus active agents in their emancipation—but as passive beneficiaries of an external “responsibility to protect”96.

According to Mamdani, defining those affected by war and atrocities as “humans” instead of as “citizens” contributes to remove their agency at the same time. Bertrand Badie presents another view of individuals’ movement from being mere “citizens” of a state and acting only through this state on the international arena, to “human beings” acting through and outside the state framework and thus challenging states’ former monopoly on international relations97. The redefinition of individuals as “human beings” is for him more a vector of interconnection between individuals all over the world, who recognize each other in virtue of being “fellow human beings” (and not as citizens of different states) and thus as members of the same interdependent international system. It is in this sense that I will understand the term here and when speaking of transnational solidarity, based on this idea of being “fellow human beings”. It is the reduction of the space between “witnesses and actors, between those responsible and spectators, between oneself and the other98”, which is the fundament making the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts studied here at all possible. Badie shows that it is this appropriation of the international public sphere by citizens of the world and the

97 Badie (2002), op.cit.
98 Ibid, 9. (own translation)
community of human beings that leads to issues being set on the agenda, and so outside the control of the states.

**Internal social “pathologies”, seen as only possible means to ”heal” through external interventions**

Domestic conflicts, when creating large scale human suffering, can be assimilated to “social pathologies”\(^{99}\) that can be solved, as opposed to the prevalent view in realistic theories of international relations, adopting a fatalistic approach to war and power struggles. Such a sociological approach focuses more on the origins and possible solutions for a conflict, rather than the security/prevention/military nexus. However, in practice, when it comes to viewing internal conflicts as social pathologies, many humanitarian discourses do not stop there. Internal troubles are indeed often perceived and redefined as states of “illness” that can only be “healed” with international interference. Even when local mechanisms of crisis response do function to a certain degree, there is a tendency to ignore this, simply to justify the need for external rescue. Interpretations of a country’s internal problems in terms mental or physical illness have a tendency to ignore this state’s or society’s inherent agency and rationality\(^{100}\), and thus the possibilities to negotiate with it. The advocated solutions that usually follow thus focus on how to change the problematic subject in question from the outside. Internationalization is in other words seen as the only “remedy” in the face of internal illnesses. The way internal weaknesses are put forward in order to justify external interventions will be further explored in chapter VI. Stakeholders opposing the internationalization of the conflict, in the Sudanese case first of all the government of Sudan itself, but also to different extents external supporters such as China, will refer to the conflict as a matter of internal problems, while claiming that local and national conflict solving mechanisms can deal with the situation.

Most internal conflicts in the world today reach the international arena through the humanitarian suffering they generate. This aspect is the most likely to touch the international audience, and it is first of all through the human suffering that the international “responsibility” is built. A political conflict that does not generate violence or human suffering as a direct consequence is usually considered as a matter of domestic affairs, unless

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the stakeholders themselves ask for assistance from the international community. Yet even when international assistance is sought, as long as the conflict remains broadly non-violent, there are few chances that the conflict will receive high-level international attention. Widespread violence, killings and human suffering, as soon as it catches the international attention, will rapidly be followed by claims that the international community should "do something" to stop it.

Humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians are usually portrayed as morally good and unambiguous. Despite the new humanitarianism distancing itself from the older humanitarianism, notably on the issue of the depoliticization of the understanding of the humanitarian crises, new humanitarianism still attempts to portray the types of responses it advocates for as morally unquestionable. Images of victims of conflicts, famines or other atrocities makes humanitarian organizations, supported by an international audience witnessing the suffering from afar, want to help immediately, no matter what political reason is causing the troubles. New humanitarian discourses may well “take position” and denounce the role of one (or more) of the parties in an internal conflict, however its responses are presented as the only right and human thing to do, and hence as almost politically neutral. The heritage from the old humanitarianism has in other words not entirely evaporated. Humanitarian aid has increasingly come to be seen as an instrument that can impossibly be purely neutral, however, its overall utility and necessity are rarely contested as such.

The social entrepreneurs of internationalization

However, for a norm to become one, and for internal conflicts to become matters of international concern, there needs to be social actors pressuring for norm recognition and to push the conflict issue towards the international agenda. These “norm entrepreneurs”, in our case the “entrepreneurs of internationalization”, can be external actors such as student activists, experienced human rights advocates, diplomats, journalists and politicians, as well as actors party to or affected by the conflict, such as rebel leaders, displaced or refugees. This dissertation is organized around the bottom-up pressure for internationalization versus the

101 Boltanski, op.cit.
top-down responses to this pressure, in order to put to the fore the dynamic created by these social entrepreneurs of internationalization.

Citizens mobilizing to influence their governments’ foreign policy agenda

The anti-war demonstrations in the United States against the Vietnam war in the late sixties have marked history as the first moment where citizens were both witnessing the unfolding of a war their country was involved in and taking action, by organizing massive demonstrations, in order to put an end to the war\textsuperscript{102}. It was however a war which concerned Americans to the highest degree – over 58 000 Americans are estimated to have lost their lives in the war\textsuperscript{103}. More than a decade later, a humanitarian disaster in Eastern Africa, this time with little apparent connection to external interventions, came to attract large-scale international attention. This time, humanitarians and citizens, moved by the crisis they witnessed live on TV, called for massive international aid to be sent to Ethiopia. As will be developed in chapter I, this humanitarian crisis also created a new trend with music celebrities engaging to mobilize the public to collect money in favor of the victims of the famine.

These different manifestations inaugurated a new trend that was only to become stronger with the end of the Cold war, as foreign policy and diplomacy became increasingly transparent and accessible to the general public. The sphere of diplomacy, as Bertrand Badie writes, has for a long time been seen as the “last stronghold” of the states, where secrecy prevails and where the general public is seen as “incompetent, indiscrete, lacking self-control, and eaten by passions\textsuperscript{104}”. Badie argues however that between the two conceptions of diplomacy today, a “classic” one based on force, and an alternative one based on law, “the increase in power of public opinions, the assertion of social transnational actors, just as the renewed nature of international issues pull this alternative conception of international relations upwards, substituting power with solidarity\textsuperscript{105}”. An often-celebrated example of the influence of transnational advocates on states’ policies is the achievement of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Starting as a loose coalition of NGO’s that came together in late


\textsuperscript{104} Badie (2007), \textit{op.cit.} 7.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, 15.
1991 and early 1992, the ICBL eventually succeeded in what many had described as “utopian”: a comprehensive prohibition of landmines, formalized in the Mine Ban Treaty signed in Ottawa, Canada, in December 1997\textsuperscript{106}. This does not put in question the relevance of states as actors on the international arena, on the contrary, as the ICBL’s main target were precisely the states in order to make them commit to an international treaty\textsuperscript{107}. However, it tells us something about the way many international challenges are largely dealt with today: non-state actors proclaim themselves as “moral guardians” protesting against injustices around the world, and pressuring those they perceive as most influential to respond and to put an end to the problem: the states and their diplomatic representations. Although foreign policies are still made up according to strategic concerns belonging to the sphere of secrecy, they are also influenced by pressure from civil societies and their own public opinions whose views they cannot afford to ignore.

Different manifestations of activism that contest governments’ policies have occurred on the international arena over the past two to three decades. A much-studied transnational activist movement is the so-called anti-globalization movement. Although many of its tools of pressure resemble the “Save Darfur” campaign’s, a fundamental difference between the two can be noted: the anti-globalization movement has built its image on the rejection of state- and international organizations’ policies and the types of interventions that they have carried out in poor and heavily indebted countries, while the Darfur movement has been much more consensual and establishment friendly – it be in the US or in France – requesting their governments to do more of whatever they can do. Sociologically speaking, while the anti-globalization movement has usually recruited activists with higher education, mastering foreign languages, with strong international connections\textsuperscript{108}, the “Save Darfur” campaign has not only recruited within student communities in the US, but also within larger audiences with little previous experience with or knowledge of international affairs. Most sociological analysis of social movements usually pertain to how a social issue is transformed from being something that concerns individuals or a group of individuals to become a wider social issue.


\textsuperscript{107} Samy Cohen, The resilience of the state: democracy and the challenge of globalisation, (London: Hurst & Company in cooperation with the Centre d’études et de recherches internationals, SciencesPo, Paris, 2006), 198.

However, this scholarly work is generally focused on social issues that concern the protagonists of the movements on an individual basis. In the study of the social entrepreneurs engaging to internationalize the conflicts in Sudan however, most are not directly affected by the violence they protest against. The question of what makes external actors \textit{a priori} not concerned by a conflict feel concerned will be studied in this dissertation.

One of the early cases in recent times of a non-governmental actor playing a crucial role in making former enemies of war conclude a peace agreement is the case of the community of Sant’ Egidio in Mozambique. After years of humanitarian efforts and the building up of personal connections with partners on both sides, Sant’ Egidio eventually came to play an important role as a mediator, and a peace agreement was finally signed in October 1992\textsuperscript{109}. The current references to this specific example, often used to prove the possibility for non-state actors to serve, as “private diplomats” in peace processes, is indicative of a new awareness of the role that non-state actors can play in complex conflict situations. It also shows a manifested interest in the potential role that such actors can play when professional diplomats do not manage or are prevented from reaching out to the belligerents. However, even the case of the Sant’Egidio also reminds us that no peace process can be done without the involvement of the states and governments: first of all the state involved in the conflict itself – in this case the FRELIMO government, but also neighboring states or overseas governments may play an important role - Zimbabwe and Kenya, as well as the Italian government were also crucial supporters in the Mozambican peace process. Yet, when speaking of non-state actors playing the role of “new diplomats” on the international arena, this is not restricted to organizations directly becoming involved in the mediation between warring parties. The so-called “new diplomats” can also pressure state diplomats to consider and give attention to a conflict they are concerned about, and contribute to shape the policy responses and approaches to the conflict subsequently.

“Inside-out” internationalization: rebels and victims calling for help from the outside

Margareth Keck and Kathryn Sikkinks concept of a “boomerang effect” is useful to point to how it is in the rebellions interest to search for overseas support. Since their political message is not heard inside Sudan, they project their struggle on the international arena in the hope of gaining support from foreign governments who will have more weight when they pressure the regime to change its policies. Hence, the “boomerang effect” of mismanaged internal struggle is coming back at the government in Khartoum from the outside. Herfried Münkler, in his conceptualization of the “new wars” as being first and foremost characterized by the “asymmetry” between the warring factions, also provides a useful account of how it is in the interest of the weakest party to attract attention from the outside. Clifford Bob has gone even further in this idea, in his book on the *Marketing of rebellion*. By comparing the international arena with a market, where international aid and support is a good that NGOs can provide and that rebel movements have to compete for, he argues that rebel movements across the globe have to compete to obtain this support, therefore the “marketing” of their causes to attract international support. Indeed, NGOs are numerically in a dominant relationship over the different rebellions, since they can select among a wide range of suppressed and suffering opposition movements, and can thus choose the cause that best fits their own image. This connection between external advocacy groups’ own interests, promoting a certain image, and their choice to engage in the internationalization enterprise of the Sudanese conflicts will be further analyzed in chapter II.

International context and the influence on the internationalization of conflicts

While the civil war in the South went on for almost twenty years, moving in and out of the international spotlight, but remaining mostly out of it, the war in Darfur was in comparison relatively swiftly set on the international agenda. However, several contextual factors of the

111 Münkler, *op.cit.*
beginning of the Darfur conflict differing from the onset of the civil war in the South should be taken into account to understand this disparity. In 2003, as opposed to in 1983, the world was no longer organized in terms of bipolarity. During the Cold War, local conflicts were mainly interpreted as a result of the bipolar rivalry, and the large powers found greater interests in supporting friendly regimes against hostile ones, rather than in trying to solve the conflicts.

"Wrong" and "right" timing as factors of internationalization

Gary Goertz, in his study on the influence of international context on states’ behavior, identifies three different types of contexts: first of all, context as a causal factor for a given outcome; secondly, context as a barrier, preventing certain outcomes; and thirdly, context as changing the meaning of certain events. These different modes are useful to make sense of the international contexts surrounding the emergence on the international arena of the two Sudanese conflicts. Indeed, the “timing” of the first alerts may have a significant meaning for the reach the news about a conflict will have. In many ways, when the rebel attacks reached a new scale in Darfur in the first months of 2003, it was a “bad timing”. The context of the Naivasha peace talks in many ways played the role of a “barrier”, since it was neither in the interest of the parties to these talks, nor the international mediators, to open up the process to another rebellion front. In addition, it was a difficult time of the talks, as the parties were negotiating the probably most sensitive area of the negotiations: the security arrangements. This moment of the talks required the full attention of the international mediators. Furthermore, it seems that the large concessions the government delegation was made to give on this area of the negotiations in the summer of 2003, also had consequences for its response to Darfur. The Sudanese military, humiliated in el Fasher and having granted large powers to the Southern rebels, needed to show it had control over military and security affairs. The agreement on Security Arrangements, the future chapter VI of the CPA, was finally signed in Naivasha on September 25, 2003.

As for the broader international context of the time, the world was in the first months of 2003 intensely following the escalation towards a US intervention in Iraq on March 20th. The heated debate and discussions within the Security Council, among the great powers opposing and favoring the intervention, as well as the massive public demonstrations in Europe and in

113 Goertz, op.cit.
the US against the intervention, made it difficult for any internal conflict at the time to receive a decent amount of attention. On the other hand, the fact that international spotlights were already set on South Sudan due to the historic negotiations certainly made it easier for the Darfur conflict to eventually reach the international agenda and to obtain sustainable international attention. In the spring 2004 indeed, a breakthrough in the peace talks between the GoS and the SPLM/A helped pave the way for the new focus that was to be given to Darfur. Also, as elections approached in the US, and as the war in Iraq was moving further and further away from a “mission accomplished”, speaking out on Darfur and condemning the violations there became a tool in the search for public support. However, it was certainly the international context of the ten years commemoration of the Rwandan genocide that constituted the veritable trigger element projecting Darfur from the status of a distant echo and a trouble for the North-South talks, to the status of number one of the worrisome crises in the world. In other words, the very context of the Rwanda commemorations changed the meaning of the different alerts set out on Darfur. The following electoral period in the US then accelerated the public diplomacy dynamic, with the US government eager to show its domestic public opinion that it was fully aware of the crisis. Electoral periods are indeed especially prone for issues the public care about to be set on the agenda, and Darfur was again a central issue in the 2008 US presidential campaign, and became a central issue in the French presidential election in 2007.

The liberal discourse on the need to defend human rights and spread democracy worldwide, that has developed in the post-Cold War period, has also played a big role in transforming the way local conflicts in Africa are viewed in Western democracies. While the “cold” interpretations of the bipolar era have been replaced with more “passionate” understandings of violence in Africa, supposedly results of greed and ethnic hatred, attitudes among Western public opinions have also evolved to become more concerned. This evolution has to do with more than the fall of the Berlin wall, it also has to be seen in relation with the development of new information and communication technologies (ICTs).

**New ICT’s and the CNN-effect: bringing the world closer**

Although the media’s role in shaping the public and the policy makers’ agenda is not a new phenomenon, the way international news are presented in the media has changed in content and in rapidity over the past two to three decades. The immense progresses in information and
communication technologies since the 1980’s - high speed internet, cell phones, and satellite TV producing instant reports from far away fields - has changed the way distant and local conflicts are represented in the Western world. Wars and human suffering in Africa more easily, not to speak of much more rapidly than before, become imaged and visible issues for the Western media-connected public. Neil MacFarlane, in his study of the changing form and content of post-Cold War interventions, draws on the “evolving nature of war\textsuperscript{114}, leading to an explosion in numbers of civilian casualties, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, in order to explain the new-found “interests of major states \textit{vis-à-vis} internal conflicts\textsuperscript{115}”. However, he admits, “many of these phenomena were hardly new”, and pursues:

“But the globalisation of means of communication made it much more difficult to ignore the resulting human suffering. Citizens watched it on television, and their desire that something ‘should be done’ was unsurprising. The result in the developed states was strong pressure on governments from public opinion to assist and protect the victims of these catastrophes\textsuperscript{116}“.

This reduction of time and space that progress in modern technologies has led to is hence translated into a globalization of domestic agendas: global issues are inserted into domestic agendas, and domestic issues may be diffused and treated in foreign and international media.

The effects of media attention on conflicts have been widely studied over the past two decades, notably through the concept of the “CNN-effect”. The concept was first coined during the Gulf war in 1991, as the relatively young broadcasting channel CNN found itself as being the only one diffusing live images from the ground after the two other US broadcasting channels were cut off air when the Iraqi communications network they depended on was destroyed\textsuperscript{117}. From then on, and following the US-led intervention in Somalia, officials at the Pentagon, but also journalists, started to refer to the ”CNN-effect” to describe the perceived impact of real time, 24-hour news coverage on the decision-making process of the American government. The post-Cold War period was also a time where journalists felt “freed” from the constraints of the Cold War. As for the American journalists, they seemed to be no longer constrained in their choices of topics to cover and in their eventual criticism of US foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{114} MacFarlane, \textit{op.cit.}, 50.
\footnote{115} Ibid.
\footnote{116} Ibid, 51.
\end{footnotes}
As Piers Robinson puts it, the concept includes the idea that with new technologies reducing the time and space for news to reach TV audiences, it also reduces the "scope for calm deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focused on". Robinson reminds the reader of the existence of another way of seeing the relationship between media and policy formulations, referred to as the theory of the "manufacturing consent", which argues that on the contrary, politicians manipulate media to support the decisions they have already taken. Robinson concludes that whether the CNN-effect or the manufacturing consent applies depends on the whether the governments "pressured" by media coverage already have a clear policy to respond to the issue in question. If it has a clear policy, it will apply it and provide substantive information to justify their decision with hopes to influence the media coverage (manufacturing consent), but if it does not have a clear policy, it may be more easily influenced by external pressure and notably the media coverage (CNN-effect). From the study of the Sudanese conflicts agenda setting, it can be added here that the pressure exerted by civil society and activist movements will have more or less the same capacity to influence policy makers, depending on the policy makers’ approach to the conflict beforehand.

More generally however, the so-called CNN-effect also transforms the very way in which the audience and decision makers perceive and respond to humanitarian crisis and conflicts. The audience usually only see the human suffering on their TV screens and not the historical and political context leading to this disaster, and will thus react and request that, as Neil MacFarlane says, something “should be done”. Policy makers however see their accepted time of “reflection” be narrowed, and will have to respond, by “something” much quicker than in periods where the general public is unaware of the realities of such conflicts and decision makers can make their decisions calmly, undisturbed by external pressure, and while pondering different options. In other words, the public pressure is not always based on thorough information on the situation in question, and decision makers under pressure do not always have time to gather the necessary information. However, to take the example of the highly mediatized war in Darfur, receiving sustained coverage over a consistent period of

119 Ibid, 301.
time, the policy responses have also been able to move from “immediate reactions” to an unfolding emergency to more reflected and better-informed responses over time. The human rights movements and activists mobilized have, as the conflict dragged on, also been able to become better informed on the situation and the historical origins of the conflict. However, as will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation, despite new, more nuanced and better informed accounts on the conflict, the initial qualifications have impregnated the general narrative of the conflict.

The mere fact that live images from humanitarian catastrophes in Africa and elsewhere have become available on international and national newswires over the past few decades has constituted an important step towards the emergence of the norm that international interference is needed and is essential, to assist in situations where the local and national crisis response mechanisms are absent or have broken down. Indeed, the weaker the local authorities appear in the face of the humanitarian crisis, the more they appear as the very architects behind the crisis, and thus the clearer the need for international interference appears.

**The qualifications of the conflicts determining the level of internationalization**

The third variable studied in this research is the qualifications given to the internal conflicts, assuming that this matters for the level and the extent of international attention generated. The issue of qualification is closely dependent on both the variable of context and the variable of the norm entrepreneurs. A given qualification may have little importance at one given point in time, but have a much greater resonance with another timing (e.g. the war in South Sudan which some stakeholders had qualified as a “genocide” in the 1990’s, receiving little attention, and the war in Darfur being labeled as a “genocide” at the time of the ten year commemoration of the Rwandan genocide). Likewise, a qualification, for it to “matter” in terms of internationalization, needs to be adopted and pushed forward by a great number of social entrepreneurs. I will argue here that one of the main accomplishments of the Darfur activist movement has been to impose their framing and qualifications of the conflict.
Norm framing and the qualifications of the Sudanese conflicts

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norms based on relatively simple ideas have greater chances to be adopted than more complex ones. As such, the more general idea of the need to internationalize internal conflicts generating large scale human suffering, as a means to resolve them, may easily attract support and understanding, while more complex ideas of conflict resolution through negotiations may be more difficult to promote. Furthermore, they argue that “norms prohibiting bodily harm to innocent bystanders are among those most likely to find transnational support.” In other words, issues of physical protection of non-combatants seem to reach the upper levels of moral unambiguity and clarity. By extension, conflicts implying ethnic violence or possibilities of genocide will more easily attract high-level international attention, since they express the occurrence of “bodily harm to innocent bystanders” in an organized form, where in addition those affected by the violence seem to be targeted not because of what they have done but because of what they are.

Sam Marullo, Ronald Pagnucco and Jackie G. Smith ask the following question in their study on the US Peace movement and its framing techniques after the Cold War: "In a world with so many deadly occurrences, how are particular issues defined as problems around which people can be mobilized?" They show that, as is stressed by Finnemore and Sikkink as well, activists mobilized around a given issue will seek to frame it in certain ways, notably by establishing connections with already existing and established norms and newer emerging norms. As will be explored in this dissertation, not only do the general qualifications used to describe the reality of the conflict affect the international responses proposed, but some qualifications also more clearly call for specific actions. As Scott Straus argues in an article in Foreign Affairs in 2005, two reasons motivated activists and other observers of the crisis in Darfur to insist on the qualification of “genocide”. First of all, because they believed that the situation responded to the criteria of “genocide”, since, as Straus writes, “the violence targeted an ethnic group for destruction, was systematic and intentional, and was state supported.” Secondly, proponents of using the term genocide believed it would almost

121 Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., 908.
automatically trigger an international intervention to stop the violence. Straus quotes Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan from Africa Action, an advocacy group specializing in Africa-related issues, who wrote in The Nation: “We should have learned from Rwanda that to stop genocide, Washington must first say the word124”. This clearly reflects the underlying assumption in the international campaign to “Save Darfur”, leading some critics to point to the fact that qualifying the crisis as “genocide” has at times been given more importance than reflections on what to do.

Actors contributing to the general framing and qualifications that are adopted to describe a conflict can include media channels, NGO’s or international organizations’ reports, governments’ assessments of the situation or representatives of the conflict-affected population. Symbolic images and black-and-white representations of the Darfur conflict have played an important role in the internationalization of the conflict. First of all, the Arab/non-Arab divide, often referred to as the struggle of “Arabs vs. Africans”125, conveys images of an easily understandable and graspable conflict. The terms ‘Arab’, ‘non-Arab’, and ‘African’ do refer to realities on the ground; the first is more linked to historical (claimed) origins while the second is more a result of the recent conflicts, to distinguish between those who are Arab and those who are not. The mere description of the conflict as an ancient struggle between these two groups however heavily overshadows the complexities on the ground. Being ‘non-Arab’ does not for example mean that these groups do not speak Arabic, the most used language throughout Darfur. Being ‘non-African’ does not mean that these groups are physically distinguishable from their ‘African’ neighbors as any outsider would often not be able to make the difference. But most importantly, the description of the conflict in terms of two clearly distinguishable groups represents a distortion of the realities of Darfur where alliances across these “boundaries” have been formed, severed and re-established incessantly over the years. Also, while people in Darfur often refer to themselves as “Arabs” or “Africans”/”Black” (“Zurga” in Arabic), these terms might give away a different meaning when reused in human rights reports for example. The qualification of the groups as ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ has however certainly contributed to the internationalization of the crisis, just as

124 Salih Booker, Ann-Louise Colgan, « Genocide in Darfur », The Nation, July 12, 2004, 

125 This divide is often referred to as the Arab/African divide, however, knowing that the quality of being “African” is only based on whether a given group defines itself as Arab or not, the qualifications of “non-Arab” or the names of the tribes usually defined as such, the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa, will be preferred here.
the description of the North-South war as a confrontation between the Christian and Animist population in the South and the Islamists in the North. Indeed, the use of universal qualifications increases the chances for the conflict narratives to have an international resonance, as opposed to for example when names of the local tribes are used. Summed up, references to a conflict as “Arab vs. African” or as “Christian vs. Muslim” have another reach than references to “sedentary vs. nomad”, or “Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa vs. Rizeigat/Baggara”. As the rebel groups in Darfur are the ones most interested in internationalizing their struggle, they have also been the most prone to push forward the “African/Arab” divide to describe the conflict, while the government in Khartoum, seeking to hush down the international fuss around Darfur have tended to describe the conflict as an “inter-tribal” dispute.

This reading, establishing a clear divide between the groups, has also been applied to the differentiation between the so-called “victims” and the “perpetrators”. An often-reproduced scheme\textsuperscript{126}, the description of a conflict in terms of “victims” and “perpetrators” has the consequence of occulting the political dynamics behind. In Mahmood Mamdani’s words, the general narrative of the Darfur crisis has conveyed an image of ”a world populated by villains and victims who never trade places and so can always and easily be told apart\textsuperscript{127}”. The result is an emotionally strong image of the situation, easily attracting attention, but where political solutions going through negotiations seem superfluous.

\textbf{Research methodology}

My first encounter with Sudan and its internal conflicts was in 2005, while working on my Masters’ thesis on the internationalization process of the conflict in South Sudan. While concentrating on the process leading up to the beginning of the negotiations in 2002, it made me realize the existence of a strong “South Sudan-lobby” in the United States having played a central role in forging the US approach to the conflict. The engagement of civil society actors and activists seeking to influence the international efforts towards internal conflicts, but also the very idea of the “oughtness” to internationalize, were aspects I wanted to explore further


in this doctoral work. As I began this present research, the Darfur conflict was making big headlines in international media channels and a seemingly new activist movement was making a lot of noise around the crisis and the need for the international community to “do something”. From there the idea to compare the two internationalization processes emerged, a tool that seemed pertinent to rightfully understand their specificities and to trace some general tendencies. Indeed, it enables a deeper understanding of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts specifically, as the internationalization of the more recent conflict in Darfur to a large extent builds on the internationalization of the older war in the South. Furthermore, it can hopefully also provide some indications of variables of internationalization transposable to other conflict situations.

To carry out this research, a strong emphasis has been placed on the conduct of semi-directive interviews with key actors and close observers of the internationalization processes of the Sudanese conflicts. A total of 136 interviews have been carried out in the United States (44), in Sudan (56), in France (10) and in Norway (16)128. Longer research stays in Sudan (3 months total) and in the United States (3 months total) provided me with precious opportunities to observe closely the actions taken by the different social entrepreneurs and to understand the different perceptions of the conflicts. The conduct of interviews in these respective countries each constituted singular experiences, with the Sudanese context being the one where most caution had to be adopted, but the sensitive information sometimes provided by stakeholders in the other countries also imposed discretion129. Beyond the information collected and the tendencies traced through the interviews, I have closely observed the unfolding of the Darfur conflict and the international attention granted to it over the past few years. The studying of an ongoing conflict has also posed some challenges: information has certainly been abundant, but time to analyse it before new events occurred have at times been scarce. However, as shown in this introduction, the main focus is not to understand the day-to-day evolution of the latest conflict, nor to assess the results of the international responses (which can only be done later on, although attempts are made in the last part to understand how internationalization affects some of the conflict resolution efforts), but to understand how the crises emerged into the international attention. Analysis of the

128 With an additional ten interviews being entirely anonymized or phone interviews.
129 I elaborate more on this in the presentation of the interviews in the annex. See also the excellent account on the conditions for carrying out research in Sudan: Jago Salmon, “Field Research in Sensitive Areas”, Working Papers Micropolitics, 1, (2006), Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, 19.
discourses, produced in Sudan and on the international arena, confronted with the events observed, has been a useful tool to “look behind” the various events, and the discourses they have been wrapped in, to understand the complexities of the internationalization processes.

Certain choices have had to be made in order to make this research possible, including favoring the analysis of certain aspects and actors over others. First of all, a large focus is placed on the role of the United States in the internationalization of the two conflicts, although the emergence of activist movements in other countries and their respective governments’ responses are frequently mentioned as well. The first reason behind this prioritization is that the US has witnessed the development of the most important activist movements, which in the case of the mobilization for Darfur has influenced the movements emerging in other countries. Secondly, the US policy adopted in response to the Sudanese wars has to the highest extent influenced the way other Western powers have responded as well. While the US superpower and its policies may be the subject of harsh criticism from close allies as well as from its considered enemies, it however exerts an immense influence on the rest of the world130. It does not mean that decisions taken in the US will necessarily be followed by the rest of the world, but decisions taken in the US will heavily influence the positions of other actors in the international system, who choose to either conform to US policies, or to challenge them. As Ghassan Salamé writes, the calls for superpower interventions, or in his expression, the “calls for empire” are mainly addressed to the Americans, who are themselves well aware of this, and “they authorize themselves the supreme whim of only hearing them when they enable them to demonstrate their power131”. A special emphasis is also made on the reactions and the responses formulated in the United Kingdom and in Norway, as they were part of the troika supporting the Naivasha peace talks for South Sudan. In addition, the role of France will be studied in the case of the international responses to the Darfur conflict, due to its proximity with Darfur’s neighbor, Chad, but also due to the role it has played within the Security Council in transferring the Darfur issue to the ICC. A special access to information on the role of Norway in the North-South peace process have provided me with an interesting insight into the political dynamics of a “small power” seeking to play a special role in terms of peacemaking.

130 Salamé (2005), op.cit.
It should also be noted that at some points the two internationalization processes will be analyzed in an equal comparative perspective, while at other points, especially in the last part of the dissertation, the internationalization process of the more recent conflict in Darfur will be the central focus of attention. I argue however that the internationalization of the Darfur crisis cannot be understood without also studying the internationalization of the civil war in the South, which is why even when Darfur is the focus of attention, I draw on elements from the Southern conflict. This also constitutes the originality of this research, as many of the publications on the recent conflict in Darfur rarely treat the preceding war in South Sudan and the international attention it received. The study of the internationalization of the two conflicts also provides the possibility to study the evolution in time of the mechanisms of internationalization: from an internationalization in a Cold War context, to the international engagement of the 1990’s and finally the mechanisms of internationalization in the era of an accelerated globalization.

Furthermore, speaking about the way issues are framed does not mean that what these frames portray is untrue or disconnected with reality. Framing simply means the way the reality is told, as it may highlight some aspects and downplay the importance of others. Sometimes these framings are used to justify one or more qualifications, such as “genocide” or “ethnic cleansing”, qualifications that will be discussed and put into question. It is important nevertheless to note that although some qualifications may distort the general image of a conflict, it does not mean that the initial observation on which they were made is false. There has been a particularly vivid debate around the qualifications of the conflict in Darfur, and notably the appropriateness or not of the term “genocide”. The very debate around this qualification is at the center of certain parts of the dissertation, yet due to the many reserves presented as to the correctness of the term to describe the crisis in Darfur, the term will here be used with brackets when referring to this particular case. Also the terms “conflict”, “war”, and “crisis”, although the different nuances they carry are acknowledged, will be used interchangeably, except for some situations where the one or the other especially fits in the context.

In the case of South Sudan, the pressure they exerted kept the conflict on the agenda for political attention, and framed it as a war between the Islamist regime in Khartoum and the Christian/Animist South. However, the conflict was ended thanks to a concerted willingness by the parties to negotiate and regional and international support and pressure on both parties.
to fulfill this commitment. Interestingly, this was an approach that originally was not supported by the pressure groups in the US and Europe, where many had grown to become fiercely anti-Khartoum. The appointment of a former Episcopal priest as the US Special Envoy for Sudan certainly carried an internal dimension too, in order to obtain the support of the Christian community concerned with the fate of their fellow believers in South Sudan. In the case of Darfur however, the pressure exerted by a large array of activists has triggered a dynamic of public diplomacy making the conflict becoming at times more a question of internal politics in the US than a foreign policy concern. Indeed, the ”wait-and-see” attitude adopted in favor of the Naivasha process by many pro-South Sudan activists, seem to have triggered an even louder and more aggressive reaction once the Darfur crisis became known.

Outline of the dissertation

This research methodology has led to certain findings that can be pointed out here. First of all, the Sudanese conflicts have triggered more or less international attention according to the international context in which the first alerts emerged on the international arena. Secondly, the non-state social entrepreneurs, in Sudan or in countries where citizen movements emerged, have been driving forces pushing forward the internationalization processes. Pressure from Western civil society actors, mainly in the US but also in Europe, have played a central role in forging the place the Sudanese conflicts have had on the international agenda over the past few years. Thirdly, the qualifications of the Sudanese conflicts and of what ”should be done”, imposed by these norm entrepreneurs, have become the narratives the international diplomatic contingent and the Sudanese political actors have had to relate to, whether they agreed or not with them. A central argument in this dissertation is thus that the way a conflict problematic is understood, framed and qualified in a given international context determines the place it will obtain on the “international agenda” and the international responses that will be proposed. Fourthly, the internationalization of these internal conflicts does not leave the internal conflict dynamics untouched, on the contrary these are profoundly altered by the international attention they receive and the external efforts to solve the conflicts. Internationalization processes may contribute with valuable resources to the conflict solving process, as they can be a source of deep complexification.
The first part of this thesis seeks to establish the meaning of the two central components of internationalization, the agenda setting process and the norms incorporated in it, by analyzing the bottom-up actions of internationalization. The first two chapters study the mechanisms through which external non-state actors become seized of the Sudanese conflicts, and thus contribute to their internationalization. The very dynamics of the internationalization processes will be studied in chapter I, and in chapter II, the timing and framing of the Sudanese conflicts will be analyzed to understand their relevance for the internationalization process. Finally, chapter III will focus on the inside-out internationalization, materialized through the various Sudanese non-state actors’ calls for internationalization.

The second part will thus “respond” to the first one by analyzing state reactions to these pressures for internationalization from below. Just like the boomerang effect is described as the tool launched by non-state activists, destined to pressure states and inter-governmental organizations to respond, the responses triggered are the center of attention here. The first chapter in this part (chapter IV) will address the political and strategic choices of the Sudanese government, and how it has contributed to shape Sudan’s and its internal conflicts’ place on the international arena today. Then, the second chapter of this section (chapter V) will examine the responses of major powers, neighboring countries and international organizations.

In the third and last section, I will examine how the internationalization process of the Sudanese crisis has affected the internal conflict dynamics, and the possibilities to solve them. The trajectories of the Sudanese conflicts, moving from internal issues in Sudan, to international issues and lastly domestic issues in the countries where constituencies have mobilized in favor of governmental engagement in the conflict resolution process, will be studied in the first section of chapter VI. The pressure generated by public attention and extensive media coverage, and the effects this has on the conflict resolution efforts, are the topics of the last section of this chapter. The way the two conflicts have been framed and understood by the international actors interfering will be studied in the first section of chapter VII. These qualifications also shaped the international responses, and the level of coordination among the intervening actors will be explored in the last section of this chapter. In South Sudan, a small and coordinated “group of friends” pressured and supported the regional mediation initiative set forth by IGAD. The Darfur crisis however has generated such a high-
level interest that “everyone” wanted to do something, yet no one wanted to take full responsibility.
First Part. Internationalization of Sudan’s internal conflicts: how societies seize, qualify and project an issue on the world arena
Activists assembling in great numbers, NGO’s raising large funds to support their field operations, opinion leaders writing engaged op-eds to call for protection or increased humanitarian assistance, or even rebel leaders inside or outside Sudan calling on the “international community” to intervene to stop the conflict: how have these non-state actors proceeded to project the Sudanese conflicts onto the international arena? This is the central question posed in this first part, proposing to explore how demands “from below”, on behalf non-state actors, have influenced the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. These actors are in the international context often perceived as the weaker part when faced with state actors. Hence, exploring how external non-state actors decide to seize themselves of a conflict issue and project it on the international arena as well as how non-state actors party to the conflict decide to internationalize their struggle seeks to better understand these actors capacity of action on the international arena. The next part will show how state actors have responded to this pressure, thus contributing to shed light on the complex nature of the relationship and the power-balance that exists between state and non-state actors on the international arena today.

In chapter I, the very idea of the internationalization of conflicts will be explored: first of all in the sense of the process of international agenda setting, and secondly, in terms of what it means as an emerging norm. I will hence first proceed to define the concept of an “international agenda”, a much used, but ill-defined term, often given different meanings according to the contexts. This section seeks to understand the different components, levels and social entrepreneurs intervening in the making up of an international agenda, in order to better understand how the Sudanese conflicts have obtained the place they have (or have had) on the international agenda. Then, the norm of the “need to internationalize” complex violent conflicts in order to “save the victims”, “stop the crimes” and “resolve the conflict” will be studied, by identifying the norm entrepreneurs contributing to its emergence. The role of new technologies in this respect will also be discussed.

The timing and the context in which the first alerts on the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur emerged will be examined in chapter II, while identifying the “frames” put forward
internationally to explain the conflicts. This chapter thus answers to the first one, by showing specifically how these two conflicts were placed on the international agenda. The central argument advanced here is that the way a conflict is defined and qualified by external actors determines the level of attention the conflict receives on the international level, but also, as will be shown later on, the way it will be approached politically and diplomatically in the search for an end to the hostilities.

In the third and last chapter of the first section, I will examine the role of the Sudanese non-State actors in the internationalization process, that is how a societal issue that is not resolved on the national level is externalized on the international arena. The intention is to show that the process of internationalization of the crisis in Sudan is not only the result of an outside-in process through external actors’ sense of concern, it is also the outcome of an inside-out process, produced by Sudanese actors’ political choices and strategies. The role of the so-called actors from “below” - local communities, rebels and displaced populations - in calling for international support will be explored in this chapter. After an assessment of the rebels’ strategies to export their struggle onto the world arena, I will show that what has been of greatest interest for the human rights activists reporting on the situation in Darfur are the testimonies of the internally displaced persons and refugees.
Chapter I - Internationalization as a norm: social entrepreneurs setting the Sudanese conflicts on the agenda

States are the main targets of the pressure exerted by human rights activists worldwide, and thus they are also the main actors expected on the intervention and conflict resolution arena. As the “good causes” and the conflicts potentially needing external assistance are numerous, non-state actors, regular citizens and activists, mobilizing to attract public and international attention, have in the case of the Sudanese conflicts been the main engines behind the “outside-in” internationalization process. These actors all have their very own trajectory leading them towards a specific engagement for the Sudanese conflicts, which will be analyzed here. They also have their own interpretations and understandings of the conflicts, and the connection between the general narratives of the conflicts and the type of social groups who become engaged, will be studied more in depth in the next chapter. The central question studied here is how a political agenda is set in general, by whom and through what mechanisms, and how were the Sudanese conflicts in particular set on the international agenda? Who were those social entrepreneurs refusing to remain silent when faced with the multiple alerts set out on the situation in this East African country and mobilizing to prevent it from becoming another forgotten conflict? How did the norm of the “oughtness to internationalize” affect their reactions towards the Sudanese conflicts? To answer these questions, the way an issue is set on the international agenda, and which types of (international) agendas, will first be studied, in order to then explore how “internationalization” is emerging as a norm among the social entrepreneurs advocating for international involvement in Sudan.
A - Internationalization as agenda-building: how NGOs in the field, international media, opinion leaders and the public seek to set the agenda of governments and the United Nations

Internationalization is here considered both as a norm and as a process of agenda setting. The relationship between these two characteristics should be understood as follows: the agenda setting process is the objective of the social entrepreneurs having internalized the norm of the “oughtness” to internationalize internal conflicts. Succeeding in placing a crisis on the agenda of a foreign government or the United Nations contributes to push the norm of internationalization towards a wider acceptance in the international community. Before exploring the actions of the different norm entrepreneurs pushing this norm forward, I will attempt to conceptualize the very dynamics of agenda setting, on domestic and international levels.

1) Dynamics of international agenda setting: beyond regionalization of conflicts

Internationalization understood as a process of agenda setting on the international level is a more diffuse and much less “photographable” process than the geographical internationalization, generally referred to as the spillover of a conflict into its neighboring countries. A conflict spillover certainly increases the chances for a conflict to attract international attention. The regionalization of a conflict, in the sense that regional actors are drawn into the conflict dynamic in different ways, may also spur the involvement of international players, as extra-regional friends and allies of the affected countries become concerned with the evolution of the conflict and the security threat it poses. Furthermore, the regionalization of a crisis arguably constitutes a greater threat to international peace and security, written down in the UN Charter as the responsibility of the world organization. Regionalization may also take the form of the merging of distinct national conflicts, creating a “system of conflicts\textsuperscript{132}, to use the expression of Roland Marchal to describe the intricate web of alliances and counter-alliances, local and cross-border conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Although such a merging of conflicts can seem more alarming for external observers than an internal crisis, and that by the mere “crossing of

\textsuperscript{132} Marchal (2006), \textit{op.cit.}
international borders” it becomes more likely to fall under international defense agreements or the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, regionalization of a conflict does not automatically trigger a place on the international agenda for conflict solving. First of all, international partners’ involvement in the conflict in question may simply take the form of direct or indirect support to a regional ally to fight its local or proxy war. In a transnational system of conflicts or in a local/intra-state conflict, where each party has its regional or extra-regional supporter, the conflict may go on and on for a long time before it becomes an issue of resolution. Secondly, the mere fact that a conflict crosses an international border does not automatically grant it a place on the agenda of the UN Security Council, although the latter is likely to at least express its “concern” with an evolution of this type.

**Public vs. formal agenda**

How then is a conflict as an issue set on the “international agenda”, accompanied with the priority label “conflict that has to be stopped”? As studies on agenda setting show, notably the ones carried out by Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross, the number of potential “issues” far exceeds the capabilities of decision-making institutions to process them, and hence there is competition between the different issues to have a place on the agenda\(^\text{133}\). Studying social movements and frames of protest, John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston put it this way: “One of the earliest and most important lessons a student of social movements must learn is that there is no simple relationship between injustice and mobilization\(^\text{134}\)”. Although studies of social movements are preponderantly directed at domestic situations, where a national issue leads to the mobilization of domestic groups, often themselves affected by the issue, the concepts advanced in this field of study are also useful to understand the dynamics of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. Although so-called “regular citizens” in Europe and the US mobilizing around the crisis in Sudan are thus mobilizing around problems that are not affecting them *directly*, nor their immediate surroundings, their efforts to set these conflicts on the agenda of their elected government officials obeys many of the same logics as the mobilization around strictly domestic issues.

\(^{133}\) Cobb, Ross and Ross, *op.cit.*

Cobb, Ross and Ross define the agenda building as “the process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials\textsuperscript{135}. An issue can achieve “agenda status” either through the direct initiative of political leaders or through the mobilization of groups of citizens requiring the given issue to be granted political attention. Furthermore, Cobb, Ross and Ross distinguish between two types of agendas: the public agenda and the formal agenda. The former consists of issues that have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility, while the latter is the list of items that decision makers have formally accepted for serious consideration. Issues that are placed on the public agenda are generally subject to widespread mobilization, where those mobilized perceive the issue as an appropriate concern for government officials and therefore decide to exert pressure and require a reaction on its behalf. The setting on the formal agenda may be simply symbolic, taking the form of public declarations of the intention to take a given issue seriously, and not necessarily lead to concerted and concrete action. Even when the intent of policy makers truly is to dedicate time and political capital to a given issue, the issue won’t necessarily be dealt with in the way its proponents hoped for, nor will it automatically lead to effective action.

**Media agenda as additional component**

James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers also include the “media agenda” as a component in the global agenda setting process of a society. They conceptualize the agenda setting process as the interrelationships between the media agenda, the public agenda and the policy agenda, where there is an “ongoing competition among the proponents of a set of issues to gain the attention of media professionals, the public, and policy elites\textsuperscript{136}. Media’s role in shaping the public as well as policy makers’ views on current events is certainly not a new phenomenon, and has most notably been popularized through the concept of the “CNN effect” since the early 1990’s. Media influences the public as well as policy makers, and the public agenda affects the policy agenda, which in turn affects the media agenda. Although early research on mass communication found little direct effects of media coverage on the opinions and attitudes of the public, agendas setting research enabled scholars in this field to see the role of the media differently. As Dearing and Rogers write, ”essentially, public agenda setting

\textsuperscript{135} Cobb, Ross and Ross, *op.cit.*, 126.

investigates an indirect effect ("what to think about") rather than a direct media effect ("what to think"). Hence, media play a role of "issue selector", selecting which issues members of the society should think about, reflect on and discuss. Exactly how they will think about a given issue will depend on individual and collective experiences, environment and other sociological factors, but also on the different positions expressed by opinion leaders and policy makers.

Agenda setting is thus a complex process, which can be declined into different levels - the media, public and formal/policy agendas. However, these are not clearly separate entities, as each agenda-level is constructed and reinvented by the social entrepreneurs who define them, constantly trying to influence the other levels of agenda setting. Journalists and news editors are the agenda setting entrepreneurs of the media agenda, while activists, human rights advocates, as well as so called “regular” citizens, act in their capacity as members of the society, who are able to vote in regional and national elections, and thus set the public agenda. However, how does an issue move from the public or the media agenda, and onto the formal/policy agenda? While I will go more into detail in chapter IV on how various governmental actors have responded to the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur, different models for agenda building, as well the idea of an “international agenda” will be explored below.

2) Conceptualizing the “international agenda”: from a transnational public agenda to the formal agendas of governments and the United Nations

When grass-roots organizations or policy makers claim the need for “the international community” to react to a disaster developing in a country far away from their own, they do not only attempt to set the issue on the policy agenda of their own government, they also attempt to set it on the agenda of the "international community". How then should the move from the domestic to the international level be understood; in other words, what makes up the international agenda? Is there one international agenda or several international agendas? I will argue here that it is more appropriate to speak of several international agendas, together making up a global one, by showing that the global international agenda the Sudanese

conflicts have been set on can be declined on three levels: 1) different domestic agendas outside Sudan, 2) the UN agenda and especially the agenda of the Security Council, and 3) a last and more diffuse "transnational agenda". Before we proceed to analyze the different processes of agenda setting, we should look at how these three different components of the "international agenda" work.

**Multiple Domestic Agendas: Externalization of the Sudanese agenda**

A first level of international agenda setting can be conceptualized as the externalization of the Sudanese domestic political agenda, where the issues related to the conflicts are placed on the agendas of various societies and governments outside Sudan. The study of the Sudanese conflicts’ trajectory reveals how they were first domestic issues, on the Sudanese agenda (raised by the armed opposition movements and which the Sudanese government "dealt with" through a violent response), before being absorbed onto the international arena because of the ill-treatment of the issues internally in Sudan. As an issue makes its way to the international level - where alerts are being voiced by different international players, international NGOs, the UN and international or domestic media - it may still take some time before it finds an appropriate forum or actor who decides to seize the issue and take it up on its agenda. Here is where domestic pressure groups can play an important role, as from the moment where they are alerted and informed about a situation, can decide to pressure their respective governments to place the issue on their agenda. If they succeed, the initially domestic Sudanese issue, becomes a domestic American, French or Norwegian issue according to the constituencies who become mobilized. The issue then not only competes with other international problems, but also with domestic issues already on the agenda in the countries where mobilization around the Sudanese conflicts takes place.

The Sudanese conflicts as issues of resolution can indeed become items on the agenda of neighboring countries as well as extra-regional countries with a proved interest in helping to create the necessary conditions for peace in Sudan. The issues can be set on the agenda through focus in the media (national or international TV channels, radio, press and an increasing extent of internet media), by mobilized groups of citizens (setting in on the public agenda, pressuring for the issue to be taken up on the formal agenda), or directly by government officials (formal agenda). If an issue is taken up directly by government officials
in charge of the country’s foreign policy, the issue will most likely be set on the country’s foreign policy agenda. However, if the issue is mounted by pressure groups aiming at mobilizing large parts of the population in order to pressure the government, and the policy makers respond to this pressure, the issue additionally becomes a matter of domestic politics. The media is in this context precisely a medium between the public and the policy makers.

The role of the Sudanese diaspora merits a specific mention here. First of all, they have often been central in the agenda setting efforts in their new country of residence, by relaying and spreading information received from their connections in the war-affected region. Secondly, as Sudanese residents abroad, they are part of both the domestic Sudanese sphere, and the domestic sphere of their host country. In other words, if a US citizen is not feeling directly concerned by the human suffering in Darfur, when he or she hears the live testimony of someone who has experienced the war or who still has relatives in the region, it soon becomes more real – and more concerning. How the issues of the Sudanese conflicts make their way to the domestic agendas of the US, UK, France and Norway in competition with other international and domestic issues will be further investigated in the following parts. The point can however be made here that once an initially domestic issue reaches the domestic – public or formal – agenda of another country, the issue has already come a long way in its internationalization process.

**Agenda of the UN and the Security Council: the UN as an autonomous actor or as dependent upon its member states willingness of action?**

Efforts to conceptualize the existence of an “international agenda” inevitably leads us to look to the UN and particularly the agenda of the Security Council, as the latter is what many observers of international relations will have in mind when they evoke the existence of an “international agenda”. This is probably first of all due to the fact the agenda of the Security Council is certainly the closest we get to a concrete and graspable agenda that is not only international (involving two or more nations), but also global in its mandate, or at least in its ambitions. As stipulated in the UN Charter, the UN Member States “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf\textsuperscript{138}. This has in some ways made the agenda of the Security Council become the barometer of the degree of internationalization of many conflict and security issues. In many international forums, a conflict will be defined as an international issue only when and through its process of being placed as an item on the Security Council’s agenda. As described in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary General “shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter\textsuperscript{139}. Hence, issue proponents attempting to set a conflict on the agenda of the Security Council may alert the UN Secretary General directly, a UN organ, or a member state. If a member state proposes an issue to the Security Council agenda, it means the issue is already in some way on the formal agenda of the member state in question. This configuration however only gives an indirect role to civil society movements and NGO’s: if they want to put a conflict on the Security Council agenda, they will need to go through one of these three instances.

This however leads us to reflect on the nature of the UN, and the Security Council, as agents of international relations, and more specifically, what the UN means in terms of internationalization. The UN does after all represent, in “real politics” as well as in the imaginary of a broader human rights activist community, the very institution that contributed to grant individuals their place within ”high politics”, by introducing the field of human rights as a necessary basis for peace\textsuperscript{140}. Indeed, “the UN” as well as “the Security Council” are often referred to as unitary, homogenous actors with an agency of their own. However, they can both also be considered as nothing more than the sum of their member states, or as able to advance only as fast as the sum of the “push” and ”pull” of the different member states allow them to. Speaking of “the UN” might in some cases refer to the congregation of member states, while in other cases “the UN” might refer to the Secretary General or other high level UN officials speaking on behalf of the UN secretariat. It is also important to remember that ”the UN” has a different signification for the world public opinion listening to declarations


\textsuperscript{140} Guillaume Devin (ed.), Faire la paix : la part des institutions internationales, (Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 2009), 271.
emanating from the UN headquarter in New York and for the local populations where UN peacekeeping missions intervene\textsuperscript{141}, which we will come back to in chapter V.

So “who” do we refer to when we say that the UN has seized itself of an issue? Effectively, speaking of ”the UN” means different things according to whether one refers to the UN as an institution capable of intervening globally, the aggregation of member states as mentioned above, or more abstractly as an epistemic community. Peter M. Haas, in an article on how problems of global concern are responded to and how states coordinate their policies, defines an epistemic community as a: ”network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area\textsuperscript{142}”. As such, ”the UN” could well refer to the epistemic community of member states and UN agencies seeking to ensure international peace and stability. This definition certainly incorporates the idealist aspect of ”the UN”, in the sense it is often understood within activist circles seeking to ”internationalize” certain conflicts. However it does not incorporate many of the contradictions and conflicts inherent in the UN, notably the fact that the member states are not only the main engines, but also those who often curb the possibilities for ”the UN” as a whole to take action. The definition is however useful to reflect on the way ”the UN” seizes itself of an issue, since in a network it can be both one professional (state representative) that brings an issue to the attention of the others, as it can be the network as a socialized ensemble of agents, in other words, ”the UN” as something more than the sum of its member states. It is in this sense we shall understand the role of the UN in the context of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts, that is a community where both member states and the institution as such participate in the agenda setting process. It should however be noted that the way an issue is set on the agenda of the UN Security Council, whether it is through the initiative of a member state or through the initiative of the institution (agencies or the Secretary General) will influence the way it is treated subsequently. Having strong ”state supporters” may be an indispensable asset for some issues to receive the necessary amount of attention.


\textsuperscript{142} Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”, \textit{International Organization}, 46, 1, (Winter, 1992), 1-35, 3.
Indeed, what does “the UN” mean in the specific context of the internationalization of conflicts? Some conflict issues may be highly internationalized and never or only belatedly be inserted on the agenda of the Security Council. That was the case of the conflict in South Sudan, which from its start in 1983 and through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, was never set on the agenda of the Security Council. Only two months after, in March 2005, was it brought up and resolution 1590 on sending in UN peacekeepers was adopted. As Julie Flint and Alex de Waal note:

"For the purposes of approving that mission (UNMIS, UN Mission to Sudan), the war in South Sudan was raised at the UN Security Council – for the first time in twenty-one years of fighting. Darfur reached the Security Council within a year of rebellion breaking out, on the coat-tails of peace in South Sudan."

Hence, restricting the understanding of the “international agenda” to only the agenda of the Security Council would mean missing many other important dynamics that are unfolding on the international arena. One could also argue that it limits the scope to conflicts that the powerful five permanent members (P5) deem of interest for the Security Council. The P5 can indeed both keep issues away from the Security Council agenda as they can easily place them on the agenda. Many of the world’s so-called forgotten conflicts, Tibet and Chechnya for example, most certainly do not have a place on the Council’s agenda because of China and Russia’s role in the conflicts. However, even as South Sudan became a high diplomatic priority for two of the P5, the US and the UK, it was never seen as a necessity to place it on the Council’s agenda. Thus, an issue may have a high place on the formal agenda of even the most powerful of its members without being transferred to the Council’s agenda.

Nor was it an easy task to make Darfur become an item on the agenda of the Security Council. Not only because of China’s resistance, as it is often believed, but the US and the UK, who were heavily involved in the negotiations in the South, were in the beginning eager to restrict their attention to this conflict and not miss what was considered as a historic opportunity. The conflict in Darfur was effectively brought to the attention of the Security Council.

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Council on April 2nd, 2004145, by the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, and hence prior to the moment where the issue was set on domestic public agendas or the formal policy agendas of the member states. Thereafter, the continued pressure “from below” would grant Darfur an important place on the Security Council’s agenda for the years to come. Indeed, according to a former UN official and close observer of the process, as domestic pressure arose in the US, as well as in the UK, in the weeks and months following Egeland’s briefing before the Council, the “Anglo-Saxon” couple became increasingly mobilized on the issue and started pleading the case for an increased attention to be granted to Darfur within the Security Council146. At that time, a little more than a year after the US invasion in Iraq, this immediately nourished suspicions of a new “imperialist project”.

It is worth to note that citizens and activists mobilizing for a cause, even when placing their attention on what the UN can do and not do, tend to direct their pressure on their own governments, in turn asking them to direct pressure through the channels at their disposal within the UN. It is rather the more specialized advocacy groups, with organizational facilities in New York, who “lobby” the UN in a more direct manner. Hence, it is interesting to note what several observers interviewed have shared: that it was as the US and UK governments started to feel increased pressure from their own constituencies that they began to take the Darfur issue up in the Security Council. In other words, although the “Security Council” as such is not lobbied directly by these citizen activists, it still represents a forum for the member states to show that they take the concern seriously. Pressure to set the agenda is principally directed where it is viewed as being most efficient, because most direct, that is on the respective governments of the activists mobilized. Citizen mobilizations have taken place in front of the UN headquarter and elsewhere in New York concerning Darfur, but that was once the crisis was already on the formal agenda of the UN (and the US for that matter), and the mobilized activists then rather sought to accelerate the decision making process aiming at authorizing a peacekeeping mission to the region. When it comes to the role of the UN agencies and the UN secretariat in alerting the Security Council on an issue, these each have a mandate to fulfill, defining their “raison d’être”. Thus if alerted about an ongoing crisis,

146 Interview, PV, former UN official, New York, 24.04.2008
independently of the type of action that will be taken subsequently, their credibility depends on them at least taking into consideration what the alerts might mean in terms of their responsibility.

**Towards a holistic approach to the international agenda**

Lastly, to fully grasp the multiple dynamics of the international agenda setting in terms of responses to internal conflicts, we should take into account what can be called the transnational efforts to internationalize the Sudanese conflicts. In other words, the sum of the efforts to draw attention to Darfur and to spur an international response can be seen as part of a broader set of transnational efforts “to set the agenda”. International media channels (BBC World, CNN International, TV5, Al Jazeera) or newspapers with an international reader audience (The New York Times, The Guardian, and many more) propagate news far beyond the audience of the country where they’re based, although it is important to not overestimate the extent of this audience on a global level. Furthermore, the activist movements, first and foremost in the US, have not only focused their efforts on pressuring the US government. In fact, we can trace a clear evolution within the US-based movement, from internal pressure on the US government in the beginning, towards a progressive expansion of its focus along with the realization that the latter was in fact highly mobilized on the issue. The signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5th, 2006, under strong American pressure, was preceded by one of the largest activist rallies in Washington. Seeing the concrete result of those talks in the form of the DPA, the activists became convinced that their pressure had indeed concrete effects on the US executive. However, as security started to deteriorate in Darfur, and as the efforts seeking to authorize a peacekeeping mission to Darfur were not making much progress, activist pressure switched its attention towards another government, for some time presented as the main obstructer of international efforts for Darfur: China. Its close economic and military ties with the Sudanese regime - Sudan being the number one importer of Chinese weapons, and China being the number one importer of Sudanese oil - were put forward in newspaper columns and activist blogs. China’s constant efforts to defend the Sudanese regime within the Security Council, wrapped in the discourse of non-interference in a sovereign country’s internal affairs, soon became presented as the last element blocking everything else on Darfur. The new mantra for the Darfur activists, in the US and shortly after in Europe too, became to pressure China to put pressure on Khartoum.
Quickly, the perfect tool to pressure China was discovered: the threat of an international boycott of the Olympic Games in Beijing scheduled for August 2008. Not only did this attract widespread media attention, it created the ground for a ”transnationalization” of the activist campaign on Darfur. Mia Farrow, a movie celebrity turned activist celebrity, even organized a symbolic ”alternative” Olympic torch relay. Accompanied by several famous activists, such as Eric Reeves and Ruth Messinger, their torch was lit in Chad, a few miles from the border with Darfur on the same day as the official torch relay started in Athens. It was then carried through a range of symbolic places, namely countries having experienced genocide: Kigali, Erevan, Berlin and Sarajevo (while being forbidden in Cambodia). The calls for a boycott of the Olympic Games more than any other effort managed to make “Darfur” become an international issue, even a transnational one, moving beyond the attention of the neighboring countries and some Western countries. China was constrained to show a more consistent engagement for Darfur, and in May 2007, a Chinese special envoy for Darfur was named. Although it is hard to assess the real level of implication of China on the Darfur issue, as the Chinese diplomacy remains deeply committed to discretion and secrecy, the very fact that they named a special envoy, mainly in charge of international PR, reveals the impact of the transnational campaign. The fact that government officials of several European countries as well as the United States were put in a serious dilemma over whether they should participate or not in the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games shows the extent to which this issue was “set on the agenda”. Although all chiefs of government finally chose to attend the ceremony, Darfur was definitely placed on the map and even affecting diplomatic relationships between Western governments and China.

An illustration of the transnational character of the campaign can be found in the results of an international survey carried out in April 2007 by World Public Opinion, an international project initiated by the University of Maryland in the US148. In countries as different as Armenia, Poland, Israel, India and China, the majority of the respondents declared that the UN Security Council either has the right or the responsibility to intervene in Darfur compared to those who said it does not have such a right or responsibility149. However, the results also

147 Lionel Vairon, former French diplomat and China expert, Paris, 18.03.2008
149 The exact question posed on this aspect was ”Some people say that the UN Security Council has the responsibility to authorize the use of force to protect people from severe human rights violations such as
show a great disparity between the respondents. In the US and in France, respectively 83 and 84 percent responded favorably to the question, followed by Israel where the share amounted to 77 percent. Among the other countries where the survey was carried out (Argentina, Poland, Armenia, Ukraine, India, China, Thailand), it was only in India and in China that the responses favoring an intervention went above 50 percent. Hence, although “Darfur” is something many seem to have heard enough about to at least have made up an opinion about the international community’s right or responsibility to do something, the disparities also show that the mobilization favoring an intervention is concentrated in Western democracies (US, France) and democracies close to Western countries (Israel, and to some extent India). The level of response in China may indicate that although information is severely controlled, the activist pressure exerted from the outside, it be through media channels, internet sites, or references made in speeches delivered by Western government officials, have reached the Chinese public in some way as well.

In this sense, the “international agenda” as a whole can be seen as a diffuse ensemble of the agenda setting efforts that are unfolding outside Sudan, englobing different agendas: the domestic agendas of countries who want to play a role in the management of Sudan’s conflicts, the UN agenda (as the epistemic community’s and as the Security Council’s agenda), as well as transnational initiatives from coalitions of states and networks of advocates. Issues that are either set on the formal Sudanese agenda, but which have failed to be treated properly, or issues that have simply never reached this agenda, are through different means externalized – either by actors outside Sudan or by Sudanese issue proponents – with the hopes that an external initiative may have greater success. Hence, the understanding of the international agenda here is a holistic one, it is more than merely the sum of domestic agendas or the UN agenda.

3) How an agenda is built: different models of agenda setting

The process leading a conflict to be set on the international agenda is complex and non-linear. Different factors can contribute to or increase the chances for a conflict to be placed on one or several agendas. Although a single factor is unlikely to alone lead to the agenda setting of an genocide, even against the will of their own government… Do you think that the UNSC does or does not have this responsibility?”
issue, in some cases it is possible to identify a particular event or a particular declaration that clearly set the process of agenda setting in motion. Cobb, Ross and Ross identify three different models of agenda building\(^{150}\), that is how the formal/policy agenda is built, shaped and articulated in relation with internal and external influences. Although these models were initially conceptualized for the domestic framework, they are useful to understand the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts as well. First of all, the *outside initiative model*, accounts for the process through which an issue first arises in non-governmental groups before it is expanded sufficiently to reach, first, the public agenda and, finally, the formal agenda. Secondly, the *mobilization model* refers to issues that are initiated inside a government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. To be successful in the approach to the issue however, decision makers are often required to expand and place the issue on the public agenda as well by mobilizing actors outside the government. Thirdly, the *inside initiative model*, qualifies the process where an issue arises within the governmental sphere, but remains internal to the government as the supporters of the issue are not trying to expand it to the mass public. In this case, the proponents of the issue do what they can to ensure formal agenda status, without help from the “outside”, as well as to obtain a favorable decision and a successful implementation. Initiating groups in this case generally do not want the issue to come on the public agenda.

I will argue here that the “outside initiative model” has played a preponderant role in the general agenda setting process of the Sudanese conflicts. However, these processes have also been shaped by mechanisms pertaining to the two other models. First of all, the international agenda setting processes of the Sudanese conflicts have evolved over several years, and have therefore also gone through different phases where different models have applied. Secondly, the issues of “the war in South Sudan” and “the war in Darfur” should be understood both as general issues (attracting attention for the issue in general is seen as the objective by the issue proponents), as well as composed of several sub-issues (punishing Khartoum, struggling against slavery and religious persecution, counter-terrorism, protection of civilians etc.).

**The outside initiative model**

The outside initiative model is useful to understand how the activist movements in Europe and the US have mobilized their fellow-citizens in order to pressure their governments to take

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\(^{150}\) Cobb, Ross and Ross, *op. cit.*
"South Sudan" or "Darfur" up on a formal agenda. This “outside initiative” has been a dominant model over the past few years in relation with the Darfur crisis, but constituted an important driving factor for the agenda setting of the Southern conflict during the 1990’s and early 2000’s as well. The mobilization of specific interest groups in the US, notably the Christian evangelists and the African-Americans, along with strategies to raise the awareness of key members of Congress close to these groups, made the situation in South Sudan become an issue of lobbying. Also, members of Congress or the US government wanting to attract the support and the votes of the Christian conservatives or the African-American population increasingly addressed the Sudan issue to garner their sympathy. In the case of the mobilization for Darfur, the objective of the Save Darfur movement has been to attract the support of a constituency as broad as possible in order to pressure the US government through their sheer force in number and their representation within different groups of interest.

The mobilization model

The mobilization model would here correspond to the situation where decision makers personally engaged for the cause of the Sudanese conflicts, try to encourage public mobilization, or at least refer to public concern in order to facilitate or justify the issue’s access to the formal agenda internally in the government. What can be seen in the case of the agenda setting processes of the Sudanese conflicts, and especially the Southern conflict, is a mixture of the outside initiative model and the mobilization model. Indeed, as several former activists or personalities with a strong connection to the civil society, have turned government officials, they have attempted to set “their” issue of predilection on the agenda, from the inside. They may use their experience as former ”outside mobilizers” on the inside, but also refer to outside public “sympathy” for the cause in order to justify their agenda setting efforts. Alternatively, as seen more preponderantly in the case of Darfur, former government officials may, once on the outside, use their experience from the inside in order to best target their advocacy efforts and advise other activists.

During the Clinton administration, personalities such as Susan Rice and John Prendergast were important agenda setting entrepreneurs on the inside, as members of the executive with a strong connection to civil society and a likewise strong engagement for South Sudan. Susan Rice, the Under-Secretary for African Affairs at the State Department during the second mandate of the Clinton administration, played a significant role in strengthening the attention
given to Sudan within the second Clinton administration. Through her bonds with civil
society, Rice played an important role in transforming the civil engagement for South Sudan
into an issue on the agenda of the administration. According to one of the central international
players in the Naivasha peace talks, it was thanks to Rice that there was ”a connection
between NGOs, the Congress and the Administration151”. With her colleagues Gayle Smith
and John Prendergast at the State Department, they made the ”Sudan-file” became a
prioritized issue. Prendergast has during the Bush administration become one of the most
important activists in the campaign for Darfur, and has played an important role in lobbying
the government and the UN (through his work with the International Crisis Group), as well as
in rallying new young activists (by holding lectures in colleges around the US) and in
convincing Hollywood celebrities to engage in the campaign152. Exactly how they approached
the “Sudan issue” will be further analyzed in chapter V.

Another moment where the mobilization model was clearly used to set South Sudan on the
formal agenda was in the first months of the Bush administration. Indeed, the Clinton
administration never really made the resolution of the war in South Sudan an important issue,
preferring to adopt a policy of isolation and containment of Khartoum. This policy was
however in line with what many activists advocated for as well. The new Bush administration
taking office in 2001 however had a different vision, and early on made attempts to work for a
peaceful resolution of the war in South Sudan. However, the mere act of stretching a hand out
to the same regime the Christian evangelist lobby and the African-American lobby had
learned to loathe was not going to be easy and required them to actively mobilize public
support in their favor. The way the Bush administration sought to reach out to these
constituencies will be treated in more detail in chapter V.

The mobilization model is relevant to understand the mechanisms leading to the formal
agenda setting in Norway as well. It was in 1998 that the government decided to become
diplomatically engaged in the conflict resolution efforts in Sudan, following the great famine
in the South. Hilde Frafjord Johnson, then minister of international development and

151 Interview, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister of Development, phone interview,
23.05.2006

152 John Prendergast, Don Cheadle, Not on Our Watch. The mission to end Genocide in Darfur and Beyond,
cooperation, had a solid network within the Norwegian civil society. She also had a personal
attachment to the region and Sudan, as she was born in Tanzania of missionary parents. Prior
to her ministerial post, she was a member of the executive council of the Norwegian Church
Aid, having thus often dealt with Sudan in previous years. Her personal engagement
combined with her experience within a civil society very much concerned with the situation in
South Sudan, made her place this conflict at the top of her priorities as she entered the
government. It could be argued that this represents an “opposite mobilization” model:
individuals formerly mobilized on the outside reach the inner circles of power and carry their
engagement with them.

The inside initiative model

Lastly, the inside initiative model would in our case correspond to the secret and behind
closed doors diplomacy in the general treatment of the Sudanese conflicts. A conflict issue
may take different forms on the agenda, from being perceived as a resolution issue (a conflict
that needs to be resolved as soon as possible), to an issue of targeted support to one of the
parties (in sympathy with its cause or in order to weaken its adversary considered as a threat
to the region or the international community), or simply as an issue of humanitarian crisis
(that should be relieved and contained, but not necessarily solved by external parties).
Anyhow, if the overall approach adopted by government officials differs significantly from
the positions held by the general public opinion or influent specialized lobbies, government
officials may deliberately choose to keep the adopted approach away from public insight. In
some cases, the internal (government) and external (society) approaches may converge, yet
the internal proponents might still prefer to keep the specificities of the approach shielded
from public insight, either in order to ensure some efficiency in the treatment of the issue, or
simply to protect a sensitive diplomatic question. The counter-terrorism part of the “Sudan
file” is illustrative of this. The Sudan lobby active during the Clinton administration certainly
favored the containment of the Sudanese regime, however this policy would most probably
have been adopted in any case considering the Sudan foreign policy at the time. The public
support was more a “bonus”, strengthening the containment approach, than a trigger in this
field. However, the fact that the CIA decided in early 2000 to cooperate with Sudanese secret
services, something they have increasingly done since 9/11 and throughout the Darfur
conflict, is an issue that has been dealt with “behind closed doors” and away from public
inquiry and control. This is both due to the sensibility of the question, as well as the fact that the public would oppose and has opposed this cooperation since it became known.

Yet when internal and external approaches do converge, it generally is in the interest of the government not only to treat the issue as a priority, but also to communicate about its response to the issue and the fact that it is prioritizing it. This can be described as an “introverted” practice of public diplomacy, as opposed to public diplomacy in the sense of communication strategies directed towards citizens in other countries where a given foreign policy is to be carried out\textsuperscript{153}. The central idea in the “introverted” public diplomacy is that the domestic public too cares about its own governments’ foreign policies, and, as opposed to a more traditional practice of diplomacy in secrecy and behind closed doors, it is in fact in the interest of a democratically elected government to have its electorate’s support in the foreign policies it carries out. This is also why language and communication matters for the possibilities to apply certain policies.

Indeed, the way a conflict issue is framed will influence its capacity to move “upwards”, from one agenda level (media or public) to another (policy/formal agenda). As will be described in the following section, elements of timing, framing and type of pressure all have an impact on the overall place a conflict issue achieves on the international agenda. The fact that policy makers in the US, but also in several European countries, made the question of how to respond to the ”Darfur-question” a priority, is indicative of the success of the different agenda setting entrepreneurs. While media and public pressure cannot guarantee that a consistent policy response will be formulated, it however contributes to increase the political costs of non action for the governments.

**The career of an issue: from initiation to entrance**

In order to understand the so-called “career” of an issue, Cobb, Ross and Ross suggest to divide the agenda setting process within the outside initiative model into four major stages: first of all initiation, followed by specification, then expansion, and at last entrance. *Initiation* is characterized by “the articulation of a grievance in very general terms by a group outside

\textsuperscript{153} This “classical” sense of public diplomacy is described in: Geoffrey Cowan, Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy in a changing world”, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, (March 2008), 6-8.
the formal governmental structure\textsuperscript{154}. The degree of organization of the proponent group is highly variable, as they may be united by this one issue, but may not be united by other concerns. Also, the degree to which they themselves and the society as a whole identify them as a distinct group, as well as their previous experience as a group, may influence their internal coherence and efficiency as they work to push forward their issue. Specification is when a general grievance is translated into specific and concrete demands. Diverse demands may emerge from the same grievance, and competition or internal disagreements may arise. However, a group’s capacity to redefine a specific issue with specific demands into an issue with a universal or at least a broader validity is a source of power and influence. A successful redefinition eventually leads to the expansion of the issue, and as sufficient pressure is generated to attract the attention of the decision makers, chances increase for the issue to be placed on the formal agenda. Expansion can be done by attracting the interest of new groups in the population or by linking the issue to pre-existing ones. This is a crucial phase, but it may also lead those who initiated the issue to lose control over its evolution.

The social status, economic mobility, and political allegiances of the issue proponents are latent resources for issue expansion. Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder identify four different groups that can become involved, as an issue expands beyond its original initiators, and each may have different levels of interest in the issue: the identification and the attention groups\textsuperscript{155} (making up the “specific” publics), and the attentive and the general public (making up the “mass” public)\textsuperscript{156}. The first type of individuals likely to become involved are the members of the identification group, those who feel a strong connection with the originators of an issue and who see their own interests as closely tied to them. These are also the most likely to support the position of the initiators. Cobb, Ross and Ross write that a “typical example of the expansion of an issue to members of an identification group is the definition of a controversy in terms of regional, ethnic or religious interests\textsuperscript{157}”. As for the early mobilization for the conflict in South Sudan, the identification group can be assimilated to the broader Christian and African-American constituencies, likely to identify not only with the

\textsuperscript{154} Cobb, Ross and Ross, \textit{op.cit.}, 128.

\textsuperscript{155} Also referring to the term coined by James Rosenau, \textit{Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: an operational formulation}, (New York : Random House, 1961), 118.


\textsuperscript{157} Cobb, Ross and Ross, \textit{op.cit.}, 128.
victims of the conflict, but also with the initiators of the movement. And as shall be explored in the next chapter, the issue has clearly been defined in terms of “ethnic” and “religious” interests. However this group may not be large enough, and a need for further expansion may arise. The second group that is likely to become aware of a social conflict early on is thus the attention groups. These are groups that can be mobilized relatively quickly, but they are more dependent on the issues involved in a conflict as they have no direct affiliation with the “combatants” of the cause as the interest group have. The attention groups may include other stakeholders with an interest in the issue, yet with different and sometimes opposed views on the solution. As such, it can create a controversy, which in turn by itself will almost automatically lead the issue to receive formal agenda status. Otherwise, an expansion directed at the general public will find place.

Furthermore, Cobb and Elder distinguish between the “attentive public” and the “general public” within the mass publics. The attentive public is described as a relatively stable and predominantly highly educated segment of the population, composed of those who are most informed about and engaged in public and policy issues. They usually carry strong opinions and may be far from united, and they can hence be drawn in on both sides of the controversy. The general public however refers to a larger group, much less likely to be involved in controversies and whose interest for a topic is often short-lived and effective. Chances are greater for public involvement if the issue is defined broadly enough. The Darfur issue, at least the way it has mobilized in the US and in Europe, inserts itself perfectly in this category since it has managed to attract the attention not only of the attentive public, but more remarkably of the general public. The public opinion’s interest in the issue has not been short-lived however; it has been sustained over many years. This should be seen in relationship with the fact that the Darfur crisis has been described as an unambiguous crisis, where a massacre was carried out against one population by another group, in the shadow of international spotlights, and thus it rapidly drew the attention of a wide constituency where few had a reason to not be concerned or oppose the engagement to “save” Darfur. This does not mean that there have not been controversies around the issue, in fact there have been vivid debates, but this has mainly been between expert-activists and researchers on the region. The way the issue was presented for the general public was as an uncontroversial issue, and thus, as described by Kevin Funk and Steven Fake, it became a mainstream issue gathering activists.

158 Cobb and Elder, op.cit., 107.
with “establishment friendly political beliefs\textsuperscript{159}”. Julie Flint in the same vein describes Darfur as an issue which for the activists “is not a place with a complex history, it’s a moral high ground\textsuperscript{160}”. The mere fact that the general public became involved and engaged around the issue increased the stakes for policy makers to take the issue up on their agenda.

Indeed, the last step in the successful evolution of an issue seeking agenda setting is the entrance, the moment where an issue is transferred from the public agenda to the formal agenda and receives serious attention from the decision makers. However, even if an issue triggers widespread mobilization, this transfer is far from automatic. Among different things, it depends on the likeliness of success for the decision makers in dealing with the issue, a success measured in the approval or not within the pressure group of the government’s response. As Cobb, Ross and Ross suggest, in a setting where the decision makers feel that any decision they may take is likely to result in a rejection from the issue proponents, they are likely to avoid giving the issue any attention at all. In the case of the “Sudanese issue”, two reactions from policy makers have been observed. First of all, as the crisis in Darfur became a mainstream issue, demanding that “something be done”, it was rather easy for the various pressured governments to issue statements, fund humanitarian organizations, nominate special envoys and support the peace initiatives with diplomatic weight. Any visible and seemingly powerful political action had a great potential of being well received by the mobilized population. Another request put forward by many activists, issuing a military intervention to stop the atrocities, would however certainly also arouse popular protests in the case where deployed troops would find themselves in the crossfire on the ground. This aspect of the issue was thus dealt with warily in the beginning, as Colin Powell for example stated in 2004 that recognizing the situation as genocide would not trigger a US intervention, however the US government called the international community for concerted action\textsuperscript{161}. This position was of course also due to other policy considerations making it impossible for the US to stage any intervention on their own. However, as public protests increasingly pressured for the deployment of peacekeepers to the region over the following years, increased political capital

\textsuperscript{159} Steven Fake, Kevin Funk, \textit{The Scramble for Africa: Darfur - Intervention and the USA}, (Montreal, New York, London: Black Rose Books, 2008), 301,106.


\textsuperscript{161} Straus, \textit{op.cit.}
was deployed by Western governments, and especially the P3 (US, UK, France), in working for a UN authorized peacekeeping mission.

**B - Internationalization as a norm: on the ‘oughtness’ to internationalize conflicts in order to bring them to an end**

It is not only the fact that conflicts leading to mass killings are increasingly seen as international responsibilities that enable us to say that *internationalization* is becoming an international norm. The existence of a norm can perhaps most efficiently be proved by the negative, that is the reactions triggered if someone openly deviates from the norm. As sociologists studying “deviant behavior” show, what is deviant is what openly alters from the norm, and deviant behavior rarely leaves the social group of reference indifferent. Indeed, as will be shown in the next chapter, the young activists interviewed in the framework of this research saw the reasons for their own engagement as so evident that it was difficult to ask them why they were mobilized. Indeed, this leads us to think that the norm is internalized within these groups. On a state level, policy makers can of course choose to look the other way when faced with a humanitarian crisis, but they have little normative luggage at their disposal to eventually explain why they shouldn’t do anything. Of course, there are legitimate reasons defending the reluctance to resort to military interventions for example, but not to justify why nothing should be done (or why humanitarian aid is not needed, or why condemning the violence is not important, etc.). Assessing internationalization as an emerging norm leads us to look at the so-called ”norm entrepreneurs”, the very actors pushing the norm forward, from emergence to a wider acceptance. These entrepreneurs, in our case pushing for the “Sudan” issues to be placed on the formal agenda, are at the center of focus in this section.

1) **Norm entrepreneurs and agenda-setters: new players on the domestic and international arena**

Civil society activists in North America and Europe have been active promoters of the norm of the need to internationalize the Sudanese conflicts in order to put an end to the suffering

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the conflicts entail, and it is through their promotion of this norm that they have contributed to project the Sudanese conflicts onto the world arena and placed them on an international agenda.

Sudan activists as norm entrepreneurs advocating for internationalization

As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink write: “Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues or even ”create” issues\textsuperscript{164}. Norm emergence is within the academic literature understood as the stage where a norm, as a ”standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity\textsuperscript{165}, becomes precisely a ”standard”, as it is increasingly referred to and increasingly adopted by a series of actors. A norm life-cycle starts with the norm emergence, continues into a stage of acceptance (norm cascade) where the norm is adopted by an increasingly large group of actors, before it finally moves on to the internalization stage, where it is taken for granted among the various actors adopting it. Other international norms that have been promoted over the past years may include international law (and for example the efforts to create a permanent and universal court with the International Criminal Court), as well as norms for development aid or environmental policies. The actors contributing to the norm emergence, the norm entrepreneurs, are driving agents actively pushing for the recognition and adoption of a given norm. Some may act out of an already existing organizational platform (some international organizations or NGOs especially dedicated to the promotion of a given norm), and some times such organizational platforms are built for the very purpose of the promotion of a new norm\textsuperscript{166}. The table below, set up by Finnemore and Sikkink, illustrates well the different stages, actors, as well as the main motives and tools for action (mechanisms) animating the norm entrepreneurs in their action.

\textsuperscript{164} Finnemore and Sikkink, \textit{op.cit.}, 897.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid, 891.
\textsuperscript{166} On the role of communication of humanitarian NGOs, engaging in operations of “marketing” in the competition to put forward the specific norms they have committed to defend, see: Pascal Dauvin, \textit{La communication des ONG humanitaires}, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 194.
The focus here is thus on how norm entrepreneurs (first column) proceed to pressure states, international organizations and networks (second column) to adopt the norm of internationalization, and more specifically, to make the internal conflicts in Sudan become a matter of international responsibility. The ultimate goal, often specified after the beginning of a given campaign, is to reach the level of internalization, where not only politicians and state officials make declarations of concern and of their intention to take action towards the Sudanese conflict, but where legislation pertaining to the issue is adopted and where the bureaucracy is mandated to effectively take action.

Among the norm entrepreneurs in the campaign to internationalize the Sudanese conflicts, there have indeed been a high presence of actors with an already existing organizational platform: the Christian Solidarity International (CSI), anti-slavery networks and the Congressional Black Caucus as for the mobilization around the conflict in the South, and the American Jewish World Service (AJWS), the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), or organizations such as Amnesty International or the International Crisis Group (ICG) for the conflict in Darfur. There has also been, perhaps mostly in the case of Darfur, a large number of new organizational platforms created specifically for the promotion of this cause: the Save

167 Ibid, 898.

**TABLE 1. Stages of norms**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm emergence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Norm cascade</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms</td>
<td>States, international organizations, networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motives</strong></td>
<td>Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment</td>
<td>Legitimacy, reputation, esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration</td>
</tr>
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Darfur Coalition, the student initiative STAND (for “Students Take Action Now: Darfur”), the Genocide Intervention Network (also called the “GI-Net”) or the Enough project. The latter was initially created as a sub-organ of the ICG, in order for those working on Darfur there to be able to take a firmer stand and to engage more visibly in activism and public mobilization, obeying to different logics than the high-level advocacy that the ICG has specialized in. It has however evolved to become an organization devoted not only to the situation in Darfur but to “end genocide and crimes against humanity”, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Uganda. John Prendergast, former director of African Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration, was one of the main instigators behind this initiative and has been an important figure within the activist campaign for Darfur – in other words, a veritable entrepreneur of the internationalization of the conflict in Darfur and the “need” for the international community to intervene. Other individual norm entrepreneurs in the case of Darfur include those who set out the first alerts within the UN, such as Mukesh Kapila, the resident coordinator in Khartoum at the time, and Jan Egeland, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. Furthermore, rebel leaders in the region (or outside, notably Abdulwahid el Nour, the leader of the SLA exiled in Paris), Hollywood celebrities in the US (such as Mia Farrow, George Clooney, Angelina Jolie) and finally individuals with a strong knowledge and engagement for the genocide in Rwanda (for example lieutenant-general Romeo Dallaire, the former force commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UNAMIR, or movie actor Don Cheadle, acting in the role of Paul Rusesabagina in the movie Hotel Rwanda) have been central entrepreneurs in the campaign for Darfur. Evidence that the internationalization efforts related to both the South Sudan conflict and the Darfur conflict have eventually reached the stage of internalization, in the sense of an institutionalization of the international responsibilities, can be found in the Sudan Peace Act, a US federal law voted in October 2002 as well as numerous UN resolutions on Darfur since 2004, not to speak of the international arrest mandate against the Sudanese president set out in March 2009. Also a number of special envoys to Sudan have been nominated over the past decade, from the UN, the US, the EU, the UK, France, and more lately China.

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168 For more on the Enough Project, see www.enoughproject.org (Accessed April 21st, 2010)
170 See list in bibliography.
The motivations for civil society advocates and especially “regular citizens” with little previous experience with activism can be hard to assess in objective terms. As Finne more and Sikkink note: “for many of the social norms of interest to political scientists, it is very difficult to explain the motivations of norm entrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment”. They also refer to Robert Keohane, who shows how individuals taking action out of empathy “are interested in the welfare of others for its own sake, even if this has no effect on their own material well-being or security”. This is indeed the specificity of activists engaging for distant conflicts, in comparison with other much-studied social movements such as the feminist movement, anti-racist movements and even to some extent the anti-globalization movement, where those who become mobilized are more or less affected by the problems denounced.

The motivations of the activists engaging for the Sudanese conflicts indeed rather fall into the category Keohane refers to: a change in the situation in Sudan will not affect their own well-being, and an important reason for their mobilization is the perceived intrinsic value in enhancing the situation of the victims of these conflicts. Some may have other additional motives, such as enhancing their own organizations’ visibility and importance on the domestic or international arena, or even advancing other general norms which the conflicts in Sudan put to the fore: the struggle against religious persecution, the fight against slavery, anti-genocide efforts and finally the application of the competences of the International Criminal Court (ICC). A more detailed exploration of the progressive constitution of international networks of internationalization entrepreneurs for each of the two Sudanese conflicts will be analyzed below.

The international solidarity movement for South Sudan: between historical bonds and the development of a new humanitarianism

The first solidarity movements for Sudan emerged separately in different countries, and first of all in countries who had development projects or Church missions in South Sudan. It was in the 1970’s, after the Addis Abeba agreement of 1972, that foreign funded development projects really started to become active in Sudan. While many had to leave as the civil war

171 Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., 898.
broke out again in 1983, a few made their entrance in the early years of the second civil war. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has for example been a major actor in South Sudan for many years. The United States have allegedly allocated more than 2 billion USD to Sudan between 1983 and the beginning of the 2000’s, and most of it went through the USAID. Foreign solidarity movements for Sudan however emerged essentially from the beginning of the 1990’s, in the context of a changing international environment. First of all, the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) set up in 1989, a trilateral agreement between the SPLM, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the UN, made it possible for many more NGOs to have access to the South, something they were denied in the earlier years of the war. In turn, information about the situation on the ground became much more accessible to the outside world. Secondly, the end of the Cold War also facilitated the international action of NGO’s and of civil society movements in the West, freed from the constraints of the ideological alliances.

Several Western Churches had established links with Churches in South Sudan even earlier, during the first civil war (1955-1972). South Sudan namely represented a large reserve of potential conversions to Christianism. The Norwegian Baptist community for example has several sister Churches in Sudan, and the Norwegian Christian Council has close ties with the Sudan Council of Churches and the New Sudan Council of Churches. Other countries having developed confessional ties with Sudan include Switzerland and Canada. According to Alex de Waal, the material support provided by the Churches helped creating a relationship of confidence with the local population, as well as to strengthen the presence of Christianism. The Christian community in the US, and especially the Evangelist sector, really became engaged in and aware of the situation in South Sudan in the 1990’s. The end of the Cold war enabled the Christian missionaries to invest other territories than the Catholic countries of South America. More specifically, this lead them to become more interested and engaged in the situation in South Sudan and the fate of their fellow believers there. Today, several Churches of the ”Bible Belt” in the US also have sister churches in South Sudan. General

resentment against the ruling elite in Khartoum also grew in the US after the military coup in 1989, which was followed by a policy of support to Islamist movements in the region. The more ostensibly Islamist regime then also contributed to shed light on the situation of the Christian minority in the South, as will be shown in chapter IV.

It is especially the Evangelical Church in the US that has been engaged for the fate of the South Sudanese, which is notably due to the Evangelical community’s tendency to combine faith with political engagement and internationalism. According to Isabelle Richet, the members of the Evangelical Churches in the United States frequently attend the masses, and their priests often convey political messages in their sermons\(^{176}\). The Evangelical community is also characterized by a dense social network, supported by TV and radio channels as well as newspapers specifically dedicated to the community. American Evangelist NGOs also have a growing influence on the international humanitarian arena. Sébastien Fath argues that this results from a deep-rooted activism, related to three factors seen as constitutive of Evangelical Protestantism: first, an entrepreneurial tradition where individual initiatives have a high standing; secondly, the transnational projection of the Evangelical community, placing Christian belonging above any other attachment; and thirdly, a strong missionary component of this Protestantism\(^{177}\).

The international projection of the Evangelical community was strengthened after the end of the Cold War, and the renewed international engagement led to the development of a new cause within the movement: the struggle against religious persecution worldwide. This issue did not have the same resonance during the years where the majority of American missionaries were placed in the Catholic countries of Latin America, as compared to the beginning of their activities in countries with a strong presence of other religious groups. Isabelle Richet writes that the extension of their activities to countries where the Christian population was a minority, also led to more incidents and events of violence committed against American missionaries abroad\(^{178}\). This in turn contributed to justify the need to fight

\(^{176}\) Isabelle Richet, "La religion influence-t-elle la politique étrangère aux Etats-Unis?", Débat, 127, (2003, 11/12), 46-62.


\(^{178}\) Richet, op.cit.
against religious persecution internationally. Richet indeed describes this struggle as a "niche" policy for the Christian conservative movement\(^{179}\). Indeed, the Evangelical movement used the struggle against religious persecution to strengthen its own political influence domestically, as well as to transcend its marginal position within the conservative movement in the US. In 1998, the Freedom From Religious Persecution Act was voted\(^{180}\), and it represented a great achievement for those who defended the cause.

Another cause was to emerge from the civil war in South Sudan, namely the slavery issue. The practice of slavery was for the first time proved by two academics from the University of Khartoum in 1987, but it was only in 1995, according to Alex de Waal, that the question was truly internationalized and became a political controversy outside Sudan\(^{181}\). Louis Farrakhan, the leader of the Nation of Islam, a political and religious organization based in the African-American community in the US, who was a contested personality in the US, publicly denounced the veracity of the reports on slavery during a visit to Sudan. As de Waal writes, this transformed the issue into a “proxy war” between political adversaries in the US\(^{182}\). A polemic was then formed around the question of slave redemption, organized *en masse* by the American NGO Christian Solidarity International (CSI), as well as its British branch Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), during the 1990’s. Their programs were supported and defended by personalities like Bona Malwal, a Southern Sudanese exiled in England and editor in chief of the Sudan Democratic Gazette. The Baroness Cox in England has also been an important personality in the efforts to raise awareness around the slavery issue and was active in CSW’s campaign to redeem Sudanese slaves. In a letter to the British newspaper *The Independent on Sunday* in 2002 she claimed to have bought the freedom of a total of 2,281 slaves during eight visits to Sudan\(^{183}\). The slave redemption campaign was however strongly

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179 Ibid, 55.
180 The Freedom from Religious Persecution Act was voted to promote religious freedom as a principle of American foreign policy, and to specifically engage to defend individuals perceived as persecuted on the basis of religion worldwide. Sudan was often mentioned in debates preceding the adoption of the law, which was strongly supported by the Christian conservative lobbies.
181 de Waal (1997), *op.cit.*
182 Ibid, 55.
criticized by organizations such as Save the Children and UNICEF, who argued that such an approach would only encourage the continuation of the practice of slavery\(^{184}\).

It was also from 1995 that the issue started to attract attention within African-American lobbies. In an interview with *The Phoenix*, Donald Payne, a Democratic member of Congress and a spokes person of the Congressional Black Caucus, denounced the practice of slavery in Sudan. He affirmed the intention of the Black Caucus to actively work for increased political and public attention to be addressed to this issue and requested the US government to impose more economic sanctions as well as an arms embargo on Sudan\(^{185}\). The issue of slavery in Sudan became a cause around which the African-American community could rally, and according to some replaced the role the struggle against Apartheid had played for the community a few years earlier. Mohammed Nagi, director of the Sudan Tribune website, claims that the pressure groups which formed around the Anti-Apartheid campaign “*found in the Sudanese question a gold mine*\(^{186}\)”, a cause that would be beneficial to them as a group. The African-American community in the US is known to have been traditionally closer to the Democratic Party, and while the Congressional Black Caucus, an organization representing African-American members of Congress, is officially an independent group, it is largely identified as a lobby group close to the Democratic Party.

The solidarity movement for Sudan in the US was thus based on the engagement of essentially two communitarian lobbies – each with their own tradition of involvement in foreign policy issues, and each with their own position and status within US domestic politics as well. In other words, the early engagement for Sudan in the US was based on the dedication of politically specialized movements, more than it was an issue of awareness for the general public. As seen above, a similar strong engagement existed in the UK along the lines of the struggle against slavery in South Sudan. The anti-slavery movement has a long history in the UK, with its first roots dating back to 1785 when Thomas Clarkson, a student of theology at the University of Cambridge, won a prize for his essay on slavery\(^{187}\). The young


\(^{185}\) “Congressional Black Caucus’ response to slavery”, CASMAS, Coalition for the Abolition of Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan, 1995, [http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/black.htm](http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/black.htm) (Accessed March 16, 2010)

\(^{186}\) Interview, Mohamed Nagi, Sudanese journalist and director of Sudan Tribune, Paris, 22.03.2006

\(^{187}\) Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, *Politique(s) du conflit : De la grève à la révolution*, (Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 2008), 396.
pastor then decided to take action and put an end to this practice, and as Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow write, together with a small group of dedicated activists, he became “one of the first professional “network organizers” of the modern world\(^{188}\). Groups and personalities mobilized for the cause of South Sudan in the UK have been engaged less along lines of communitarian identification, but rather due to their specific knowledge of or connections to Sudan (the Sudanese diaspora in the UK, or individuals and humanitarians having worked in the country) or their previous engagement for similar causes (anti-slavery movement). An Associate Parliamentary Group on Sudan was created in the UK in 1998, in “response to concerns raised by Sudanese diaspora groups\(^{189}\) and reportedly counts over hundred British Members of Parliament and peers from across the political spectrum. Other solidarity movements for South Sudan emerged in different European countries, starting in the 1970’s before gaining momentum in the 1990’s.

The example of the Norwegian special relationship with Sudan is also interesting to look at in this context. Indeed, different types of actors from the Norwegian civil society have their very own history of engagement in Sudan, some dating back to the late 1960’s. Together, they have contributed to shape what has been Norway’s foreign policy towards Sudan over the past few years, including its important investment in the Naivasha peace process. The different types of actors can be roughly divided into three groups: Church-related NGO-workers, humanitarian aid workers from the political left and academics working on Sudan. The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), one of the three largest Norwegian NGOs, became engaged in reconstruction projects in South Sudan already from 1972, following the signature of the Addis Abeba peace agreement. It was a large-scale project and for some time, the NCA was the main employer in the region South of the East bank of the Nile river\(^{190}\). The Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), also one of the largest Norwegian NGOs with close ties to the Norwegian Labor Party, undertook a program of agricultural support in South Sudan from 1986 onwards. At that point, the NCA had already been forced to leave many of its projects, due to the war, and was confined to work in government-controlled areas. The NPA, contrary

\(^{188}\) Ibid, 15.


to the NCA, adopted a highly partisan approach, being strongly hostile to the government in Khartoum and never afraid of openly supporting the rebels of the SPLA\textsuperscript{191}.

Although lobby groups are not very present on the Norwegian political arena, one group should be mentioned here. The Norwegian Support Group for Peace in Sudan (\textit{Støttegruppen for Fred i Sudan}, SFS) was founded in 1993, with the aim of pushing Norwegian and international authorities to work for the advancement of peace in Sudan. Its main tool of influence is its large online data base, aimed at providing continually updated information to Norwegian and international authorities, notably the UN\textsuperscript{192}. It initially contained a strong presence of aid workers from the NCA having formerly worked in South Sudan, but has over the years evolved to include a wide range of former aid workers from different organizations, students, and others having worked with Sudan in different settings. Some younger members of the SFS are even children of former aid workers, born in Sudan and having spent their first years there. Since 1999, SFS is supported financially by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which rather than indicating any degree of dependency of the SFS’ towards the Norwegian authorities, shows how this grass root group has managed to become an important counselor for Norwegian foreign policy making on Sudan.

Indeed, there is a high level of proximity between governmental instances and civil society actors in Norway, notably characterized by a high level of mobility between research institutions, NGOs and the government. This was indeed the case during the Naivasha peace talks, where Sudan scholars from the University of Bergen were associated as experts in the official Norwegian delegation. Research institutes indeed have a long tradition of influencing the making up of Norwegian foreign policy. The University of Bergen in particular is known for its Sudan expertise and has for many years educated most of Norway’s top scholars on Sudan. Since the late 1960’s, it has also maintained close ties with the University of Khartoum. Indeed, a large number of scholars from Bergen have received valuable support from the University of Khartoum while doing their fieldwork, and a large group of Sudanese students and scholars have been able to go to Bergen to pursue their research. The cooperation was maintained until the late 1980’s, but was weakened after the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in the 1989 coup. The ties have however been strengthened again over the past

\textsuperscript{191} Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, assessment of the Norwegian People’s Aid, Aid Watch, \url{http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=75} (Accessed July 7, 2010)
\textsuperscript{192} See the website of the group: \url{www.sudansupport.no} (Accessed July 7, 2010)
few years, and the University of Bergen can, together with the Bergen-based Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), be characterized as one of the main centers of competence on Sudan in Europe\textsuperscript{193}. In large part due to this relationship, the Norwegian diplomatic engagement in Sudan has enjoyed a relatively positive image, which was beneficial as it became involved in the peace process.

In fact, several peace initiatives that Norway has initiated have started with academic seminars, gathering researchers and political actors from Norway and the country in question. This enables the parties to start a dialogue in an informal setting, or at least make a first step towards an open dialogue. An important academic report on power and democracy in Norway published in 2003, stated, “often, individual initiatives were decisive for peace processes and dialogues on human rights to start up\textsuperscript{194}”. The well-established network between different stakeholders following Sudan can probably explain the rapid and efficient coordination that took place following the humanitarian crisis in Sudan in 1998. NGOs and networks of researchers were rapidly mobilized, and effectively persuaded decision makers to change the orientation of their policy towards Sudan, according to Kjell Hødnebø, a Sudan scholar from the University of Bergen and for the past few years a senior consultant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{195}. The change of orientation of the policy was based on the realization that providing humanitarian aid would not be enough, political capital had to be invested as well to solve the conflict, which was seen as the main cause of the humanitarian crisis and the famine. It was however not the first time that Norway engaged in such an initiative in Sudan. The former Foreign Minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, attempted to launch secret negotiations in Sudan in 1993, but the initiative was not followed up\textsuperscript{196}.

When the general public is made aware of an issue promoted or defended by human rights organizations, it immediately increases the stakes for key decision makers in charge of


\textsuperscript{195} Interview, Kjell Hødnebø, Oslo, 18.05.2006

\textsuperscript{196} Interview, WF, Oslo, 19.05.2006
formulating foreign policy positions on the issue. The specific tools of action and strategies of
the actors involved in the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts will be examined
more deeply in the following chapter. However, some remarks can be made to sum up the
main characteristics of the different non-governmental actors involved in bringing the war in
South Sudan out of its international isolation. The mobilization as we have seen in the US,
UK and Norway, although involving sociologically different types of actors in each case, can
yet be characterized as based on two different types of motivations: on the one hand, a sense
of proximity based on (communitarian or religious) identity and on the other, what we could
call “expertise”, whether academic or merely gained from working experience in Sudan.
Christian conservatives and African-Americans in the US showed their solidarity with victims
they felt a certain proximity with based on their own identity, while the “expertise”
engagement describes well the mobilization of former aid workers who refuse to let what they
have been witnesses to be just an experience from the past. Communitarian groups in the US
seem to feel a personal connection with the people of South Sudan, seeing them respectively
as “fellow believers” and as a people sharing the same destiny of discrimination and slavery.
These groups’ have generally little or no knowledge of “the field”, at least not as they become
involved. Over the years however, as humanitarian workers started to return to the US and as
Sudanese refugees in the US became more organized, groups with first-hand knowledge of
Sudan came to play an increasingly important role in the US as well. Not only have they
served as important sources of updated information from the region, they have also come to
be central spokespersons for the general movement for Sudan, contributing to rally new
members. Former aid workers or humanitarians “converted” into activists once back home,
can be qualified as “expert advocates”, because their very activism is based on the knowledge
they acquired in the region. As we have seen in the case of Norway, the groups involved in
the solidarity movement for Sudan there were also issued from a specialized background,
rather than from a general human rights movement.

Mobilizing for Darfur: towards a generalized movement

The mobilization we have seen over the past few years for the conflict in Darfur can be
explained by a variety of different factors, however, it would probably not have been the same
without the engagement of already well organized groups in the US, UK, Norway and several
other European countries, such as France, Germany and Switzerland, to name a few. The
Darfur mobilization can, as opposed to the mobilization for South Sudan, be characterized as generalized rather than specialized, with some groups motivated on identity grounds, however to a lesser extent than for the war in the South. First of all, the movement has been a lot larger in size, rallying students down to junior high school level as well as a very broad range of different social groups. Secondly, many of the main spokespersons for Darfur as well as the groups mobilized over the past few years had little or no previous knowledge of the region. The older South Sudan movement has however clearly set its footprint on the Darfur movement, since many of the leading personalities in the more recent campaign started their engagement for Sudan by following the war in the South. Eric Reeves, a professor of literature at Smith College, having written extensively on Sudan for many years now on his own blog, and John Prendergast, mentioned previously, both discovered Sudan through the Southern conflict and have become central personalities in the Darfur campaign. Although the Darfur conflict has not triggered the same sense of direct identification with the victims as the “Christian connection” did for the South, there has been a sense of a “shared destiny” within a specific group engaged for Darfur, as was the case for the African-American mobilizing on the issue of slavery. Indeed, Jewish groups in the US have been particularly active in the Darfur campaign, and often put forward their special responsibility to protest against an ongoing “genocide” to justify their engagement.

Despite this “connection”, the Jewish organizations at the origin of the Save Darfur Coalition have actively tried to not make it become seen as exclusively a Jewish movement. The meeting convened in New York in July 2004, where the Save Darfur Coalition was founded, was organized by the American Jewish World Service (AJWS) and the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) and gathered many Jewish organizations, along with other faith groups. According to Rebecca Hamilton and Chad Hazlett, this “was not strictly a reflection of the natural responsiveness of Jewish organizations to the specter of genocide, but also the result of the pre-existing connections that Messinger (from the AJWS) and Fowler (from the USHMM) had to organizations within the Jewish community197. However, the Save Darfur Coalition would soon gather a broad range of organizations from across the political and religious specter. It also became part of the campaign initiators’ strategy to claim that they represented every kind of social and communitarian group within in the US, in order to have a larger effect when lobbying the Congress or the government.

197 Hamilton and Hazlett, op.cit., 344.
Although the US based movement continues to work along lines of communitarian mobilization, a strong characteristic of lobby activities in general in the US, the new Darfur movement deliberately sought to not be associated with only one group (and thus with limited reach), but as a broad-based movement (with maximum reach). The Jewish organizations also proved a remarkable capacity to connect with a broad network of local Jewish constituencies. Thanks to a dense social network, the information was able to spread easily and rapidly from the New York and Washington based AJWS and USHMM to local Jewish Community Relations Councils (JCPR), through a “trickle down” effect\textsuperscript{198}. Along with the outreach of the Jewish groups, the student groups engaged for Darfur across the US also came to play a central role in turning the mobilization into a generalized mass movement. As put forward by Hamilton and Hazlett, students have showed a remarkable capacity to use and to spread information on the internet\textsuperscript{199}. With the student organization STAND at the core of their activity, they have managed to set up a whole network of “mobilized” college campuses across the United States.

The Darfur campaign that emerged during 2004, largely benefited from the solidarity networks built up in the 1990’s for South Sudan. In the US, as well as in France, a large number of “older activists” were at the core of the new movement in formation\textsuperscript{200}. Indeed, many of these older activists were highly skeptical to the negotiations engaged between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebels, contributing, through the mediation carried out by the US, the UK and Norway, to give international legitimacy to a long contested adversary in Khartoum. The eruption of the war in Darfur became the ultimate “proof” for them that Khartoum “wasn’t worth the trust”, and thus a reason to resume public protests, and this time to voice out their aversion even more loudly. The first demonstrations in front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington in the early summer of 2004 were organized notably by Christian Solidarity International. Indeed, it would have been difficult to protest against the negotiations in the South, largely presented as a historical opportunity to make peace. However, demonstrating and protesting against the violence in Darfur became a means for them to directly criticize Khartoum, and only indirectly the peace process engaged for the South.

\textsuperscript{198} Interview, NN, JCPA officer, New York, 12.05.2008
\textsuperscript{199} Hamilton and Hazlett, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{200} Interview, Jacky Mamou, former president of Médecins du Monde and then president of the Collectif Urgence Darfour, Paris, 29.02.2008
2) The power of live images and popular culture in “reaching out” to the wider public

Real or live images of a crisis situation, depicting the suffering entailed by the conflict, are powerful triggers of international attention. Increasingly, public intellectuals and even popular culture celebrities have come to play a role in building momentum around these images.

Images: the most efficient alerts on a crisis situation

Media’s role as an agenda-setter is well illustrated in a comparison made by Dearing and Rogers between the coverage of the Ethiopian and the Brazilian humanitarian crisis in 1984. Based on a study by William Boot, they show how the Ethiopian famine in 1984 was placed on the US agenda and the international agenda, while the Brazilian drought, more serious and occurring at the same time, never reached these agendas. While an estimated 6 million people were suffering from the famine in Ethiopia, 24 million people in Northeast Brazil were hit by the worst drought in 200 years and the starvation that followed. However, Ethiopia “attracted television reporters whose broadcasts led to immense donations for food relief from the public”. According to Dearing and Rogers, the “nature of the Brazilian famine did not fit with ”good television”, mainly because of the disparity of the feeding stations and problems of access to ”good images”. Images of the Ethiopian famine were available for many months before the media woke up, however the story that ”broke” was the one about ”a three-year-old child (dying) on camera and a throng of adults resembling Auschwitz inmates”. The shooting was made by Michael Buerk and was send prime time on BBC. It did not take long before Save the Children, referred to in the report, was submerged by calls from private donors. Tens of millions of dollars were raised by rock musicians through benefit events, and US government and international aid agencies became engaged in relief efforts. This account clearly shows the power of news editors in selecting certain issues over others, the power of images (”If there’s no picture, there’s no story”), and generally the power media has on the public agenda.

201 Dearing and Rogers, op.cit., 69.
202 Ibid.
204 Ibid, 69.
This leads us to reflect on the question of what it is that triggers the first images and pieces of information on a conflict. In other words, who comes first to a conflict affected field to voice the first alerts, media reporters or NGOs? If we look at the conflict in South Sudan, NGOs and international organizations such as Oxfam and UNICEF were present on the ground from early on in the war, and were instrumental in preparing the ground for the Operation Lifeline Sudan that was launched in 1989, creating the largest humanitarian operation of the time. Some momentum was created around the humanitarian situation in 1988 when large floods around the area of Khartoum attracted some foreign journalists, however, it was first and foremost after the OLS was launched, that foreign journalists gained a better access to the field and that reports from the region became accessible. In the case of Darfur, some NGOs were already on the ground in early 2003, while the first media reports only came about in late 2003/early 2004. This in turn triggered the interest of more relief organizations, whose access was improved after an agreement between the UN and the Sudanese government in July 2004. Although direct access to Darfur has been severely constrained for journalists from the beginning of the current conflict, relegating most of them to report from the Chadian side of the border, the access has been considerably easier for humanitarian organizations. With a record high number of humanitarian organizations on the ground, information on the situation has been relatively accessible. Hence, two observations can be made on the relationship between humanitarians and the media. First of all, journalists usually go where there is a story to tell, and for there to be a story at all, there usually have to be at least some foreign actors present beforehand giving the first alert. Secondly, media reports on a crisis situation usually have a direct effect in attracting more relief organizations to the region. Also a situation is more likely to attract the attention of journalists when the issue is either new, seriously deteriorated compared to a previous period, or touching on national interests of the country the journalists report to (it be national citizens in danger, a national company involved in some way in the conflict, or simply the area being a traditional sphere of influence the country in question).

The power of real images from the battlefields or showing the human suffering entailed has been well documented and researched. Susan Sontag reflects on how an image produces a link between the "victims" and a far-away public:

"Who are the “we” at whom such shock-pictures are aimed? That “we” would include not just the sympathizers of a smallish nation or a stateless people fighting for its life, but – a far larger constituency – those only nominally concerned about
some nasty war taking place in another country. The photographs are a means of making “real” (or “more real”) matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore\textsuperscript{205}.

By examining the “recipient” side in the diffusion process of an image, she shows that images, or photographs, have the power to connect those “fighting for their lives” and an audience far away. The only thing the two have in common, is their “nominal” quality of being human beings, which is the very basis for the shock and the emotional reaction that occurs within the recipient audience. However, the far-away audience has an advantage over the photographed victims: they can see them, while the victims cannot see the distant audience. Additionally, this audience can, as Sontag points out, choose to look, or choose to ignore. Precisely because of this relationship, it is interesting to try and understand for what reasons the images of the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur became something many chose to look at and become personally engaged for.

The role of public intellectuals and celebrities in speaking out about social issues

The Ethiopian example is again of particular interest here, for two reasons. First of all, it was one of the first African famines to be reported live on TV in Western countries. Secondly, it set the stage for a new phenomenon in Western societies: the engagement of personalities from the entertainment industry, using their celebrity to attract attention and raise money for the “noble cause” of saving African lives. In 1984, the Irish musician Bob Geldof saw the news report by Buerk on BBC. He was so moved by the images of famine stricken children that he decided to use his contacts to try and collect money. The result was a song entitled “Do they know it’s Christmas” released a few weeks later and just a few weeks before Christmas, co-written with another musician Midge Ure, and featuring a wide range of the most popular Irish and British musicians of the time. Together they created a band called Band Aid, referring both to a well known brand of adhesive bandage, and to the idea that a music band could provide aid to “ease the pain” of a serious wound: the famine in Ethiopia. The single that came out on November 29\textsuperscript{th} 1984 immediately became the Number 1 in the UK singles chart, and the fastest selling single ever in the UK with more than a million

singles sold the first week\textsuperscript{206}. All the money raised went to the cause of the victims in Ethiopia.

Twenty years later, in November 2004, a new single was recorded: Band Aid 20. All the money raised this time went to the victims in Darfur. In fact the engagement of famous celebrities has become emblematic of the Darfur campaign, a “fashion” that can be traced back to the early engagement for the famine in Ethiopia. This celebrity engagement is reminiscent of Edward Saïd’s pledge that intellectuals have a moral responsibility to be engaged in the world that surrounds them and to use their voices to raise awareness around social injustices. He writes that, being an intellectual carries with it a “sense of being someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'être is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug\textsuperscript{207}. He considered intellectuals as “endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public\textsuperscript{208}”. In other words, intellectuals in his view possess the capacity to spread a message to the broader public, and that is probably the most important role played by the celebrities today as well. Thanks to their celebrity, they are able to attract the attention of a broad audience to a topic they would otherwise certainly know very little about. Movie celebrities and pop stars playing the role of socially engaged intellectuals however prefer to emphasize the simple messages in order to “mobilize the masses”, rather than communicating a complex and nuanced intellectual opinion in the way Saïd probably saw it. The way some of these expert-advocates on Darfur actively mobilized Hollywood celebrities to participate in their campaign will be further explored in the next chapter.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Internationalization understood as the process through which internal conflicts are set on the international agenda is an emerging international norm, as we have seen in this chapter. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{206} The UK’s Best Selling Singles, UK Charts, \url{http://ukcharts.20m.com/bestsell.html} (Accessed June 30, 2010)
\item \textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
"international agenda" should be understood as a global ensemble of various political agendas, international in nature, from the UN agenda to the sum of the agendas of various states having seized themselves of the conflict issue, as well as social transnational initiatives unfolding outside the control of the states. As shown through the agenda setting processes of the Sudanese conflicts, these different levels and components do not necessarily intervene in every internationalization process, or every stage of it. The various social entrepreneurs engaging to set a conflict issue on the formal agenda of policy makers may be motivated by different factors, from a special connection with the country where the conflict unfolds, a sense of identification with the victims, or merely the feeling that "doing something" in favor of the victims seen in newspapers or on TV screens would be the only moral thing to do. What these motivations tell us about the norm of internationalization, and its level of emergence, will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter II – From the first alerts to a place on the international agenda: the role played by timing, framing and activist strategies

How did the two Sudanese conflicts emerge under the international spotlight? When and under what circumstances were the first alerts on the situation voiced? Did these circumstances of the first alerts influence the subsequent framings adopted by the activist movements? This will the be explored in the first part of this chapter, while the way the activist movements have shaped and framed the general understandings of the conflicts will be studied in the second part. The focus will in this second part essentially be on the activists mobilized around the Darfur crisis, analyzing the strategies used by these activists to make the conflict reach the formal policy agenda. What can be revealed from this analysis is that the activists have played an important role in imposing the general narratives that have been used to comprehend the conflict. This has enabled them to reach mainly two objectives: first of all, mobilize the greatest number of people around the issue in order to put pressure on policy makers, and secondly, use these framings as such as a tool to exert direct pressure on politicians and decision makers by increasing the stakes of non-action.

The third part of this chapter will therefore study more in depth what makes certain framings or qualifications retain the attention of the general public in order to understand how the sense of solidarity develops across borders. As seen in the previous chapter, the mechanisms of identification with the victims, along confessional lines or according to a sense of a shared destiny, were central for the internationalization process of the South Sudanese conflict and to some extent the Darfur crisis as well. The majority of the Darfur activists however have rather been motivated by a “moral” sense of solidarity, that is a solidarity generated by the mere witnessing of fellow human beings suffering from the war. As will be shown here, the context for the development of this solidarity is the emerging norm of the “oughtness” of the international community to make situations of massive human suffering become international concerns.
A - The first alerts: how the conflict in South Sudan and in Darfur first emerged under the international spotlight

What triggers the first alerts concerning conflicts and humanitarian crisis today, and who set out these alerts? I advance here that the tracing of the first alerts around the Sudanese conflicts is fundamental to understand their internationalization processes, and how they have become issues of public and political concern. The two conflicts have gone through very different internationalization processes, however they have in common the fact that it was the humanitarian aspect of the conflicts that first triggered international attention.

1) The war in South Sudan: a long and hesitant road to the international agenda

The process leading to an effective internationalization of the war in South Sudan was much longer and more drawn-out than the internationalization process of the war in Darfur. This was due to several factors, notably the fact that the conflict erupted in the global context of the Cold War, but also the fact that various alerts are much more rapidly diffused today, in the age of internet and new information and communications technologies, than they were when the second Sudanese civil war broke out in 1983. The conflict went through different stages of low-level internationalization before it eventually reached a high level international interest, in the form of an international commitment to support the regional efforts to solve the conflict.

The humanitarian aspect of the war triggering international alerts

Several NGOs came to Sudan with the drought and the famine of 1984-85, particularly serious in the northern and western parts of the country. During this period, many refugees were coming from Tigray and Eritrea, and more than fifty NGOs were providing relief and assistance to the displaced and famine affected Sudanese, but also to the Ethiopian refugees. As the famine situation came under control, attention shifted to the South, which in turn was seriously hit in 1986-88209. The drought and famine situation became especially hard to deal

with there, because of the civil war, as each party tried to prevent relief convoys to reach the adversary. Larry Minear writes about the years preceding Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), explaining: “political authorities on both sides were preoccupied with fighting the war rather than with relieving the suffering it was creating”.

The author provides one of a few sources on how the Southern conflict progressively came to attract international attention, as well as humanitarian relief. He recounts how, in the beginning of 1986, an important alert came from two important Sudanese institutions: the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Sudanaid, the relief and development section of the Sudan Bishop’s Conference. Alerting international relief agencies about food shortages in the South and the interference of the civil war, they estimated that “thirty percent of the population had already been displaced”. Their persuasion, combined with encouragements from Oxfam-UK and UNICEF as well as several donor governments, led the Sudanese government to set up a committee to monitor the situation. Other NGOs were present too in South Sudan, such as the French, Belgian and Dutch Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and the Irish NGO Concern. Many provided aid simply where they would get access, but the government maintained that relief could only be shipped to the areas under its control and withheld permission for agencies to operate elsewhere.

Several efforts were made between 1986 and 1988, notably by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to make the parties come to an agreement on humanitarian aid and the distribution of food, but were time and again frustrated. It seems as if the natural disaster that struck Khartoum in 1988 constitutes a turning point in different ways. Floods following heavy rains seriously worsened the situation for the 1.5 million displaced from South Sudan living in the suburbs of Khartoum. Minear quotes a UN official, saying that only with the floods, “were we able to make references to those people who had arrived in Khartoum as displaced from the South”. He also recalls that the floods triggered the interest of several international media channels, which again resulted in the provision of some humanitarian aid. According to

211 See also the writings of former Oxfam Country Representative in Sudan from 1985 to 1989, Marc Duffield, “Absolute distress: Structural Causes of Hunger in Sudan”, Middle East Report, 166 (September-October, 1990), 4-11.
212 Ibid, 7.
him, such media interest had been weak during the previous years, despite the famine and the suffering resulting from the war. The real trigger elements however, leading to the launch of the OLS are twofold and of political nature. First of all, the realization that outside help was needed to overcome the difficulties was materialized in an appeal to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuéllar by the Sudanese government in June 1988. It was the necessary push that eventually led the UN General Assembly to request a major relief and reconstruction effort. Secondly, the personal engagement of some high level UN officials, such as James P. Grant, then director of UNICEF, are singled out as perhaps the “single most influential force” behind the OLS. A long-time humanitarian aid worker with the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in South Sudan, Ken Miller, recalls how international attention was first directed at the region: “it started when James Grant, UNICEF director in New York, said that something had to be done. This led to an agreement between the UN, the government of Sudan and the SPLM”. Appointed as the Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the OLS, Grant is described as someone with an “ability to project the suffering of the Sudan’s civilians onto the world stage”, and as possessing a “passionate commitment and boundless energy” as he embarked on numerous trips to Sudan in the first months of the initiative.

Humanitarian interest triggering media interest

Globally, the launch of the OLS was the steppingstone for a generalized international attention to South Sudan. As Minear writes, “admirers and detractors alike credit the UN with having put the Sudan crisis on the world map”, which in turn attracted international journalists, made Western audiences become aware of the situation, and last but not least, attracted important funds to the operation. Although some media interest picked up with the floods around Khartoum in August 1988, the real increase of media coverage occurred in April 1989 onwards. In other words, the media played more a role of a “follow-up” consolidating the civil war’s newfound place on the international agenda, by generating political and public interest and support to the initiative, rather than the role of an instigator triggering the early agenda setting process. However, media attention dropped some time after

214 Ibid, xi.
215 Interview, Ken Miller, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid, Juba, 27.11.2007
216 Minear, op.cit., xi.
217 Ibid, 34.
the successful launching of the OLS. When the SPLA split in 1991 and inter-tribal fighting dramatically increased, the conflict seems to have lost some of its initial appeal and capacity to garner sympathy within international media channels. Or perhaps the superposition of a South-South conflict on the more graspable North-South war made the whole picture too complex to sustain any large-scale media or public interest. It was only in 1998 that the Southern conflict again became the center of international attention through the advent of a new large-scale humanitarian crisis. The situation was different from 1986-88, as numerous NGOs were already present in the region with the OLS, and alerts thus more rapidly reached international media agencies. As a French journalist having followed Sudan for many years remembers, after several years of low level and sporadic media coverage, “there was the famine in 1998, which was real, but like every famine was also a media phenomenon and which provoked a real revival of interest”\(^{218}\).

Speaking of a media phenomenon, the special role played by the NPA is particularly interesting here. Ken Miller recalls how they chartered a flight into Bahr al Ghazal, and “many journalists were on board, the BBC, AFP, Sky News, CNN…”\(^{219}\). Access was made scarce by the government, and only four airstrips were made accessible for the UN, out of a demand for access to 45 airstrips. However, the NPA pilot identified an airstrip controlled by Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who was then realigned with the SPLA after a long period of strained relations with John Garang\(^{220}\). Miller describes how “we did the booking and the security arrangements for the journalists. It became the big story of the summer 1998 in Europe”\(^{221}\). According to him, “a lot of NGOs didn’t have money, but the media gave a lot of focus to this”, and by talking about a ”humanitarian response of too little too late”\(^{222}\), they attracted new funds. A Norwegian academic and senior advisor to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kjell Hodnebø, also recalls how focus on Sudan picked up at that time:

“On the Norwegian side there was a clear shift during the summer of 1998, with the great famine in North and South

\(^{218}\) Interview, Christophe Ayad, journalist at the French daily newspaper Libération, Paris, 09.03.2006

\(^{219}\) Interview, Miller, NPA, Juba, 27.11.2007

\(^{220}\) Kerubino Kuanyin Bol was one of the leaders of the mutiny in the South in 1983, and number two of the SPLA for several years until he and John Garang fell out. The latter imprisoned him in 1987, and after his escape in 1992, he sided with the government in Khartoum who armed him for many years to attack Dinka villages and create a buffer zone between the SPLA areas and the oil fields.

\(^{221}\) Interview, Miller, NPA, Juba, 27.11.2007

\(^{222}\) Ibid.
Sudan, in Upper Nile and with fighting around the cities of Wau and in Bahr al Ghazal. There was a lot on it in Norwegian media and newspapers, and children on every corner were collecting money and sold their own toys to send the money to Norwegian organizations in Sudan, to save the children there. (…) Norway increased its humanitarian aid to Sudan the same year.”

The media thus contributed to reset or re-evaluate the place of the Southern conflict on the international agenda, by generating increased public awareness and funding from donors.

However, this media attention also contributed to the emergence of a political awareness on the need for a change of approach to the conflict. Although the OLS was there to provide humanitarian help, the war, the source of the human suffering, went on. In fact, the OLS was the first humanitarian program established to provide relief in the midst of an ongoing civil war and within a sovereign country. As Hødnebø testifies:

"It became clear that this war, that had been going on for almost 20 years then, could not continue, and that it was the war that was the cause of the famine, and not the drought, even if the problems of drought were also real. One had to put an end to the war, and it immediately became the Norwegian strategy to launch negotiations.”

Compared to the situation of the mid-1980’s, the media seem to have played a more proactive role in 1998 in attracting new international focus on the conflict. This was not merely a matter of their willingness to publicize the crisis or not, but mainly a matter of access: it was highly restricted in 1986-88, and it was facilitated in 1998 by the OLS in general and the NPA in particular, for the otherwise inaccessible SPLA-held areas. Also, the NPA story shows how NGOs on the ground can attract the attention of powerful media agents by facilitating their production of the perfect news story. Hence they can actively contribute to publicize a story that would otherwise remain in internal briefings at the NGOs’ headquarters in Western countries and also stimulate the spiral of financial funding that the NGOs depend on. Media agents are thus both active agents of agenda setting by themselves, and “instruments” of

223 Interview, Kjell Hødnebø, Senior Advisor at the Regional Section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 05.05.2006
225 Interview, Hødnebø, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 05.05.2006
agenda setting for other social entrepreneurs, in the field or outside, seeking to internationalize an issue.

Another humanitarian aid worker came to play an important role in championing the cause of the SPLA and more broadly the fate of the Southern Sudanese population. Roger Winter, head of the US Committee for Refugees between 1981 and 2000, was one of many humanitarians having worked in South Sudan who developed a strong relationship with the SPLA leader John Garang. Winter defended the idea of a “New Sudan”, dear to John Garang, but he also drew attention through his work to other internal and forgotten crisis in Sudan, notably the situation of Chadian refugees in Darfur in 1987 and the situation in the Nuba mountains in 1995. The US government however only had eyes and ears for South Sudan at the time.

2) The internationalization of the war in Darfur or the dilemmas of overnight international celebrity

The war in Darfur was both put in the shadow of and internationalized more rapidly because of the already existing war in South Sudan. As the first alerts on the deteriorating situation reached the outside world, diplomats engaged in the peace process in the South were more preoccupied with not spoiling the “historic opportunity” for peace between the Sudanese government and the SPLA, rather than addressing the new conflict situation. However, once the situation in Darfur really emerged under the international spotlights, it rapidly monopolized the attention of both former South Sudan activists and expert-advocates, as well as a range of new activists. This rapid celebrity would certainly not have been possible without the previous engagement for South Sudan.

The first alerts and humanitarian responses

In 2001, Roger Winter found himself working as the head of USAID’s emergency relief bureau. The same year, a drought and food crisis in Darfur led the administrator of USAID Andrew Natsios to visit the region. It wasn’t until April 2003 however that the first humanitarian operation was set up by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Roger Winter then visited Darfur, and mentioned the situation in front of the US Congress.

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226 Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.
Committee on International Relations in May 2003\textsuperscript{227}. Although the attention was still focused on South Sudan, his alert about the new conflict emerging in Darfur did enable UNICEF to organize an operation in North Darfur with funds from USAID. According to Flint and de Waal, in the beginning of 2003, there were only five humanitarian NGOs operating in Darfur. However these first alerts by the USAID helped lift restrictions on humanitarian access little by little. In September 2003, Natsios visited the region, following the Abéché ceasefire, and the USAID then committed 40 million USD in aid for the next months, a “crucial beginning\textsuperscript{228}”.

Eric Reeves, a Smith College professor in literature and a long time activist on South Sudan, was one of the first grass roots activists to register the unfolding situation in Darfur in the fall of 2003 and to try and pull the alarm. He had followed the evolution of the conflict in the South for a long time, and was highly critical of the new US envoy for Sudan, John Danforth, and his efforts to negotiate with the government in Khartoum. Reeves continued to refer to the Sudanese government as the “National Islamic Front” despite the party having changed its name years ago to the National Congress Party. On October 8, 2003, he wrote his first post on his blog denouncing the violence against civilians in Darfur: “Military assaults by Khartoum and its Arab militia allies have produced hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the region, disproportionately women and children\textsuperscript{229}”. He also cited various news briefs from the UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) and reports from Doctor’s Without Borders (MSF), the oldest sources dating from early September.

As for the war in South Sudan, the first international responses to the Darfur crisis were humanitarian in nature. Jan Egeland, UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, recounts how the first humanitarian NGOs set up emergency relief operations in September 2003, and were followed by the humanitarian section of the UN in October/November 2003\textsuperscript{230}. However, the crisis only started to attract the world public’s attention on a large-scale in early 2004 after two alarming declarations made by Egeland himself and Mukesh Kapila,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid, 169.
  \item \textsuperscript{229} Eric Reeves, “The Face of War in Darfur (Sudan): Many Tens of Thousands Flee Khartoum’s Campaign of Aerial Bombardment, Militia Attacks”, October 8, 2003, \url{http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article285-p1.html} (March 27, 2010)
  \item \textsuperscript{230} Interview, Jan Egeland, Director of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), former UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Oslo, 25.09.2007
\end{itemize}
the UN humanitarian coordinator in Khartoum. First of all, Kapila claimed in unusually
critical terms for a UN official, that: “It is more than just a conflict. It is an organised attempt
to do away with a group of people”. He also said it was the “worst humanitarian crisis in
the world today” and qualified what was happening as “ethnic cleansing”. But perhaps
more importantly, he told news channels such as the BBC and the UN IRIN that “the only
difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved”. He then managed to
arrange a visit for a dozen humanitarian experts from OCHA into Darfur, which until then had
been difficult to access. Shortly after, on April 2nd, Jan Egeland, speaking in front of the
Security Council on the basis of the fresh reports from Darfur written by the OCHA experts,
described the conflict as one of “ethnic cleansing”. He also said it was the largest
humanitarian crisis in the world where “an organized campaign (is) being undertaken of
forced depopulation of entire areas”.

Reportedly, Mukesh Kapila already knew by then that his position with the UN had not been
renewed and that he would soon leave Khartoum. This perhaps conveyed him with an extra
sense of freedom of speech, enabling him to transcend the strict controls imposed by the UN.
Jan Egeland is also known for his straightforwardness, never afraid of offending anyone with
his blunt declarations. In his biography, he writes about this first speech in front of the
Security Council and explains that despite him talking of “ethnic cleansing” and a “scorched-
earth campaign”, several members of the Security Council (China, Pakistan, Algeria)
prevented the common statement of the Council from expressing more than a simple
“concern”. This was reflected in the astonishment of the journalists reporting from the UN
headquarter. “We finally had the media attention we needed, but world leaders still did not
provide the political pressure or the physical protection that could stop the atrocities”,

231 “Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan”, BBC News, Friday 19 March, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm
232 “Sudan slams UN for ‘heap of lies’”, BBC News, April 22, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3559621.stm
233 Ibid.
234 “Sudan Violence Approaches Scale of Rwanda Genocide”, Jo Kuper, Saturday April 3, 2004,
OneWorld.net, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0403-01.htm
235 Egeland (2008), op.cit.
236 ”Sudan: Envoy warns of ethnic cleansing as Security Council calls for ceasefire”, UN News Centre, 2 April
237 Egeland (2008), op.cit., 90.
238 Ibid, 91.
Egeland pursues. Aware of the importance to have the media onboard in order to mobilize public attention and funds, and also to pressure the policy makers further, Egeland knew that the language used in his briefings to the Security Council mattered. Together, these alarming accounts, not to speak of the implicit and explicit comparisons with the genocide in Rwanda, immediately spurred enormous international media and public interest for the conflict. In an interview, Egeland says that it was from April/May 2004 that the real “CNN-effect” started on Darfur and that funding started to flow in. He however deplores the fact that once state leaders woke up, it was almost exclusively the Western countries, noting the absence of reaction from the Arab countries as well as from China. According to him, China only started to be diplomatically engaged in Darfur from 2006/2007.

In Sudan, Ken Miller from the NPA wanted to repeat his successful experience from 1998 and arranged for foreign journalists to go and see the situation in Darfur for themselves:

“\textit{In July 2004, we made a trip to the SLA areas in the Jebel Marra area. This was the first media visit to the region. The Norwegian daily “Dagbladet” was on board, along with two European TV-companies, Reuters and one other. The SLA, with Ahmed Abdul Shafi, organized our trip. He was the foreign affairs officer of Abdulwahid el Nour at that time, and Minni Minawi was the Secretary General. This was the first visit to the rebel-held South Darfur. Prior to that, Human Rights Watch had been the first to go into rebel-held areas.}^{240}\textit{.}”

Just as for the famine in South Sudan in 1998, he insists on the importance of media presence to generate funding for the humanitarian NGOs in the field. The first high-level alerts from UN officials effectively triggered more media interest, and with the help from NGOs in the field with a good knowledge of the local actors and the local terrain, such as the NPA, more media reports from the field were produced and diffused to the outside world. The media coverage of Darfur has been remarkable, both in its intensity and duration and in the mobilization of emotional images. As Peter K. Bechtold wrote in early 2009, “during the past half-decade, those Americans following international affairs have been inundated by media accounts of genocide in Darfur, supplemented by full-page advertisements in the major

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239 Interview, Egeland, NUPI, Oslo, 25.09.2007  
240 Interview, Miller, NPA, Juba, 27.11.2007
newspapers, sponsored mostly by the Save Darfur Coalition\textsuperscript{241}. The media coverage did not only attract money for the humanitarian operations however.

**The beginning of the campaign to save Darfur**

As reports on the violent attacks on civilians started to flow out from Darfur, the long-time activists, who until then had only been interested in the South, quickly stepped up in front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington to demonstrate. From late June 2004, Christian Solidarity International (CSI) arranged daily demonstrations in front of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, in cooperation with the National Council of Churches (NCC) and the Congressional Black Caucus\textsuperscript{242}. On July 14th, Black Caucus Congressman Charles Rangel and Reverend Robert W. Edgar, the General Secretary of the NCC were arrested for civil disobedience\textsuperscript{243}. Such actions, deliberately leading to the arrest of high profiled activists, have been repeated throughout many other demonstrations for Sudan. Most of all, it has been an efficient way to obtain a notice of the demonstrations in the press and on the web. During the summer months of 2004, the initial engagement for Darfur among older South Sudan activists was spread to include various other groups, from institutionalized human rights organizations to other communitarian groups. The burgeoning activism for Darfur soon became an institutionalized campaign on its own with the creation of the Save Darfur coalition in July. The coalition then became the initiator of many other activist actions, from the “Global days for Darfur” to citizen petitions to name but a few.

One important structural difference between South Sudan and Darfur, beyond the progress in information technologies that has occurred since the start of the war in the South, is that access to the area has been made easier at an earlier stage. According to Fabrice Weissman, the former head of mission of MSF in Darfur, the international pressure quickly contributed to ease the access for the aid workers. “By May 2004, the government had lifted visa and travel

\textsuperscript{241} Peter K. Bechtold, "Darfur, the ICC and American Politics", *Middle East Policy Journal*, VXI, 2, (Summer 2009), 149-163, 149.


permit restriction, and 90% percent of Darfur was open to relief assistance\textsuperscript{244}, he states. According to him, the visa procedure for Darfur in the past few years has been “better than the normal procedure to operate in northern Sudan\textsuperscript{245}”. Warnings of possible sanctions made by Colin Powell and Kofi Annan during their visits to Sudan in late June and early July 2004, led the Sudanese government to further lift restrictions on aid and relief workers in Darfur, by facilitating visa procedures and exempting humanitarian goods from customs duties. And as the access for NGOs improved, information more easily reached the outside world and international media channels as well. Although access to Darfur through Khartoum has never been easy for journalists, many accessed through Eastern Chad or simply made their reports on the Chadian side of the border areas, interviewing refugees and victims of the war fleeing the violence. Critics have pointed out that this limited access to the various stakeholders in the conflict has had a tendency to produce one-sided accounts of the war, interviewing mostly victims and much less the Arab militias, the rebel groups or even the populations not directly affected by the war\textsuperscript{246}, as we shall come back to in the next chapter.

\textit{B - Exploring the strategies of the Darfur activists: mobilizing and framing the issue}

Once the activist campaign for Darfur was initiated, the activists had different goals they sought to achieve, and these goals have also evolved over the years as some goals have been achieved and new and more specific goals have come to the fore. Initially, the main objective among the activists was to mobilize the greatest number of citizens and activists in order to put pressure on the politicians to grant sufficient attention to the humanitarian crisis. As it became clear that politicians effectively had taken the issue up on their agenda, the priority became to pressure for certain types of responses to the crisis and notably the protection of the civilians through a peacekeeping mission.


1) **Strategy number one: mobilize the greatest number**

The first objective aiming at reaching out to the greatest number of people is the result of two different, but interrelated, dynamics. First of all, pressure on policy makers to take effective action in the face of an unfolding crisis is best achieved by human rights groups and communitarian organizations through the mobilization of electorates. Secondly, both the need to mobilize widely and the need to create a lot of publicity around the cause can be summed up with one slogan: the need to “lift the silence”. The focus on the need to lift the silence in order to stop the atrocities in Darfur is again closely linked with the lessons learned from Rwanda, as the “silence” and “ignorance” of the international community have widely been defined as some of the main causes for the tragedy in 1994.

**Mobilize the greatest number as a tool of pressure on elected policy makers**

Justin Vaïsse, studying the US political system, identifies voter pressure as one of four different ways in which a pressure group can influence decision makers, be they in Congress or in the executive. The three other tools of pressure he identifies being money, lobbying and the level of organizational coherence within the group. Although elements of these other tools have also been exploited in the campaign for Darfur, most of the attention has definitely been on the voter mobilization. As explained in chapter I, the Darfur activists in the US deliberately tried to not be perceived as a communitarian movement, but as a general citizen movement in order to have a larger influence on policy makers. This does not mean that they did not mobilize along communitarian lines and by using communitarian networks already established, as much of the influence of pressure groups on the legislative and executive in the US is based precisely on mobilization along such lines. This is not only because citizens in the US are used to define themselves and to be seen as belonging to one ethnic/communitarian group or another, it is also because that is how the elected representatives are used to perceive their constituencies. An unknown number of constituents mobilizing around a given cause does not mean as much to a US Congress member as “the African-American electorate” or the “Asian electorate” pressuring for a certain policy

decision. The Darfur campaign was thus as much as any other campaign based on communitarian mobilization, and reached out to citizens through these same communitarian networks. However, as the leaders of the movement did not want to be associated with only one or two different communitarian groups, they sought to appear as a broad movement representing every different kind of electoral group. As a spokesperson of one of the Jewish organizations engaged in the Save Darfur explains:

”The interesting part about the coalition, I think, is that it does bring together a lot of faith-based, political, non-religious organizations all together. I think the value in that is... let’s say you have an entire coalition filled up with Jewish organizations, well there’s only so much you can do, there’s only so many people you can influence. And let’s say you’re going to lobby your Congressman, and you have a bunch of Jews walk into the office, and that member of Congress is going to look at you and say “alright, so I pissed off the Jews, they are like 2% of the population if they are at all part of my constituency”. But if you walk in, and you have the Christians, and you have Muslims, and you have African-Americans, and you have Asians, people who are just part of the general human rights community, well then that member of Congress is going to look at this or that group, and say “alright, I’m pissing off like seventeen different people here”. And we’re more likely to gain an influence in how he is going to approach the issue and he’s more likely to push it to the top of his agenda and get legislation to pass. And that’s where I think the value of having the (Save Darfur) coalition really started”.

Not only did the Jewish organizations initiating the Save Darfur Coalition wish for the campaign to not be associated with a ”Jewish” citizen movement, they also sought to mobilize within other groups as a mere tool to better influence members of Congress when lobbying them on Darfur. According to Hamilton and Hazlett, the public mobilization for Darfur effectively put pressure on the Congress, and at times led certain members of Congress to accept some policy outcomes in exchange for more funding or legislation on Sudan. Michael Capuano for example, a Democrat from Massachusetts, proposed an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2006 “Emergency Supplemental Funding Request”, asking for USD 50 million to the African Union force in Darfur. He had recently returned from a trip to the region, and his “amendment ran counter to entrenched political interests that might otherwise have prevented

248 Interview, NN, JCPA Public Relations Officer, New York, 12.05.2008
even him from approving it\textsuperscript{249}, as the amendment was done on a request for more funding to the war efforts in Iraq. Capuano himself slightly nuances the effect the “number of constituents” can have on him, however he admits that a group of a certain size mobilized around an issue does retain his attention. As he says in an interview with Chad Hazlett in March 2006: “I have 635,000 constituents. Even if you can get me 500 letters, I can easily walk away from 500 votes. And in truth 499 of those people are going to vote the same way anyway, because they agree with me on most other issues. But they get my attention\textsuperscript{250}. Getting the elected politicians attention could thus be obtained through the size of the group mobilized, as well as the way in which the issue was framed.

”Lift the silence”: a heritage from Rwanda fitting the logic of mobilization

The campaign for Darfur has particularly stressed the need to “lift the silence”, according to the saying that it is “the silence that kills”. This saying is strongly related to one of the main lessons drawn from the Rwandan genocide, and the international community’s failure to intervene as needed and in time, at least that is how the lesson is retained within the humanitarian and human rights communities. Samantha Power, the Harvard professor who has been among the most vocal critics of the situation in Darfur, published in 2002 a comprehensive study on the US’ reactions to the various genocides of the 1990’s. The book, entitled “A problem from hell”: America and the age of genocide, is written mostly in an engaged manner seeking to mobilize the reader. She quotes Senator Paul Simon, a Democrat from Illinois, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, who believed public pressure should have and could have played a role in alerting US decision makers and pressuring them to take action in Rwanda:

“If every member of the House of Representatives and Senate had received 100 letters from people back home saying we have to do something about Rwanda, when the crisis was first developing then I think the response would have been different\textsuperscript{251}.”

This specific quote has also retained the attention of Darfur activists, notably a NGO called Genocide Prevention International, to justify both the need for citizen mobilization, and the

\textsuperscript{249} Hamilton and Hazlett, \textit{op.cit.}, 358.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid, 358.
capacity citizens have in pressuring the decision makers. The quote seems to tell the activists that if elected decision makers are not pressured by their constituencies, they have no reason to take action either. In an article published on their website, potential and already mobilized Darfur activists are encouraged to write letters to their respective representatives and senators, as well as to the US president, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Secretary General as well as his special adviser on the prevention of genocide. To justify this incitement, they widely quote Samantha Power and her book, which indeed has become a sort of “Bible” for the Darfur activist community:

“The real reason the United States did not do what it could and should have done to stop genocide was not a lack of knowledge or influence but a lack of will. Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to. (...) The executive branch has felt no pressure from the second possible source: the home front. American leaders have been able to persist in turning away because genocide in distant lands has not captivated senators, congressional caucuses, Washington lobbyists, elite opinion shapers, grassroots groups, or individual citizens. The battle to stop genocide has thus been repeatedly lost in the realm of domestic politics. (...) As a result of this society-wide silence, officials at all levels of governments calculated that the political costs of getting involved in stopping genocide far exceeded the costs of remaining uninvolved. (...) When Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch met with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake two weeks into the Rwanda genocide, he informed her that the phones were not ringing. “Make more noise!” he urged. Because so little noise has been made about genocide, U.S. decision-makers have opposed U.S. intervention, telling themselves that they were doing all they could - and, most important, all they should - in light of competing American interests and a highly circumscribed understanding of what was domestically “possible” for the United States to do.

The incitement to “make more noise” was not picked up by activists at the time, in 1994, also due to the rapidity with which the genocide occurred in Rwanda. It was however picked up by Darfur activists ten years later.

Struggling to “lift the silence” is understood in the sense of political, media and public silence, and the aim of the campaigners has been to create as much public “noise” around the


253 Power (2002), op.cit., 508-509. (The quote is here presented the way the Genocide Prevention International has reproduced it on its website, highlighting the same passages, only punctually corrected in comparison with the original text).
issue as possible in order to “disturb” policy makers and make them react to the crisis. Samantha Powers writes about “bystanders” and “upstanders”, referring to those who do nothing and just watch, and those who raise their voices when faced with human atrocities or genocides. The activists first of all believe, with the lessons taught by Samantha Power in mind, that if a sufficiently large part of the population mobilizes and calls for action on Darfur and become “upstanders”, then policy makers will have a real self-interest in addressing attention to the issue. It is true that public pressure will not necessarily lead to immediate and concerted action; however, the political cost of not acting is effectively increased. There is also another belief among human rights activists motivating them to “make more noise”, which is that “lifting the silence” carries an intrinsic value. According to the activists, spreading the word about the crimes perpetrated in Darfur is a way of “naming and shaming” the perpetrators. The underlying message is that this will make it more difficult for the perpetrators to pursue their crimes, since they are no longer shielded by the world’s ignorance. This is a belief shared by many high ranking international officials and diplomats, as we can see with Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, saying: “What message does silence bring to the victims in Darfur? What message does the silence bring to the perpetrators?”

The activists believe that “lifting the silence” is closely linked with the obligation to hold accountable the perpetrators of the crimes. John Prendergast and Don Cheadle have in the same vein chosen a powerful quote by Professor Elie Wiesel, a Nobel Laureate and survivor of the Holocaust, to figure on the cover of their book: “Remember: silence helps the killer, never his victims.”

“Celebrities” engaging and motivating “regular citizens” to take action

The objective of “lifting the silence” is both an action in itself and a tool for the activists to reach other objectives, more directly concerning the situation on the ground: trigger responses from policy makers, send peacekeepers to the region, search for an end to the conflict. “Lifting the silence” is however the action the activists have the greatest possibility to achieve by themselves, produced by their efforts to reach out and raise public awareness. Precisely because of that, and because it is the most visible aspect of the campaign, it has often been presented as an aim in itself. Also, the objective goes hand in hand with the idea that “each

255 Prendergast and Cheadle, op.cit., on the backcover of the book.
and everyone” can contribute to make a difference. As David Rosenberg writes on the Save Darfur Blog, “You can’t do enough, but you’ve got to do something256”. He also refers to the Darfuri diaspora and advocacy leaders who “assure with passion that we have already helped save lives in Darfur257”. This illustrates an underlying idea of the campaign for Darfur: if a sufficiently large constituency can be made aware of the situation in Darfur and mobilize to raise further awareness, it will have a direct impact on the situation on the ground.

An interesting example of the "individualization" of the campaign to "Save Darfur" is the above-mentioned book published by the renowned activist and former member of the Clinton administration, John Prendergast and Hollywood actor Don Cheadle. Entitled Not On Our Watch: The mission to end genocide in Darfur and beyond, the book details their “mission” to end the crisis in Darfur258. In the book, everything is thought out to seduce the reader that they too can make a difference by getting involved. The cover of the book carries a publicity note that very well resumes the spirit of the book: “Includes six ways you can help today”. The “tools of pressure” they propose all have in common the fact that they favor actions that individual citizens can “do” on their own in order to make a small difference. They are of both political and economic nature: 1) raise awareness, 2) raise funds, 3) write a letter (to elected officials), 4) call for divestment, 5) join an organization, 6) lobby the government. Under the first of these “things you can do immediately”, raising awareness, it is suggested that the activists ”stay informed, and inform others, about what’s going on in Darfur” and that they ”subscribe to the latest news from organizations working to stop the atrocities”, where they mention organizations such as GI-Net, STAND, Save Darfur and Africa Action259. These advocacy groups all send out suggestions of events to attend and actions to take for the activists. To raise awareness, it is also suggested that the newly engaged citizen ”write an op-ed or letter to the editor of your local newspaper”, or even ”write to the TV networks and encourage them to cover Darfur”260. Another political tool is to lobby the government, and here the authors suggest that the activists find out about their representative’s record on Darfur, ask focused questions and meet with elected government officials.

257 Ibid.
258 Prendergast and Cheadle, op.cit.
259 Ibid, 245.
260 Ibid, 246.
The constant search for more direct ways of influencing the situation in Sudan, instead of waiting for diffuse measures to be taken by the policy makers, has led to the success of the divestment campaign that sprang out from the student’s movement. By mobilizing to call shareholders in their respective colleges who also had shares in companies investing in Sudan, and ask them to “divest” from Sudan, the students found a unique possibility to take action in their own hands. Luke A. Patey shows that this part of the activist campaign was extremely efficient, reaching federal legislation within three years as President George W. Bush signed the Sudan Divestment and Accountability Act into law on December 31st, 2007. In comparison with earlier divestment campaigns directed at the Apartheid regime in South Africa, this was a “remarkable achievement (which) was spurred on by the wonders of Google and YouTube, employing sophisticated methods of divestment targeting”. However, Patey argues that the “Sudan Divestment model was more designed towards success in the United States than influence in Sudan”, as it didn’t manage to influence the activities of Asian companies in Sudan for example, which are mainly governmental companies highly resistant to Western activist pressure.

As for the book co-written by Prendergast and Cheadle, which became a New York Times best-seller, the combination of an experienced activist having worked for a previous government, and a Hollywood actor whose job it is to move his audience, seemed as the perfect combination to reach out to “regular citizens”. In an effort to personalize the message and to make himself more familiar to the reader, Prendergast does not hesitate to tell how he is inspired by superheroes from cartoons who want to restore peace and justice in the world. As for Don Cheadle, he learned about Darfur when Hotel Rwanda was released in the US, the movie in which he played the role of Paul Rusesabagina, a hotel owner in Rwanda who hid over a thousand Tutsi and moderate Hutu survivors in his hotel during the Rwandan genocide. As the movie received unexpected success, Don Cheadle was contacted by a congressman, Ed Royce, from Orange County, telling him that the movie could “be a rallying point around which to draw attention to the recent troubles in Darfur”. That’s how he learned about the “genocide” going on in Sudan, and in January 2005, he was invited to join a Congressional delegation on a trip to Eastern Chad to witness firsthand the effects of the genocide. However,

262 Ibid.
it is in their effort to touch “regular citizens” and engage a broad range of people to the activist ranks that these celebrities - George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, not to speak about the most dedicated “celebactivist”, Mia Farrow - have played their most important role. When a celebrity appears in the heroic role of the witness on the ground, be it in press reports or documentaries, it adds “newsworthiness” to the story and generates greater interest among journalists as well as the greater public. As Alex de Waal writes, a “celebrity playing a humanitarian role, such as Farrow does, acts as a bridge between a (Western) audience and a faraway tragedy. She is a focus for empathy, an emotional interpreter.”

Not only is it easy for these celebrities to spread their message in the media (through op-eds, interviews, press conferences and so on, as they return from the field), their very celebrity makes their testimonies likely to be read and listened to by a far larger audience than classic war reports confined to the “International” pages of newspapers usually do. The familiar appearance of the celebrity makes the issue easier to identify with. George Clooney reportedly said in front of the enormous crowd at the April 2006 rally in Washington: “This is in fact the first genocide of the 21st century, but there is hope: all of you.” Figures that teenagers and many others look up to declaring that “you can make a difference too” indeed had a powerful effect on the engagement of scores of new recruits to the movement, and for many of them, this was the first political cause they had become engaged for.

“Darfur” as an issue has also become an item embraced by the popular culture itself. Several pop songs have been made to shed light on Darfur; one notable example is the British duo “Mattafix” who released a song called “Living Darfur” in the fall of 2007. With a vested socio-political consciousness, they were approached by “some human rights lawyers and Crisis Action to get involved on Darfur, resulting in a video shot in a refugee camp in Eastern Chad. The video clip shows scenes from Darfur, where Hollywood actor Matt Damon also appears. The message is mainly one of breaking the silence, or “where others turn and sigh, you shall rise” as the refrain goes. Another artist that has ventured into political engagement and awareness rising through her music is the French rapper Princess Anies. In


her song entitled “Au carrefour de la douleur” (At the crossroads of pain), she goes much further than Mattafix in describing both the suffering of the Darfuris and the history of the region. However, the main theme is still about lifting the silence, while responsibilizing those who remain silent (“And blood on the hands of all those who remain silent”267). Darfur has appeared in other mediums of popular culture as well, notably in several TV series, such as in an episode of “ER” as well as “Boston Legal”. In the episode of ER, the very popular TV show from an urban teaching hospital, the character of Dr. Carter travels to Darfur to treat the suffering in a refugee camp. In the episode of Boston Legal, the lawyer Lori Colson represents a Sudan-born client, who wishes to sue the US government for not having done more to stop what had by then already been qualified as a “genocide”. The episode clearly conveys the message that the US government has a legal responsibility to act. These TV episodes and pop songs show well how broadly the “message about Darfur” has spread, firstly because the song writers and script writers choose to focus on this issue, and secondly, because these cultural vehicles have the capacity to reach a very large audience. They have also picked up a central message of the Save Darfur campaign, the very idea that the Americans and the US have a responsibility to take action in the face of mass violence and especially genocide. Popular culture in general has hence played a tremendous role in “breaking the silence” and setting “Darfur” on the agenda, and thus also in furthering the emergence of the norm of internationalization.

2) Means to reach the goal: frame and name the issue

The activists, along with media agents covering the Darfur crisis, have been active in diffusing clear and understandable narratives of the conflict, as well as to put forward the characteristics most likely to mobilize a larger audience. The naming process is not a strategy in the sense of the aim to “lift the silence”, which has been clearly and deliberately stated by the activists as part of their effort to “save Darfur”. The naming process is less easily controlled by the activists and is not expressed as a deliberate strategy, although considerable efforts have been deployed to ensure that the crisis is called by its “right” name: “genocide”. The efforts to name and frame the issues at stake have also been crucial tools to fulfill the

objective of lifting the silence, as the right framing increases the likeliness of attracting a broader public attention as well as of exerting efficient pressure on policy makers.

**Theoretical approaches to “framing” as a tool for mobilization**

Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross show how initiators seeking to place an issue on the formal agenda resort to framing strategies, redefining the issue within larger mobilizing frameworks. In the issue “expansion” phase, where activists seek to attract the attention of larger groups within the public than simply the immediate identification group (cf. chapter I), the framing is particularly important. According to the authors:

> “An important strategy in issue expansion is to associate a particular issue with emotionally laden symbols which have a wide acceptance in the society. In America both the civil rights and women’s liberation movements have stressed the symbols of equality; in Ireland, groups seeking independence for Ulster have stressed the notion of a “united free country”.

Some concepts or ideas indeed have a broader appeal than what a concrete issue may have in and by itself, and as such the process of associating the specific issue with high standing values with a broad appeal is crucial for the expansion of the support to a cause. The mobilization around Darfur has successfully managed to associate this cause with the broader struggles against “genocides”, war crimes (and their impunity), as well as racial discrimination.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink also write about the role of the activists, or “norm entrepreneurs”, in framing the issues they mobilize around, “by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes”. These processes of reinterpretation and redefinition of the issues, referred to as the ”framing” in the social movements theories, have played a crucial role in the Darfur activists’ efforts to attract attention and support to their issue. As seen in chapter I, scholarly work on media and agenda setting tend to show that there are few observations of media’s capacity to tell its audience exactly what to think; rather media plays the role of pointing out what to think about. This seems to be only partly true in the case of activist mobilization attracting attention to the situation in Sudan. The specific frames of analysis of the Sudanese conflicts created in the interaction between media agents and civil

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268 Cobb, Ross and Ross, *op.cit.*, 131.

269 Finnemore and Sikkink, *op.cit.*, 897.
society activists, as well as the precise context in which these frames have been used, has had two main effects: first, they have had a significant meaning for the types of socio-political groups that have become mobilized, secondly, they have to a large extent contributed to shape what the public has been thinking about South Sudan and Darfur. Exactly “what” the public thinks is of course subject to individual variations, however the frames of analysis that have been created as a result of activist mobilization and media coverage have strongly oriented the general understanding the public has had of the situation. As shall be argued in the last chapter, the general frames used to understand and qualify the situation in Darfur have also conditioned the actions of policy makers. They could agree or disagree with the public framings, but they have had to take them into consideration when formulating their policy priorities, as well as when communicating about them.

In other words, media agents not only set issues on the agenda, they also frame these issues in a specific way, underlining certain problematic aspects of a broader issue. Then the public makes up its own opinion. The very narrative of the “core problem” of an issue, the aspects that are highlighted, and those that are ignored, as well as the perspective chosen, all contribute to create certain images (with certain colors and shapes so to say) in the minds of the public. The same influence also goes for the leaders of the advocacy groups working on Sudan, as they have been heavily influential in shaping the conflict narratives that have prevailed both on the “grassroots” level and on the political levels in Western countries. As will explored in the next chapter, the differences in access to first-hand sources in the field have also shaped the different ways in which media agents, human rights NGOs and humanitarian organizations have told the “story” about Darfur.

**Simple narratives as a tool to increase public attention**

The first media reports from Darfur tended to portray the conflict in terms of a clear-cut separation between victims and perpetrators, Africans and Arabs, of ethnic cleansing and of genocide. With time and as more detailed information reached the outside world, more nuanced reports have been accessible, in the media or through human rights organizations. However, the initial framework of understanding adopted by many leading activists has been particularly resistant to nuances that have been proposed to the initial and simplified story of the conflict. This has certainly to do with the strong emotions the initial accounts of the conflict triggered, and a fear among some activists that nuancing the story about Darfur could
lead to a loss of support, and limit their outreach. As a UN official in New York puts it, when speaking about different personalities engaged in the information campaign on Darfur: “you don’t mobilize people by telling them how complex the situation is”.

Horrors of African wars have been reported on Western TV channels and in newspapers many times before, but the level of attention is highly variable. Mahmood Mamdani poses the rhetorical question of: “Why the contrast between the relative silence that greets most African wars and the global publicity boom around the carnage in Darfur?” Indeed, the type and level of media coverage and of public mobilization seem to be interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Mamdani draws on two other humanitarian crisis in Africa having received only insignificant media coverage to point out the exceptionality of the extensive coverage of Darfur: “Congo, like Angola, is the norm. Darfur is the exception. With Darfur, media reports on Africa entered the arena of grand narratives”. His explanation to this unprecedented media attention is mainly based on the fact that an apolitical, simplified and black-and-white narrative organized around the central qualification of “genocide” was soon developed to describe what was happening in Darfur. Peter K. Bechtold in the same vein blames the journalists reporting on Darfur for giving an un-nuanced picture of the situation, as they “arrived in the region and filed stories about malnourished children, their mothers too frightened to leave camps to collect firewood, and tales of rape and murder”. To illustrate his argument, he refers to two European scholars using the concept of “helicopter journalists” to describe the news coverage of the crisis in Darfur. Although some journalists stayed through longer and produced more thoughtful analysis, according to Bechtold “journalists who wrote about alleged Arab savagery were given print and air time, while those who actually spent weeks rather than days in the area and reported a more complex situation were bypassed in the major media and had to resort to the blogosphere for publication”. This observation may be valid in many conflict situations, where the journalists who portray the issues at stake in clear, simple and recognizable terms are given more space than those who want to point out the “complex and nuanced” picture. It is however illustrative of the little space left to discuss and nuance the dominant narrative about Darfur.

270 Interview, PV, former UN official, New York, 24.04.2008
271 Mamdani (2009), op.cit., 21.
272 Ibid.
273 Bechtold, op.cit., 161.
274 Ibid.
To understand the role played by simple narratives in generating mobilization, a comparison with the international attention to the war in Iraq is relevant. As Mahmood Mamdani writes in the spring 2007, “the most powerful mobilization in New York City is in relation to Darfur, not Iraq. One would expect the reverse, for no other reason than most New Yorkers are American citizens and should so feel directly responsible for the violence in occupied Iraq275”. His comparison between the two conflicts is interesting, because as opposed to Iraq, which is an issue that divides, “Darfur” is an issue for which there is agreement across political boundaries276. It is not a sensitive issue like Iraq, since there are no American troops present, and last but not least, Darfur is a conflict where it is seemingly easy to point out the “bad guys” and those who should “be saved”. As Mamdani analyzes:

“This is a messy place in the American imagination, a place with messy politics. Americans worry about what their government should do in Iraq. Should it withdraw? What would happen if it did? In contrast, there is nothing messy about Darfur. It is a place without history and without politics; simply a site where perpetrators clearly identifiable as ‘Arabs’ confront victims clearly identifiable as ‘Africans’277.”

Darfur has in other words become an issue where taking position is easy, since condemning the atrocities seems to be the only viable response. Darfur has also become an issue opposing unambiguous moral poles, of good against evil, where the only good thing to do for “outsiders” is to denounce the atrocities, to become “upstanders”, to use Power’s expression.

As seen in chapter I on the media coverage of the Ethiopian famine, the framing chosen by the journalists and the images they obtain access to is determinant of the level of attention the issue receives within the public. When it comes to the media coverage of Darfur, some individual journalists have come to play a crucial role in placing Darfur high on the agenda and ensuring that it stayed there for a long time. Nicholas D. Kristof, a New York Times columnist, is perhaps the most important one. He won his second Pulitzer Prize in 2006 for commentary, for, in the words of the judges, “his graphic, deeply reported columns that, at personal risk, focused attention on genocide in Darfur and that gave voice to the voiceless in other parts of the world278”. A number of activists and “regular citizens” do indeed refer to the

276 See for example the joint statement by the three former candidates to the US Presidency, Hillary Rodham Clinton, John McCain and Barack Obama, “We Stand United on Sudan”, Save Darfur Coalition, http://www.savedarfur.org/page/content/Candidates_Statement/ (Accessed June 11, 2010)
277 Ibid.
first reports they read in the newspapers, and especially the op-eds by Kristof, in order to explain how and why they became engaged in the cause. A family father, Carl Wilkens, who lived with his wife and small children in Rwanda when the genocide broke out in 1994, gives an interesting account:

“I remember first reading about Darfur from Nicholas Kristof. As he described a mom and her now fatherless children fleeing the killers it brought back all kinds of memories… no, no… not again…279”.

Although Wilkens with his background and experience was more likely to understand the severity of the situation, it still shows how Kristof was able to frame the crisis by putting forward characteristics reminiscent of Rwanda and hence spur citizen engagement. The rapprochement with the genocide in Rwanda ten years earlier was probably the single most mobilizing characteristic, whether it was referred to explicitly or implicitly, in media reports or advocacy briefings.

**Rhetoric of “genocide” and “a new Rwanda” to pressure governments**

The world’s bad conscience about its own silence during the genocide in Rwanda had given “the need for international reactions” and “never again” a new meaning. Taking this into account, as well as the intensity of the violence in Darfur in mid-2003, one could actually say that it is strange that the international attention given to Darfur came so late. It however shows the importance of the framing and the timing: the first alerts in April 2004 comparing Darfur to the situation in Rwanda ten years earlier. The combination of such comparisons in a context where world leaders prepared their speeches of commemoration of the Rwandan genocide revealed to be an explosive one. In fact, the way the conflict, once it moved out of the shadow and into the international spotlight, did so almost over the night is remarkable.

One can distinguish between different qualifications used to describe the situation in Darfur, from “ethnic cleansing” to “crimes against humanity”, “war crimes”, “scorched earth” tactics and “depopulation campaigns” and finally “genocide”. The qualification of “genocide” has

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/editorialsandoped/oped/columnists/nicholasdkristof/index.html
(Accessed June 11, 2010)

formally only been used by US politicians (in addition to activists in the US and in Europe alike). It has however not been used by the UN, the EU nor any of the European governments, who chose to stick with the conclusions of the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur, released in January 2005. The intense debate that has followed around the question of whether genocide has taken place or not has however not altered the beliefs of most activists. They have easily written off “experts’” or government officials’ attempts to nuance this qualification as refusals to admit the truth and to take responsibility for the situation. While some NGOs or authors writing about Darfur have left the so-called “G-word” out, the continued references to the “ethnic” motivated violence, as well as the asymmetry of the parties confronting each other, have continued to feed the idea of Darfur as a “new Rwanda”.

Some of the force in the very the notion of “genocide” is that once it is claimed by a few powerful actors, it is politically difficult to “come back”, to nuance and to discuss it. All US diplomats and envoys who have attempted, not to nuance, but simply to avoid using the genocide terminology (notably Robert Zoellick, in the spring 2005, and Scott Gration in 2009), have been met with severe criticism from the NGO and activist community. The same goes for the numbers of victims claimed in Darfur, a question that has been the subject of almost as much debate and polemics as the genocide term. John Hagan, one of the authors of the Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS), a study commissioned by the US State Department and carried out by an NGO alliance, the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), advanced in the spring 2005 the number of 350,000-400,000 deaths. This is the number that has been the most widely used by NGOs and activists, and is based on the findings of the survey conducted during a month among Darfuri refugees in Chad in the late summer 2004. Mahmood Mamdani, representing the opposite side in this debate, refers to a review carried


282 Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, op. cit.
out by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a US governmental agency mandated with auditing other government agencies. He shows that the GAO found that the numbers advanced notably by Eric Reeves and Johan Hagan were highly exaggerated, pointing to methodological shortcomings, notably in their extrapolation techniques. The GAO however declared the study carried out by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), a WHO affiliate, to be the most trustworthy. Its estimate ranged between 131,000 (excess deaths) and 158,000 in more or less the same time period (September 2003 – June 2005). John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond however argue that different agencies use different techniques to count the number of victims, thus advancing that health oriented research tends to under-report compared to crime-oriented research. The dispute did not stop there, as the European Sudanese Public Affairs Council (ESPAC), among critics and activists seen as close to Khartoum, in 2007 filed a complaint against the Save Darfur Coalition to the British Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), challenging the Save Darfur Coalition’s claim of “400,000” deaths in Darfur. The ASA concluded that the Save Darfur Coalition should make it clearer in their ads that this number was subject to debate and represented a certain opinion. The debate is serious, and has large implications, notably in terms of jurisprudence for criminal investigators and concerning “how to count”. Politically however, it has the tendency to translate into a test of the positions of the different stakeholders, where those who put into question or seek nuance given numbers, or refer to lower estimates are soon considered as “serving Khartoum’s cause”. The numbers and the rhetoric of genocide, despite the critiques raised, thus remain powerful when it comes to shaping the public’s “idea” about Darfur.

The qualification of “genocide” or of a “new Rwanda” strikes at the heart of the sense of guilt that has been widespread among political leaders in the West since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. As Lydia Polgreen writes in an article of the New York Times:

“Darfur holds the world’s gaze because of that magic word, genocide. The word, implying that there are clear criminals and clear victims, has been perhaps the single greatest attention-getter for efforts, however feeble, to end the fighting and organize relief efforts, even though the fighting has lately turned in directions that

283 Mamdani (2009), op.cit.
indicate the situation was never so clear-cut."

The fact that the conflict was seemingly “new” obviously made it more “newsworthy”, however it was the fact that it was compared to the conflict in Rwanda that had the greatest impact on the way it was covered in the media, not to speak about the extent of the coverage. Nicholas Kristof’s first op-ed on Darfur was published on March 24, 2004, and carried the title: “Ethnic cleansing, Again”. He referred to Kapila’s comparison with Rwanda and called on the UN Security Council and the “world community” to stop the “pogroms”. Deborah Murphy has studied the chronicles and op-eds written on Darfur between March and September 2004, in four of the biggest US newspapers, and shows that even if the authors often do recognize the complexity of the issues at stake, there are few deviations from the first account made by Kristof. She describes a recurrent narrative assigning polarized identities to the “Africans” and the “Arabs”, usually describing the situation as one of genocide, and presuming that the government controls the violence. According to her, this simplified version of the conflict probably explains for a great part the success that the human rights activists have had in attracting attention to Darfur.

The story of Carl Wilkens mentioned above, and his wife, Teresa, is interesting and illustrative of many other activist trajectories. Together, they were honored as “Darfur Heroes” by the Save Darfur Coalition, a program started in 2007 destined to highlight “individuals and groups who play a crucial role in helping end the violence in Darfur through awareness-raising and other efforts”. When reading what Kristof wrote about Darfur, ten years after his family was evacuated from Rwanda while he chose to stay through, Carl Wilkens decided that now he was part of that “rest of the world” he once blamed for inaction.


those Samantha Power calls “bystanders”. He quickly grasped the opportunity “to do something”, and from 2004 onwards he has traveled extensively to speak about the Rwanda/Darfur genocides, a part-time activity that became a full-time occupation in early 2008. Indeed, Wilkens’ story on the one hand and the Save Darfur Coalition’s idea of electing “Darfur Heroes” (people outside Darfur) is another example of the individualization of the activist campaign, following the message that “each and everyone can make a small difference”.

The media coverage of Darfur, as well as the attention from the general public and specialized organizations has been high over a long period of time. This has also allowed citizens particularly devoted to the cause and professional advocates to continue to learn about the different dynamics and complexities of the conflict. A more detailed understanding of the stakes of the conflict has developed over the years of activism, however, the very center of the narrative, the idea of a “genocide” and of an asymmetric confrontation, has remained as the focal points. A point should thus be added to Mamdani’s comparison between the mobilization against the war in Iraq as well as the mobilization for an intervention in Darfur mentioned above. By looking at the mobilization against the war in Iraq prior to the American invasion, as well as the mobilization all along for Darfur, one realizes that there is one thing public mobilization, engaged citizens and activists have achieved: imposing the qualification of the conflicts. While the US invasion in Iraq as a result has since been seen as fundamentally illegitimate, at least partly in the US, and to a very large extent internationally, the situation in Darfur has, as a result of the first alerts and the following activist framing, been defined as the “new Rwanda”. This qualification refers both to the genocidal nature of the conflict and the need for or lack of response by Western great powers.

C - How solidarity with a distant population emerges: from specific identification to a generalized norm on internationalizing human suffering

As we have seen in the previous section, the framing of the conflict in Darfur has played a significant role in mobilizing large segments of the population in the US, just as it has engaged citizens and activists in Europe. The framing of the crisis has been overwhelmingly done in morally clear and politically unambiguous terms, making it touch people based on a
sense of solidarity with “fellow human beings”. The framing of the war in South Sudan was different. Although it too carried elements sensitizing people outside Sudan purely on the basis of their solidarity and empathy with fellow human beings, it also tended to mobilize people along lines of identification with the victims, either as fellow believers or as sharing a common destiny.

1) On solidarity: from Durkheim to transnational solidarity in a globalized world

The emergence of solidarity, as a feeling of empathy with fellow human beings, has been conceptualized in many different forms throughout history. From “compassion” and “charity”, to the idea of the “good Samaritan” or the different forms of “philanthropy”, the concepts expressing the bonding between those who witness the suffering of others, and who have the means to help, and those who are subject to this suffering, are many. They have played a great role as Christian and more generally as religious terms, but have also been picked up by secular movements. Luc Boltanski is interested in how these feelings of empathy appear when there is a (considerable) distance between those who suffer and those who don’t, that is when the “victim” and the “spectator” do not necessarily meet. He refers to Hannah Arendt who conceptualizes the terms “compassion” as the feeling towards those who are near, and “pity” as the feeling towards those who are far away. He also refers to different norms for assistance to the suffering, from the “Good Samaritan” (who acts out of moral “goodness”: he is not charged if he does not assist the suffering), to the principle written down in French law of the “obligation of assistance to a person in danger”, initially applicable when the non-suffering actually find themselves face to face with the suffering, but which can also be seen as a norm having infused into contemporary talks of international humanitarianism.

Boltanski also refers to another type of bond between the “unfortunate” and those who are aware of the others’ unfortunate, which is when there is a pre-established bond (of kinship or community) between the two, a relationship that alters (increases even) the sense of obligation between the suffering and the non-suffering. He is however interested in how the politics of pity appear, between people with no pre-existing relations, which according to him requires a sense of solidarity.

290 Boltanski, op.cit.
dimension of generalization of those who suffer. The paradox is however that pity “is not inspired by generalities”. Boltanski writes that although the subject of “pity” could be “anyone”, for this feeling to be triggered and sustained, a combination of individual destinies (the image of an orphan child, or a crying mother for example) and general statistics and numbers (the same has happened to x number of people, cf. the debate on the number of deaths in Darfur as discussed above) must be conveyed to the international audience. It should be added that although the solidarity with these victims is expressed along the lines of empathy with fellow human beings’ suffering, the fact that those suffering appear as victims, as helpless and without defense, in the face of an enemy disproportionately larger than them, is important for the sentiment of transnational pity to develop.

To understand the emergence of an international solidarity movement for Sudan, it is interesting to dwell on this distinction between what we can call “communitarian” and “universalistic” motivations for engagement and empathy, or the “mechanic” and the “organic” solidarity of Durkheim. Indeed, comparing the solidarity movement formed in the 1990’s in support of the people of South Sudan, with the solidarity movement formed since 2004 in support of the Darfuris, reveals these two types of solidarities, at least if we look at how the reasons for engagement are expressed and justified by the activists themselves. The motivations for engagement are on the one hand justified by a sense of identification and proximity (which can be divided into two sub-groups: one is based on a shared identity label, e.g. “Christian”, “Africans”, and one based on a sense of a shared destiny, e.g. “slavery”, “genocide”), and on the other hand they are justified by general “pity”, with fellow human beings’ suffering. Revealing these two types of justifications poses the question of whether there is a fundamental difference in motivation, between that of the solidarity linking Christian communities and African-Americans with the people of South Sudan and that of the solidarity linking the “Save Darfur” activists in general with the Darfuris?

292 Boltanski, *op.cit.*, 11.
293 Ibid.
294 Badie (2008), *op.cit.*
295 It should be noted that the term “pity” is here translated from the French term “pitié”, which is slightly less condescending than the English term. Alternatives might be “compassion” and “empathy”, however, for the sake of coherence, I choose here to use the term as used by Arendt and as translated in the English version of Boltanski’s book.
To better understand the different types of solidarity expressed, it is relevant to look back at Emile Durkheim’s lesson on solidarity. In his classic 1893 book[^296], *De la division du travail social*, he distinguishes between the mechanic solidarity of traditional societies – that is a sense of solidarity with those who share the same values, who are similar to us – and the organic solidarity of modern societies. The latter emerged with the establishment of a social contract based on the division of labor in industrialized societies. This form is defined as the solidarity between those with complementary activities and functions, but who do not necessarily share values. This solidarity is more abstract than the mechanic solidarity, since it is based on the recognition of the other as a member of the same society, but they do not necessarily need to interact in their everyday lives or share the same values. The central aspect of this solidarity is that it is based on a sense not only of complementarity, but also of interdependence between those who are connected by this form of solidarity.

These concepts of solidarity describe different forms of relationships mutually linking individuals in a society. The “solidarity” we talk of when describing the involvement of individuals in North America and Europe wanting to “do something” to alleviate the suffering of fellow human beings in Sudan however, is a transnational and not necessarily mutual form of solidarity. First of all, it transcends international borders and links together individuals who do not live in the same society, at least as long as we’re not speaking about a “global village society”. Secondly, it is a one-way solidarity, that is those who express solidarity with victims of the war choose to do so, and the victims of the war do not choose their “saviors”, nor do they necessarily express a similar form of solidarity in return (and they might also not be aware of the mobilization they are subject to). However, we could argue that the international solidarity expressed across confessional lines or a shared identity is an internationalized form of mechanic solidarity, since the justification for the solidarity is based on the argument of the victims being “fellows” of some kind. From fellow believers to people sharing a fellow destiny of slavery or discrimination, or even genocide, the solidarity expressed is done so on the basis of shared values and the feeling of being the likes of the victims of the violence. Then, the solidarity expressed on grounds of “moral duty” by individuals in the privileged parts of the world for groups of victims in less privileged parts of the world, without any such sense of shared identity or destiny, could be paralleled with Durkheim’s concept of organic solidarity. It is a solidarity linking individuals because they are part of the same society (here

a transnational/global society), and in their quality of being different and even complementary. In the case of the international solidarity movement for Darfur, the Western “saviors”, to use Mamdani’s expression, are inherently different from their Darfuri “survivors”, and they even complement each other (“savior and survivor297”). The one couldn’t be what it is without the other; however, their relationship is not personal or based on some sort of shared identity.

The last section of this chapter will show that both types of solidarities exist in both movements, for South Sudan and for Darfur, and can also co-exist as dual motivations for the same activists (the two types of motivations are not mutually exclusive). It will also be argued that the usage of “communitarian” rhetoric to justify the mobilization of some is not so much based on a fundamentally different motivation or sense of solidarity with those who use a “universalistic” discourse. Both are based on a feeling of “pity” regarding people suffering far away. Although different elements of the suffering conveyed from afar can trigger the attention of different types of people (Christians persecuted in South Sudan triggering the attention of Christian movements in the West), the main difference is how different interest groups justify their engagement and how they use these justifications to legitimate their engagement and constitute themselves as coherent and influential groups within their own societies.

2) Solidarity along lines of a feeling of proximity: groups of identification and of shared destinies

The identification with the victims of the conflict in South Sudan on the basis of a feeling of proximity was mainly done along two lines: (1) a solidarity with fellow Christian believers (and as an extension to the Animist part of the population too, who were at least “non-Muslim” and in the eyes of some Christian organizations, seen as potential converts to Christianity), and (2) a solidarity based on the sense of a shared destiny as victims of slavery. Some activists mobilized for the sake of the victims of the Darfur crisis have also stressed a sense of a shared destiny, mainly among Jewish activists sensitized by the “genocide” in Darfur. As we shall see here, indentifying some of the motivations behind the engagement of those who mobilize is useful to understand the very formation of the broad coalitions of

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297 Mamdani (2009), op.cit.
activists and the possible effects they may have on policy makers. The stated motivations are interesting in and by themselves, but should however also be understood in the context of the various groups’ search for influence and recognition in their own societies.

Herrmann and Palmieri have studied the actions of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the face of genocides, from 1904 to 1994, and show how the organization in its beginning was influenced both by the types of victims and the reactions of the public opinion at home, in Switzerland and in Europe. It is an interesting argument, knowing that the ICRC today is the non-governmental organization most attached to the principles of neutrality, credited precisely for this. As they write:

“The major factor, determining the degree of preoccupation for the victim, can be expresses in terms of geographical, “ethnic”, cultural or ideological proximity. The more the identification is easy and multidimensional, the more the victims will be considered as such; the more the differentiation is easy and less the suffering will be recognized298.”

In this perspective, it should be noted that the very names and characteristics used to describe the victims of the Sudanese conflicts are “universal” terms, carrying the potential of broad international recognition. From the identities of “Christians” in the South and “Africans” (vs. “Arabs”) in Darfur, to the sense of being “victims of slavery” and “victims of genocide” are identities that go far beyond the Sudanese borders. They thus carry from the beginning the potential to internationalize the conflicts, something the specific names of the tribes for example wouldn’t have had to the same extent.

The religious aspect of the war in South Sudan and the appeal to Christian Americans and Europeans

The war in South Sudan was in the 1990’s in international forums usually presented in terms of a religious confrontation between the Islamist regime in the North and the Christian and animist population in the South. The perception of this conflict, as based on a clash between religious identities, considerably influenced Christian solidarity circles in the West. This is not to say that the religious persecution dimension of the war in the South was non-existent. On the contrary, it has been confirmed by the stories told by South Sudanese refugees settled

in Europe and the United States, insisting on the religious oppression as a reason for their escape\textsuperscript{299}. This has, in turn, asserted the Western audience’s perception of the issues at stake in the war. However, as Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos writes, “understanding the hostilities in South Sudan as a war of religions would be extremely reductionist\textsuperscript{300}”. Religious persecution or domination was not the main motivation for the resumption of the rebellion in the South in 1983, in fact the Sharia was imposed on the whole of Sudan six months after the formation of the SPLA. Furthermore, the SPLA did not identify itself as a Christian movement during the 1980’s (rather a Marxist movement), and only operated a redefinition of its pledges and allegiances in the early 1990’s, as part of a search for new allies internationally. However, the dominance from the North and the imposition of Sharia and other Islamic practices in the South, as well as a religious discourse by the leaders in Khartoum moving up a notch after the coup in 1989, all in all clearly symbolized the relationship of dominance by the North over the South. Although different parameters make up the total unbalance of power between the two, it was easier both for the South Sudanese themselves as well as for the Western public, to focus on the religious aspect of the domination.

This is important to understand the mobilization of Christian groups in the US as well as in Europe. Seeing themselves as endowed with a special moral duty to intervene to protect their fellow believers, the first missionaries who became aware of the war in South Sudan were quickly seized of the issue. It was also easy for them to mobilize other Christians in the US or in Europe. First of all, the more politically engaged Christians (members of Christian organizations or lobby groups), but also a broader constituency of Christians, not necessarily defining themselves as fervent believers, but identifying themselves more easily with “Christian” victims of “Islamist” violence than other victims of distant tragedies. This feeling of proximity among fellow believers has been conceptualized in other cases as well. Herrmann and Palmieri, mentioned above, notably look at the ICRC’s reactions towards the Armenian genocide:

\textsuperscript{299} Ref. interviews conducted by Roqaia Abusharaf with South Sudanese refugees in the United States and in Canada. Numerous Sudanese have also settled down in the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway. Roqaia Abusharaf, “Southern Sudanese – A community in exile”, in Diasporas within and without Africa. Dynamism, Heterogeneity, Variation, ed. by Leif Manger and Munzoul A.M. Assal, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), 200, 140-164.

“Nothing surprising in the fact that the Armenian victim finds a special resonance with the ICRC. First of all, it is a Christian people persecuted by non-Christians, which arouse the compassion of European citizens, not to say their identification with the oppressed. This attitude is again strengthened by the destiny of the Armenians, whose fate has preoccupied Europe since the second half of the 19th century. The ICRC did not escape from this movement.”

The reason for the empathy, compassion and solidarity with the Armenian victims is thus clearly identified as being because of the possibility to identify with the victims due to a common identity label. By being part of a “Christian” community, excluding “non-Christians”, they feel close to the Armenian victims, although they are far away, and perhaps even more because they are threatened by an enemy who is a “non-Christian”. The authors however note that “this impetus of charity lacks when the victims are Black”, and stress the ICRC’s lack of implication in favor of the Herero massacred in Namibia between 1904 and 1908. Observing the extension of fields of involvement over the years, they however conclude that this causality is nuanced or strengthened with the “media impact”. Indeed, “the more a massacre arouses public indignation, the more the ICRC seems pushed to override its legal competencies.” The first African conflict highly exposed in international media, the war in Biafra, was also the first African conflict where the ICRC became involved.

It is thus not difficult to understand the indignation and engagement of American and European Christians in the early 1990’s, based on a combination of identification with fellow Christians, strengthened by media images conveyed through the OLS and missionaries’ reports from the field. However, their mobilization came to have another dimension as well. As the Christian movement in the US became increasingly concerned with the issue of religious persecution worldwide, the suffering of the Southern Sudanese came to perfectly symbolize this issue. The situation endured by the Christian population in South Sudan fitted perfectly in as an illustrative example, as the Evangelists demanded that the government place the issue of religious persecution among its highest priorities. The fact that the mobilization for South Sudan continued in the US throughout the 1990’s, despite a lack of media coverage after the setting up of the OLS and before the great famine of 1998, clearly shows that there were other motivations for the engagement of the Christian conservative

301 Herrmann and Palmieri, op.cit., 237. (own translation)
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid, 243.
304 Richet, op.cit.
movement than the constant refill of emotionally loaded images. This motivation seems to be precisely to achieve the agenda setting of the issue of religious persecution, a means for this movement to overcome the previously marginal position it had within the politically conservative movement.

**Shared destinies: from “slavery” to “genocide”**

The same goes for the African-American movement, which became aware and sensitized on the fate of the South Sudanese in 1995, as the issue of slavery was internationalized (cf. chapter I). This coincided with African-American leaders’ search for a new federating cause around which it could mobilize the community, after the abolishment of Apartheid in South Africa around which many of them had rallied in previous years. Their engagement was also motivated by a feeling of proximity with the victims, first and foremost due to a sense of shared destiny in the practice of slavery. In addition, the fact that this practice was executed by “Arabs in the North” against “Black Africans in the South” certainly contributed to strengthen the resentment of the African-American community in the US, as it became even more reminiscent of their own history of enslavement. However, the possibility to protest against the practice of slavery in South Sudan was also useful for the African-American movement for whom the recognition of their past sufferings is a constitutive part of their broader struggle against racism and discrimination. In other words, mobilizing for the cause of the victims in South Sudan, who in addition seemed so clearly to be the underdogs, became an efficient tool for the African-American movement to create internal cohesion, to strengthen the feeling of being a group, and to reaffirm to other political actors their existence as a group. Through their representatives in the Congressional Black Caucus, the mobilization around the “unambiguous” issue of slavery in Sudan (no-one will say that slavery is not a bad thing, although some stakeholders have contested the very existence of slavery in Sudan) became a strong tool to regain a certain audience, both within the public and among policy makers.

Similar arguments have been made to explain the mobilization of Jewish organizations around the issue of “genocide” in Darfur. Jewish activists themselves, on an individual level, often refer to their sense of a “special moral responsibility” to shout out against genocides worldwide, as their forefathers were victims of the genocide against Jews in Europe during
the Second World War\textsuperscript{305}. As the African-American community, Jewish groups were certainly also first alerted by the usage of an emotionally loaded term to describe the situation in Darfur. However, their strong mobilization thereafter has also enabled the Jewish movement in the US to both build alliances with other communitarian groups\textsuperscript{306} as well as to surmount the image of being only concerned with the situation in the Middle East and the Jewish population in Israel. Yet, as we shall see next, the Jewish organizations involved in the Save Darfur campaign have not promoted such reasons for their engagement, preferring to profile “Darfur” as an issue concerning everyone.

**The forming of a political alliance in the US**

While the Christian conservative movement, including the Evangelists, is generally close to the Republicans in the US, the “black evangelicals” as well as the African-Americans tend to be close to the Democrats and vote in majority for the Democratic candidates. Already during the 1990’s, an unlikely alliance was formed between these two movements on the issue of South Sudan. Former Ambassador David Shinn recalls how the relations between the US and Sudan deteriorated in the early 1990’s and quite rapidly. Part of it was because of pressure from the Congress, concerned with the records of the new regime in place, and part of it was because of the private interest groups. He recalls a growing influence of the Christian movement and the Evangelical movement in those years.

“It didn’t take long before it became a driving force, connected with the Congressional interests. And then you eventually had a new element coming into it, it was very important on Capitol Hill, more important than it was in the American public. And that was the anti-slavery effort and the Black Caucus, on sort of beating up on Sudan because of its perceived support for slavery. And that was actually for a while the single most important issue. It began in the early 1990’s and it would continue pretty much throughout the 1990’s and even into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century for a short period. Initially it wasn’t all that significant, it was building all along. By the late 1990’s it was a far more important issue. And then you sort of had this coalition of the Evangelicals, the Black Caucus, and a few other groups who were pushing the slavery issue, some non-governmental

\textsuperscript{305} Recurrent argument encountered in a series of interviews carried out with young activists present at two different public protests, the Global Day for Darfur in Washington, 13.04.2008, and a protest organized in front of the Coca Cola headquarter in New York, 27.04.2008

\textsuperscript{306} Interview, NN, JCPA Public Relations Officer, 12.05.2008, New York
organizations, humanitarian organizations, some of them very responsible. We were being (inaudible) on how the Sudanese government was handling its own internal problems. Some of the human rights groups had started to really become critical, they had been critical of Sudan for a long time, but they started to become more critical in the 1990’s, on what was going on there. With Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and various others. So you had the building, throughout the 1990’s, of a group that was very anti-Khartoum307.”

According to him, they were very influential in shaping the US foreign policy at that time, as I shall come back to in chapter V. What is interesting to note here, is Ambassador Shinn’s remark on the overall consensus there was on the policy to adopt on Sudan at the time. There was no opposition and few voices were raised to nuance the policy to adopt. In fact, the engagement of multiple groups for the cause of the Sudanese people led to an unprecedented alliance in Washington between Evangelicals and the Black Caucus, as well as advocates for the main human rights and humanitarian organizations. This was what was enabled them to exert a coherent pressure during those years, although it can be discussed how much influence they really had, since it was already the Clinton administration’s policy to contain the government. The public pressure in many ways just asserted the governmental policy, by confirming their support. However, it was this broad alliance that also created the basis for the Darfur movement that was to emerge from the summer 2004 and onwards. Although the activists rallying for Darfur are in majority new activists, with little previous knowledge of South Sudan, they received indispensable support from members of Congress, who had been “champions” of the Sudan cause for many years, as well as former members of the Clinton administration converted into activism since the takeover of the Bush administration: Susan Rice, Gayle Smith and John Prendergast, to mention just the most significant ones. The Darfur movement also became a large, even larger, alliance of politically and socially very different groups. The broadness of the alliance for Darfur has led some to describe it not only as a “bipartisan” movement, but a mainstream movement; in any case, anything but an “opposition” movement.

3) Distant solidarity, observing the emergence of the norm of the “oughtness to internationalize”

307 Interview, Ambassador David Shinn, Washington D.C., 23.05.2008
The other type of solidarity, which was seen in the mobilization of humanitarian organizations and some human rights organizations in the case of South Sudan, and which has been expressed through an even broader movement in the case of the Darfur crisis, is the one “simply” based on a sense of identification with fellow human beings. The sense that “something has to be done” and that it is the “international community’s responsibility” to do something in the face of internal conflicts, is part of an emerging international norm, notably concretized in the principle of the “responsibility to protect” but also in other manifestations of transnational solidarity. The different manifestations of this non-particularistic form of solidarity (or universalistic in the pure sense of the term) indicate even better than the more particularistic forms, the level of emergence of the norm of the “oughtness to internationalize”.

Various motivations among the Darfur activists for joining the mobilization

The Darfur movement has rallied a broad coalition of activists from very different backgrounds. In order to better understand the motivations of these activists, some questions can be derived from studies done on the sociological composition of other social movements, notably the anti-globalization movement. Boris Gobille for example writes in an article on the anti-globalization movement, based on the findings of a survey on activists attending a social forum, “among the factors that predispose individuals to become engaged, the presence of activists of the cause within friendly and personal connections is determining”. He shows that a majority of the participants of the social forum declare having friends that are rather or strongly active within the anti-globalization movement, and large proportions have families that are either “strongly” or “rather” militant. Other vectors of mobilization are the organizations or the groups the individuals are part of. Interestingly, the author points out, “these solidarities thus rival with the distant incentives such as Internet (30%), the media (37%), posters and tracts (23%)”.

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309 Gobille, op. cit., 140. (own translation)

310 Ibid.
Despite many fundamental differences between the anti-globalization movement and the Save Darfur movement, many of the same motivations can be found among the Save Darfur activists. During interviews carried out in Washington and New York in the spring of 2008, many activists refer to friends or family members who were engaged and aware of the situation as reasons for them to become involved as well. Many young activists first heard about the crisis when fellow students made them aware of it. However, mobilizing for victims of a distant conflict requires something more, something triggering the decision to take action. Feeling strongly about issues related to anti-globalization is a political stance, and taking action is equivalent to becoming politically involved in something that concerns these activists in a way or another. Mobilizing in solidarity with distant victims however, when there are few or no apparent connections between the political stances of those who mobilize and the “cause” of the victims (when this is at all presented) requires that the activists go beyond the fact that their own well being is not dependent on the fate of those who suffer. So what were the different triggers for the mobilization of the Darfur activists?

Firstly, as seen in the previous chapter, motivations for engagement can be hard to explain or justify without using terms such as empathy and altruism. Many young activists do refer to such moral motives, to the extent that when being asked “why” they were participating in protests against the situation in Darfur, many had a hard time understanding the question. Although the very fact of engaging in the cause was not necessarily a self-evident thing for most, reflecting on the reasons for their involvement was something far from all seemed to have done. Protesting against the “genocide” in Darfur seemed for many as such an inherently “good”, “right” and even natural thing to do, that a reflection over the reasons for their engagement seemed superfluous and almost contrary to the message they were conveying through their activism. Those who had reflected on the reasons for their engagement, referred precisely to the inaction of the international community facing the genocide in Rwanda, something they themselves were too young to remember. Indeed, the combination of learning about historical events such as the Holocaust as well as the Rwandan genocide, in school or at home, followed by the saying of “never again”, simultaneously as they started hearing about the “genocide” in Darfur in the media, seems to have been a reason for many to take action. Some young activists even argued that since they were too young when Rwanda happened,
this was their chance to make a difference and engage to stop an ongoing “genocide”\textsuperscript{312}.

In combination with this sense of being witnesses to an “ongoing genocide”, socialization and concrete encounters seem to have been important additional triggers for the mobilization of many of the young activists. As I asked more detailed questions concerning the time of and the context around their first encounter with the issue of Darfur, some additional indications concerning the various factors leading them to engage were obtained. Some explain that a friend of theirs was engaged in a local “STAND” chapter and they thus went along to one of their awareness raising meetings. Others had to realize a project at school with a social component, and their professors had encouraged them to do something on Darfur. The domestic context seems to have played a role as well, as a student says that when they were collecting money for the victims of the Kathrina hurricane in the fall 2005, a fellow student of hers burst out that it was unacceptable that no-one cared about Darfur\textsuperscript{313}. Another student is more lucid when it comes to the socialization aspect of the mobilization, as he said about his involvement in the divestment campaign against Khartoum that: “it was kind of a sweep in college, you know, there are certain social consciousness activities that are going on”\textsuperscript{314}.

But more than learning about the conflict and the possibilities for involvement through friends or family, or through a school project, other ways in which the young activists became aware of the situation can be described as “eye-opening experiences”. They were often generated by a more or less famous activist (or celebrity) giving a speech on their college campus (John Prendergast, Eric Reeves, etc. have traveled extensively to raise awareness about Darfur and were often mentioned), a book they’ve read on the topic (Samantha Power’s \textit{America in the age of genocide} is often referred to), a movie (“Hotel Rwanda” for example) or the previous knowledge of another conflict which they have become sensitive to, and which Darfur resembles in a way: obviously Rwanda because of the “genocide”, but also the Democratic Republic of Congo, because of the reports of sexual violence, was mentioned. The issue of sexual violence in Darfur, with the use of rape as a weapon in the war, has been widely covered in the press and in human rights reports. It naturally attracts attention, triggers strong feelings and statements of condemnation, due to the inherent sense of injustice and


\textsuperscript{313} Interviews, Global Day for Darfur in Washington D.C., 13.04.2008

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid, interview with activist \#4
infringement it conveys. However, it apparently does not suffice alone to trigger a widespread movement, as numerous reports have documented the large scale of sexual violence in DRC, but have not triggered anything close to the activist movement for Darfur.

The human factor trumping other factors of identification

Herrmann and Palmieri, in their study of the ICRC and its reactions towards massacres and humanitarian crises, recognize that despite the fact that some victims of massacres have a greater potential to trigger a sentiment of proximity within the Western audience, as well as within the organization, the overarching and most powerful trigger of solidarity is the “human” factor: “The presence of the ICRC on the scene of the drama is the precondition for every real – and not only theoretical - recognition of the phenomena of massacres by the institution 315. The concrete experiences with, or, for those who are not “in the field”, the concrete images of human suffering, are the strongest conveyors of the feeling of solidarity and empathy with the victims.

The international activist movement for Darfur has attempted to present Darfur not as a cause engaging this or that communitarian group more than others. Instead, it has been presented as a humanitarian cause, which should potentially touch every citizen, every human being witnessing the suffering, be it from afar, and concerned with their own governments’ actions on the international arena. As a cause, “Darfur” has been portrayed as a situation of unambiguous suffering, inflicted by a clearly distinguishable group of perpetrators on a clearly distinguishable group of victims. It has not been portrayed as moving one specific group, precisely in order to put forward the general human dimension of the suffering and the pity that it should inspire. Following Luc Boltanski’s distinction, these victims are the subject of pity, as opposed to compassion when the suffering is near and to situations where the solidarity is expressed through communitarian pre-established bonds. Pity is expressed towards a victim that could be “anyone”. In other words, the victims’ suffering is magnified into a broader policy issue; in the case of Darfur it has been the policy of intervention in internal conflicts, and especially genocides, as well as the principle of the responsibility to protect. “Pity” is a sentiment created to express empathy with victims far away, with no previous bonds or relationships connecting those who suffer and those who don’t. In other words, it is a transnationalized type of organic solidarity, expressed towards victims who do

315 Herrmann and Palmieri, op.cit., 244.
not necessarily share “our” values or with whom we do not necessarily have any previous connection. But we express a sense of solidarity because they are seen as fellow members of an interdependent (global) society. The victims appear as needing external help, and quickly. The external witnesses, by “doing good” towards the victims, justify themselves as individuals and groups. By acting on their sense of responsibility rather than turning away, they respond to their own sense of shame and of being ill at ease, triggered when learning about the suffering through images or direct accounts.

TV images and live images from the scene of suffering produces a very special relationship between those who suffer and those who will potentially express pity - the international TV audience. As Neil MacFarlane shows, although the international engagement for the cause of victims in internal conflicts is not something new, live images of victims suffering made it harder to ignore this human suffering. In other words, images conveyed thanks to the progress and diffusion of new information and communication technologies, build a bridge between the distant victims and those who do not suffer and who might express pity and provide assistance. The distance between the two is deconstructed, and the non-suffering indeed find themselves confronted with the moral dilemmas of the Good Samaritan crossing a suffering person on his way and the obligation to assist a person in danger. The exit options are either to turn away, or to say that assistance to the person in danger is impossible. Indeed, the geographical distance between the two remains, despite a sense of closeness, and this complicates the provision of assistance. It is not merely about “stretching one’s hand out” as when the suffering and the non-suffering actually meet. Last but not least, it is an even more asymmetric relationship than that between the Good Samaritan and the suffering individual he meets on his journey, since those who suffer and whose images are broadcasted cannot, in turn, see the audience. This in many ways also makes it easier for the spectator to turn away.

Conclusion

The likeliness for action to be taken, through "paying" or "speaking" as Boltanski puts it, by a larger public and policy makers, is generally heightened when real images of the suffering are conveyed and constantly renewed to the international audience. If no or few images are available, a crisis situation, when triggering any attention at all, it is more likely to be on

316 MacFarlane, op.cit., 51.
behalf of attention of groups identifying with the victims along particularistic lines. Conversely, when the stakeholders in the conflict benefit from no or few such bonds with the outside world, it is increasingly more dependent on the diffusion of live or real images of the suffering entailed by the conflict, in order to attract attention. Indeed, as we have seen in this chapter, the configurations were different for the “communitarian” type of engagement for the victims of the war in South Sudan in the 1990’s - who until 1998 did not have a continued access to images of the suffering, but who remained informed through other channels, notably missionary and humanitarian organizations on the ground - and the ”humanist” type of engagement for Darfur seen since 2004, relying much more on the constant flow of images and news reports. The two types of solidarities also produce different justifications for the mobilization, which in turn defines the strategies of the activists in the search for influence on policy makers. The first ones used arguments based on communitarian bonds or a sense of shared destiny to justify their strong engagement, notably in order to mobilize others in the same interest group and to show outsiders that they are a coherent group, but also to pressure policy makers on the very basis of their need to take into account the grievances of consistent interest groups in their electorate. Mobilizing on this basis thus also becomes a means to exist as a clearly identifiable group, both internally, in relation with other groups and on a political level. In addition, engaging in international solidarity has the benefit of being an issue competing interest groups hardly can disagree with. Although some activists in the Darfur movement have justified their engagement along such particularistic lines (identification, sense of shared destiny), this movement has first and foremost come to exist as a broad based movement, and not as a communitarian one. Its leaders have also sought to exert pressure on policy makers precisely on the basis of their broad representation in the population. Groups mobilizing on this basis hence to a larger extent contribute to the emergence of the norm of the “oughtness to internationalize”: first of all, since their manifestations of solidarity can not be “simply” explained in particularistic terms; and secondly, because this engagement supports the idea of the need to “do something” in the face of distant human suffering – no matter who the victims are.
Chapter III - The search for external support in internal conflict: how the rebels and the “voiceless victims” have exported their struggle

"From the beginning, the root cause of internationalization does not come from the outside, but from the inside. However, this drive for internationalization coincided with powerful trends outside."

Atta el Battahani, Professor of Political Science,
University of Khartoum

The internationalization of the wars in Southern Sudan and in Darfur would probably not have been possible without the internal efforts to garner international support, despite the proactive and with time sustained efforts by external actors as seen in the two preceding chapters. Although many external observers have made their opinion on Darfur independently of what the Darfuris themselves had to say, the international consciousness about Darfur has also been brought about by the very parties to or groups affected by the war. The Sudanese stakeholders have both deliberately and sometimes unwillingly contributed to make their internal conflicts become the international issues they have been over the past few years. The deliberate efforts to internationalize have been manifested through the rebels’ and civil society actors seeking support, sympathy and assistance, and will be the center of focus in this chapter. Other Sudanese stakeholders, notably the Sudanese leaders in Khartoum, have also actively contributed to place “Sudan” on the map, however with the internationalization of the internal conflicts more as unintended consequences of their international ambitions. This will be studied more in-depth in the next chapter.

The external support sought by the “weaker” parts in the conflict, notably the rebel groups, is at times sought with the hope of increasing their chances to win the war over their adversary.

317 Interview, Atta el Battahani, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 02.12.2007
and at other times it is sought in order to help out in the process of resolving the conflicts. Opposition parties, rebels and the ruling government have each in their own ways sought for support abroad, from regional and international partners, each creating their distinctive “groups of friends” internationally. However, the rebel groups and the opposition parties have been the most proactive in spreading information about the war internationally in order to win support. They are the ones who have needed international support as a means to increase their own power facing a central government much stronger than themselves, and who have had an interest in divulging the widespread injustices inside Sudan. The different governments in Khartoum however have rather been interested in hushing down the evolution of the conflicts, as these conflicts have inherently attacked their legitimacy.

In a first section of this chapter, I will look at how the idea of “the international” as a powerful resource in the war emerges within the different insurgent groups in Sudan, and which tools are used to reach this international support. Secondly, I shall show how the premises for international interest in Sudan are mirrored in the rebels’ discourses directed at an international audience. In other words, the rebels adapt their discourse according to the type of interest shown by the foreign audience, so as to maximize their chances of support from the outside. The rebels in the South for example adapted to a changing international context in the early 1990’s by exploiting the potential for support from Christian groups abroad, whereas the Darfur rebel groups have leaned on the genocide discourse to maximize their potential for external support. Lastly, we shall look at why some rebel groups manage to become seen as the legitimate counterpart to a contested government, the credible representative of the people they claim to fight for, in short, the “heroes of liberation” in the eyes of the international community, while others fail at this enterprise.

**A - Emergence of “the international” as a powerful resource in the internal wars in Sudan**

Insurgents and rebels around the world have a vested interest in searching for overseas support when faced with an asymmetrically stronger adversary, and this interest is increased and stimulated by globalization and the new means of communication and information that have followed.
1) How the idea of “the international” becomes a part of the internal struggle

The Herfried Münkler is one of the few authors to have reflected on this asymmetric aspect of contemporary wars, which he describes as the single most notable aspect of what he calls the “new wars”318.

Conceptualizing the search for overseas support

Münkler argues that different periods throughout history have been characterized by different types of warfare: the “privatized” wars of the 14th to 17th centuries, the wars among nation-states that followed, and since the end of the Cold War a return to “privatized” wars, or intra-state wars. As such, he shows that certain forms of contemporary warfare are not new in and by themselves, however, he puts forward the asymmetry between the belligerents as the single most characteristic aspect of these “new wars”. He distinguishes between the asymmetry of capacities (logistics, armament, high vs. low tech), of legitimacy (as defined by the international community, since the representatives of a state are the privileged interlocutors for other states and international organizations, a recognition non-state actors do not benefit from) and of strategies (the “speed” of the warfare, a slower pace is in the interest of the relatively “weaker” insurgents, while an acceleration is in the interest of the relatively “stronger” part)319. It should be noted here that globalization has in fact made it easier, for the “weaker parts” to enter a direct, but asymmetrical confrontation with a more powerful adversary. Not only provisions can be supplied from the outside, as Münkler insists on, but moral support, political advice, and international advocacy done on their behalf can be important assets for the relatively weaker part in a conflict. Indeed, an opposition movement struggling to be heard on the national level may increase its leverage on its adversary if it can refer to international support, of different kinds, for its cause. As seen in the previous chapter, in the “age of globalization”, where networks are built across old boundaries and where a crisis unfolding in one region feels increasingly closer to the audiences in other parts of the world, solidarity for distant causes is increasing as well.

318 Münkler, op.cit.
319 Ibid.
Some, as Clifford Bob, would present this transnational solidarity as a highly demanded good on the international market where rebellions meet overseas relief agencies, interest groups, journalists and human rights organizations\(^\text{320}\). Bob argues that on this international market, those seeking internationalization are more numerous than those who can provide solidarity, relief and international support. Therefore, the different insurgent groups need to adopt a strategy of marketing of their cause in order to be heard among all the other worthy struggles around the world. This can be done by putting forward special bonds between their homeland and an overseas potential supporter, or by attaching their own struggle to broader and more universal symbolic causes that these targets may be interested in supporting. It can also be done by presenting the struggle they find themselves in as an unfair confrontation with an asymmetrically more powerful adversary, and thus justify why external support is needed. Indeed, on the international “market of pity”\(^\text{321}\) evoked by Badie, receiving the empathy of international agents of solidarity is not only a political resource, it also contributes to legitimizing the insurgents’ struggle. This search for empathy and support thus becomes the most powerful weapon of the poor and powerless, who in lack of a state structure and legitimacy, of financial capital, and of other tools to reach out on the international arena or to pursue the war internally, can capitalize on the sympathy and “pity” they receive from the outside. This is the most powerful weapon of the “powerless” because it is precisely in the quality of being the underdogs that these actors attract support. A government can also search for overseas support for an internal struggle along the same logic – the case of the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni and his search for support for his internal war against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is an illustrative example here. But a government can’t capitalize on the same feeling of “pity” as a deprived opposition group can. The internationalization processes are indeed shaped by the very actors who call for internationalization from within, in other words, those who ”call for Empire”\(^\text{322}\) interventions.

Each party to an internal conflict in search for international support will seek to delegitimize their adversaries, by opposing the moral righteousness of ones own struggle with the criminal

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320 Bob, op.cit.

321 The original term in French is “marché de la pitié”, yet, as mentioned above, “pity” in English may contain a slightly different nuance. I however choose to use the term “pity market” here, while underlining that “pity” here is somewhat closer to the feelings of compassion and empathy than the condescending aspect that “pity” may convey. Badie (2002), op.cit. See also: Bertand Badie, “L'opinion à la conquête de l'international”, Raisons politiques, 19, (3/2005), 9-24.

322 Salamé, op.cit.
warfare of the other. The most efficient tool at the disposal of governments today seems in this respect to be to brand internal opposition movements as “terrorist” movements. The insurgents in search for international support on their side can draw attention not only to the righteousness of their struggle, but also to their own weakness and the unfairness of their counterpart’s attacks. Several images and photographs portraying this asymmetric opposition between a weak and a powerful party have contributed to build support for specific causes: the photo of the “flower girl” facing a range of heavily armed soldiers in a protest against the Vietnam war or the pictures of stones-throwing young Palestinians facing Israeli tanks are just some of the more famous examples. These are “David against Goliath” type of confrontations, and the “Davids” here receive sympathy because they are the smallest and weakest – and thanks to this sympathy, they increase their chances to win over the “Goliaths”.

French Africa scholar Jean-François Bayart coined the term of “extraversion” towards the end of the 1980’s in his book *The State in Africa: the politics of the belly*[^323]. The concept of extraversion describes the strategies through which African political actors have actively, and not passively as often described, used their (often asymmetric) relation with foreign powers, based on different forms of dependency, as a strategy to gather political and economic power at home. It should be noted that the context and the premises for the search for overseas support changed drastically with the end of the Cold War. Not only did former allies become enemies for some, and vice versa (the United States for example went from being rather in support of Khartoum, to a total opposite of supporting the Southern rebels), but the conditions for capitalizing on such links changed as well in the post-Cold War world. However, although initially this term was mostly used to describe government policies, the concept of extraversion can also be used to understand opposition movements’ strategies to gather external support. By calling on international actors’ “responsibility” to intervene, using international (or Western) rhetoric to gain audience, both at home and abroad, and by referring to international support for their cause, the ultimate objective is to gain leverage in the internal struggle.

Margareth Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have conceptualized this search for overseas support, and the eventual effects, as the “boomerang effect[^324]. When internal channels for demand for

[^324]: Keck and Sikkink, *op.cit.*
political change are blocked, say by an authoritarian undemocratic regime with little apparent interest in listening to its own people’s demands when it can suppress it, the challengers of the central power will try and search for support abroad. The “boomerang effect” is triggered when a foreign government, mobilized on the issue presented to it by the frustrated challengers, chooses to exert pressure on the oppressive government in question. Thus the mismanaged and initially internal issue comes back at and backfires on the government like a boomerang. As I will show here, the internationalization of the conflicts in Sudan is not only the result of an outside-in process triggered by external actors’ sense of concern; it is also the outcome of an inside-out process. This internal dynamic is produced by the Sudanese actors’ own voices and outcries, their strategies of communication and “marketing” and their different means of exporting their struggle abroad in search for overseas support. Actors from “below” - local communities, internally displaced persons (IDP), rebels and opposition movements – have been at the forefront in calling for international support and in launching the “boomerang”. Two questions are worth to ask, and will be studied below. Firs of all, what strategic position has this internationalization enterprise occupied within Darfur, as well as in South Sudan, has it been a marginal activity for a few rebel leaders with an international network or has it been a central priority for the movements? Secondly, has this inside-out process had any influence on the broader international perceptions and response, and if so, how?

Examining the inside-out process of the internationalization process could take into account the actions of the Sudanese opposition movements in general. However, the Sudanese opposition parties have not shown the same interest as the rebels to export the stories of the conflicts abroad. Belonging to the general opposition, but yet often also to the riverine elite in and around Khartoum, they have at times been be closer to the governments’ strategies of internationalization rather than those of the marginalized peoples of the peripheries of Sudan. Their role will thus be studied in the next chapter, looking at the international strategies of the Sudanese regime, while the demands for internationalization from “below” will be studied here. These internal actors “from below” can be divided into two overall categories, which are however neither mutually exclusive nor always perfectly distinguishable: (1) the rebel movements and (2) the civilians affected by the war (internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and other civilians who can bear testimony of the effects of the war). The reason is quite simple: the rebels, in both the South and in Darfur, have probably been the most active in working to obtain international support for their cause, while the IDPs, refugees and other
civilians are the group most often consulted by external actors searching for “victim” testimonies on the situation.

**The rebels – from grassroots to international spokespersons**

The Southern rebel movement went a long way to reach the status of an internationally respected and legitimate representative of the Southern people as well as a legitimate counterpart in the peace talks with the Northern government. The SPLM/A, in the beginning of the North-South peace talks, was indeed able to refer to a long list of prominent friends internationally. Indeed, its success on this front has both inspired and motivated the different rebel movements in Darfur, whose strategies of internationalization will be analyzed next. But first, who are the “rebels”, this group of government challengers?

“Rebel” is a common and much-used term to designate those who confront the rule of a government, and generally gives associations to armed men in the bushes. The Oxford Dictionary however defines the verb “to rebel” as to “rise in opposition or armed resistance to an established government or ruler”\(^{325}\). A second definition describes the action as to “resist authority, control, or convention”\(^ {326}\). From this definition, rebel does not necessarily designate only those who wear arms, and it is in this sense that we shall understand the term here. A broad definition of the word should hence include both those who have rallied with one of the rebel leaders, carrying arms and participating in raids against government sponsored militias or the government itself, as well as all those who resist government sponsored violence and who struggle – in the political sense of the term – for a better form of power and wealth sharing in their country. It can be argued that the term “rebel” carries a pejorative nuance, contributing to delegitimize those who can also be referred to as insurgents, however I choose here to use mostly the term “rebel” since it is the term these actors use to refer to themselves.

The anecdote of my encounter with a student from the Massalit tribe, originally from el Geneina in Darfur, illustrates this well, and also shows what the term “rebel” seems to mean for some of those who actively resist the governments’ authority. The young Massalit was introduced to me by colleagues who said he had been a rebel in Darfur. As I met him in

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326 Ibid.
Khartoum, I asked him for how long he had been a rebel, and at first he seemed to not understand the question. Then he answered, “I was born a rebel”. I soon understood that for him, the “rebel” denomination was first of all an indicator of his political standing and opposition towards the central government – something that is so natural and goes so far back that he feels he was born into it. I also understood that, although he was active politically, and had worked for several internationally recognized rebel leaders, he had never been active in military fighting. When he spoke about fellow students from Darfur at the University in Khartoum, and when indicating their political sympathy with one or another rebel movement, he referred to them too as “rebels”. The “rebel” denomination thus clearly includes an indicator of their political standing, and we should here understand as “rebels” the young students rallying in support with the rebel leaders, the armed men in the field, and the rebel leaders themselves.

It is the leaders of the rebel movements who have been at the forefront of the efforts to internationalize the struggles, both in the South and in Darfur, at least those with international connections. Some have frequently travelled abroad, others have been exiled in a neighboring country or overseas, and others again already lived abroad when the conflict broke out. John Garang had an important international network, gained through his previous studies in the US, which he knew well how to use. He was also known to be extremely eloquent. It is worth to mention however, that although he did embark on several trips abroad, to Europe and to the US, to garner support for his cause, his priority was always to stay close to his men in the field, in order to guarantee a strong and united movement against Khartoum. According to some of his close connections in Norway, “had he traveled around, the SPLM/A wouldn’t have been what it was, far from it”.

Things however changed with the end of the Cold War, and the shift of regional alliances following the fall of the Ethiopian regime of Mängestu Häyle Maryam in May 1991. John Garang and the SPLA then lost an important source of support and means of survival. This notably resulted in a series of important military victories for the government forces in the

327 Interview, NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009
328 Interview, Helge Rohn, Former Representative of Norwegian People’s Aid in South Sudan (1992-1996), Oslo, 30.01.2008
South between 1992 and 1995. The defeat of the SPLA seemed close several times, notably when it was expelled from Ethiopia in 1992. It was also from 1991 that the Southern rebels actively started to look for support beyond the region. The severe drawback the loss of the Ethiopian support inflicted on them made the search for alternative sources of support a necessity. Lam Akol and Riek Machar split away from Garang in 1991, and while the latter was still attached to remaining close to the movement in the field, the two dissidents subsequently spent a lot of time traveling around in Europe and in the US to speak with the authorities that were willing to meet with them. Lam Akol was also known for his eloquence, an important asset to reach out to his international audience. A number of the high-ranking officials of the SPLA indeed have University diplomas from Europe and the United States. Not only did many of them continue their political work while living abroad, but these journeys abroad also enabled them to build international networks and to adopt the international codes of advocacy, important to ensure that their messages were heard and taken seriously. In other words, they played an important role in “marketing” the Southern rebellion abroad, to use Clifford Bob’s expression, while also, as we shall see below, establishing a network of international spokesmen within the Southern Sudanese diaspora.

The Darfur rebels also sought support from the outside early on. Indeed, as shown by Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana, the Darfur rebel movements sought support mainly from three different places: neighboring Chad, their “role models” in the Southern rebel group SPLM/A, and lastly, the Darfuri diaspora. The diaspora was indeed among the very first groups abroad learning about the disaster unfolding in Darfur. As the young “rebel student” said about those who had left in earlier years to find work, “they were in Eritrea, in Libya, in France, in England and Belgium. And when they called their families, they heard about all the problems in Darfur.” And like the SPLM, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) has also established a network of spokesmen in different countries, as well as professionals helping them out in their public relations (PR) and lobbying efforts.


331 Interview, Arne Ørum, Norwegian People’s Aid Desk officer for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa (1987-1994), Oslo, 05.02.2008

332 Bob, op. cit.


334 Interview, NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009
The search for internationalization as a means to survive

Clifford Bob explains that in conflicts around the world, where challengers confront more powerful opponents, they will seek support from outside their country, from international organizations, NGOs, international media and a broader audience. The first thing the rebel movements of Sudan have in common is their common enemy – the central government in Khartoum. The mere power and capacities of their adversary can explain their early search for external support. They simply relied on it if they wanted to continue their struggle. As argued previously, the great asymmetry of power between the rebel groups and their adversary calls in itself for external support, although this support can take many different forms. Walter Lodwa, an SPLM representative in Oslo, explained that the very strength of their adversary required them to look for support abroad:

“If you have an adversary who uses very heavy means against you… in order to make them sit down and negotiate, we needed a strong support to back us and to put pressure on the adversary. The support we got from Norway and the US, it was mostly those two, but Britain was part of it too, played a great role in making the regime in Khartoum negotiate.” 335

He also showed that it was not only the fact that their counterpart was much more powerful, but also the fact that the Khartoum regime had important allies internationally, that made it important for them to build strong international partnerships too. “The regime in Sudan has big international supporters, like China, Russia and Iran. In order to counterbalance this, we needed to look for supporters internationally too” 336, Lodwa argued.

Internationalization: not only a tool of war, but a stake in itself

The real or perceived benefits that international support has given the rebel groups in their struggle has contributed to make “internationalization” become more than a tool to pressure their adversary, but a stake in itself. Indeed, internationalization has become a resource so important that it sometimes appears as more important than the battles on the ground. Indeed, speaking with representatives of the Darfuri opposition and rebellion in Sudan, it often seems like their war against Khartoum cannot be carried out without international support. It is in

335 Interview, Walter Lodwa, SPLM Representative in Norway, Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM Chapter in Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008

336 Ibid.
fact seen as the only means to success. This longing for international support and assistance even leads some to think that the solution to their problems are to find in the international community rather than in their own homeland. Ahlam Mahdi, a woman from Nyala in South Darfur and the founder of a local NGO, the Ahlam Charity, explains:

“Abdulwahid must ask people outside to have help. (...) And if I could go to France, I would go right away, or to any other place, to tell people about what is happening in Darfur and the violence against women. I would call people and ask them to bring peace back to Darfur. I prefer to go outside to help people in Darfur, than to stay here in Khartoum or in Darfur”\(^{337}\).”

The mere fact that the rebel leader who for a long time was perceived as the most influential chose to stay in Paris to heighten his claims instead of returning to the negotiation table shows what potential the international support seems to incarnate for him and much of the movement he represents. The battleground has in a sense moved out of Sudan and is to be found somewhere between a European capital and Washington. It is uncertain whether this externalization is a result of the too great imbalance between the adversary’s power and their own capacity to "fight back”, or some sort of response to the intense international attention that has indeed been given to the conflict in Darfur. Indeed, because of the widespread international activism, many believe that help is just around the corner. As the young Massalit rebel says:

"The activists have done a lot to make people all over the world know about Darfur. Everyone knows there is a problem in Darfur. And the people in Darfur think that someone will come and protect them and help them"\(^{338}\).

Although the hopes for international rescue have been stimulated by the international advocacy campaign, the search for international backing started already before the rebels stepped up their attacks in February 2003. One of the Sudanese rebel leaders reportedly traveled to a Western capital not long before this attack, explaining and warning about the tense situation in Darfur and addressing the need to take this into account in the Naivasha talks\(^{339}\). He was told that their turn would come after the negotiations with the South, but

\(^{337}\) Interview, Ahlam Mahdi, Chair of Ahlam Charity Organization for Women Empowerment and Child Care, originally from Nyala, South Darfur, Interview in Khartoum, 26.03.2009.

\(^{338}\) Interview, NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009

\(^{339}\) Interview, IKG, Western diplomat, 16.05.2007
these diplomatic incitements did not suffice to halt the rebel groups’ plans. This willingness to warn about what was about to happen strengthens the idea that the attacks on government positions in Darfur was not simply the spontaneous action of some frustrated rebels, it was a planned strategy set out as other non-violent ways to obtain international attention did not work. The fluctuant guarantees they received from international players did not convince them, and were interpreted as a justification of the need to take up arms just as the South had done for so many years. Stepping up their struggle was supposed to make them become part of the “indispensable players” on the national and international chessboard, the stakeholders who would have to be taken into account when the social contract of the country would be renegotiated. Internationalization is thus not only a tool for the rebels to exert pressure on their adversary, it is also a resource the rebels hope to obtain through violence. In this regard, the real novelty about the February 2003 attack, compared to former rebel attacks, was that the rebels this time justified it for political reasons, and thus potentially increasing the chances for international media interest.

However, the mere fact that the Darfuri rebels exported the internal struggle onto the international arena became an additional reason for the government to clamp down on them. As the Darfuri woman working with the Ahlam Charity Organization says:

"The government armed the Arabs to kill the Africans. They didn’t like the Africans because people like Abdulwahid (El Nour) and Khalil Ibrahim went outside Sudan and said bad things about the government".

The internationalization of the conflict thus also becomes a reason and a motivation for the continued repression by the government. It becomes a stake in the conflict itself – a way for the rebels to increase their chances to win the war, and a reason for the government to use harsher tools of repression on those who have humiliated them internationally. It is a stake in the conflict also in the sense that the internationalization and the image that is broadcasted of Sudan becomes something each belligerent wants to have control over.

340 Interview, Mahdi, Ahlam Charity Organization for Women Empowerment and Child Care, Khartoum, 26.03.2009
2) Different tools to reach “the international” according to the conflicts

Reaching out, seizing international attention, keeping it, controlling it thus become important stakes in the internal conflict. And while “the international” emerged over the years as an important resource for the SPLM, it was a part of the strategy of the Darfuri rebels almost from the outset of their confrontation with the government. They had learned from and also received important lessons from the Southerners. But how did the Southerners and the Darfuris proceed to reach out and which tools were available to them?

South: Churches, diaspora, and the early beginning of internet forums of discussion

Generally speaking, the Southern civil society remained weak and poorly developed during the war. There were few organizations capable of asserting themselves internationally or beyond South Sudan. According to John Young, this was mainly due to two specificities of the SPLA: firstly, its essentially militaristic identity combined with a weak ideological profile kept it from searching support within the civilian population, and secondly, its deep suspicion against the idea of a well organized civil society that might constitute a potential base of dissidence.341 The civil society in South Sudan thus developed slowly, and essentially under the influence of traditional chiefs. However, there were two exceptions: the Churches, including structures like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) and groups from the diaspora.

First of all, the Churches played an important role, not only as a place where communities gathered, and with time a place where different ethnic groups – Dinka and Nuer for example - met on equal grounds, it also served as an important contact point with “the outside”. Christians have been present in Sudan since the early times of Christianity, but mainly in the North, close to the border with Egypt. Christianity in South Sudan however is essentially a colonial phenomenon, and the country has indeed been a central destination for missionaries.

for centuries since the first Franciscan missionaries came in the 17th century\textsuperscript{342}. Later, solid bonds have been built up between Churches of the American “Bible belt” and Christian communities in Sudan, and today several American churches have sister churches in South Sudan\textsuperscript{343}. The region indeed represents a great reserve of potential conversions to Christianity. A Norwegian Baptist Church established towards the late 1990’s a friendship agreement with a Church in Khartoum, the Banat Local Church, gathering mainly displaced Southern Sudanese from the region of Mabaan\textsuperscript{344}. The Christian Council of Norway has a well-established cooperation with the two Church Councils in Sudan, the Sudan Council of Churches (North Sudan) and the New Sudan Council of Churches (South Sudan), which dates back to 1995\textsuperscript{345}. This bond was established in close cooperation with the Norwegian Church Aid\textsuperscript{346}. Canada and Switzerland are among the other countries having developed bonds with Southern Sudanese Churches. The material aid provided by these Churches enabled them to build up a trustful relationship with the local populations as well as to strengthen the presence of Christianity\textsuperscript{347}. Most importantly, the South Sudanese Churches’ international networks became an important channel through which information about the situation in South Sudan could reach the outside world, and especially a growing Christian evangelist community in the US with an equally growing interest for South Sudan in the 1990’s.

Secondly, the South Sudanese diaspora has played a central role in spreading knowledge internationally about the conflict in their homeland. This international network of advocates is first and foremost a network built by and based on the promotion of the SPLM/A. The Southern movement indeed established over the years a network of national and regional chapters in the different countries where South Sudanese have found refuge. The members of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{342} "Important dates of the Church’s History in Sudan”, website of The Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa (Amecea), http://www.eglisesoudan.org/english/dates.htm (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
\item \textsuperscript{344} Information catalogue on friendship agreements between congregations published by the Norwegian Church North South Information (KUI) and the Inter-Church Council, http://www.kui.no/doc//vennskapssamarbeid/Vennskapssamarbeid_TRYKK.pdf (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
\item \textsuperscript{345} On international cooperation, Christian Council of Norway, http://www.norgeskristerad.no/index.cfm?id=101738 (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
\item \textsuperscript{346} Norwegian Church Aid, on Sudan, http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Arbeidet-vart/Hvor-vi-jobber/Ost-Afrika/Sudan/ (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
\item \textsuperscript{347} de Waal (1997), op.cit.
\end{itemize}
these chapters served as important international spokespersons for the Southern cause, although their “real” influence on the policy makers and the authorities they lobbied remained relatively marginal in many countries.348 Norway is one of the countries that have hosted a consistent Sudanese diaspora, and an SPLM chapter has been in place since 1996. Walter Lodwa, the SPLM Representative in Norway, arrived in the country in 1997 to speak about his work with Changemaker, an international non-governmental youth organization initiated by the Norwegian Church Aid349. After encouragements from his friends back home, he chose to stay in Norway:

“I chose to stay, first of all because I wanted to continue the efforts to inform about the situation in Sudan, which was only getting worse. I worked with Changemaker Sudan, but first of all with the SPLM. I decided to stay, and they (the SPLM) contacted me and said I did a good job here, and that they would lose and important resource if I went back350.”

He got in contact with other South Sudanese, who were also members of the SPLM. Together they worked to inform the Norwegian authorities (the foreign Ministry and the political parties). When John Garang came to Norway, they organized his visits and arranged his meetings with Norwegian civil society and politicians. They also tried to obtain audience within the newspapers, a task that was more difficult according to Lodwa. However, in the global competition for media attention and audience within the wider public, political challengers are increasingly professionalizing in their internationalization enterprises. As Clifford Bob shows, the SPLM are not the only ones to have established such “quasi-diplomatic offices” in key Western capitals351. This professionalization of the search for international support has also led those who have the means to (or those who have supporters willing to pay) to go to well known PR firms to help them with their communication strategies. The SPLA understood this need and was among the luckier of the contenders: as

348 Notably, in France, the SPLM representative seems to have been relatively marginalized compared to other Sudanese personalities.
350 Interview, Walter Lodwa, SPLM Representative in Norway, Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM Chapter in Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008
351 Bob, op.cit.
Bob wrote in 2005, “in recent years, American supporters of the SPLA also footed the bill for a high-powered Washington PR firm”.

As seen in the section on the mobilization of the American students in the US, the Darfur conflict had a “comparative advantage” over the older war in South Sudan, in the sense that information and communication technologies have become much more developed and widely accessible since the start of the conflict in South Sudan. However, as internet developed and as new forms for maintaining transnational networks have emerged, the South Sudanese too have established themselves on the web. In 2002, a South Sudanese IT expert based in the UK had the idea, inspired by compatriots in other European countries, to establish Gurtong, a website destined to promote information on South Sudan and work for peace. It received the support of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the backing of the Africa Educational Trust, and has since become known as the meeting place on the internet for the South Sudanese diaspora. In 2003, another website was founded by a Sudanese based in Paris, a Northerner this time: The Sudan Tribune. This website works as a Sudan specialized news agency, publishing own articles and articles on Sudan from other newspapers. It has since become the ultimate reference for everyone wishing to follow information on Sudan. Walter Lodwa from the SPLM chapter in Norway testifies the central importance of these websites in order to stay in touch with members of the diaspora in other countries, as well as to continue to follow the evolution of the situation back home. He and the SPLM chapter have been active on most forums:

“We publish articles on sudansupport.no or on Sudan Tribune, and I also write for Gurtong. These webpages make it easier to stay in touch. There’s also the Sudan List, a discussion forum online for Sudanese. We heard about it from the SPLM and that’s how we got in touch with them.”

355 Another online information webpage created by the Norwegian Support Group for Peace in Sudan (SFS), see: http://sudansupport.no/English/ (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
356 Several mail-based discussion groups exist in the internet: Sudanese (“the largest and most comprehensive list”), New Sudan Mailing Discussion List (“a political oriented list for Sudanese and opposition members interested in the cause of democracy and human rights in Sudan”), and Sudan-L (“a political semi-moderated list for Sudanese with opposing political views to the Sudanese Government”). Source: http://www.sudan.net/community/subscribe.html (Accessed March 21st, 2010)
357 Interview, Walter Lodwa, SPLM Representative in Norway, Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM Chapter in Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008
Although scattered around in different locations around the world, the South Sudanese community could thus keep in touch and keep the political debate alive. It also made it easier for those interested to learn more about Sudan to easily find information on the web, although the information did not reach out to the news media in the sense the diaspora and their support groups hoped it would. Until the war in Darfur broke out, media coverage of Sudan to a large extent depended on specific events within Sudan: the famine in 1998 or the beginning of the peace talks in 2002. Thus, the inside-out internationalization of the war in South Sudan essentially passed through initiatives and networks entertained by the SPLA, as well as through the networks built between the Sudanese and Western Churches.

**Darfur: diaspora, satellite phones and a model in the South**

The Darfur rebels too, whether in Darfur or exiled in Europe or in the neighboring countries, have placed the internationalization of their struggle at the center of their strategy. They too have actively used the Darfuri diaspora and information and communication technologies to promote their struggle on the international arena, often visibly inspired by the older Southern movement. However, they have benefitted from a considerable progress in ICTs, and, starting a year after their rebellion stepped up, from an international community much more receptive to information from Sudan. The diaspora played an important role for the Darfuris, in terms of political support as well as in terms of channeling out information from inside Darfur. Indeed, in a series of interviews done with Darfuris in Khartoum in April-March 2009, one of the elements that was most often evoked when the question of how European and American publics became aware of the tragedy that was unfolding in their homeland, was the role played by the Darfuri diaspora. Their role was regularly described as calling the newspapers, politicians, and Human Rights organizations in their host countries, but also sending money to some of the rebel groups.

An important representative of the Darfuri diaspora community is the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). It was founded in 1994 and has been led by Ahmad Direige, a Fur and former governor of North Darfur, and his deputy, Sharif Harir, an anthropologist.

358 Interviews carried out in Khartoum, Sudan, in the period March 19th-April 4th 2009, with a group of ten Darfuris of different backgrounds (students, academics, NGO-workers, officials at the Darfur Transitional Authority).
formerly based in Norway and more recently in Eritrea. The Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), the predecessor of the SLA, sought support from the SFDA, also a member of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a gathering of most of the Sudanese opposition parties, from the outset in 2002. Apart from the fact that it helped the Darfur rebellion to build a connection with the broader national opposition movement, it also helped them, thanks to Direige and Harir and their international networks, to attract valuable regional and international focus to their movement. Harir especially became engaged in the cause of the Darfuri rebels, and at some point even said “the fighters in Jebel Marra were the military wing of the SFDA”. Yet Direige was not convinced, and eventually the rebels received little help from the SFDA. This may have opened the door for other types of support, and notably the opportunity for John Garang and the SPLA to approach the SLA.

After the relative failure of the negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006, the today enigmatic leader of the SLA, Abdulwahid El Nour left first for Eritrea and then to France. Since late 2006, he has been based in Paris and has carried on his lobbying from there. He has a group of Darfuris working with him in Paris, as well as spokesmen in different key capitals, notably one in London. The latter was however suspended in early 2010 after having deviated from Abdulwahid El Nour’s political standing and calling for self-independence for Darfur. He also used to have a representative in Norway, a Darfuri who has lived in the country for over ten years. This representative has however reportedly taken some distances with Abdulwahid in the later years. Finally, several sources report that Abdulwahid for the past few years has had a French lobbyist working for him in Washington. Germany has also hosted a large group of Darfuris since the outbreak of violence in 2003, and the Darfuri community there has been actively working to internationalize their struggle. Haydar Ibrahim at the Sudanese Studies Center in Khartoum, a center that was initially founded by the Sudanese diaspora and opposition to the regime in Cairo, describes Germany as the “center” for the Darfuri diaspora:

359 Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.
360 Ibid.
362 Interview, Walter Lodwa, President SPLA Chapter Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008
"Germany seems like the center for the Darfurian people abroad and even the Sudanese government is accusing Germany of supporting the Darfuris. Most Darfuris in Germany are affiliated with different armed movements in Darfur, the SLM, the JEM, and all the others. All the factions and the different movements have representatives in Germany, in Berlin, in Frankfurt and even in the small towns (...). And the main source of the news and the mass media are these Darfuris."364

Indeed, especially the Zaghawa community is strongly present in Germany. Atta el Battahani, a professor of political science at the University of Khartoum, also credits the Sudanese outside Sudan a special role in the internationalization process of the conflicts, in the South as well as in Darfur. For him, it is not only because they find themselves outside Sudan and closer to key capitals in the Western world, but also because those who leave for these countries are generally the best equipped in terms of cultural and educational capital. This gives them valuable tools in the race to reach out to the media:

"Sudanese outside the country were very important. This middle class was skilled with civil society actors, trade unionists; they know the way to treat the media in these countries. They triggered and they were instrumental in this process."365

Media access has however been much easier for these Darfuris and leaders such as Abdulwahid El Nour in Paris than it was for the SPLM spokesmen in the earlier years, and this is most certainly first of all due to the massive international interest for Darfur since 2004. Secondly, when it comes to Abdulwahid El Nour specifically, in his quality of being one of the rebel leaders who left the Abuja peace talks without signing and who also claims to have the broadest popular support within the internally displaced camps, he has built up a certain stature internationally. He is the one everyone wants to see returning to the negotiating table, and he has received a lot of attention because of that since 2006. The international activist campaign that has used a very aggressive tone against Khartoum has made him increasingly confident, and encouraged him to set sky high pre-conditions to accept a return to the negotiations table. However, while hoping to emerge as “the one” and uncontested leader for Darfur, he has increasingly become seen as a spoiler, who finds himself far away from his people. His frequent contacts with the media have contributed to export the Darfur conflict to France. On the other side, the Sudanese regimes’ disapproval of him staying in

364 Interview, Haydar Ibrahim, Sudanese Studies Center, Khartoum, 06.12.2007
365 Interview, Atta el Battahani, Professor, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 02.12.2007
Paris has drawn France into the conflict, in another way than France’s role as the powerful ally of the Chadian regime has done.

Secondly, the access to modern information and communications technologies in a world where news are broadcasted almost instantaneously as they unfold has constituted a major change in the ability of the Darfur rebels to export their message compared to the isolation the Southern rebels found themselves in during the first years of the war. As Ahlam Mahdi from the womens’ charity organization working in Darfur said: “Without the media, Abdulwahid (El Nour) cannot do anything. After he called them (the Western journalists), they came to Darfur to see what was happening.” It can be added that Abdulwahid El Nour cannot do anything without his satellite phone. Indeed, this contact with the outside world has been made possible not only thanks to personal connections, but also the use of new information and communications technologies and especially the satellite phone. It has become an important tool for the rebels to stay in touch with international media and other important contacts and supporters abroad.

Illustrative of this is how some of the first attacks carried out by the rebels in 2002 were never made notice of by the international community, most probably because the rebels were not yet equipped with satellite phones. As we have seen, the conflict in the Western province of Darfur was latent for many years before it gained in intensity when the rebel groups attacked government garrisons in el Fasher in February 2003, the first rebel attack that effectively reached the outside world. As described by Alex de Waal and Julie Flint, the rebel group, which then still called itself the Darfur Liberation Front, issued a statement that was communicated to journalists and academics in Europe following their attack on Golo, the district headquarters of Jebel Marra, on 26 February 2003. As de Waal and Flint note, at the time of the attack on Golo, “war was already raging in Darfur: the rebels were attacking police stations, army posts and convoys, and Jebel Marra was under massive air and ground attack.” At this point, the international community was still focused on its efforts to end the war in Southern Sudan, and gave little notice to Darfur. The authors however point out that

366 Interview, Ahlam Mahdi, Chair of Ahlam Charity Organization for Women Empowerment and Child Care, originally from Nyala, South Darfur, Khartoum, 26.03.09
367 AFP, "New Rebel Group Seizes West Sudan Town", February 26, 2003, qualified as the first political manifestation from the rebels having reached the outside world. Flint and de Waal (2005), op.cit.
368 Ibid, 81.
“the existence of a rebel movement in Darfur had been known to the government since an attack on a police station in Golo in June 2002.\textsuperscript{369}” As the footnote following this remark notes:

"Some SLA officials say this attack (in 2002) was the first claimed in the name of the DLA, but the claim does not appear to have reached the outside world – most likely because the rebels were not yet equipped with the satellite telephones with which they would, by early 2003, be calling human rights organizations and journalists."

The satellite phones have indeed been a crucial instrument in the war in Darfur, both for the rebels searching to alert the international community about their cause, as well as for the exiled rebel leaders keeping contact with their bases on the ground. A long-time activist and Sudan expert in Paris even claims to have seen Abdulwahid El Nour command his assistants on the ground over the phone, ordering them to attack government positions.\textsuperscript{370} One may wonder how rebel groups in a poor dusty and remote area such as Darfur can get ahold of satellite phones. There are many different ways through which they may have received them, one notable one being their supporters in the diaspora. When asked about what role the diaspora played and how they assisted the rebel movements, a group of young Darfuris interviewed in Khartoum\textsuperscript{371} emphasized that the Darfuris abroad sent Thuraya satellite phones and phone cards to the rebel leaders so they could keep in touch with them.

One of these students, the Massalit “rebel” mentioned earlier, himself seized the communication technologies available to him to tell his own story to a broader international audience. Through a website dedicated to news about Sudan – sudaneseonline.com - he learned about the Save Darfur campaign in the US and discovered their homepage. He decided to write to them to tell them more about the situation in his homeland. He also says, "what they did was very important. They could not have done anything better, because the situation there is very complicated". The very act of writing to the Save Darfur coalition is visibly an inherently important act for the young Massalit. He saw it as his contribution to the broader struggle to gather international support. If his testimony made a difference is

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid, 76.
\textsuperscript{370} Interview, TC, Paris, 19.03.2007
\textsuperscript{371} Interview, group of young Darfuris, Khartoum, 02.04.2009
\textsuperscript{372} Interview, NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009
uncertain, but he has since received regular news briefings from the US based Save Darfur coalition.

Ultimately, ICTs have played an important role to help both the leaders of the rebellion and lower ranked members of the different movements to broadcast and make their message heard internationally. Internet democratizes the participation in the political struggle, making it possible for even those with a poor income or finding themselves lower down in the hierarchy of the rebel movements to participate in the broader political work and to reach out to a public that finds itself miles away from the field of combat. The satellite phones have made it possible for even a remote area such as Darfur to communicate – almost instantly – with the international community.

B - The premises for international interest in Sudan mirrored in the rebel discourses

Once contacts with the outside world were established, the very way the rebels have communicated about their struggle at home has been an important tool to attract attention and garner support. Although the consciousness about the importance of their public relations internationally came in later on for the Southern rebels than the Darfuri groups, the results, or the support obtained, have been quite different for the two.

1) Southern rebels’ access to internationalization through the framing of their struggle as a religious conflict

The second civil war in South Sudan started at the height of the Cold War and was rapidly interpreted as part of the East/West confrontation. During the first years of the war, the SPLA received important support, material and political, from socialist Ethiopia of Mängestu Häyle Maryam, who in turn was the Soviet Union’s closest ally in the region.

Implications of the end of the Cold War for the Southern rebellion

The SPLA’s Marxist rhetoric as well as the fact that it fought against the government in Khartoum, a sworn enemy of Ethiopia, entertained this vital bond. Khartoum at this time was backed by the US because of its declared intention to fight communism, and also because it was the only Arab country to have declared its support to the Camp David Accords of 1979.
The Ethiopian connection also made it possible for the Southern displaced to find refuge in Ethiopia, which counted around 250,000 refugees in early 1988 and an estimated 400,000 in early 1991. It also facilitated the task for the commanders of the SPLA to meet, plan and launch new attacks against government positions from neighboring Ethiopia. The fall of the Soviet Union as well as the overthrow of Mângestu in 1991 deprived the SPLA of an important ally and especially of an important channel of support. The new regime in Ethiopia reestablished close bonds with Khartoum, who since the coup in 1989 provoked skepticism and repulsion in Washington. It represented a heavy drawback for the SPLA, who was severely weakened in its confrontation with the Northern government. The SPLA was soon split into several factions, and despite several efforts to reunite the ranks it remained split throughout most of the 1990’s. Other major changes had however been set into motion on the international arena, and the SPLA rapidly adapted to this new political context.

**A progressive shift in rhetoric: from Marxist sympathies to a “religious struggle against Islamists in the North”**

The SPLA has often been portrayed as fighting to defend a Christian and Animist population in Southern Sudan against the authoritarian and Islamist regime in Northern Sudan. However, as we’ve seen with the SPLA’s initial alliance with Marxism, it was very far from claiming any Christian identity in the first years of the second civil war. Things started to change in 1989, with the launching of the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). The arrival of a range of new NGO’s into South Sudan, among which many had a close relationship to the foreign Churches already present in the region, made John Garang realize the potential support the Churches could give him and his movement. The foreign Churches and the Christian organizations represented a wide international network of Churches and Christian interest groups in Europe and the US. The initial sympathy the SPLA benefited from on behalf of the Christian organizations and some of the Churches inside Sudan, resulting from the mere fact that they fought to defend the people of Southern Sudan, could hence easily be extended to these Christian groups in Europe and in the US. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos explains how the SPLA attempted to gain support from the Western Churches in South Sudan, notably by ceasing to kidnap foreign pastors in the areas under their control as they were used to doing and by adopting the theology of liberation as diffusely by the New Sudan Council of

Churches (NSCC)\textsuperscript{374}. This also enabled the SPLA to broaden its support within the civilian population, who following the "tragedies of the war had (been) rushed towards the religion\textsuperscript{375}". The NSCC for example was founded in a refugee camp in Ethiopia in 1989. The aid provided by the foreign Churches and the affiliated organizations, essentially taking the form of religious instruction and food, became vital for the survival of the SPLA. The SPLA thus granted a large autonomy to the NSCC, although some disagreements remained concerning the spiritual orientation of the movement. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Monclos also notes that “with the support of the anti-slavery lobbies, the missionary movements and the actors of the humanitarian aid sector, the evangelization and the emancipation of the South finished by rhyming\textsuperscript{376}”. Southern Sudan has reportedly witnessed a notable increase in its proportion of people who call themselves Christians, however the numbers have remained heavily contested.

The war in South Sudan has thus often been portrayed as one opposing the Islamist regime in North Sudan and the Christian/Animist population of the South. Even if this interpretation of the violence is rather narrow and to some extent misguiding of the complex realities of the war, this narrative has been comforted and reproduced by Southern Sudanese refugees in Europe and the US\textsuperscript{377}. These refugees certainly perceived the persecution on religious basis as real, but desires of a certain “embellishment” for the sake of the foreign audience should not be excluded. As Valentino Achak Deng, a “Lost Boy” from South Sudan having found refuge in the US, tells in his biography:

”At the height of our journey from southern Sudan to Ethiopia, there were perhaps twenty thousand of us, and our routes were very different. Some arrived with their parents. Others with rebel soldiers. A few thousand traveled alone. But now, sponsors and newspaper reporters and the like expect the stories to have certain elements, and the Lost Boys have been consistent in their willingness to oblige. Survivors tell the stories the sympathetic want, and that means making them as shocking as possible. My own story includes enough small embellishments that I cannot criticize the accounts of others\textsuperscript{378}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{374} Pérouse de Montclos (2002), \textit{op.cit.} It should however be mentioned that the SPLA was a large coalition, and even when the leaders ordered the stop of such kidnappings for example, it didn’t prevent some factions to act as they wanted in the field.
\item \textsuperscript{375} Ibid, 43.
\item \textsuperscript{376} Ibid, 44.
\item \textsuperscript{377} Abusharaf, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{378} Dave Eggers, \textit{What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng}, (San Francisco: McSeeney’s, 2006), 538, 21.
\end{itemize}
The Lost Boys was the name given by UN and other humanitarian aid workers to the more than 20,000 boys, essentially from the Dinka tribe, orphaned or separated from their parents during the war in South Sudan. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) helped resettle several thousands of them in the US in 2001. The autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng, told by himself and written down by Dave Eggers, recounts the story of his flight, along with the other Lost Boys in the 1980’s and their following resettlement in the US. Deng pursues his reflection on their encounters with a Western audience eager to learn more about their experiences from the war, and shows how they become aware of what this audience wants:

"No doubt if you have heard of the Lost Boys of Sudan, you have heard of the lions. For a long while, the stories of our encounters with lions helped garner sympathy from our sponsors and our adopted country in general. The lions enhanced the newspaper articles and no doubt played a part in the U.S. being interested in us in the first place. But despite the growing doubts of the more cynical, the strangest thing about these accounts is that they were in most cases true. As the hundreds of boys in my own group were walking through Sudan, five of us were taken by lions."

Indeed, it is not because some embellishments are given to the stories told that they are not true, but the effects of the encounter with a foreign audience on the narratives produced by the refugees in Europe or North America are important to keep in mind.

The issue of slavery has also to some extent been instrumentalized by the Southerners in order to gain international audience. Having taken note of the mobilization of a number of foreign organizations around this question, organizations representing both sources of income and access to international media, several central players within the SPLA concluded that cooperating with these organizations carried several potential benefits. John Garang for example voiced many speeches highly critical of the practice of slavery in South Sudan, which according to Alex de Waal, could have been written by Christian Solidarity International (CSI). The practice of slavery is a tool of war and domination with old roots, but which has been hard to map out properly. Stories of Southerners having been asked to say they were slaves in order for the “slave owners” to collect money through the slave redemption carried out by a few Western NGOs, have nourished suspicions around the extent of the practice. However, its existence during the war cannot be denied and independently of

379 Ibid, 30.
380 de Waal (1997), op.cit.
how widespread it really was, the image it conveys illustrates in a very powerful way the asymmetric balance of power between the North and the South. In this sense, it soon became an efficient tool to gain the attention of a foreign audience.

2) Darfur rebels responding to the external mobilization and seeking the “right framing”

The rebels taking up arms in Darfur against the central government in 2003 has often been interpreted as an opportunistic initiative in order for them to be heard while the Northerners and the Southerners were negotiating in Naivasha, and in order to have their share in the remaking of the power sharing in the country.

The Darfur rebels’ tactical use of the genocide and human rights discourse

The strategies of internationalization are both the result of autonomous initiatives to receive support, as well as a tool tactically used in response to international mobilization. However, as Clifford Bob points out in his writing about *The Marketing of Rebellion*, the movements seeking international support are numerous, and hence there are many more challengers for international support than those who actually manage to become famous international causes. In order to reach the international agenda, the contenders have to present their cause in the most attractive manner possible. Their discourse should fit with NGO concerns, and their cause should sound like the ultimate defense of “right” against “wrong”. If possible, they should also align their political struggle with the foreign policies of the countries likely to support them.

The Paris-based rebel leader Abdulwahid el Nour, who is also a lawyer trained at the University of Khartoum, seems to have perfectly understood the importance of “the right framing, in the right place and at the right time”. His discourse on the crisis in Darfur, the issues at stake and what should be done to remedy the situation is more aligned with what his European interlocutors are likely to be moved by than marked by Darfur specificities. The debate on whether the crisis in Darfur has been amounting to genocide or not has occupied a lot of attention within the international campaign for Darfur, as discussed in other chapters (II, and VII). Without taking position on this debate here, or the “correctness” of the term to describe the situation in Darfur, it was in any case in the interest of both human rights
activists seeking to attract attention to the cause and the rebels themselves to adopt this term and insist on its gravity. Set aside the atrocity that this term carries with it, “genocide” also describes a situation where there is one clear perpetrator group and one clear group of victims. Thus both for its powerful and inherently shocking message and for its inherent message of an imbalanced and unfair violence, this term has helped both the activists in generating increased attention and the rebel leaders in fostering sympathy and support.

Abdulwahid el Nour is one of those who have fully endorsed this concept. He has even gone further than that in his search for Western support. Indeed, not only does he use the term genocide for the above-mentioned reasons, he also compares Darfur with the genocide that has marked European history the most: the Holocaust. He describes the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps as “concentration camps”, and refers to the counter-insurgency campaign led by Khartoum as the government’s search for a “final solution” to the Darfur problem. In order to stop this, he has repeatedly called for a NATO-intervention in Darfur, for a long time believing that a UN peacekeeping mission, waiting for the Sudanese government’s authorization, would never become a reality. At a press conference in Paris in early 2007 he skillfully referred to European history to reach out to his audience:

“If we are not Europeans, we are citizens of the world. Don’t we deserve the same fate as the people of Kosovo, where NATO intervened to put an end to the ethnic cleansing?”

The lawyer certainly knows how to make his pleading. Other public speeches he has voiced make clear references to the ethical objectives of European foreign policy, as for example praising the opportunity to speak in France - “a democracy” and “the country of Human rights” - before adding that that is not the case in Sudan. This discourse and the way it is pronounced is reminiscent of what Jean-François Bayart writes about the strategy of extraversion, “democracy, or more precisely the discourse of democracy, is no more than yet another source of economic rents, comparable to earlier discourses such as the denunciation of communism or of imperialism in the time of the Cold War, but better adapted to the spirit of the age. It is, as it were, a form of pidgin language that various native princes use in their

381 Interview, Abdulwahid El Nour, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Paris, 08.03.2007


383 Abdulwahid El Nour speaking at a public meeting organized to launch a special issue of the journal “Outre Terre” dedicated to Darfur, Hotel de Ville du Vème arrondissement, Paris, 21.10.2008
communication with Western sovereigns and financiers. In other words, the terms like “democracy” and “human rights” have become the passwords to western political support and those who know that use it actively in their interactions with potential external supporters.

Usages of the term “genocide” inside Sudan

The qualification of “genocide” seems among some Sudanese stakeholders, chiefly those affected by the war and the rebels, to be the most unquestionable term to describe the crisis in Darfur, while others, mainly government officials and members of the Khartoum opposition, see it as a concept imposed from the outside. The young Darfuri students I spoke with in Khartoum, all close to different rebel movements, explain “it is very clear for everyone that there has been a genocide”. When asked what “genocide” constitutes for them, one of the answers was that “the people who have been attacked are Africans and those who attacked were Arabs, and it was planned”. They however remember that they started talking about genocide after they had heard that the American Congress had publicly termed the situation as “genocide” in a resolution on 24 June 2004, and a friend of theirs studying law at the University of Khartoum went seeking for the definition of the term. When Kofi Annan and Colin Powell in turn visited Khartoum and Darfur shortly after, at the end of June/early July, the students I spoke with tell me that they demonstrated in front of the US Embassy in Khartoum and distributed tracts about the situation in their home province. A Khartoum intellectual, defining himself as a fierce opponent to the government of Omar al Bashir, remembers that it was after the visit of Kofi Annan to Khartoum and Darfur in July 2004, that international actors started to speak about genocide. He however perceives the reasons for the term being used as weak, seeing it as something the international actors started talking about “simply”, as he puts it, on the basis of these delegations having witnessed horrible destruction and “bodies thrown in the wells”. The young Darfuris however, claim their right to describe the crisis that has hit their homeland as “genocide” and they reacted fiercely when


385 Interview, group of Darfuri students, Khartoum, 13.11.2009

386 Ibid.


388 Interview, KR, Khartoum, 29.03.2009

389 Ibid.
the new US envoy of President Barack Obama, Scott Gration, in 2009 attempted to avoid using the genocide term when speaking about Darfur. As one of them says, “Gration said that there is no genocide in Darfur, it shocked me.” What Gration had said was however not that genocide had never occurred in Darfur. As reported by media channels after his return from his first visit to Sudan, he said, “it doesn't matter what we call it (...) We have people living in dire, desperate circumstances. We have women who fear for their lives, who have had their souls ripped out of them...I'm not going to get into a debate that doesn't have to happen.” Avoiding this term was also part of a new US strategy to propose serious possibilities for engagement to the Sudanese government, in exchange of considerable improvements on the ground. The young Darfuris reactions, quite similar to the Darfur activists in the US, however shows the strength of the term “genocide” – once it is being used by a sufficiently large part of internal stakeholders and external observers, it becomes close to impossible for anyone to attempt to nuance this narrative without at the same time being accused of “denying the realities”.

The efforts to export the conflict in Darfur onto the international arena are hence not only autonomous initiatives to alert a foreign audience and powerful Western governments, but are also developed in response to the international attention and the international discourse about the crisis. The ”genocide” and ”lack-of-human-rights-and-democracy” discourse of the human rights organizations is reproduced and reshaped by the rebel leaders and other Darfuris affected by the war. When it comes to the connections between activist coalitions and the rebel movements, many activist leaders, especially in the US, have deliberately refused to be associated with anyone of the rebel leaders, not wanting to be seen as supporting an armed rebellion, but as speaking in defense of the “voiceless victims”. Others however have openly welcomed personalities such as Abdulwahid el Nour in their public information meetings, as was the case of a large public meeting organized by the French Urgence Darfour in March 2007. In any case, the international lobbying made by the Darfur rebels, and the

390 Interview, group of young Darfuris, Khartoum, 13.11.2009


392 Meeting at ”La Mutualité” in Paris, March 20th, 2007, organized by “Urgence Darfour” to raise awareness about Darfur, a few weeks before the French presidential elections. Reportedly, an envoy from the US based Save Darfur Coalition, who came to Paris especially for this meeting, was very concerned with the list of attendants and speakers, stressing that he did not wish to have to shake hands with Abdulwahid el Nour who was also present. The French activists had less trouble with that, and although they did not intend
“testimonies” they share from the ground, do contribute to justify the *raison d’être* of the international activist campaign to “save Darfur” - although the rebels’ direct influence on the advocacy movement seems overall marginal, with the exception of a few activist leaders in Paris having particularly connected with Abdulwahid el Nour.

3) Have the voices from Darfur been heard? Which ones? How calls from inside have shaped the international response to the crisis

In order to understand if the internationalization strategies of the Darfur rebels have had any impact on the activist campaign that has been built up on the international arena since 2004, two types of sources should be looked at: on the one hand, public discourses and reports published by human rights organizations and advocacy groups in order to see which types of "sources from the ground" they use, and on the other hand international press coverage from the ground.

**Humanitarians, activists and journalists and the usage of victim testimonies in their campaigns**

Indeed, reading the activists’ calls for actions and the reports published by human rights organizations393, one can barely find any trace of the testimonies and appeals for intervention voiced by the rebels. Their advocacy briefings are rather based on victim testimonies and the stories of displaced persons. Accounts of innocent civilians suffering, having fled from their villages under attack, often loosing family members on the way, seem to better illustrate what the human rights reports want to communicate than what a call for military intervention by

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armed rebel soldiers would do: the image of a population in need of protection and assistance, and not a population among which you can find armed provocateurs. The journalists having gone to the region to see for themselves have on their side been more incline to use rebel testimonies. Some initial accounts about the conflict in Darfur reported in the media were highly simplified stories. However, with time, many more detailed and more nuanced stories about the course of events and the state of the situation in Darfur have reached the pages of internationally read newspapers. This is notably due to journalists’ constant search for opposing and contrasting testimonies to illustrate their reports, leading them to search for different types of stakeholders to give their version of the events.

Indeed, as shall be studied below, the type of access and the nature of their work have largely determined the type of sources and the overall image they, the external actors, have ended up with. The humanitarian organizations have had a relatively good access to Darfur since July 2004, despite strict visa procedures to travel into Darfur and a widespread image in the media that this access was highly restricted – which was certainly also due to the journalists’ own lack of access to the field. It was as the conflict escalated, and long before the international community started to give any noticeable attention to Darfur, that the Sudanese government severely restricted access for humanitarian organizations. Only five foreign NGO’s were present in Darfur in early 2003, and access slowly but progressively improved as international pressure increased, and as Khartoum’s “counter-insurgency” campaign went to an end. An agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan and the UN, in July 2004, under the pressure of Secretary General Kofi Annan, and opened up for a so-called “fast-track” procedure for humanitarian aid workers seeking visa and travel permits to Darfur. Hence, although the entrance procedure would still take some time, the access has reportedly been rather good compared to many other conflict areas in the world and contrary to what is often believed about the highly publicized crisis in Darfur.

The work of the humanitarian aid workers on the ground can be seen as twofold: delivering aid to the people in need, and reporting back to their headquarters about the state of the

394 Murphy, in de Waal (2007), op.cit.
395 Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.
situation. In their interactions in the field, they are naturally in contact first of all with people who have suffered tremendously from the conflict, where most have fled from their home and lost family members on the way. This is the population the humanitarian aid workers are there to assist and give relief to. When it comes to other stakeholders in the conflict, such as the armed rebels or the government sponsored militias, the humanitarians are naturally inclined to do all in their capacity to avoid being seen as interacting with them. The search for neutrality pushes the humanitarian NGOs to do what they can to avoid being seen as supporting one party against the other, but even the NGOs who do take sides are generally reluctant to be associated with armed actors. The most notable example is the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the NGO known for its partisan engagement and their tradition to actively support the “underdogs” and “liberators” in civil wars around the world. As the head of NPA in the late 1980’s, Egil Hagen, put it: “Relief in war situations is politics. (…) I am one hundred percent with the SPLA. I don’t make public statements to that effect but I do the maximum to see that they get the material aid they need, apart from weapons”. Allegations that the NPA also transported weapons for the SPLA during the war in the South have naturally been strongly rejected by the NPA itself.

The human rights reports based on information the humanitarians have collected on the ground generally reflect this relationship, with a clear majority of experience related information coming from internally displaced persons and refugees – or the “victim” and “civilian” population in the humanitarian jargon. Humanitarian organizations also have a tendency to portray these civilians as “purely” civilians, although the delimitations between “civilians” and “rebels” or “combatants” in the field are often blurry. The displaced populations’ testimonies also contribute to justify the very presence of the humanitarian organizations, at least as long as these populations are “victims” more than “parties to the conflict”. And as long as there are new stories of suffering, the humanitarians will have a reason to continue their work. Interviewing and relating the experiences of other actors, either who have not suffered, or who are partly contributing to the violence, has therefore little relevance, as it would blur their narrative of the situation. Jane Blayton, a student of literature, has done a pertinent reading of a range of human rights reports as well as of two books on Darfur, written by two authors with highly different views on the conflict: Eric Reeves and

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David Hoile\textsuperscript{398}. As she points out, “as a genre, human rights reports provide an exclusive explanatory framework which asserts moral and factual certainty and does not leave room for multiple explanations\textsuperscript{399}. Any ambiguous or alternative account of the events in Darfur is therefore not of interest for the human rights reports eager to send out a strong and appealing message. Furthermore, Blayton writes about human rights reports that:

“(…) the wealth of victim testimony can play some narrative tricks. For example, in some reports, the sheer number of the testimonies gives the impression that the whole story has been told, whereas in fact no testimonies have been provided from the perpetrators point of view, which would be necessary for a complete picture. The sample has been carefully selected by the researchers and writers. There are also no testimonies from people who for one reason or another were unaffected by the atrocities\textsuperscript{400}.”

Also, few testimonies are provided in these reports from the rebels’ point of view, and their role is even often played down. Not only does the number of testimonies give the impression that the whole story has been told, it also gives the impression that the crisis is everywhere in Darfur and that the need for external aid is indispensable, immediately, to prevent the entire region from imploding.

In other words, drawing in alternative testimonies diverting from the story of the victims would distort their clear and unambiguous moral account of a heinous crime being committed in Darfur. This observation calls for a nuance to the image that the victims are the “voiceless” actors and those who wear arms are the ones who have their say. In the general human rights narrative on Darfur, victims actually have a voice, and sometimes even a face, at least those individual victims who are put forward to tell their story. Speaking of the “tools of the weak”, these victims are given the possibility to talk precisely because they are the “voiceless” in the conflict - the victims that no one would otherwise listen to. However, they are generally


\textsuperscript{400} Ibid, article (1)
presented as having little or no agency of their own and extremely little control over the conflict and the violence that unfolds around them. The “perpetrators” however, the Arab militias supported by the government forces, are given no voice and only sometimes a face, then usually showing them as the horseriding militiamen they have become famous as. But as opposed to the victims of violence, they are presented as entirely organized and as having control over the violence perpetrated and the evolution of the events. Any close observation of the situation on the ground calls for a nuance to this image. Although Khartoum most certainly gave them the initial orders, some of the armed militias have turned their backs on the government (notably after realizing that the promises of payment were not held), and have joined the rebel movements, while others continue to work for the government, but sometimes carrying out attacks on their own. The government in Khartoum is generally depicted as capable of stopping the conflict anytime, if only it is willing to. However, the conflict has become increasingly complex over the past few years, not only the Arab militias, but the rebel groups too have incessantly split and divided into new sub-factions. The largest challenge these past few years has for example not been to convince the government in Khartoum to go to the negotiations table, but to reunite the rebels or at least gather them around some common positions401.

When it comes to foreign journalists’ approach to the conflict, their access to Darfur has been much more restricted402. This should probably be understood as a result of the activist campaign, often adopting a quite aggressive tone against the regime in Khartoum, which in turn has done what it could to prevent journalists from going to see for themselves and write additional critical reports. The result however has been that most journalists have traveled through Chad, either seeking to speak with Darfuri refugees having crossed the border into Chad or by traveling – at their own risk – a few kilometers into Darfur403. The refugees they

401 An interesting report in this respect is written by Omer Ismail and Maggie Fick, from the Enough project, asserting that portraying the rebels as fractured, having become the “norm” on the international arena, only serves the Sudanese government’s rhetoric. They however seek to show that only four rebel groups are relevant to the peace talks, and that the “differences between them owe more to personal and ethnic rivalries than substantive disagreements over the issues central to most Darfuris”, “Darfur rebels 101”, Enough Project, January 29, 2009, http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/darfur-rebels-101 (Accessed July 6, 2010)

402 See notably the account of a young Zaghawa working as translator for foreign journalists traveling into Darfur from Chad: Daoud Hari, The translator: A tribesman’s memoir of Darfur, (New York : Random House, 2008), 204.

403 Quote by NL, Massalit rebel/student: ”There were also foreigners, journalists, who went to Chad and they asked the Sudanese coming from Darfur what was happening there”. Interview, NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009
met in Chad naturally had a flood of stories of desperate escapes to share, but few alternative stories were accessible. This is a critique that has also been addressed to the investigators of the chief prosecutor of the ICC, which, incapable of sending investigators into Darfur itself, had to rely on inquiries led in refugee camps in Chad and information reported in human rights reports\(^{404}\). This certainly provides them with a range of valuable and first hand accounts of the violence that has spread throughout Darfur, however, as Blayton reminds us, it can never redraw the whole picture.

The journalists who ventured into Darfur would often be assisted by armed opponents – both interested in showing the foreign journalists around, but also the only ones capable of conducting them more or less safely across the border. This was notably the case with the French writer and one of the most vocal French activists on Darfur, Bernard-Henri Lévy in March 2007\(^{405}\). His journey into Darfur was organized from Paris by Abdulwahid el Nour and assisted on the ground by his men from the SLA. His account of the situation, published in a two page article in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, is however an exception among the other reports from inside Darfur: he effectively ended up recommending that the international community sponsor and arm the rebels in order to help them win the war. Most journalists would however simply relate the calls for intervention voiced by the rebels, whether they found themselves in Western or regional capitals or in Darfur\(^{406}\). While undeniably giving the rebels a platform on which they could express themselves, the support they have been seeking through their calls in the media is far from obtained automatically.

\(^{404}\) Luis-Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, claims to have more than thirty different witnesses ready to explain President Omar al-Bashir’s role in the crimes committed in Darfur. However, only speculations have been possible about who have given them the information, as well as who the witnesses are, because, as Ocampo says himself: “we foresaw what is happening now: they are attacking people who they believe could be our witness”. Most of the witnesses are thus protected. “ICC claims ‘strong evidence’ against Sudan’s Bashir”, *France24*, March 3, 2009, [http://www.france24.com/en/20090303-icc-claims-strong-evidence-against-sudans-bashir-prosecutor](http://www.france24.com/en/20090303-icc-claims-strong-evidence-against-sudans-bashir-prosecutor) (Accessed April 20, 2010)


Darfur rebels failing to become the "voice of Darfur" and "heroes of liberation" – a comparison with the SPLM in the South

One of the important reasons for the Southern Sudanese rebel groups’ success, both on the ground, but first of all politically, is the late leader John Garang’s capacity to eventually gather an internally split movement and to effectively play the role of the charismatic leader internationally. Following the overthrow of the Mängestu regime in Ethiopia, a faction of the SPLA split off. For the larger part of the 1990’s the SPLA remained divided between the original SPLA (“mainstream”) and SPLA-United, led by Riek Machar who later on signed an agreement with the government in the North and fought along with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Yet, although Garang had lost his most important support in the former socialist Ethiopia, it did not take him long before he built up a new network of strong international supporters. He was frequently invited to hold lectures in the US, at think-tank seminars, in front of the Sudanese community or in front of religious communities with a special involvement in South Sudan. He managed in 2002 to reunite with Machar, who previously had tried to overthrow him, and this was probably one of the most key steps making the peace talks and the following Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) possible. He was then, and is still today, almost uncontestedly referred to as the "charismatic leader of South Sudan", within and outside Sudan. Many humanitarian aid workers having worked in South Sudan and who came to know him, and several European and American academics and politicians, developed a close friendship with him407.

As we shall see in this last part, the Darfur rebels have attempted to garner support on the model of the Southern rebellion, however they have had much less success than their Southern predecessors. This is due to three reasons, one structural, one related to the leadership and one related to the media coverage. First of all, on a structural level, the war in Darfur has attracted international attention for the human suffering it has entailed, but not for the political struggle of the rebels, which the Southern rebels managed to do. As Walter Lodwa puts it: “In South Sudan, we fought for a democratic and just government in Sudan. That was the plan A for the SPLM, and plan B was that if this didn’t work, we would (need to) have an independent South Sudan, and that goal requested international support408”. When it

407 Very few humanitarian NGOs had direct contact with the SPLM in the South during the war, with the exception of the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and World Vision International for some time as well.

408 Interview, Walter Lodwa, SPLM Representative in Norway, Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM Chapter in Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008
comes to the conflict in Darfur, “Abdulwahid for example wants Darfur to become one unified region, but that is something that can be solved on a national level”\textsuperscript{409}, Lodwa says, arguing that this is where the difficulty of internationalizing the Darfur conflict lies.

Secondly, the Darfur rebel movements have lacked a unifying and charismatic leader capable of keeping and capitalizing on international support, as well as unifying the movement internally. The rebels in Darfur were from early on inspired by the SPLA. Indeed, it was the Southern rebels who from the outset sought to support the Darfuri movement, even before it was constituted as one\textsuperscript{410}. However, as Julie Flint and Alex de Waal write, Abdulwahid el Nour was “an enthusiastic but not wholly uncritical admirer of John Garang” - critical of his toughness on his own people, yet highly admirative of his vision for Sudan. Garang’s position internationally seems to have been one of the important working strategies Abdulwahid wanted to adopt. His discourse on a ”New Sudan” and a ”secular and federal Sudan” as detailed to his audience in Paris is also very close to late Dr. Garang’s policy visions for the country. However, Abdulwahid has never managed to come even close to a ”new Garang” for Darfur. What many from the international diplomatic contingent in Khartoum, as well as humanitarian aid workers, say when asked about the political support for the Darfur cause on the international arena, is that: ”there is no Garang in Darfur”\textsuperscript{411}. The humanitarian behind this quote continued by saying that ”there is Khalil Ibrahim who has a certain political stature, and there is Abdulwahid who has a certain political vision for Darfur as well”\textsuperscript{412}. But again, “no Garang”. Others are much more severe when it comes to judging Abdulwahid el Nour’s credentials. As an international official in Khartoum said: ”We have phone and SMS contact with Abdulwahid, but he’s not interested. He requires certain things that won’t be implemented until after an agreement. (…) I don’t think he has any strategy. But he wants to be vice-president of Sudan”\textsuperscript{413}.” A Northern Sudanese independent consultant relates some of

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{410} Darfur as a strategic territory for expansion goes back to the SPLA’s failed attempt to conquer Darfur by Daoud Bolad in 1991. Before the SLA was founded, the SPLA even encouraged the activists to form a movement they could support. As Abdulwahid El Nour became known for his role in gathering the movement, John Garang contacted him personally by sending two SPLA officials to Jebel Marra. After conversing with him about his vision, he wanted to send him weapons and support the movement. The SLA eventually insisted on mounting its own movement, and not be a section of the SPLA, and as the SPLA became involved in the negotiations with the governement, SPLA support to Darfur faded away. More on this in: Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.

\textsuperscript{411} Interview, A.P., official from French NGO, Khartoum, 14.11.2007

\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{413} Interview, PS, UN official, Khartoum, 17.11.2007
the rumors circulating about Abdulwahid el Nour in exile in Paris: "Abdulwahid, from what people told me, is drinking, seeing girls and is not doing lobby work\textsuperscript{414}\textsuperscript{.} However, he admits, "when he speaks, he speaks on national problems and not just as a Darfurian. He’s addressing the real problems\textsuperscript{415}\textsuperscript{.} When it comes to his reluctance to return to the negotiating table, he also points to Abdulwahid el Nour’s personal ambitions: "Abdulwahid is intelligent, he doesn’t want to be one among twelve others, he wants to be the one\textsuperscript{416}\textsuperscript{.} Along with his long exile abroad, he has more and more become seen as detached from his people and those he’s supposed to represent in the negotiations. A lieutenant colonel from the US Army, working as an observer with the African Union (AU) mission in Darfur, resumed Abdulwahid’s position well: "He was a hotel rebel\textsuperscript{417}\textsuperscript{.}

Thirdly, media reports on the Darfur conflict have provided more detailed reports of the violence perpetrated by the rebels than what was ever the case for South Sudan. In a comparative perspective, this has certainly made it difficult for the Darfur rebels to keep and capitalize on their initial international support. Indeed, initially the rebel groups did dispose of a tacit support from the international community and the activist community in the broad sense – a support that was rarely voiced out directly, as it was rather a reaction to their adversary’s proven and unanimously condemned scorched earth tactic. Jan Pronk, the former UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Sudan, said in December 2004 to the \textit{New York Times} that the rebels "had a lot of sympathy in the international community\textsuperscript{418}\textsuperscript{,} which he deemed they were losing then following two surprise attacks. In comparison with the SPLA in South Sudan during the 1980’s and 1990’s, it should be noted that the existence of satellite phones and the possibilities for extensive and almost instant media coverage have not been only beneficial to the Darfur rebels. While the SPLA factions were responsible for at least as many violent attacks causing civilian casualties in large parts of the South, this was before the era of the satellite phones and journalists had little access into South Sudan, except when

\begin{footnotes}
\item[414] Interview, IBB, Independent consultant, Khartoum, 21.11.2007
\item[415] Ibid.
\item[416] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
"embedded" with the rebels themselves. The rebels of the SLA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the other smaller factions have been much more exposed to the international media spotlight, which hence has provided the international community with more grounds to criticize them as well.

The Darfur rebels have thus failed both to keep the initial sympathy capital they had, to gather new strong support outside the diaspora, and also to gather the different rebel factions in one movement or at least around common policy objectives for the region. The two are of course closely linked: the international community is more likely to support a rebel group whose political claims are coherent and attractive, and a movement that appears to be united in its cause. The political stances of the different leaders talking with international media became lost amid reports of rebel attacks, abuses, as well as arrest warrants issued against three rebel commanders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in late 2008419.

With their strategies of internationalization, the rebel movements of Darfur have fed and contributed to the larger international activist outcry destined to “Save Darfur”. However, they have not become the exclusive spokespersons on the situation in Darfur. On the contrary, the “voiceless victims” have been the privileged witnesses that international activists refer to when they want to alert a Western audience on the situation in Darfur. Indeed, there is a bottom-up internationalization strategy (rebels, Darfur opposition) which reaches the outside world, however what could be read as an international response to this call (the activist campaign and the numerous human rights reports published on the conflict) has developed rather independently from the inside-out calls for support. What is at stake here is that the spokespersons who want to broadcast a political message on ”what should be done” in Darfur have not managed to break through and become the legitimate “representatives” of the Darfuri people. Those who are most often quoted in human rights reports however, the IDPs, are rarely asked about their political stance. The rebels had a political message to communicate when they took up arms in the beginning, however the image of them as internally split, as unpredictable and as using blind violence as much as their adversaries (although not with the same means) has blurred this political message. The IDPs however seem to fully impersonate the humanitarian crisis and contribute to justify the need for international humanitarian – and perhaps military – protection. That is the only level on which the IDPs and the rebels claims

meet each other: both appear as demanding more international involvement, both seek the solution to Darfur’s problems outside Darfur and both expect an external protection force. Besides such demands for “international intervention” or more caricatural demands of ousting the government, the IDPs are rarely quoted on what political solutions they see for Darfur.

**Conclusion**

As we have seen in this chapter, rebels’ calls for international support have contributed to and fed the broader internationalization process of the Sudanese conflicts, however with consistent differences in the type of support achieved. The rebels in South Sudan, despite various criticisms addressed against them, eventually came to be seen as defending a legitimate cause and as the legitimate representatives of the Southerners and – at least in the eyes of the government in Khartoum and the international mediators intervening in the peace process from 2002 onwards. The Darfuri rebels have to a much lesser extent achieved this, and most of the narratives on the conflict are produced independently of or overlooking the political messages they may have had to communicate. They have even themselves adapted to the international interest for the conflict, preferring to focus on the results of the conflict (the human suffering, the “genocide”), rather than the political cause that made them take up arms in the first place. However, they have largely interpreted the massive international campaign, strongly condemning the Khartoum regime’s handling of the crisis, as a direct support to their struggle. This may have led them to believe that international support for their cause was something they did not need to work much for to obtain or to keep. Thus, they felt they could push their claims further before accepting to go to the negotiating table, instead of going there and then negotiate. Human rights reports, quoting victims and not armed actors of the conflict, have served as a primary source of information for many activists and journalists, but also for the basis on which the ICC prosecutor has accused president Omar al Bashir and other high ranking officials in the government. All in all, this has favored a process of criminalization, and perhaps more importantly a depoliticization of the international understanding of the conflict, justifying the intervention of the ICC as the most appropriate instance to help find an issue to the conflict – while negotiations are seen as ineffective talks between fractured rebels not knowing what they want, and a government unlikely to respect a future agreement.
Part II. How States Respond: between regional and international ambitions
Introduction

An important argument advanced in this dissertation is that a process of internationalization of an internal crisis can be pushed forward by international players “from below”: civil society, human rights activists, journalists, “everyday citizens” outside, as well as rebel groups and civil society within the conflict-affected country. However, they all exert pressure on their respective governments or other governments with perceived leverage in order to make them do what they can to put an end to the conflict. Civil society actors outside Sudan have for example exerted pressure on their own governments in order to make them pressure the government in Sudan, and sometimes they have attempted to exert pressure on other governments than their own, notably the Chinese government, perceived as having more leverage on the Sudanese government. Opposition movements, rebel groups and victims of the Sudanese conflicts, each in their own ways, seek external support in order to make their pressure on the government in Khartoum weigh more heavily. Hence, to understand the cycle of the internationalization process, or one could say the cycle of the boomerang, it is essential to understand the responses of these governments, and of the international organizations seized of the issue. Some respond to pressure “from below”, in the configuration where activist movements pressure their governments, while others, here the Sudanese government, respond not only to pressure “from below” within Sudan, but also to pressure “from above”, exerted by the various representatives of the “international community”.

As we shall see in chapter IV of this second part, the Sudanese regime has also contributed to give Sudan – and as a consequence, its internal conflicts – the very special place it has on the world arena today. Its international ambitions set out from the early 1990’s and the following search for acceptance in the international community did not have the objective to put forward the conflict in the South, however, its increased visibility on the international arena had this unintended effect. Eventually, as Sudan from the mid-1990’s became an international pariah, it became in its interest to work towards a peace deal with the South – under the auspices of the international community and especially the United States – in order to gain international and especially American goodwill. Likewise for Darfur, the Sudanese governments’ ambitions have been to work against the internationalization of the conflict. However, as the
conflict unfolded, and as the international protests became louder and louder, the resolution of the Darfur crisis has become the central component of most of Khartoum’s interactions with the international community – at least with Western diplomacies and the UN. Efforts to solve the Darfur crisis have become the key to any kind of normalization of relations with the US (literally, with the perspective of being taken off the US list of states sponsors of terrorism) but also European countries and even its neighboring countries.

As for the reactions of the United States, several European countries engaged in the conflict resolution efforts, the neighboring countries, notably through the regional organizations, and finally the United Nations, their responses to the “internationalization from below” will be explored in chapter V. The US can first of all be said to have a quite special relationship with Sudan, in the sense that it is unlike any other relationship with countries in the region or any country with internal conflicts such as the ones in Sudan, sometimes resembling a “love/hate relationship”. More accurately, the relationship is more complex than what it sometimes looks like on the surface. Although Sudan had hosted Osama Ben Laden throughout a large part of the 1990’s, and has been on the US list of states sponsors of terrorism since 1993, the country was not mentioned among the countries belonging to George W. Bush’s “axis of evil”. The relationship is certainly strained between the two governments, notably due to the war in Darfur, however their intelligence services have been cooperating for many years now. When many observers thought the relationship would become even more strained with the change of administration in 2009, the new administration opened up for the possibility of engagement, although on the condition of a certain number of improvements in the situation in Darfur. Indeed, despite cooperation on different levels, Sudan has over the past few years lived under a tremendous pressure from the US – diplomatic, political and economic.

The European countries most involved in Sudan, Great Britain and Norway, also have a special relationship with the country – Great Britain has traditionally been close to Khartoum and Norway has traditionally been close to the South. France, having been drawn in with the outburst of the Darfur conflict, through its connections with Chad, but also due to a dynamic activist network at home, has on its side gone from a compliant to a strained relationship with Khartoum. Last but not least, Sudan’s neighboring countries have played a crucial role both in Sudan’s internal wars and in the search for peace over the past few years. Regional organizations – the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for the resolution of the war in the South and the African Union (AU) for the war in Darfur – have been placed
at the core of the international initiatives to solve Sudan’s internal conflicts. This has both been a result of internal Sudanese demands, as well as regional and international requests for regional ownership and international legitimacy to the conflict solving process. This chapter will thus explore first the special bond between Sudan and the US, which conditions much of Sudan’s international behavior as well as the other international partners relationship towards Sudan. Secondly it will look at this interplay between the two levels – regional and international – of the resolution of the two conflicts.
Chapter IV - The search for international legitimacy: the Sudanese regime’s efforts to shape its identity on the international arena

Unlike today, Sudan was in the 1980’s a country that rarely produced any headlines in the international media. Indeed, as Roland Marchal and Oussama Osman put it, “its role as a player on the international arena was largely defined in relation with conflicts or tensions that it was not at the origin of: Libya was a cumbersome neighbor, the different Eritrean and Ethiopian liberation movements were well established in Khartoum...⁴²⁰”. The conflict in South Sudan was also largely ignored in Western media at the time. Things however changed after the military coup in 1989.

In this chapter, the Sudanese regime’s international behavior will be analyzed in three phases, each characterized by different attitudes towards the international community, yet retaining some elements from the preceding phase, and each phase to some extent overlapping in the next. The first phase is the one starting after the Islamist-military coup in June 1989 and which lasts until the end of the 1990’s, and is characterized by the new regime’s ambition to become a new Islamic power in the region. Progressively, during this phase, it however becomes more aware of the failures of this policy, which led it to become famous as the new “safe haven” for radical Islamist movements. Trapped in a severe economic crisis, the regime laid out on a search for new allies to break its international isolation. The second phase starts in 1999, with the eviction of Hassan al Turabi from the government and the beginning of a new era for Sudanese politics and its position on the world arena. The internal rearrangements helped to forge a new relationship between the US and Sudan, and the engagement in peace efforts in the South became the ultimate way to consolidate this relationship. However, the outburst of the conflict in Darfur shortly after, in 2003, was the beginning of a new and severe deterioration of the relationship between Sudan and its Western counterparts – although at times more in discourse than in action for some. During the jubilatory signing of the peace agreement in Naivasha in January 2005, Khartoum already knew it had missed the opportunity to improve its relationship with the Western powers, an improvement that had for

⁴²⁰ Marchal and Osman (1997), op.cit., 74. (own translation)
some time been the driving engine behind its efforts to make peace with the South. The new and third phase for the Sudanese regime, that had started already in 2003 and which would become progressively more pronounced after January 2005, has consisted mainly of a rejection of Western interventionism altogether while looking Eastwards for political and economic support. But once more, is Sudan’s relationship with the outside world, and especially the US, always what it looks like?

**A - Ambitions of creating an International Islamist: places Sudan on the map of worrisome countries in the eyes of the US (1989-1999)**

To understand the place Sudan has had on the international arena over the past few years it is essential to go back to the aftermath of the coup in 1989, and perhaps even more to the end of the Cold war in 1991. As Sudan started to manifest its new Islamist project with a clear international component, as it decided to support Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War and finally as it became associated with a range of terrorist movements and terrorist attacks in the region and beyond, the regime went from being simply disliked by Washington to becoming the target of sanctions and a tough policy of isolation.

**1) The early beginning of the new regime**

The coup, carried out on June 30, 1989, placed General Omar Hassan al Bashir at the head of the new regime, while the real instigator and brain behind the coup had arranged to be in prison – in case something went wrong he could thus not be accused. Indeed, Hassan al Turabi, who in the coming decade would be the chief ideologist of the regime, had been to prison many times before for this not to seem too suspicious. Turabi had been in Sudanese politics for a long time, however he seemed to never be given the space he wanted by the riverine elite in the Democratic Union and Umma Parties as he himself was the son of a provincial notable. However, his ambitions were hard to stop, and he transformed the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that he took over about thirty years earlier into what became the National Islamic Front (NIF). The coup, for him the only means to access

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422 Ibid.
power, is generally described as “bloodless”, and it did not trigger much international attention at the time. In the following months the international community would indeed be more preoccupied with another major international event: the fall of the Berlin wall.

**Asserting its regional and international ambitions**

What was new about the NIF regime in Khartoum was not so much its Islamist character per se, although Turabi had a specific vision of how he wanted to conduct politics through radical Islamism. Indeed, it was the Nimeyri regime that had imposed the Sharia law on the whole of the country in 1983, adding sparks to the new rebellion that was building up. Also, the different governments in Khartoum over the years had not hesitated to refer to their Islamic identity in order to benefit from financial and military support from various Arab countries in the region. The truly new aspect of the NIF regime was its willingness to play a regional and international role as an Islamist power, an ambition that was thought out and formulated by Turabi himself. As Professor in political science at the University of Khartoum, Atta el Battahani, says:

“There was a coup in Sudan in 1989, and unlike previous coups, this one had an element of internationalization to it. Turabi had a vision of a new Islamic world, he wanted to challenge the West and he was not happy with the Islamic regime (previous ones in Sudan). His ambition was to create a sort of an Islamic ComIntern, to use Sudan as a base for all radical Islamic movements, so it could unleash a revolution. In the project itself there was an international dimension.”

Indeed, the new regime had a clear international ambition, as outlaid by Marchal and Osman, an ambition to become an Islamic power hub in a new regional and international network of Islamists. But the new regime was not really taken notice of on the international arena until the spring 1991 following the Gulf war. This was both due to an international context more preoccupied with the ending of the Cold war, but also that the NIF regime took some time to thoroughly specify its internationalization strategy. Not only did the regime

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424 Young (2002), *op.cit.*

425 Interview, Atta el-Battahani, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 02.12.2007

426 Marchal and Osman (1997), *op.cit.*
support Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war, a decision that was certainly taken note of by the Americans, but it was also in the spring 1991 that it concretized its ambition to create a new “Islamist International”. In April 1991, Hassan al Turabi organized a Popular Arab Islamic Conference in Khartoum, gathering delegates from 45 different Muslim countries. It was a clear attempt to make the Sudanese capital become a new meeting platform for a various range of Islamist movements in the region. Hassan al Turabi was also known for his eloquence, and not only in Arabic: he speaks fluently English and French and has studied at the University of Sorbonne in Paris. While Western capitals were worried about Khartoum hosting radical Islamist groups, “the media talent of Hassan el Turabi, the leader of the NIF, was doing wonders in front of diplomats, journalists and sometimes researchers, who saw in him a theoretician of the modern and talkative Islamist movement”.

However, the perception of Sudan by the Arab countries was not a flattering one, as Marchal and Osman note: a “country situated at the border between the Arab and African world, Sudan had been colonized by Egypt and remained perceived as populated by vaguely Islamized Africans”. Its practice of Islam highly marked by local brotherhoods, combined with elements of Sufism, did not make Sudan an immediate attractive partner for Islamists in the region attached to Salafist ideals. Hence, there were many, especially within the Sudanese elite, who wished to see Sudan play a more active role and be more respected on the regional and international arena. Its relations with its immediate neighbors were also ambiguous at the time, although many observers claim that Khartoum was the great “winner” of the restructurations that took place after the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Mängestu regime gave place to a new regime more compliant with Khartoum, and the same was the case for the new leaders in Asmara and N’Djamen, which Khartoum had helped in their accession to power. Asmara however, soon accused Khartoum of playing a role in supporting its new radical Islamist opposition. The diplomatic ties between the two countries were broken in 1994, and Asmara became the new host for a range of Sudanese opposition movements – a role it continues to play today.

428 Marchal and Osman (1997), op.cit., 74.
429 Ibid, 76.
Economic hardship motivating Sudan’s international ambitions

However, the desire for internationalization was also motivated by economic and financial needs. Sudan was, and still is today, although the oil revenues have changed the overall picture, a poor country. In 1978, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiated a Structural Adjustment Program with the Sudanese government. The adjustment entailed a mechanization of the agriculture sector based on exports, and created great problems for the pastoralists in Sudan. Internal hardship in 1984 led to a serious foreign exchange crisis, which in turn led to shortages in foreign commodities and imports. The NIF coup in 1989 conducted many donors in Europe and North America to suspend their official development assistance, except for the humanitarian aid. After several unheld promises of economic reforms, and a failure to pay its arrears to the Fund, the IMF first declared Sudan as non-cooperative and then threatened to expel it in 1993. This prompted the government to agree on a certain number of initiatives (token payments on its arrears, and liberalization efforts), however economic growth remained weak throughout the 1990’s and until the beginning of oil exports in 1999. In 2004/2005, the foreign debt of Sudan was at a level of over 17 billion USD, which exceeded the country’s total annual GDP. Marchal and Osman explain that the regime, from the early 1990’s, was therefore seeking to mobilize sustainable financial resources by addressing itself to rich Islamist businessmen, Islamist institutions (mobilizing the system of the Islamic solidarity tax of the zakat) as well as states likely to sympathize with their Islamist project and ambitions, such as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The competitive advantage that the NIF had compared to other Islamist movements was that it disposed of a state apparatus. Hence, the Sudanese leaders could offer, in exchange of financial support, a refuge, a sanctuary for the activities of several terrorist groups and former Arab combatants having fought in Afghanistan.

Indeed, Turabi was a man of “big dreams”, to use the words of Jonathan Randal, a former Washington Post war correspondent who has written a thorough account of Osama ben Laden’s trajectory. In 1989, Turabi felt he was facing a unique opportunity he could not

431 Ibid.
432 Marchal and Osman, op.cit.
433 Randal, op.cit.
miss, as the region was in need of a new revolutionary mind. The Islamic revolution in Iran was weakened after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the country’s defeat after an eight-year war against its rival Iraq. In Afghanistan, the jihad had lost its momentum after the retreat of the Soviet troops and increased fighting among the moujahidins. It was in this context that Turabi ambitioned to create the first Islamic republic of the Sunni world, which “would outshine Iran’s Shi’a revolution”. He also seized the opportunity to invite Osama ben Laden, who then sought to leave Afghanistan, to come to Sudan. This represented a twofold opportunity for Turabi and his men: first of all, it would place Sudan on the map as a country where radical Islamists could live freely, and secondly, and perhaps more urgently, ben Laden would bring in much needed funds to a ruined Sudan. The Saudi millionaire finally came to Sudan in 1991, with his four wives, his children and several dozen former Arab combatants from Afghanistan. Turabi counted on the Saudi millionaire to accomplish his project to build, in every sense of the term, a new Sudan, a “modern Islamic state, the polar opposite of the static and theologically ossified Kingdom of Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea that he so disdained – and envied – for its oil riches” as Randal puts it. For many Sudanese, ben Laden was first and foremost seen as a businessman who invested great amounts in building up the infrastructure of the country. However, on the regional and international arena, “Sudan, in the beginning of the 1990’s, achieved the reputation of a peaceful haven for Islamists who were submitted elsewhere to all sorts of pressures”. These movements taking refuge in Sudan included members of the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas of Palestine, the Jamaa Islamiyya of Egypt as well as guardians of the revolution from Iran and other Islamists from Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Uganda. Other famous and highly mediatized terrorist personalities included Carlos “the Jackal” and Cheikh Omar Abd el Rahman. The latter was in January 1995 judged responsible for the attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. As sanctions were imposed following that attack, Khartoum became more compliant and agreed to deliver Carlos to France in 1994.

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434 Ibid.
435 Ibid, 140.
436 Interview, FM, Sudanese diplomat, Paris, 10.05.2006
437 Randal, op.cit., 116.
438 Ibid, 143.
2) An indirect internationalization of the conflict in the South

The international ambition of the regime only had as a secondary effect the internationalization of the conflict in South Sudan, nevertheless this effect has to be noted. Indeed, it was not in the interest of the Sudanese regime to put forward the war in the South in its interactions with international partners. However, the increased regional and international activities of the new regime and the NIF regime’s new friends in Islamic circles was noticed beyond the region, and reminded many of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

“The enemies of my enemy are friends”: the South progressively gaining international support

The NIF regimes’ different undertakings triggered increased interest for Sudan in both Europe and in the United States, notably through alerts set out by missionaries and Christian organizations in South Sudan worried about the “Islamization” of the country. Indeed, the increasingly marked Islamist profile of the regime contributed to also increase the perceptions of the war in the South as a conflict along religious lines, opposing the Islamist North and the Christian/Animist South. Although reflecting a simplified picture of the conflict, it became a powerful narrative with a considerable echo in Europe and North America. As former member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in Congress in the early years of the Clinton administration, Ted Dagne says:

“In the 1980’s, you had a civilian government, that had at least some strong ties with Washington, the Sadiq al Mahdi’s government, which was an elected government. And you didn’t have the issue of terrorism; you didn’t have the issue of extremism, as embraced by the Turabi and the Bashir regime. Therefore, the Southerners were not seen by Washington, or the West, really as a liberation movement with a real cause. (...) and also you have to look at the larger context, this was during the Cold War. The SPLA got primarily its support from Ethiopia, Ethiopia at that time was a strong Soviet Union ally under the Mängestu regime440.

In other words, the very fact that the Southern rebellion’s enemy became a feared regime in Washington’s eyes in the early 1990’s progressively transferred support to their cause. The change of regime in Khartoum and shift in regional alliances following the end of the Cold war, transformed the formerly Marxist rebellion into a “liberation movement” fighting against a fundamentalist Islamist regime in the North. In other words, Washington suddenly had a

440 Interview, Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 22.05.2008
reason to support them, and it was to become part of a thorough US policy to support the Southern movement as well as the neighboring regimes in order to weaken Khartoum. Concurrently, a series of terrorist attacks to which the Sudanese regime was linked in the following years, also contributed to deteriorate the relationship between Khartoum and Washington, and thus contributed to strengthen US support in favor of the people of South Sudan. As shown by Severine Auteserre, the humanitarian aid destined to South Sudan, granted through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and to NGOs not participating in the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), increased as sanctions hardened on the regime based in Khartoum. This tendency was however only consolidated towards the end of the 1990’s.

The US position towards the new NIF regime was in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 coup either indifferent or in a position of “wait and see”. As Marchal and Osman point out, the interest for Sudan within the American diplomacy in the 1970’s and 1980’s was weak, it was rather seen as a country that could be relied on in case of need. President Nimeyri’s manifested leaning towards the Western bloc, notably by getting rid of the communists shortly after he came to power in 1969, gave him a tacit support from the US. However, for the Americans, it was the containment of neighboring Libya in the West and Ethiopia in the East that really mattered. It was the decision of the NIF regime to support Saddam Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait in 1991 that really placed Sudan on the regional diplomatic map. The new Sudanese leaders were hesitant at first, actually few elements gave them any reason to be sympathetic with the Ba’athist regime in Iraq. However, in the name of anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism, dear to President Bashir, the latter eventually made a strong declaration in support of Saddam Hussein. The declaration of support at first confused the rest of the leadership, but they soon accepted it seeing what political gains they could draw from it: positioning themselves as the head of a new cross-regional anti-American movement and set out their ambition to become the leader of a new Islamist order. At the same time, Sudan started to more clearly affirm its Islamist ambition, both internally and externally, notably with the organization of the first Popular Arab Islamic Conference in Khartoum.


442 Marchal and Osman (1997), op.cit.
Sudan as the international supporter of terrorist networks: increasingly placing South Sudan on the map

The fact that Sudan in the 1990’s became a refuge for a wide range of Islamic personalities, as well as presumed terrorists, would increase the Americans’ newfound concern in the country in general. During the summer 1992, the Sudanese army assassinated two Sudanese employees of the USAID in South Sudan, accused of cooperating with the SPLA. Things worsened after an attack on the World Trade Center in New York, on June 24, 1993: five of the arrested suspects carried Sudanese passports on them. In August that year, Sudan was put on the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, a list of “countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism” and giving way for a range of economic and financial sanctions. In February 1996, the US Embassy in Khartoum was closed. Timothy Michael Carney was the last US ambassador to Sudan, and there has been no US ambassador there since. The Embassy however reopened in May 2002, after the beginning of the Naivasha talks, with the appointment of a Chargé d’Affaires ad interim.

In 1995, the Sudanese security services were accused of having been involved in the assassination attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak, on his way to a meeting of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU). Indeed, “Washington, Cairo and other capitals became convinced NIF agents had been involved in infiltrating the ill-fated Egyptian Islamist hit team into Addis Ababa and in extradite its three known survivors”. The diplomatic relations between Egypt and Sudan were almost instantly broken off. UN sanctions were imposed on Sudan in 1996, a reaction to the assassination attempt and a tentative to make Sudan deliver those suspected of being involved. Sudan was also accused of having played a role in the attacks on the US Embassies of Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi on August 7, 1998. The riposte was not awaited for long: on August 20, the pharmaceutical factory in North Khartoum, al Shifa, suspected of producing chemical weapons and of hosting terrorists, was...

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444 Marchal and Osman (1997), op.cit.
447 Randal, op.cit., 122.
bombed. It was later proved that the factory had no links with ben Laden and was only producing medicines448.

The relations between the Sudanese government and the US administration hence went from bad to worse during the 1990’s. In May 1996, Osama ben Laden was expelled from Khartoum, and from there his journey brought him back to Afghanistan. As I will come back to in the next chapter, a vivid debate has been going on in Washington, especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001, on whether Sudan offered to deliver Osama ben Laden or not to the US. Some sources claim that the US persistently asked for more information on ben Laden throughout the 1990’s, but in vain. Other sources however, claim that the Sudanese government proposed to deliver ben Laden to the Americans, but that the US administration at the time was so bent on containing and isolating the regime which they saw as nothing else than an active sponsor of terrorism, that they did not react to the offer449. Reportedly, the US wanted Ben Laden to be delivered to Saudi Arabia, claiming they did not have enough evidence to demand his extradition to the US. Some also claim the US hoped the Saudis would ”summarily execute him450”. Sudan eventually simply expelled Bin Laden in May 1996.

By placing Sudan on the world map, this connection with international terrorist networks indirectly attracted more attention to the war in the South, but only very progressively. Indeed, it was only with the famine in 1998 that international news media started to speak specifically about the war in the South. However, the image of a ”sponsor of international terrorism” that the Sudanese government progressively gained made it easier for the Southern rebels to capitalize on the growing international sympathy in their direction. Back in the 1980’s, as the interest for Sudan in general was relatively weak within US diplomacy, the interest for the war in the South was also close to inexistent. The Marxist profile of the SPLM, combined with the rebel movement’s many human rights violations did not please the diplomatic contingent in Washington. The Americans were probably also dissuaded from


450 Ibid.
granting South Sudan much attention after Chevron’s oil activities in the South were suspended due to the civil war in 1984. This however progressively changed in the 1990’s, due to a combination of an active Christian and African-American lobby in the US, sympathizing with the people of South Sudan, increased focus on the South by human rights organizations in Europe and the US, as well as a proactive strategy led by the SPLM leaders to gain Western sympathy. As the Clinton administration moved towards a strategy of containment, the indirect support to the South through humanitarian channels became an efficient way to work against the regime in Khartoum.

**B - Towards a desire to break its international isolation and work for a rapprochement with the United States (1999-2003)**

Sudan became more and more isolated on the international arena in the 1990’s, falling under a series of US sanctions while being depicted as the ultimate sanctuary for the region’s various Islamist opposition movements. However, this was not the result of a policy developed in consultation and agreement among the different leaders of the regime. Indeed, despite perceptions of a strong regime in Khartoum, the unity of the government was little more than an illusion. This had essentially to do with an internal division between the military faction and the Islamist faction of the regime: the first represented by President Omar al Bashir and the second by the chairman of the NIF, Hassan al Turabi. The different international terrorist attacks that came to be linked to Sudan soon became embarrassing for the regime which from the mid-1990’s started to seek international recognition – to improve its image, but also to lift international and US sanctions, and to find international partners to boost its emerging oil sector. This second phase of the Sudanese regime, characterized by an effective rapprochement with the US and Western countries, became effective in 1999 with the internal split between President Bashir and al Turabi.

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452 Auteserre, op.cit.
1) The search for new regional and international allies

As already mentioned, the Sudanese regime’s willingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism to escape international sanctions could be noted already from the sanctions that were imposed in 1993 after the US placed Sudan on its list of States sponsors of terrorism. As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, would later report:

“At the same time453, the Sudanese regime began to change. Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb. Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir’s supporters began to displace those of Turabi454.”

The Commission was a bipartisan commission created in late 2002, mandated to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To begin with, the Sudanese regime negotiated with France the extradition of Carlos “the Chackal” in 1994. Following the failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak, in Addis Abeba in June 1995, Randal writes that:

“President Bashir claimed to be horrified. So did Turabi, but, according to diplomats, less convincingly. The botched assassination attempt did prompt Khartoum to rethink its links with jihadi radicals and at least formally deem them a liability455.”

Nafie Ali Nafie, the then head of the Sudanese intelligence service, was taken away from his position in an attempt to show the Egyptians and the Americans that some responsibility was being assumed – however the NIF soon granted him another important position and the effort did thus not impress the Americans very much. However, the bad publicity that the assassination attempt gave the Sudanese regime prompted its leaders to take further action.

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454 Ibid.
455 Randal, op.cit., 122.
Domestic reforms and attempts to negotiate to improve the international image of the government

Indeed, the desire for recognition by the Americans weighed heavily on the government’s, and the NIF’s, political choices from the mid 1990’s onwards, and the Americans knew that and knew how to manipulate Khartoum\(^{456}\). Following the 1995 UN sanctions imposed on Sudan, Khartoum came to see Osama ben Laden as a “bargaining chip to achieve its larger goal of getting back into America’s good graces\(^{457}\)”, as Randal puts it. He explains that expelling ben Laden did not go without protests within the NIF, however Turabi “justified Osama’s ouster as a nearly cost-free undertaking that might just help Sudan wriggle free of its pariah status\(^{458}\)”. Osama was finally expelled in 1996, and the same year, Hassan al Turabi, as soon as he entered his functions as president of the new parliament, announced the creation of a new Constitution. The creation of the National Congress Party (NCP) the same year, based on the Islamists from the NIF but also including members of other Islamist groupings, personalities from the previous government of Gafaar Nimeyri and other local notables, was also an attempt to show that the leaders behind the coup in 1989 were capable of building new political alliances\(^{459}\). In January 1999, a new law was adopted allowing the opposition parties to return to politics and thus give the impression of the instauration of a certain extent of liberalism. According to Roland Marchal, the press also regained a certain freedom of speech, a freedom that has a long tradition in the country, and despite some hardship “practically all large currents of opinion are represented today\(^{460}\)”. All in all, despite a continued tight control on the opposition, the “terrible excesses of the beginning of the 1990’s were barred\(^{461}\)”.

A failed chance for peace: the IGAD mediation efforts in the mid-1990’s

What did these internal changes, although modest, mean for the war in the South and the broader relationship between the Northern based government and the Southern rebels? A framework for peace talks was prepared in 1994 by the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The talks, which lasted from March to September that

\(^{456}\) Marchal and Osman (1997), *op.cit.*  
\(^{457}\) Randal, *op.cit.*, 122.  
\(^{458}\) Ibid, 123.  
\(^{459}\) Marchal (2004), *op.cit.*  
\(^{460}\) Ibid, 12.  
\(^{461}\) Ibid, 11.
year, marked the beginning of direct talks between the two parties with the support of the regional organization. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) proposed then by the IGAD diplomats included the principle of a right to self-determination for the South, a separation of the State and religion and a program for a referendum on secession for the South. For the first time since it took over power, the government felt strong enough internally to seriously revive the peace talks. However, it was probably too strong at the time for there to be serious hopes for a breakthrough or even promises of concessions: indeed, the government delegation left the negotiations shortly after the presentation of the DOP, without signing the document.

The principle of a self-determination was probably the most difficult to swallow for the government at the time, although it was not as important for the Southerners then as it has become today. The interruption of the talks then led to a worsening of the conflict, with a series of major offensive operations carried out by the Sudanese army in 1995-1996. The government delegation did not return to the IGAD talks until July 1997. The official discourse of Khartoum then indicated that they were ready for peace talks, however this was not followed by concrete action, as Hilde Frafjord Johansen, the Norwegian Minister of Development at the time, observes:

"Mustafa Ismail, who at the time was the Foreign Minister, declared that ‘1999 is the year of peace for Sudan’ (...), and he presumably wanted real negotiations to be put in place. (...) But I think the question at the time was whether the parties were really and sincerely ready to negotiate. I think the SPLM was, but I wasn’t sure that the government was."

The internal divisions in the government at that time certainly contributed to hinder any advancement at the negotiating table. Johnson explains the weak progress in the negotiations with the weak position of the government delegate to the peace talks. Mustafa Ismail was then

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464 Interview, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister of Development, phone interview, 23.05.2006
the main government representative working on the negotiations, however, he was not a “central piece” according to Johnson. According to her, in order to make any serious advances on the government positions at that time, one had to be part of the circle surrounding Ali Osman Taha, and Mustafa Ismail was never part of this clique. Taha himself was more considered a hardliner, especially in what concerns the peace negotiations.

Why was the regime so reluctant to negotiate at that time? The cost-benefit calculations seemed to indicate that the government had more to win by making the status quo situation last, rather than making peace. A breakthrough took place when the government in 1997 signed the DOP and recognized the principle of self-determination and even a possible secession. The SPLM seized this opportunity to put forward a series of conditionalities for peace – the separation of religion from the state in an interim phase, pluralism as the basis of governance, and the right to self-determination for South Sudan, South Kordofan, and a part of the Blue Nile state. These conditions were deemed unrealistic by the government, especially regarding the nature of the self-determination and the borders of the “South”. An unprecedented opportunity was thus missed; as Mansour Khalid writes: “the proposals of the SPLM could have been a historical rallying point, but the NIF missed it.”

Following this brief moment of hope, the regime returned to a position of superiority in its internal struggle with the Southern rebels. Feeling empowered by the first oil revenues entering from September 1999, when the first cargo of crude oil left the export terminal. Foreign investments, especially from China and Malaysia, started to increase – the two countries having invested in the Sudanese oil sector since 1995 and 1996 respectively. The oil revenues led some factions of the regime think that the war in the South could be won thanks to this prominent new source of income.

465 Ibid.
467 Ibid, 373.
Towards a shift of strategy in Khartoum in 1998-99

As explained by Roland Marchal, two events in 1998 had a serious impact on Khartoum’s foreign policy: first of all the bombing of the Al Shifa factory in August, and secondly the resumption of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia that year. The US bombing made the need to improve its relations with the Americans become even clearer and more urgent. As for the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, it represented the possibility for Khartoum to impose itself as a regional mediator\(^{469}\). Khartoum’s choice to work for a rapprochement with Ethiopia was a result of a realist calculation: the United States had also chosen to support Ethiopia in this war, and it thus became a way to attract Washington’s goodwill. Sudan also managed to reestablish its diplomatic relations with Asmara, with the signing of an agreement of cooperation in May 1999 – although the role of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the alliance grouping together various Sudanese opposition parties founded in 1989 and based in Asmara, was not mentioned in the agreement\(^{470}\). At the same time, Khartoum managed to build a new alliance with Kampala, until then accused of supporting the Southern rebels. Talks were engaged between the two governments in December 1999 and an agreement was signed shortly after, the two parties engaging themselves to cease any support to the internal rebel group of their neighbor\(^{471}\). Indeed, Khartoum had long been accused of supporting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, while Kampala was accused of giving sanctuary to the SPLA. Khartoum also hoped that this agreement would encourage Kampala to exert pressure on John Garang to reengage in peace talks within the IGAD framework – another channel through which Khartoum could gain recognition from the Americans. Indeed, Khartoum’s initiatives to rebuild its bonds with its neighbors were successful, and, in extension, also served as a means to rebuild its relationship with the US. However, the most important and efficient efforts made by Khartoum to improve its stance on the international arena were the efforts it undertook on the internal level. The first internal reforms were undertaken with and under the leadership of Turabi, but it was the very eviction of Turabi from the government that was to attract international attention and approval.

\(^{469}\) Marchal (2004), \textit{op.cit.}


2) Internal reorganizations in Khartoum as a means to gain international recognition

Internal political restructurations were probably the main tool that president Omar al Bashir disposed of to succeed in his efforts of rapprochement with the neighboring countries. Turabi did not have an easy relationship with the younger generation of leaders within the regime. Despite him putting forward his charismatic personality, his role as an ideologue and his international recognition as an Islamist thinker, he was seen by many in the ruling party as too attached to the politics of the “great families” in Sudan and entering alliances merely on opportunistic basis. Sudan’s neighbors, worried about the support given to their various opposition movements, largely saw Turabi as the origin of this policy. In 1999, Turabi embarked on a constitutional reform destined to consolidate his role as the leader of the party and increase his powers. He had progressively lost his influence over the state apparatus, increasingly controlled by the militaries close to the president. With this reform, he wanted to replace the center of power on the party and not the state apparatus. In reaction, president Omar al Bashir dissolved the National Assembly and declared a state of emergency on December 12, 1999, two days before the scheduled vote on Turabi’s constitutional reform. The NCP was simultaneously purged of the most fervent supporters of Turabi, and gave place to a more pragmatic approach to domestic and foreign politics. Turabi denounced the set-up, but eventually had to play the game of the president in order to retain some of his political standing and position. But that was only for a limited amount of time. Although a sort of agreement was made between the two in January 2000, in May, Bashir ousted Turabi from his position as Secretary general of the party. In August, Turabi created his own opposition party, the Popular National Congress (PNC, later the Popular Congress Party, PCP).

According to Nicolas Vescovacci, “the entire Arab world welcomed the move of the Sudanese president, the suspension of the National Assembly to prevent Turabi’s political ambitions. The decision was especially well received by Libya and Egypt, and even Iran eventually supported Bashir against Turabi, thus showing they were more preoccupied by a pragmatic alliance than by ideology. Following this, Turabi embarked on an alliance with the SPLM. As journalist Christophe Ayad, from the French newspaper Liberation, puts it, “in order to annoy his former allies, he operated a rapprochement with the guerilla of John

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472 Marchal (2004), op.cit.
473 Vescovacci, op.cit.
Garang, which provoked a sort of a speed race\textsuperscript{474}. The plan was to overthrow the government – through “pacific means” – but the plan led to Turabi’s imprisonment in February 2001\textsuperscript{475}. Perhaps most importantly, the internal reorganizations permitted a consolidation of different strategic relationships between Khartoum and regional and international partners. The eviction of Turabi was both a result of internal rivalries, but was also a means to reposition Sudan on the regional and international chessboard – after years of accusations from different grounds. The motivation behind this repositioning was both political and economic: political in order to rebuild strategic alliances with neighbors and to improve its relations with the US and economic in order to attract foreign investments to a close to bankrupt country eager to capitalize on its burgeoning oil sector.

**The necessity for economic reform to attract foreign investments**

The economic hardship Sudan found itself in was indeed an important motivating factor in Khartoum’s search for international strategic partners, besides the desire for international political acceptance. After the strained relationship with the IMF in the early 1990’s, the financial institution and the Sudanese government managed to negotiate a program of cooperation in March 2002 for two years. The IMF had indeed taken note of the economic reforms set out by Omar al Bashir in 1997\textsuperscript{476}. “The regime realized that it was easier to do business with the international community than to isolate itself from it\textsuperscript{477}”, explains Stein Erik Horjen, a former advisor with the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). Sudan began exporting oil in 1999, and this also made the regime realize that it could earn great benefits from this booming sector - if only it invested more in the sector instead of pursuing its war in the South and if it improved its relationship with countries ready to invest in the sector.

**Political motivations behind Sudan’s new international strategies**

Following the ousting of the former ideological leader of the regime, it became important for the new leadership to prove internally that it could keep control over power, and externally

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\textsuperscript{474} Interview, Christophe Ayad, journalist at the French daily newspaper *Libération*, Paris, 09.03.2006


\textsuperscript{476} Vescovacci, *op.cit.*

\textsuperscript{477} Interview, Stein Erik Horjen, Oslo, 03.02.2006
that Sudan could be a reliable partner. The regime was indeed very weak on an internal level too at that time, as Turabi took with him the large support basis that used to surround him, at least among the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood. President Bashir did not have a similar popular support basis, neither on a domestic level, nor in the region. In fact with the eviction of Turabi, the regime was deprived of the international networks entertained by Turabi as well as the internal public support that Turabi benefited from. This new form of isolation – not only on the international arena, but also inside Sudan itself – gave a new push to the regime in its search for new international partners, notably the Americans. As Marchal writes, “by playing the pragmatic card as an opposition to the radicalism of the Popular Congress, the Sudanese government gambled on a rapprochement with the Western countries, which also had as an objective to extend the competition between the foreign investors478.

The search for new international partnerships did not go unnoticed on the international arena. As an example, in a communiqué released by the French Senate, one can read, ”the eviction from power, by President Bashir, of Hassan al Turabi in December 1999, (...) enabled the opening of a “renewed dialogue” between the European Union and Sudan, on human rights, democratization and peace479.” Also, although the US administration was more reserved at first, one could note a renewed interest in assisting in the resumption of the peace talks. More importantly, the relationship between the security services in the US and Sudan had improved considerably, as “playing the pragmatic card” also meant that the “renewed” regime in Sudan did not hesitate to provide lists of names of wanted Islamists. Indeed, the eviction of Turabi enabled Bashir and Taha to use him as a scapegoat, putting the blame for all of Sudan’s past troubles – the international reputation, the links with terrorist and radical networks, and the economic situation - on the former ideologue. The past is attached to Turabi, and with Turabi out of the government, a fresh start was to begin – at least that were the hopes of the Sudanese leaders around Bashir. However, the loss of the immediate internal support basis made it necessary to find a new support basis internally as well. As Jean-Philippe Rémy, Africa correspondent for the French newspaper Le Monde, observes: “until then, the whole Turabist ideology had carried the regime, it was now important to find other working methods480”.  

479 “Rapport d’information”, French Senate website, Briefing for the Senate following a mission carried out in the Horn of Africa in February 2003, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r02-200/r02-20010.html (March 5th, 2010)  
480 Interview, Jean-Philippe Rémy, Africa correspondent for the French daily newspaper Le Monde, phone interview, 22.03.2006
The very fact that the regime moved towards a more American-friendly policy was in itself a way to show the domestic public opinion that all the wrongs done in the 1990’s were the responsibility of Turabi. As such, the domestic and foreign policy interests of the Sudanese regime converged, and contributed to give a new impetus to the Sudanese-American relationship. Indeed, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bashir and the close circle around him and the US administration found themselves with a common enemy: the former ideologue of the NIF-regime.

The road towards a sustainable peace process in the South

These internal reconfigurations, triggering an increased interest for Sudan in general in the Western countries, were accompanied by a new focus on South Sudan within the religious right in the US and humanitarian circles in Europe and the US following the famine in 1998. Thus, it became a strategic interest for the Sudanese government to grant more attention to the war in the South. Christophe Ayad, who has followed the Sudanese conflicts closely up the early 1990’s, explained that “there was a realization in the North that the country would remain a pariah indefinitely, as long as it didn’t resolve this question”, the question of the war in the South. In the following negotiations, Khartoum’s main interest was to stay in power, while for the Southerners it was to access to power. Both had come to a point where they were exhausted by the warfare, as none seemed to be able to win the war militarily, and both realized they would gain more from talking than from warring. As Tom Vraalsen, a Norwegian diplomat and former Special envoy for the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan puts it:

“In Sudan, there was simply a fatigue, it became clear for the parties that this war could not be won. This was the case as well for the military, the parties at war and the population itself.”

Khartoum’s position improved progressively thanks to the beginning of incomes from its oil exports, however, the continued war efforts in the South were costly and prevented the country from finding a sustainable level of growth. The early oil revenues certainly also made the regime realize the benefits it could enjoy from this new source of income if the war efforts

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481 Interview, Christophe Ayad, Paris, 09.03.2006
482 Interview, Tom Vraalsen, former Special envoy for the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, chairman for the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), phone interview, 28.02.2006
in the South ceased. As a Norwegian diplomat and former member of the Norwegian delegation to Naivasha observes:

“I think that the two parties realized they would make a greater profit from cooperating with the adversary. Also, the negotiations rendered their demands legitimate.”

Not only were the negotiations a means for the Southern rebellion to become legitimate in the eyes of the Sudanese government and international partners, it was also a means for the NCP, Bashir, Taha and their closest allies to construct an entirely new international legitimacy by showing themselves as willing to negotiate.

In other words, both the economic and the policy objectives of the regime at the turn of 1999/2000 came to be intrinsically attached to the question of making peace in the South: it became a condition for international recognition, which in turn was a prerequisite for the capacity to attract foreign investments. The expulsion of Turabi however had another effect on the looming conflict in Darfur, as Turabi had a strong support base in the West of Sudan and is seen by many as being at the origin of the creation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur – although this is something he and his closest allies firmly deny. The Sudanese army had indeed for a long time relied on contingents from Darfur to pursue its war in the South. As Alex de Waal and Julie Flint explain:

"The Bashir-Turabi split lost Darfur for the government, but made it possible to make peace in the South. Bashir and Ali Osman were no more accommodating than Turabi, but power had finally been consolidated. And the two men who controlled it knew they needed international respectability – not least to attract investment and find a way of paying Sudan’s $ 22 billion debt. In 2001, a serious peace process began at last, seeking a negotiated settlement to the civil war.”

The consequences of the “loss of Darfur” for the government will be further explored in the next section. Yet, from this moment, as pointed out by these two close observers of Sudanese politics, the search for international respectability clearly went through the search for a sustainable peace in the South.

The renewed interest in the peace process in 2000 and 2001 was undeniable, however, two events were to speed up the process: the election of George W. Bush as President of the

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483 Interview, WF, Norwegian diplomat, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 19.05.2006
484 Flint and de Waal (2005), op.cit, 31.
United States and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The change of presidency in the US, and the meaning that had for the US policy towards Sudan will be treated in the next chapter, but it should be noted here that the new President was much more sensitive to the Sudan issue than his predecessor. This was probably due to the vivid engagement of the Christian conservatives for the Southern Sudan situation, however, the most important was that President Bush decided to embark on a policy of engagement with Khartoum. As for the security dossier, the two countries having already started to cooperate since early 2000, the state of shock after 9/11 gave the Sudanese regime an even greater interest in cooperating. In the context of the war on terror and the US President’s rhetoric of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”, the Sudanese regime became even more eager to show the US that they were cooperating. Flint and de Waal well resume the early resumption of the talks within the IGAD framework, and the new impetus given to the process by the new “war on terror”:

“The peace moves began with a shift of US policy, in the first eight months of the Bush presidency, in support of the peace process run by the north-east African inter-state organization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The plan was to revive this almost moribund process, under Kenyan leadership, with substantial financial, technical and diplomatic support from Western powers. No sooner had the framework been agreed than the attacks of September 11 – by some of Khartoum’s one-time protégés – made Bashir prudently fall into line with US proposals.

The 9/11 attacks did thus not fundamentally change Sudan’s policy towards the US, however it did speed up an already existing process. Sudan was eager to make it very clear on which side it stood in the new war on terror. It was this new configuration that gave US diplomacy the extra amount of leverage it needed over the Sudanese negotiators in the peace process, and Sudanese diplomats the extra push and reason to come to an end in the peace talks with their Southern counterparts.


C - Failure of rapprochement and return to a rejectionist stance towards any Western interference in Sudan (2003-present)

A major motivating factor enabling the negotiations in Naivasha to move forward were the prospective of a normalization of relations with the United States, through a lifting of sanctions and a removal of Sudan from the US list of States sponsors of terrorism. This prospect was however destroyed by the outbreak of a full-fledged war in Darfur in 2003, and the massive international protests the conflict would trigger.

1) Outbreak of the Darfur conflict and Khartoum’s handling of a new vague of protests from the West

The negotiations between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – as any peace talk between parties having been at war with each other for almost two decades – were arduous. But there was an overall sense that they were witnessing and attending a historic opportunity to make peace. The hopes of normalizing the situation internally in Sudan as well as normalizing the relations between Sudan and the international community were broken by the outbreak of a full-scale war in Darfur in 2003.

Towards a new internal split in Khartoum

Little pressure was made to halt the negotiations in Naivasha in order to take into account the situation in Darfur (cf. chapter III), the diplomatic mantra being that the peace talks were too much of a unique and historic opportunity to put them at risk by including other parties. This stance was of course convenient both for Khartoum as well as for the SPLM. Despite initial support to the SLA, once the peace talks with the GoS started in Naivasha, the SPLA was fully concentrated on what it could obtain in the future peace agreement, and thus not so interested in what their former potential allies in Darfur were trying to obtain. However, as the violence in Darfur became known in the US, first and foremost by the heads of USAID, the administrator Andrew Natsios and the assistant administrator Roger Winter, in mid-2003, new conditions for normalization were set and more pressure was put on Khartoum. Winter and Natsios, as they would later explain, already then said to Ali Osman Taha that

487 Roger Winter first mentioned Darfur in a testimony to the US Congress Committee on International Relations, in May 2003, as a “new conflict zone that is not being adequately addressed”. Andrew Natsios visited Darfur a few months later. Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.
despite earlier promises of normalization on condition of a peace agreement in the South, this would not suffice anymore. They made it clear to him that normalization would also depend on the Darfur conflict being stopped\footnote{Ibid.}. The two then took the lead in pressuring Khartoum to ease its restrictions on humanitarian aid to the region, which was doubled by an internal struggle in the US to find funding for humanitarian aid to a region there was still little interest for. But little by little, during the last months of 2003, humanitarian aid access improved, and in early 2004, the funds started to flow.

A major shift is operated during the summer 2003, behind the scenes and not obvious at first sight. The parties to the Naivasha talks were then negotiating the probably most sensitive aspect of the future peace agreement: the security arrangements. The security protocol of the CPA was signed in late September 2003. According to close observers of the process, Ali Osman Taha, the chief negotiator of the GoS in Naivasha, was back in Khartoum perceived as being too soft and as giving away too much to the Southerners in these talks. The response was to grant the “handling” of the new rebellion in Darfur, which had by then deeply humiliated the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), to the hardliners in Khartoum: notably President Bashir and Salah Gosh, the head of the National Intelligence and Security Services. The sense of having given (too) large concessions to the South made it even more important for them to consolidate their grip over Darfur, historically a region much “closer” to the regime than what the South had ever been. Darfur’s position in Sudanese politics is indeed important to understand in order to comprehend the recent conflict between government forces and Darfur rebel groups. During the war in the South, Darfuris were well represented in the Sudanese Armed Forces. And despite Darfur’s overall marginalization, many Darfuris have occupied positions of responsibility in Khartoum and have been members of the National Islamic Front. As Atta el Battahani writes:

“For the dominant faction within the ruling class, Darfur is too close to heart to give away; given the present power configuration, Darfur lays at the center of the debate on legitimacy, identity, and access to strategic resources (e.g., land, animal wealth, and political power). Hence the conflict between “Arab” nomads and “Zurqa” sedentary farmers in Darfur over land is misconstrued as “Arabs” versus “Africans” in Sudan at large\footnote{Atta el-Battahani, “Ideological Expansionist Movements versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide”, in \textit{Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan. A Critical Reader}, ed. by Salah M. Hassan, Carina E. Ray, (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 528, 43-68.}.”

488 Ibid.
In other words, the denominations of “Arabs” and “Africans” have not only tainted the international audience’s understanding of the conflict through a universalistic prism, it has also influenced the Sudanese leadership’s interpretation of the issues at stake in Darfur. The fact that South Sudan was “slipping away” in terms of autonomy during the negotiations in 2003 certainly made it even more important to “keep” dominance over Darfur and show who was in command.

**Realizing normalization was not within reach after the signing of the CPA**

It remains unclear to what extent Khartoum understood the new conditions set for normalization, which were voiced by high ranking officials of the US humanitarian aid agency, but not by officials related to US intelligence or the US State Department – who would, at least in Khartoum’s eyes, be the only ones capable of lifting the sanctions on Sudan. Also, the fact that the international community seemingly dealt with South Sudan separately from Darfur, may explain why Khartoum too thought it could get away with conducting two very different “policies” towards the two regions. Only John Garang would put new attention to Darfur after a major breakthrough in the talks in May 2004. Indeed, as the most violent counter insurgency campaign in Darfur came to an end, and as the most strong condemnations of the situation started to be made in Europe and in the US, the North-South negotiations made a big step towards a final agreement. The signing of a protocol on power-sharing and the status of the three areas along the North-South border (Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile) was perceived as constituting one of the greatest achievements on the road to peace, and John Garang reportedly indicated that the solution found for the three areas could be adopted for Darfur as well\textsuperscript{490}.

The signing ceremony on January 9, 2005, was a historic moment for everyone involved, but it still had a bittersweet taste to it. The situation in Darfur was dire and for several months already, the war had been making big headlines and had prompted massive protests in Europe and in the US. The US, with the Congress first, followed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and then President George W. Bush, had named the conflict in Darfur a genocide. It was a grand moment for the Southern Sudanese, but it was not the grand moment for the whole of Sudan that everyone had hoped for. And for the leaders in Khartoum, the perspective of a

\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.
normalization of relations with Washington that they had longed so much for had already waned away. As Flint and de Waal point out, “Bashir grossly misjudged the level of international outrage, especially in America”. Indeed, the international mobilization and condemnations were not something the leaders in Khartoum had expected, but it was definitely something they would have to take into account from then on in their interactions with the international community. Darfur was to become the new central component of Khartoum’s interactions with the international community, at least the Western powers and the UN. The only notable exception to this difficult relationship would be the continued cooperation on counter terrorism between Khartoum and Washington.

2) The development of a rejectionist discourse of Western interventionism and hegemony

Since the Darfur conflict almost literally “exploded” in Western media channels and humanitarian circles in April 2004, the Sudanese government has been under close international scrutiny and also subject to harsh criticism. The latter showed itself as rather willing to make concessions in the time lapse between the end of the largest counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur in the Spring of 2004 – which corresponded to the moment where the Darfur issue emerged on the international arena – and the signing of the CPA in January 2005. It was then still negotiating peace in the South under international auspices and it was in its interest to do what it could to stay on good terms with their prospective new friends, although this did not change the ambitions of those in charge of the Darfur dossier on a domestic level. Pressure on Khartoum on behalf of the former mediators in Naivasha also increased after the signing of the CPA. Indeed, the massive diplomatic efforts that had been deployed in Naivasha were then moved to Abuja where talks between the parties in Darfur were held. In many ways, this shift in attention deprived the South in the following years of valuable diplomatic support needed for the implementation of the CPA. Studying the international community’s handling of Sudan’s internal conflicts over the past few years indeed leads to the observation that it can only have one conflict issue on the agenda at the time. More recently, in late 2009 and early 2010, as an impasse was reached in the Doha peace talks for Darfur, and as important steps in the transition phase of the CPA were approaching – national legislative elections and most importantly, the referendum on

491 Ibid, 130.
independence for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011 - attention again shifted from Darfur to South Sudan.

Attempts to capitalize on an anti-imperialist discourse

The deception of the Khartoum elite having gambled on a new era of reconciliation with the West could be measured in their following reticence to accept any form of interference in Darfur – whether by journalists, giving more material to the international activists, or by peacekeepers, which the international activists demanded. Peace talks for Darfur, between the government and the different movements, under the auspices of the African Union, were pursued in Abuja, Nigeria from mid-2004, after the first rounds held in N’Djamena and Addis Abeba had led to a ceasefire agreement and the deployment of AU observers to Darfur. Six more rounds of negotiations continued throughout 2005 and eventually led to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The Sudanese Government can therefore not be said to have ignored the search for a political solution to the crisis during this time. It however firmly rejected the allegations of genocide having been committed in the Darfur region since 2003, the efforts to transfer the negotiations to be held under UN auspices as well as the pressure it was subject to, to accept the deployment of UN peacekeepers – all seen as efforts to stage a Western intervention into its Western province. Great efforts were deployed on behalf of Khartoum to keep the resolution process within an African framework. And with the objective in mind, a comprehensive rhetoric of anti-Imperialism and anti-Interventionism supporting “African solutions to African problems” was developed and has been deployed skillfully since.

Already in June 2004, after the US Congress had named the conflict a “genocide” and called on the US government to push for an international intervention, the Sudanese government made it clear it would resist any deployment of Western peacekeepers to the Darfur region. Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail at the time said in a telephone interview with Voice of America News: “The people of Sudan are against any foreign intervention”. He further explained the government’s stance along the lines of “non-interference” in states’ internal affairs:

“No nation would accept foreign intervention in their affairs. Those who are talking about foreign intervention, they do not know exactly what the situation is. We said that we do not need foreign intervention because we have already African monitors.”

The tone is here rather neutral, in the sense that he rejects a foreign intervention simply on the basis of the principle of “non-interference” and on the basis that African monitors are already present. However, the tone was remarkably tougher two years later when President al Bashir in June 2006 called the project of a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur a “neo-colonialist” intervention. “These are colonial forces and we will not accept colonial forces coming into the country,” he said then while a joint UN-AU mission were in Sudan to plan the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. He referred to the massive activist campaign in the US in order to justify his claim: “It is clear that there is a purpose behind the heavy propaganda and media campaigns who call for international peacekeepers to be sent to Darfur. He also accused the activist movement in the US of being exclusively Jewish. Eventually a joint UN-AU mediation team was put to work in the summer of 2007, while the principle of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force was accepted by Khartoum: a middle way compromise for all, never really satisfying anyone.

A war of words: making their own position clear and re-adapting the Western discourse as a tool to “hit back”

A low point in the relations between Khartoum and the international community was reached when the chief prosecutor of the ICC announced a list of accusations addressed against the Sudanese president Omar al Bashir in July, 2008. A total of three charges of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder were filed by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, asking the ICC judges to issue an arrest order for al Bashir, which they eventually did in March 2009.

Once the ICC was seized of the Darfur issue, back in March 2005, other international organizations and great powers retained no control over the process set in motion and the ensuing investigation. That did not prevent the accusations against the Sudanese president to

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493 Ibid.
495 Ibid.
be largely perceived in Khartoum as the ultimate proof that all the Western powers were seeking in Sudan was to oust him from power. Interestingly, this was not only a view held by government officials and personalities close to the regime. Many Khartoum-based intellectuals and members of the civil society declared themselves as fiercely opposed to the regime, yet also fiercely opposed to the ICC indictment, stating that they would prefer to “handle” Bashir on their own. When the arrest warrant was released on March 4, 2009, 13 foreign humanitarian NGOs were expelled from Darfur, a majority of which worked in the Kalma IDP camp close to Nyala and thus leaving the aid community and the international audience greatly concerned about the fate of the IDPs left in the camp.

Despite some Western human rights activists’ claim that Khartoum rejected a “Western crusade” in Darfur, while adopting a “holy war” approach to any kind of Western-led intervention, such interpretations have not been made, at least not publicly, by any Sudanese government official. Such accusations rather belong to the Islamist fringe on Khartoum’s political arena, some Arab factions in Darfur and, last but not least, the regime’s former-friend-turned-foe Osama ben Laden. Already in 2004, an Islamic militant group called on all Muslim forces to fight Western forces if they were deployed in Darfur. Osama ben Laden in April 2006 called for the launching of a jihad against future Western troops in Darfur. In a tape recording attributed to ben Laden and broadcasted on Al Jazeera, the Al Qaida leader reportedly said: “I call on mujahideen and their supporters, especially in Sudan and the Arab peninsula, to prepare for long war again the crusader plunderers in Western Sudan.” In order to make its relationship with Khartoum clear, he added: “Our goal is not defending the Khartoum government but to defend Islam, its land and its people.” The members of the Sudanese government in fact seem to have deliberately avoided any religious connotation in their accusations, in order not to be associated with ben Laden and his followers. Because, despite a strong rejection of Western military intervention in Darfur, this did not compromise Khartoum’s other important foreign policy priorities, namely the continued counter terrorism

497 Series of interviews in Khartoum in March/April 2009, a few weeks after the international arrest mandate against president Bashir.


500 Ibid.
cooperation with Washington. Thus, the official discourse remained focused on anti-
imperialism and anti-colonialism, a language with which they could also rally support from
many neighboring countries. And this rhetoric indeed had an important echo among Sudan’s
neighbors: all the African states chose to stand behind President al Bashir after the
international arrest mandate issued by the ICC in March 2009. As well the states party to the
Rome status as those who have not signed it, immediately supported Bashir, despite recurrent
condemnations of the violence in Darfur and the fact that many profoundly disagree with
Khartoum’s policies. Paradoxically, the ICC arrest mandate in the immediate aftermath had as
a direct effect the consolidation of Bashir’s power, strengthening his domestic and regional
support. The regional support has however somehow waned since, with the exception of a
new-found alliance with Chad.

What is interesting however in this eternal “love-hate” relationship between Khartoum and
the international community, is how Khartoum, while rejecting the content of the allegations
addressed against the regime, integrates the very rhetoric of the discourse – in a way to “get
back at” the international community. The most recent example is perhaps the most unlikely
one too, in the sense that it has seemingly nothing to do with Darfur, and thus shows well how
Khartoum has adopted the international terms of accusation. During the international summit
on climate change held in Copenhagen in December 2009, a group of 28 leaders, ministers
and officials from among others the EU countries and small islands most vulnerable to
climate change came together to make a draft agreement – as they saw it as more likely that
they would come up with a framework agreement within a small group – in order to present it
to the plenary session afterwards for adoption. This procedure, and the draft accord it
produced, was met with rejection and virulent criticism by the states that were not included in
this group, and especially by Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia – and Sudan. When it
came to the Sudanese delegate to voice his opinion on the draft agreement, he said the plan
would be like a “Holocaust” to the African countries. Sudan’s delegate Lumumba Stanislaus
Di-aping said that the proposed plan “is a solution based on the same very values, in our
opinion, that channeled six million people in Europe into furnaces501”.

The usage of the “Holocaust” analogy must not have made much sense for the climate
experts, apart in being a “despicable” comparison to use the words of the Swedish chief

501 “U.N. climate talks end with bare minimum agreement”, Reuters, 19.12,2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSGEE5BB07F20091219 (March 7, 2010)
negotiator⁵⁰². Those involved in the campaign to indict President al Bashir and his closest allies of genocide could however see here a case of Sudanese diplomats seizing the opportunity to criticize the great powers with the same language used to criticize their own domestic policy. While the Sudanese leaders expectedly reject the allegations of genocide in Darfur, they have started to use the term as a means to criticize actions taken by the international community and which are judged unfair to Sudan. Thus, the term “genocide” indeed becomes, in Khartoum’s eyes too, the gravest accusation that can be addressed to another country. More precisely, the term is identified as the most likely to impress the Western powers, who for Khartoum seem overwhelmingly preoccupied with this qualification. The fact that the Sudanese delegate used the word “Holocaust” and not “genocide” is not a hazard either. Encapsulating the most traumatizing experience that Europe has been through, the word still has a strong resonance both in Europe and in the US. Instead of using the word genocide, after all increasingly used to qualify a range of different situations around the world, the word “Holocaust” must have seemed more likely to touch the public it was aiming.

The rejection of Western interventionism and Western dictates of international codes and rules of conduct not only found an echo in African countries for the anti-colonialist elements of the discourse, and in Arab countries for the anti-American aspect of the discourse. It also found an echo in the two non-Western permanent members of the Security Council: Russia and China. Especially the latter, a major importer of Sudanese oil and provider of arms to Sudan, has been an active defender of Khartoum within the Security Council. China has denounced any forced intervention in Sudan that did not have Khartoum’s consent, justifying its stance with the principles of non-interference, characteristic of its own foreign policy.

3) The Asia connection: an anti-interventionist discourse meets mutually lucrative economic contracts

After 2003 and the violent counter-insurgency launched against the Darfur rebellion, Khartoum started realizing that American promises of normalization were not to become a reality any time soon. A new and this time too gradual shift was operated in Khartoum,
moving away from compliance with the Americans on political issues related to the Darfur crisis, and towards an enhanced relationship with Eastern partners.

**China and Sudan: a meeting of mutual interests on the international arena**

Its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states combined with its enormous needs in energy resources, has lead China to engage in commercial exchanges with regimes entertaining doubtful human rights records. It is precisely because it maintains its attachment to not interfere that enables it to exploit the often-lucrative markets the more “moral” and human rights preoccupied Western companies have abandoned or are distancing themselves from. Two of its most famous partners in Africa are also known for their long-lasting civil wars and recurrent human rights abuses: Angola and Sudan. It was first and foremost to diversify its sources of energy supplies and to minimize its dependency on the Middle East that made China become seriously involved on the African market in the mid-1990’s. At the end of the Cold war, Africa appeared to China as a grand market still untouched by the big Western companies.

The first formalized commercial bonds between China and Sudan thus date back to 1995, when the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) came to Sudan. China has since 2002 been the recipient of 57% of Sudan’s total exports. Meanwhile, 25% of Sudan’s imports are from China (mainly capital goods). It was in 1997, that the CNPC associated itself with the companies Petronas and Talisman, respectively Malaysian and Canadian, to sign an agreement with Sudapet, the Sudanese government’s own oil company. The contract enabled the foreign oil companies to proceed with prospective explorations, exploitation of oil sources and the construction of a pipeline in South Sudan, in the Muglad basin. The project, estimated to a total investment of one billion dollars, was the first of this size on the African continent. Despite a policy of non-interference, or perhaps precisely because of it, China has not hesitated to deliver arms to its new commercial allies. China is said to have been the largest

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provider of arms and military products to Sudan over the past years. This powerful ally has first and foremost enabled Sudan to overcome major economic hardship, as the Chinese investments have made it possible for Sudan to go round sanctions and embargos imposed by the UN and the US.

China did in other words not become Khartoum’s new ally over night with the appearance of the Darfur war on the agenda of the Security Council. However, it is with the deterioration of public and diplomatic relations between Sudan and the US, following the protests against the violence in Darfur, that Sudan’s relations with China were consolidated. Referring to the Chinese rhetoric of non-interference in other sovereign states’ internal affairs was a way for Khartoum to legitimize its position against Western intervention in Darfur. Although the Western powers in large part did not buy this attempt to escape from international insight into the Darfur crisis, referring to principles of “sovereignty” and “non-interference” are legitimate claims on the international arena. They have a particular echo in some regions, especially within the former “non-aligned” countries. But even for the actors most attached to the opposing norm of the “oughtness” to internationalize internal crisis, and notably the Western powers seeking to intervene in some way or another in Sudan, does these principles mean something. David R. Black and Paul D. Williams advance the argument that the main reason for the international community’s failure to mount more robust responses to the Darfur crisis, is the fact that the principle of national sovereignty still weighs heavier than the responsibility to protect505. China’s role as the “emerging” power and champion of this rhetoric on the international arena, and especially on the African continent, although its roots as a Chinese policy go way back, constitutes a new challenge to the liberal, protectionist and interventionist discourse of the West506. The commercial bonds that Sudan first built with China, initially on a utilitarian basis – exchange of investments against right to exploit oil sources – were however progressively doubled and strengthened with the realization of mutual interests on the policy level. As Daniel Large shows, this development of a

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505 David R. Black, Paul D. Williams, “Darfur’s challenge to international society”, Behind the Headlines, Canadian International Council, 65, 6, (December 2008), 23.

506 Chris Alden, Daniel Large, Ricardo de Oliveira (eds), China returns to Africa: a rising power and a continent embrace, (London: Hurst, 2008), 382.
“constructive engagement” between the two has put into question the possibility for China to uphold its rhetoric of non-interference\textsuperscript{507}.

On the political level, the Chinese investments have given Sudan the goodwill of one of the permanent members of the Security Council – also given the duration of the different projects embarked on. China abstained from voting UN resolution 1054 in April 1996, which suggested to step up sanctions after the first resolution on Sudan that year (resolution 1044, voted unanimously in January) had not resulted in the delivery of the suspects related to the attempted assassination of Hosni Moubarak. Resolution 1054 asked all member states to restrict the right of entrance on their territory to Sudanese government officials, and resulted in most states reducing their diplomatic contingent in Sudan\textsuperscript{508}. Russia abstained from voting it too. This does certainly reflect their support for an important trade partner; however, the abstention was not necessarily a sign of any strong political support for Sudan at the time, rather the expression of a utilitarian choice. Indeed, it was certainly not in the interest of China, or Russia, to limit the diplomatic bonds with Sudan, bonds needed to support the blooming commercial relationships between them. The formal diplomatic bonds are indeed even more important for countries like China and Russia, but also India and Malaysia, investing in the Sudanese oil sector, as their oil companies are all government owned firms, as Luke A. Patey reminds us in an article entitled “State rules: oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan\textsuperscript{509}”.

A more recent example of China’s “interference” in the way Sudan was treated within the Security Council, concerns a UN arms embargo on Sudan, proposed by resolution 1564\textsuperscript{510}. The by then relatively close relationship between Khartoum and Beijing, and the increased criticism of the West against Sudan, seems to have resulted in a certain politicization of China’s stance towards Sudan. As Jean-Christophe Servant explains, ”the cynicism of Beijing


was made clear to everyone in September 2004 with the vote on resolution 1564 of the Security Council of the UN ordering an embargo on arms bound for this country. Against a background massacres in Darfur, the Chinese ambassador to the organization, Mr. Wang Guangya, threatened to veto before he abstained\(^{511}\). However, what truly made China become seen as the “number one defender” of Sudan, was its refusal within the Security Council to stand behind the pressure exerted on Khartoum to make it accept the deployment of a peacekeeping in Darfur. Finally, in July 2007, to great international acclaim, China gave its support to resolution 1769, which was thus voted unanimously\(^{512}\). China’s main condition for supporting the resolution had been the prior consent of Khartoum for such a peacekeeping mission. At last, in mid-June 2007, Khartoum accepted the deployment of a peacekeeping force, as long as the contingent of peacekeepers remained African\(^{513}\). The part of the resolution giving the peacekeepers the right to disarm the armed militias on the ground was left out however – on the request of China.

In earlier years, China had also played a role in the war in South Sudan. Mansour Khalid explains that the Chinese provided security agents to watch over the oil fields, "in order to relieve Sudanese army and security personnel for other duties, i.e. war\(^{514}\)." Khalid refers to an IMF report, dating from November 2000, indicating that the importation of arms to Sudan increased from 166 million dollars in 1998 to 327 million in 2000, “thanks to oil riches\(^{515}\)." The oil exports did thus give the regime a significant new income and gave it a new breathing space. As seen earlier in this chapter, the regime’s attempts to dialogue with the international community at this time should be understood as efforts to break free from the economic sanctions. The consolidation of the Chinese connection with Sudan however modified the regime’s dependency on normalization with the West, at least on an economic level. This connection also contributed to alter the “rules of negotiation” between Sudan and the Western countries pressuring Khartoum. Indeed, efforts to pressure, sanction or isolate Khartoum do


\(^{514}\) Khalid, op.cit., 348.

\(^{515}\) Khalid, op.cit., 346. (quoting IMF report of November 2000)
not have the same effects when the regime is supported on the other side by powerful states such as China.

**Oil, politics and the Sudanese own perceptions of their country’s strategic assets**

The Chinese support for Sudan has mobilized and introduced grand strategic issues into the international understanding of the Sudanese conflicts: the emergence of China as the new economic superpower, the perceived or real competition between China and the US, “East vs. West” in Africa, as well as the role played by the so-called ”black gold” in the interference of foreign powers in armed conflicts on the African continent. The mobilization of these issues has undeniably contributed to attract more attention to the war in Darfur. It has also led Sudanese actors – government leaders, Khartoum-based opposition and opposition movements in the peripheries – to see the oil as their most valuable asset to attract international attention and funding. Some seek foreign investments, wherever they come from, while others accuse the Western powers involved in Sudan’s various peace processes of having a hidden agenda of taking over Sudan’s oil reserves once a peace deal is signed.

Indeed, in interviews with various Sudanese actors, the answer to the question on why they think the United States have such a vested interest in Sudan, one of the most often evoked factors is oil. The following reflection of a Sudanese journalist in Khartoum, is quite representative of how many Sudanese the perceive the American interest in their country:

”They have their own interests in Sudan of course. Sudan is a big country, bordering nine African countries, where the Americans have a lot of interests. The Americans were the pioneers of exploration of oil in Southern Sudan. There is still a lot of potential oil in Southern Sudan. That is why they are interested.”

This point of view can be found among many intellectuals based in Khartoum, whether close to the government or firmly opposed to it. The “strategic” position of Sudan – close to Saudi Arabia and surrounded by nine African countries - is often emphasized too. Other geostrategic elements often invoked to explain the international interest for Sudan include the fact that

516 Interview, Ahlula Barhe, Editor, Sudan Vision, Khartoum, 15.11.2007
Sudan borders East and Central Africa, the fact that it borders with Francophone Africa, supposed for some to incarnate a struggle of influence between the former colonial powers in the region, and finally Sudan as close to the Red Sea and the Gulf countries. As for the strategic resources other than the oil, the old myth of Sudan being the “bread basket” for the wider region due to the great potential in its agricultural sector and its water resources, as Sudan is the largest of the Nile river countries, is also frequently mentioned by various Sudanese actors seeking to explain the international interest in their country.

Sudan’s holdings of gum Arabic however is practically never mentioned, although Sudan is by far the largest producer of gum Arabic in the world, an important component in the production of candies and soft drinks, as well as pharmaceuticals. More importantly, it is the only product for which the US has actually made an exception in its sanctions against Sudan, following pressure from certain industrial lobbies in the US\(^5\). Despite this notable exception in US sanctions on Sudan, not to speak of the multiple other reasons for the US becoming involved in Sudan, the American engagement is very often seen by Sudanese stakeholders as the almost inevitable result of the country’s oil resources. This is probably the result of a combination of two factors related to the Sudanese governments’ policies: firstly, the governments’ authoritarianism, making citizens, although part of the intelligentsia, have a hard time understanding that any “non-realist” factors may influence US policy; and secondly, the fact that the government for many years has used oil as a central tool to attract foreign investments.

And Sudanese government officials themselves indeed see oil as both the country’s most important asset, not only to attract foreign investments, but also to increase chances for a reengagement with the US and put an end to the sanctions. Sayeed al Khatib, director of the Center for Strategic Studies in Khartoum, NCP member and part of the GoS delegation to Machakos and Naivasha, explained it this way:

> “There is a very keen interest from the Americans because of minerals, uranium, petrol, especially in Darfur and in South Kordofan. If they cannot use these resources, at least they can prevent others from doing (it). Also, Sudan has a very important geopolitical position. (…) They (the Americans) talk openly about securing the oil fields, and I would not be surprised if the

\(^5\) Auteserre, op.cit.
US would be interested in engaging to have military bases to secure the oil fields. Sudan is close to Saudi Arabia, Libya, Chad, CAR. If they decide to engage, they will lift the sanctions.  

It is important to make clear here that there are few certainties, but many speculations, about the presence of oil and minerals in Darfur. A first exploration in the region was prepared in 2008 by government owned Chinese companies, but the potential to find oil reserves is still uncertain today. It is interesting to see how Sayeed al Khatib not only explains the massive American engagement in Darfur by the natural resources that presumably can be found there, but also how he views the oil fields as being the key to a future lifting of US sanctions on Sudan, as the US will, according to him, eventually seek to re-enter Sudan’s oil market. A close advisor to Hassan al Turabi, Bashir Adam Rahma, presented a similar point of view in 2007:

"Another element, which politicians do not see, is the economic element. The international community is now coming for Sudan, and Sudan has oil. This is the lifeline for modern civilization and Sudan has a lot of different resources in addition to oil: agriculture, mineral resources, animals and a lot of educated people. There is a good media for investment in Sudan, but without peace, you cannot invest. The Chinese have invested a lot in Sudanese oil, but the Western companies are kept outside. So now they say that they do not want to boycott Sudan, they want to invest here. Sudan is a virgin in terms of constructions, so there is a lot to invest in for foreign firms here."

This reflects how both US and Western engagement in Sudan’s peace processes is largely viewed as a strategy to enter the Sudanese market. This sense that oil is so important to the Western countries, that they are ready to do almost anything to get a hold of it, has certainly also contributed to shape Sudan’s foreign policies in the last couple of years.

However, as the study of the various Western governments’ engagement for Sudan reveals, the presence of oil in Sudan has not been a main motivating factor for their involvement in the peace processes, it be in the South or in Darfur. The role played by the “oil factor” can of course not be entirely denied, as shall be further explored in the next chapter, however, it is far from a dominant factor. Endre Stiansen, a member of the Norwegian delegation to the

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518 Interview, Sayeed al-Khatib, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Khartoum, 05.12.2007
519 Interview, Bashir Adam Rahma, First Advisor, Popular Congress Party (PCP), Party headed by Hassan al Turabi, Khartoum, 03.11.2007
Naivasha talks, explains that from his experience, the “oil factor” was far from a central motivating factor for the Americans:

"A lot of people said that the oil played heavily (on the American interests), but I found myself at the heart of the negotiations and I can say that it was not the oil that was leading the American interests. That was quite clear, and the sanctions are still in place. It was an element in the negotiations, but it was not central."520

The public pressure in the US from mid-2004 onwards due to what was seen as a “genocidal campaign” in Darfur, best explains the fact that the sanctions are still in place. Concerning the beginning of the North-South peace talks in 2002, Alex de Waal supports the same thesis: "despite a range of speculations favoring the opposite thesis, nothing proved that the exploitation of Sudanese oil had been particularly determining, in one sense or the other, in the attitude towards Khartoum and the SPLA521." Those who defend this position often refer to the difficulties of extracting, transporting, processing and refining the Sudanese oil, in addition to the fact that the Sudanese oil reserves are not big enough to constitute a decisive strategic interest for the Americans522.

4) The Khartoum based opposition capitalizing on the international discourse

The human rights record of the government is a much more important condition for the Western countries’ eventual engagement with Sudan, politically and economically, than what the Sudanese decision makers seem to seize. Sayeed al Khatib, as other government officials with him, is far from ignorant about the existence of a strong activist movement in the US and in Europe. However, he does not see them as an independent movement of citizens pressuring their democratically elected government, but rather as agents controlled by and working for the government.

520 Interview, Endre Stiansen, Researcher, PRIO, phone interview, 15.03.2006
522 Patey (2007), *op.cit.*
However, on the side of the Turabi-led opposition, the attitude is quite different. The human rights movements in Europe and the US are there seen as having played an important role in pushing the Americans and the Europeans towards their current engagement in Sudan. This can however be seen as part of a larger strategy of the opposition to capitalize on the Western humanitarian discourse on Sudan. As Bashir Adam Rahma, the close advisor to Hassan al Turabi, explains:

"Another factor is the human factor. Westerners coming to Darfur to help humans suffering, and they do it independently of religion. In Europe and in the US, there has been a lot of pressure, where people tell their governments that you cannot let this happen to human beings. And because these are elected and democratic governments, they will be aware of their public opinions’ pressure, and they will want to go to Darfur to try and resolve the conflict. This is what leads to the resolutions within the Security Council and the signing of the CPA."

In adopting a discourse that openly admits human rights abuses in Darfur, strongly rejecting them and showing understanding for the international indignation, they automatically appear to the international audience as an interesting alternative to the regime in place. Already from the “divorce” in 2000 between the Islamist Turabi-led faction of the regime and the politico-military faction of al Bashir, the new Popular Congress Party of al Turabi played the “democratic” card in order to take the lead of the opposition. As Roland Marchal notes, “after having been vilified for years, the democratic claim became the central point of the political program of the Popular Congress. Interestingly, this discourse clearly joins the rebels’ attempts to reproduce Western humanitarian discourses in order to gain international attention and support.

Conclusion

The internationalization of the internal conflicts in Sudan hence does not leave the internal political dynamics untouched, and even becomes a means for the various opposition movements to build alliances between them. The separation is not clear however, between those who reject and those who seek internationalization, since some fierce opponents of the regime have also rejected some of the international interference, and most notably the ICC.

523 Interview, Bashir Adam Rahma, First Advisor, Popular Congress Party (PCP), Party headed by Hassan al Turabi, Khartoum, 03.11.2007
arrest warrant on President Bashir. However, internationalization becomes a means for the various political actors inside Sudan to position themselves, in relation to each other, in relation to the regime, and finally in relation to how they view the solutions to Sudan’s domestic political challenges.
Chapter V – Neighboring states, international organizations and diplomatic powers: the transformation of the Sudan issue into a priority of resolution

Pressure from public opinion, on a domestic or transnational level, is a central element in the internationalization of distant conflicts. Such influence from “below” is especially pregnant where great powers’ strategic interests are weak or absent, a tendency that is confirmed in the case of the Sudanese conflicts. Yet even when strategic interests do interfere and condition the foreign policy adopted, public opinion, when mobilized, may still play an important role, especially in framing the way the problem is understood and the political language used to approach the issue. Each path towards the international agenda taken respectively by the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur is unique, but what the different social entrepreneurs engaged in their internationalization have in common, is their aim: pressuring their own and other influential governments, to take the issue up on their agenda and propose an adapted policy response to the crisis. A successful internationalization, in the eyes of these social entrepreneurs, is a situation where governments with leverage take the issue up on their agenda and decide to take effective action to put an end to the conflict in question. Different social entrepreneurs may pressure for different “solutions” to be adopted, and the governmental responses may take the form of humanitarian aid, sanctions against one of the parties to the conflict, mediation efforts or military intervention.

It is the role played by the “states”, “governments”, “diplomacies” and “chancelleries” external to the conflicts, the so-called traditional actors of international relations, which shall be examined in this chapter. To say that “governments’ decisions matter” is not a return to a realist vision of conflict solving, rather an observation of where the social entrepreneurs of different kinds place their efforts: in pressuring the governments to “do something”. The role played by the international and regional organizations intervening in the Sudanese conflicts will also be examined here, however first and foremost through the role the various

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525 Robinson, op. cit. Robinson shows how the “CNN effect” has proportionally a larger influence when governments are unsure or have not yet defined their position when an issue is exposed in the media.
governments have granted them. This is not to say these organizations have not also played a role on their own, however their member states’ motivations here seem as the most pertinent approach to understand the role they have played altogether. A government’s role may be shaped by two contextual factors, facilitating or hindering different outcomes as shown by Gary Goertz\textsuperscript{526}, and two factors of proactive demands for them to take action. Firstly, concerning the context, the government’s internal political situation and the broader international context (notably the presence of other issues the government in question may be preoccupied by) are important to understand its response to a crisis. Secondly, concerning the direct demands to take action, pressure from domestic constituencies and requests from the parties to the conflict in question (State or insurgents), offering them a role as external advisors or mediators, contribute to shape the government’s responses.

As the title of this chapter indicates, the central question posed here is what makes “Sudan” become a priority on various policy agendas, an issue governments or international organizations decide to invest their efforts in, in order to find a solution to the conflicts. The first part of the chapter will look at the evolution of US policy towards Sudan. Two reasons should be put forward to explain the relative importance given to understand the role played by the American diplomacy: first of all, as seen in the previous chapter, among the different states on the international arena with whom Sudan could build new political and economic partnerships towards the end of the 1990’s, it was the alliance with the US that was most desired by the Sudanese regime itself. And even when the Sudanese regime has proven unwilling to respond to any kind of Western pressure, the US has still been the external player with the most leverage, at least among the countries whose declared policy is to support the peace process. Secondly, the general attitude and positions of the other Western diplomacies vis-à-vis Sudan is largely determined by the evolutions in American Sudan policies.

The second part of the chapter will hence examine how other diplomacies have become involved in the efforts to solve Sudan’s internal conflicts, as well as the international or regional initiatives they have been part of. Norway and the United Kingdom’s efforts in the North-South peace process will be examined in the framework of the IGAD initiative, while also looking at the role played by the IGAD members in the region. The analysis of the international responses to the Darfur conflict is more complex, as it has not benefited from the

\textsuperscript{526} Goertz, op.cit.
same investment of a small group of countries having made the resolution of the conflict their absolute priority, but rather has been the object of “everyone’s” investment to “do something”. This last section will therefore look at the placement of the Darfur issue on the agenda of the Security Council, the broader UN response to the crisis, the role France has played, within the UN and as a regional supporter of Chad, and finally the interactions between the UN and the AU. The relationship between the world organization and the regional organization in their efforts towards Darfur gives an insight into a complex play between great powers within the UN eager to maintain their legitimacy by taking decisive action, yet happy to give the tough part of the job to their African counterparts, who in turn seek to build an image of a credible and responsible regional organization.

**A - A special US-Sudan relationship and how the superpower has responded to the Sudanese conflicts**

As explored in the previous chapter, there is a special relationship between Sudan and the US, and it is not only a one-way relationship where Sudan seeks a lift of sanctions and a better relationship with the US. The US also has a special bond with Sudan. It is special, not in the sense that they are “best friends”, but in the sense that the US’ policy towards Sudan is impossible to put in any box, impossible to compare with the relationship it entertains with any other country in the region or conflict-affected country elsewhere. The relationship can best be described as the bond linking two countries, where despite an often-aggressive discourse of mutual accusations, both have a keen interest in keeping up at least a good and reliable line of communication.

1) **From a security agenda of containment - with public support**

Throughout the larger part of the 1990’s and during the two Clinton administrations, US policy towards Sudan was a policy of containment, seeking to isolate Sudan on the international arena, in order to make it comply with international and US demands to cease supporting radical terrorist networks. US efforts to invest political capital in the search for peace in South Sudan were thus weak at that time, when they at all took into account what was happening in the South.
Counter-terrorism priorities and the formation of a security agenda during the Clinton administration

When Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, the relationship between the US and Sudan was already deteriorating – following Sudan’s declaration of support to Iraq in the Gulf war and the regime’s manifestation of its Islamist ambitions. A few months later, the attack on the World Trade Center was broadly associated with Sudan, as several of the arrested suspects carried Sudanese passports. In August, Sudan was added to the list of States sponsors of terrorism. As a result, the US was prohibited from giving any kind of aid to the government of Sudan, including through intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank. It also prevented the US from exporting so-called dual-use items, mostly technology products, to Sudan. The sanctions were stepped up in 1997, following the UN sanctions imposed on Sudan in 1996. President Clinton’s Executive Order 13067 prohibited the import of Sudanese goods to the US, as well as the export of US products to Sudan – with the exception of humanitarian assistance. The order also prevented US nationals and companies from conducting business in Sudan, unless given an exemption by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the US Treasury Department. The stepping-up of the sanctions were justified by Sudan’s continued support to international terrorist networks. However, a certain new awareness of the conflict in the South could be noted as the order also mentioned the Government’s responsibilities in the human rights violations in the South527.

Despite some early hesitations on how to deal with Sudan, the leading policy of the Clinton era was hence one of containment and isolation of the Sudanese regime. Some initial internal contentions within the administration persisted however, around the question of whether this policy was the most appropriate and whether it was well carried out. Accusations against the Clinton administration of having failed to respond to Sudan’s offer to deliver Osama ben Laden in 1996, accusations that resurfaced after September 11, 2001, put into evidence these internal disagreements on how to treat the ”Sudan issue”. An article published in the January 2002 issue of Vanity Fair, written by the investigative journalist David Rose, claims that ”September 11 might have been prevented”528. In this debate, there is on the one side personalities such as Timothy Carney, the last US Ambassador to Sudan, who supports the


idea that the Clinton administration was so attached to the idea of isolating Sudan that it failed to take seriously the offers presented by Sudanese intelligence. The idea is supported by a former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, J. Stephen Morrison, who argues that the Clinton administration was narrow-minded in its approach to Sudan during those years. He qualifies the policy as “ultimately rigid and extremely vitriolic, to the point of being mindless. It was impossible to get an open debate about it in the Clinton Administration”\(^{529}\). On the other side, there are higher-ranking personalities such as Susan Rice, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from October 1997 to the end of the Clinton administration, who strongly rejects these accusations. She reckons that the priority was containing the Sudanese regime, but argues that the US administration never stopped talking with the Sudanese during those years. As she is reported to have told a journalist for the allAfrica.com website: “There was never argument on the counter-terrorism issue. Sudan was a serious sponsor of terrorism. Going back to 1995, the question was, how much pressure to apply, what we might get by pressure and containment. This was something that continued to be discussed and debated, but we never stopped talking to the government of Sudan\(^{530}\). She asserts that no offer of information on counter terrorism was made during those years. Her point of view is supported by another former member of the Clinton administration, Ted Dagne, a former member of the House Africa Subcommittee. He claims that the main sources of Rose’s article is Sudanese intelligence or persons friendly to them. He explains that the first Clinton administration was more conciliating: “We had a period of ‘constructive engagement’ from 1992 to 1996 (…) and when Ambassador Donald Petterson was in Khartoum [until 1995] he specifically engaged the government on the terrorism issue. They were the ones who were not forthcoming\(^{531}\). He explains that this policy was reverted after the 1993 World Trade center bombing and then the attempted assassination of the Egyptian president in 1995, and from then on the policy of containment was progressively consolidated despite protests from people like Ambassador Carney. The latter argued that engagement would be the only right approach to adopt, as he perceived the Sudanese regime as seeking a way out of the “supporter of terrorism” role it had become stuck in.

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\(^{530}\) Ibid.

\(^{531}\) Ibid.
What seems clear is that communications never ceased between the two governments. However, US trust in Khartoum was seriously damaged after the terrorist attacks of the first years of the Clinton administration, followed in 1998 by the bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. While some testimonies assert that US officials continued to actively seek information from Sudanese authorities, others paint a picture of a US administration more preoccupied with sanctioning, isolating, and not giving the Sudanese the benefit of the doubt or the opportunity to explain and provide information when they offered to. A memo written by CIA officials and handed to Sudanese intelligence officials during a back-channel meeting in the spring of 1996, entitled “Measures Sudan Can Take To Improve Relations With The United States”, reportedly included requests for information on ben Laden. From the Sudanese authorities’ point of view, it seems that when they tried to make offers on information sharing, they were met with silence. Both before the expulsion of ben Laden from Sudan and after, Sudan allegedly continued to offer information on him to US intelligence services. Former Sudanese diplomats and intelligence officials whom David Rose spoke with report having been rejected in their efforts to start a dialogue. Former Sudanese Ambassador to Washington from 1996, Mahdi Ibrahim Mohamed, declares having spent three years trying to meet the assistant secretary for Africa, Susan Rice, as well as the succeeding heads of the National Security Council, Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger – without success. David Rose also writes about a letter written by President Bashir to President Clinton in February 1997, offering the Americans to come to Sudan and investigate the allegations of training camps for terrorists, adding that he never got an answer. The same thing goes for a letter written by Bashir to Lee H. Hamilton, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1997, extending an offer “to the FBI’s Counter-terrorism units and any other official delegations which your government may deem appropriate, to come to the Sudan and work with our External Intelligence Department in order to assess the data in our possession and help us counter the forces your government, and ours, seek to contain”.

Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service, and a staff member on the Committee of Foreign Relations in Congress early on in the Clinton administration, explains how it was the Congress at the time that pushed for the sanctions regime to be put in place, and not the Executive. This was not so much because of a constituency pressing for sanctions;

532 Ibid.
533 Rose, op.cit. (journalist’s italics)
according to him it was a very small constituency at that time. It was first and foremost due to certain members of Congress, on both sides, who were especially dedicated to the cause of South Sudan, who knew a lot about the conflict and who were determined to bring about a change in US policy towards Khartoum. Some of them visited South Sudan early on in the Clinton administration, a trip that Dagne organized. He describes how they saw the destruction and met with the leadership of the SPLM. He also recounts how he was leading the negotiations between the Congress and the State Department on placing Sudan on the list of States sponsors of terrorism\textsuperscript{534}. The State Department at the time said there was not sufficient evidence, but as he recalls, Congress persisted in saying “they are extremists, they are terrorists, they are providing assistance to elements in the region (...) and we need to move forward in that direction\textsuperscript{535}”. This was right before the June 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, which effectively led to the placement of Sudan on the list of States sponsors of terrorism. Little by little, thanks to pressure from Congress, sanctions were stepped up, more measures were taken, and later on, in September 1999, a special envoy was nominated.

Ambassador David Shinn, in charge of East Africa at the State Department from 1993 to 1996, depicts a situation where there was little room for contesting the administrations’ Sudan policy. Comforted by public pressure asking for sanctions and further containment of the Sudanese regime, as well as the absence of consistent groups opposing this and favoring another approach, US policy makers at the time had a relatively “easy job” on Sudan:

“In the American governmental system, you almost always have at least two different competing interests, taking opposite sides (...). This was one of those where you needed one, but there was not another interest group that was, for whatever reason, interested in being supportive of the government of Sudan. There were the oil companies that might be, and initially they were a little bit. But they sort of put their finger in the wind and said “we don’t want to fight this one, this is a loosing opposition, so we’re out of it, we’re not going to contest what’s happening in Sudan, even though we would like to be involved in their oil”. And otherwise, there was no obvious group out there that had any sympathy towards Sudan. So much about what they were doing was negative anyway. You were sort of slipping into a bus slot, if you said something that was even half way balanced on Sudan. So you had this very interesting and disparate group allying against Sudan. And when you have that

\textsuperscript{534} Interview, Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 22.05.2008
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid.
situation in Washington, it’s sort of an obvious policy response, you just go with the flow. If there’s no one who’s taking the opposite point of view (...), then it’s just a very easy policy to pursue. As a result you had increasingly harsh language towards Sudan throughout the 1990’s, throughout the Clinton administration\textsuperscript{536}.

It certainly led to little margins for self-critical thinking, in which it is not hard to imagine that the administration was little receptive of whatever offers that the Sudanese regime might have made to cooperate or deliver information.

**A consolidation of US Sudan policies in the second Clinton administration**

As can be noted from the critical account of Ambassador Shinn, a certain unease about the Sudan policy, although minor, existed within the State Department during the first Clinton mandate. The two consecutive Ambassadors in Khartoum during these years, Donald Petterson and Timothy Carney, were both eager to take the Sudanese seriously in their offers to negotiate and cooperate on counter-terrorism\textsuperscript{537}. From 1997 however, with the second mandate of the Clinton administration, the Sudan policy in Washington was consolidated around a harsh stance against Khartoum. Carney also had to leave Khartoum that year, and there has been no US Ambassador in Khartoum since. Indeed, just like the policies coming out of Khartoum at the time were the result of different currents and often contradicting views, some disagreements also existed internally in the US administration in the early years of the Clinton administration. It was these internal disagreements between the different factions of the Sudanese regime that made it possible for Khartoum to be at the origin of a number of terrorist attacks during the 1990’s on the one hand, all the while offering information and cooperation on the other. The rejections of the offers made by the Sudanese however relied on a vision within the US administration of a regime as internally unified in its policies and of the leadership as homogenous. The mantra of “never negotiate with terrorists”, strongly embedded in US politics seems to have had as a bi-product the failure to take any Sudanese proposal seriously.

\textsuperscript{536} Interview, Ambassador David Shinn, Washington D.C., 23.05.2008

According to Rose, a last letter was produced by the Sudanese authorities in February 1998, this time written by Gutbi al-Mahdi of the Sudanese intelligence and sent to David Williams, chief of the FBI’s Middle East and Africa desk. Again, an offer of cooperation was presented. Janet McElligott, a lobbyist and former staff at the White House during the George Bush presidency and a go-between encouraging the Sudanese to pursue their efforts, reports that her contact at the FBI said they were eager to accept the Sudanese offer, but that the officials at the State Department wouldn’t let them. This was after a notable shift had occurred within the US State Department, especially on the level of those in charge of formulating the Africa policy. The entering of Susan Rice, Gayle Smith and John Prendergast in key positions at the State Department at the beginning of Clinton’s second mandate came to consolidate US policy towards Sudan around a determined policy of containment.

Susan Rice played an important role in intensifying the efforts on Sudan during Clinton’s second mandate, in the direction of containment and isolation. She joined the administration in 1993, working as the Director of International Organizations and Peacekeeping for the National Security Council (NSC). It was while holding this position that she made her perhaps most troubling experience, as she visited Rwanda during the genocide and recalls having seen “hundreds, if not thousands, of decomposing corpses outside and inside a church”. She is reported to have said:

“It was the most horrible thing I’ve ever seen. It makes you mad. It makes you determined. It makes you know that even if you’re the last lone voice and you believe you’re right, it is worth every bit of energy you can throw into it.”

In 1995, she was appointed special advisor to the president and senior director for African affairs. In 1997, she became the youngest US Assistant Secretary of State ever, in charge of African Affairs at the State Department. It was her mentor and long time family friend Madeleine Albright that recommended her, as she herself was appointed Secretary of State. The two also had a very similar view on Sudan. Madeleine Albright had in 1996, while serving as US Ambassador to the UN, called Sudan “a viper’s nest of terrorism”. During her position as Assistant Secretary of State, Rice adopted a very critical approach of the

538 Rose, op.cit.
540 Ibid.
541 Cobb Jr., op.cit.
Islamist regime in Khartoum. She was favoring political and economic isolation of the regime in order to force it to cooperate on the anti-terrorist issues. Despite her young age, 33, when she took the position in 1997, she quickly showed her ability to convince people with her plain spoken opinions. According to Hilde Frafjord Johnson, who became Norwegian Minister of International Cooperation and Human Rights the same year and who was in close contact with Rice on issues related to Sudan, it was thanks to her that there was a “rapprochement between NGOs, the Congress and the Administration”. Johnson even describes her as “very important during this period, as an active support for the South and for the SPLM”.

What was new about this renewed interest at the State Department however, was an increased awareness of the situation in South Sudan accompanied with a willingness to support the Southerners, through humanitarian aid and political support. Gayle Smith served as a Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council from 1998 to 2001. She had a solid background from Africa after having been based there for over 20 years as she worked as a journalist covering military, economic and political affairs for amongst others the BBC, Associated Press, Reuters, Boston Globe and the Financial Times. She also knew the NGO and humanitarian sector well, having been coordinator of the Africa program of the Washington-based Development Group for Alternative Policies, and as she had taken on consultation missions for a range of organizations such as UNICEF, the World Bank, the Dutch Interchurch Aid and the Norwegian Church Aid. Between 1994 and 1998, she worked as senior advisor with the US Agency for International Development. The USAID during those years remained a major donor and participant in the OLS providing humanitarian assistance to South Sudan. Gayle Smith was therefore not insensitive to the situation in South Sudan when she joined the State Department.

John Prendergast joined the State Department in 1997, first as director of African Affairs at the NSC and then from 1999 as special advisor to Susan Rice. He too had a solid background

542 Interview, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister of Development, phone interview, 23.05.2006
543 Ibid.
544 See notably interview: Gayle Smith, “The Famine This Time”, Middle East Report, 166, (September-October 1990), 12-14.
from the NGO sector and had worked for various think tanks on African issues. He had authored and co-authored a series of books on Africa, and notably on Sudan and the Horn. Known for his "activist" approach and his straightforwardness, whether in government or in opposition, he, like Rice, adopted a strong policy of containment of the regime in Sudan. As he said during a conference organized by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) on religion and peacebuilding in 1997:

"the US policy seeks to isolate the NIF government and to contain the threat it poses to its own people, its neighbors, and to the international community. We consider the NIF regime to be one of the most heinous regimes and as the main threat to interests of national security for the US on the African continent today."

A last, but not less important person among the Africa policy makers in the Clinton administration was the above-quoted Ted Dagne. Of Ethiopian origins, he was first a staff member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in Congress, in charge of policy formulation on East and Central Africa, then a member of the House Africa Subcommittee, and later a special advisor to President Clinton’s special envoy, Harry Johnston. Also intervening at the USIP conference in 1997, he too defended the view that containment was the only way to make the regime change, if not fall. Hilde Frafjord Johnson qualifies him as a “key person” for the formulation of the US Sudan policy at the time, and describes him as an important supporter for the SPLM vis-à-vis the US Congress. Indeed, the walls in his office at the Congressional Research Service are covered with pictures and posters from South Sudan, many portray John Garang and on some he is himself accompanying the late SPLM leader. However, as he points out, despite an increasing number of sanctions and a deterioration of relations between Washington and Khartoum during the 1990’s, until it reached a low point in 1998, the US never broke its diplomatic ties with Sudan. Countries like Iran and Cuba, also on the list of States sponsors of terrorism, have had their diplomatic ties with the US broken, although the two measures were not necessarily directly linked. The fact that a line of communication was

546 Quoted in Master’s thesis, Maria Gabrielsen, “Le processus d’internationalisation du conflit au Sud Soudan, Perceptions, mobilisations et stratégies de mise sur agenda”, defended on September 7, 2006, Sciences Po Paris. The quote is taken from the transcript of the conference, then available on: http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/panel6.html As this link is not available anymore, the quote here is a translation from French to English of the text in the Master’s thesis.

547 Ibid.

548 Interview, Frafjord Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister of Development 23.05.2006

549 Interview, Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 22.05.2008
kept with Sudan throughout all those years was certainly at least partly due to the situation in South Sudan, and the vast budget the US allocated to humanitarian aid in the region through the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).

A security response to the war in the South: indirect support to the SPLA and direct support to the neighboring countries

As the US Sudan policy was consolidated in the second Clinton administration, there was also an increased awareness concerning the conflict in South Sudan. The famine in 1998, widely reported in Western newspapers, further contributed to give new political attention to the disastrous humanitarian situation in the region. This increased attention on the South, as opposed to an approach based almost exclusively on containing Khartoum, remained however based on a securitarian approach.

As we have seen in previous chapters, the situation in South Sudan progressively attracted the attention of various interest groups in the US in the 1990’s, either with indirect connections to the region, but motivated by a special sensitivity to the causes of the wars, or with direct connections through the experience gained by humanitarian aid workers or missionaries. Ted Dagne notes that the pressure from civil society in the beginning of the 1990’s was not yet remarkable, however the policy of containing, sanctioning and isolating the Khartoum regime was something those aware of the situation in the South favored. When they pressured the Congress or the government on Sudan-related issues, it was in order for them to exert more pressure rather than engaging in any way with the regime. When the Freedom from religious persecution act was voted in 1997, it was largely a victory for the Christian right having put a lot of effort and political capital to have the bill passed into law. Furthermore, a senior official at the Africa Bureau of the State Department under the first administration of George W. Bush, recalls that the main pressure groups, the Evangelicals and the Black Caucus, were still favoring this containment policy when the Republicans took over.

Looking back at the Sudan policy of the Clinton years, Ted Dagne plainly describes how the administration supported the Southerners – not militarily, but politically and diplomatically –

550 Interview, Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 22.05.2008
551 Interview, DT, State Department official, Washington, 23.05.2008
as well as the neighboring states, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda in order to weaken Khartoum. This was the policy of the “frontline states”, as an echo to the alliance created between Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to overthrow the Apartheid regime in South Africa and obtain a black majority rule. This coalition of states covertly supported the ANC military wing, yet discouraged them from using their territories to launch their attacks. Eventually, their efforts to form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in the 1980’s, which received the support of many European countries and the United States, enabled them to efficiently isolate South Africa and force its leadership to negotiate with the ANC. As for Sudan, and the containment of the NIF regime, Washington tried to recreate this dynamic by supporting an ad-hoc alliance between Sudan’s Eastern and Southern neighbors from 1995 onwards. Millions of dollars were set aside to support these countries militarily, especially Ethiopia. However the financial support was halted when the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out in 1998, and the whole frontline policy came to an end. It was around that time as well that Khartoum and Kampala reestablished a line of communication. During the years of the frontline policy however, the support of these states was perceived as crucial by the US in order to exert efficient pressure on the Sudanese government. As stated later, in the Sudan Peace Act passed into law on October 21, 2002: “The ability of populations to defend themselves against attacks in areas outside the control of the Government of Sudan has been severely compromised by the disengagement of the front-line states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fostering the belief among officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.”

Séverine Auteserre argues that the apparent contradiction between the US being the major donor of humanitarian aid to South Sudan in the 1990’s as well as appearing as one of the regime’s harshest opponents on the international arena has only one explanation. According to her, “humanitarian aid, and especially food aid, is not a substitute for political action, but (…) it has become the main channel of the US’s Sudan policy for the past ten years.” In other words, the shipping of humanitarian aid, through the OLS and with time outside the OLS as well, was part of an overall strategy to contain and challenge the Khartoum regime.

554 Auteserre, op.cit.
Direct military aid was not an option (although some members of Congress continued to push for it), as it would be perceived as a declaration of war against Khartoum and at the same time compromise the OLS. Thus, humanitarian aid, with its appearance of neutrality and moral highness, became an efficient tool to support the Southerners cause. Despite a difficult relationship with the SPLA in the early 1990’s, due to its poor human rights records, the ties improved as the relationship with the NIF regime deteriorated. The SPLM encouraged this progress in relations by opening up humanitarian space in rebel-controlled areas as well as putting notable effort into at least appearing as respectful of human rights. As Auteserre writes, “in 1997, the relations were even so good as to prompt the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright to officially meet the SPLM leader John Garang in Kampala, and to express support for his objectives555. In 1999 she met again with the SPLM leadership and the National Democratic Alliance, and reportedly she then promised help to the rebels. Among the members of Congress pushing for a more proactive support to the rebels, those linked to the Christian conservative movement were usually the strongest advocates. Yet, the overall approach of support to the Southerners and the SPLA was broadly supported by a range of US politicians. Sam Brownback, one of the notable Sudan champions in the Congress and a Republican representative of Kansas, introduced an amendment to the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 2000, in order to authorize the administration to provide direct food aid to the SPLA556. The Sudan Peace Act of 2002 follows in the same path: "The President is authorized to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture557. In practice, the "areas of Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of Sudan" were areas controlled by the SPLA. At this time, however, the Bush administration had been in place for almost more than a year, and US Sudan policy had taken on a new orientation.

555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
2) Towards a policy agenda of engagement - against public will

It is often said that President George W. Bush’s close ties with the Evangelist movement and the Christian right is what made him take the Sudan issue up on his agenda relatively early after he took office. This is not wrong, however it only provides a very partial understanding of the policy priorities at the time. In this section, I shall first show what kind of "special relationship” connected President Bush and these pressure groups. Then I will argue that the change of policy in early 2001, towards a policy of constructive engagement, was first of all the result of a new administration seeking to "try something new” as the old policy had not brought about any satisfactory results. Eight months into the Bush administration, it would be doubled by a new-found leverage on the Sudanese government.

A special relationship between President George W. Bush and the Christian right

The new Republican administration taking office in January 2001 gave the public mobilization for Sudan a new meaning. First of all, the Christian right had for some years already achieved an important influence within the Republican Party, and the religious movements engaged on the South Sudan issue for that reason had a much better audience within the new Republican administration than what they used to have during the previous Democratic administration. Also, President George W. Bush had a personal history with the Evangelical movement, being himself a so-called born-again Christian. As several authors have pointed out (Natalie La Balme558, Ole Holsti559, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane560), the perceptions, beliefs and values that political leaders have will structure the way they understand the world around them and influence the decisions they make. A system of beliefs can vary according to the personality of a leader, his education and previous experiences. However, it is always subject to new impulses and will always evolve over time. Although this cognitive method of analysis of decision making processes cannot say much about why decision makers take a specific decision at a give point in time, it certainly tells us something about the links between personal beliefs and experiences, political ideology and

choices made in politics. Indeed, George W. Bush’s experience of rediscovering Christianity under the influence of the televangelist Billy Graham, the numerous religious references in his presidential campaign speeches, and his general strong connection with the Evangelist community are all significant to understand the new administration’s policy orientations as well as the special audience given by the White House to the representatives of this movement.

It was in the early 1980’s that the Evangelicals managed to build a solid alliance with a certain conservative wing within the Republican Party. The movement is estimated to represent around 18% of the electorate561; it is thus not a majoritarian movement, but a group that has come to count a lot when elections are tight. As a long time observer of US foreign policy, Justin Vaisse, pointed out: “from the moment where the Republicans needed the support from the Christian right to be elected, any Republican president would have been sensible to the question562,” referring to the Sudan issue. Yet, “with Bush, it was an even more special relationship563.” The Evangelists gather many militant and politically very active personalities, and George W. Bush knew well how to address them. Many of them abstained from voting during the presidential elections in 2000, however, his messianic discourse and his Manichean world-view that came to be expressed after 9/11 granted him their full support. In the mid-term elections in 2002, the Evangelical community voted massively for him564. Although he didn’t have any specific knowledge of Sudan at the time he took office, the issue was to become one through which he could communicate with this important electoral basis.

However, there were other, probably more important, factors that led the Bush administration to make Sudan one of the first foreign policy issues it engaged seriously in. According to Robert Jervis, four levels of analysis are important to take into account in order to gain a certain understanding of the decision making process in foreign policy matters, and are a useful complement to the contextual factors mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. First of all is the level of decision making (is it the president himself deciding whether or not to engage in an issue, or is it the State Department officials for example), secondly is the

561 Ibid.
562 Interview, Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Brookings Institution, phone interview, 03.07.2006
563 Ibid.
564 Richet, op.cit.
nature of the bureaucracy (the “human resources” within the bureaucracy, its structure and the powers allocated to it on different issues), third is the nature of the state and the general functioning of domestic politics, and fourth is the influence of the international environment. Each level has a different weight and importance according to the issues as well as the stages of the decision making process. The level of the bureaucracy (pressure exerted by members of Congress for example) as well as the international environment (connections between Sudan and a range of terrorist networks) are pertinent levels of analysis of the US policy engagement on the conflict in South Sudan in the mid and late 1990’s. With time, the Congress has also become the most important channel of influence for the mobilized activist groups, notably those mobilized on the Darfur crisis. The role played by the international context became increasingly important after 9/11 with the development of a new American foreign policy strategy. However, it was the role played by a handful of new officials appointed in the Africa bureau of the State Department in 2001, taking into consideration the meager successes of the Sudan policy conducted by their predecessors and aware of the leverage they already had towards the Sudanese regime, that led to a change in the American approach to Sudan.

An audacious change of policy: in part thanks to public pressure, yet going against the approach they advocated for

The new administration taking office in January 2001 could have been expected to be even more prone to applying a policy of containment and isolation of the Sudanese regime than its predecessors – with the Christian right asking for such a policy to be applied and the Republican’s tradition of being more attached to policies of sanctions and pressure than the Democrats. However, an almost opposite approach was chosen, as a policy of engagement was eventually proposed to the Sudanese. This change of policy was undertaken well before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, contrary to what is often believed; indeed it started in the very first months of the Bush administration, while it was still modestly involved on foreign policy issues in general.

This new policy orientation was far from having the automatic support of the American public and more specifically the lobby groups mobilized on the situation in South Sudan. These

lobbies, highly critical of the Khartoum regime, were indeed not the natural supporters of a policy of engagement and negotiations that could eventually lead to a legitimization of the Khartoum government. According to one of the new officials appointed to the Africa Bureau at the State Department in 2001, one could “make the case that not necessarily lobbying groups, but powerful interests inside the new coalition, Bush’s coalition, actually had an impact on the policy”\textsuperscript{566}. The new Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, Walter H. Kansteiner, had a solid background with African affairs within the State Department. He had served as Africa director of the State Department’s policy planning staff from mid 1989 to mid 1991, when he became director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. During the Democrat administrations from 1993 to 2001, he carried on with a business career. In 1994, he was one of the founding principals of The Scowcroft Group, an initiative led by Brent Scowcroft, the former National Security Advisor to George H.W. Bush. The group specialized in international business advisory, and has built a reputation of expertise in investing in the economy of emerging markets as well as its strong connections with key players in politics and industry sector in the US. This business orientation was something he would bring back into his new position at the State Department in 2001. As his close colleague describes him: “he was not interested in Sudan, he was interested in business, he was a businessman”\textsuperscript{567}.

As he took office, he asked his staff to brief him on issues he was not aware of, issues which, if they came up without them being prepared, could force them to have to do things outside of his area of interest. His staff answered by putting Sudan on the agenda. One reason was the Black Caucus, which they perceived as a strong force in the opposition, who had built their reputation precisely on their engagement for South Sudan, but also on its support for a policy of isolating and punishing Khartoum. The other reason was the strong engagement of the Christian right in favor of South Sudan – where organizations such as the Samaritan’s Purse, the organization chaired by Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham who converted George W. Bush, had built and supported local churches and hospitals. In early 2001, a hospital they had built in the town of Lui was bombed nine times\textsuperscript{568}, a matter that certainly did not go unnoticed by the new Bush administration. The fact that this group was an important part within the

\textsuperscript{566} Interview, DT, State Department official, Washington D.C., 23.05.2008
\textsuperscript{567} Ibid.
president’s electoral block – or at least a group he should work to obtain and keep the support of – led the policy planners in the Africa bureau to advise the Assistant Secretary that a cohesive Sudan policy should be developed. It was a preemptive strategy: better prepare a cohesive strategy responding to the Administration’s interests early on rather than having to respond later on to public pressure, potentially forcing them to apply a different policy than their interests indicated. The fact that the previous administration’s policy had not had much success, as well as the opportunity to “try something new” in order to distinguish themselves from the Democrats, made them develop a proposal to be presented to the Sudanese. According to one of these senior officials working out this policy, mentioned above, the plan was to tell the Sudanese the following:

“if you think the Clinton administration was bad, then with the bombing of some of the president’s constituents (hospital in Lui) and the Black Caucus (who) likes (the containment policy), so we have an option to continue on the hardline and make it even harder, because this is a Republican administration and it can be more pushy if it wants to be. Or, we’re willing to negotiate with you provided that you accept our premises, (...) we’re not going to treat you equally because we think the Southerners are the aggrieved party, but we’ll treat you fairly in the negotiations”.

Kansteiner received the permission from Secretary of state Colin Powell to pursue this approach, at least in a first stage to see how the proposal would be received by the Sudanese. According to this former State Department official, the fact that Sudan was put on the agenda in the first place was because of these two powerful blocks that had an interest in Sudan – although they did not at all support this new policy orientation. Somewhat paradoxically however, it gave the Americans an added leverage over the Sudanese, since they could threaten to apply an even harsher policy than their predecessors. On May 3, 2001, Bush publicly denounced the crimes and the atrocities perpetrated by the Khartoum regime in a speech in Washington. The same month, a secret meeting was arranged outside Nairobi with a delegation from the Sudanese government, including the foreign minister and a senior general, and a delegation from the Africa bureau team of the US State Department, including

569 Ibid.  
Kansteiner himself\textsuperscript{571}. The two options were presented, and the Sudanese were given a week to consider them, while being told that if they did not respond, then it would be considered that they opted for the confrontational line. They reportedly answered 48 hours later: favoring the negotiations options over the confrontation. The Americans launched the initiative shortly after, and first talks with the parties were organized that summer.

As the political side of the administration close to the President, mostly at the White House, became aware of the initiative, the Africa bureau staff was told that the price to pay would be to appoint someone to talk to the Christian right. And this is where Senator John Danforth comes in, also an Episcopal priest. His nomination as the president’s Special Envoy to Sudan was a way to reach out to the Christian right, and more importantly, a means to give this constituency a guarantee that their interests would not be sold by the negotiations prone diplomats at the State Department. John Danforth was nominated in the rose garden of the White House on September 6, 2001. An article in the \textit{New York Times} the day following his nomination says: "An intellectual conservative and an Episcopal minister, Mr. Danforth, 65, also brings credentials to a conflict that has prompted sharp concern from religious groups in this country\textsuperscript{572}". His appointment had been known to the State Department officials since August, but that was at the height of the summer holidays, and thus the official ceremony was postponed to early September, when it was hoped that it would have a larger echo. Danforth had no previous knowledge of or experience with Sudan, but rapidly agreed to work on the initiative thought out by the State Department officials. The mandate he was given by President George W. Bush was to “determine the commitment to peace by the parties to the Sudan conflict, and to recommend whether the United States should engage energetically in efforts to bring a just peace to that country\textsuperscript{573}”. He proceeded to apply four tests to the parties to the war, in order to verify their seriousness to negotiate – an approach that fitted well with the pressure groups at home and their demands for continued pressure on Khartoum.

\textsuperscript{571} These details are drawn from the interview with DT, State Department official, Washington D.C., 23.05.2008

\textsuperscript{572} Christopher Marquis, "Bush Picks Envoy to Seek Peace in Sudan", \textit{New York Times}, September 7, 2001, 

The fact that the Bush administration chose to engage seriously in reviving the dormant peace process has in retrospect often been interpreted as a result of the pressure from the mobilized lobbies, and thus believed to be a choice they more than welcomed. As Benjamin Bock of Amnesty International USA wrote in an article of Amnesty Magazine:

“Against a backdrop of relentless devastation, pressure from an odd convergence of U.S. interests has raised hope for peace. The U.S. religious right is outraged that Christians are under attack by Sudanese Muslims, while the Congressional Black Caucus has long urged a U.S. role in ending the war. These curious bedfellows successfully pressured President George W. Bush to intervene574”.

This widespread understanding perhaps best illustrates the success of the new Bush administration to “sell” its new and potentially contentious approach towards the Sudanese regime. To refer to the different models of agenda building (cf. chapter I), this effectively seems to be a case of a successful application of the mobilization model: the choice of policy approach was taken internally in the administration, but public support was actively sought on the outside in order to make the approach possible.

**Role of economic lobbies in making the case for engagement**

From the State Department point of view, it was the engagement of the two powerful pressure groups that led them to put Sudan on the agenda, and it was the fact that they were part of a new administration that led them to think that “something new” could be tried out. It is indeed recurrent that when a new administration comes in, it seeks to try different policies than its predecessors, simply in order to distinguish itself. Also, the departure of the former Africa team of the State Department, bent on isolating and containing Khartoum, gave room for other officials to take over the Sudan file. The fact that the Assistant Secretary of State was close to a powerful business group eager to invest abroad and in Africa certainly also pushed the case for engagement over containment. As Sudan had started to export oil in 1999, US oil companies, who had a much better audience with George W. Bush than they used to have with Bill Clinton, were also curious to see what could be done. As Marc Lavergne and Fabrice Weissman write in 2003 about the Bush administration’s first months in office:

"Washington finds itself in an awkward position: while the die-hard conservatives, the Black Caucus (the Afro-American lobby) and the human rights activists forcefully insist that Sudan is a rogue state, guilty of support to terrorism, of “genocide against Christians” or of numerous human rights violations, the business circles try to inflect the State Department’s position towards a country offering sizeable business opportunities (and notably in the oil sector), about to be seized by Asian, European and Canadian operators. De facto, the US administration shows itself as more and more divided between the partisans of a strengthening of the pressure on Sudan and those who think that the “Sudanese threat” is overestimated. The latter feel that in the absence of a credible alternative to the present regime, one should resume talks with Khartoum before the regime consolidates its economic and diplomatic relations with China and other Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, also with large Muslim populations) who could help it resist pressures from Washington.\(^{575}\)"

Although one should be wary to think the oil interests constituted a guiding motivation for the new Bush administration, the prospective of Sudan being invested by Chinese and Asian business corporations certainly increased the stakes\(^{576}\). As such, Lavergne and Weissman argue that the election of George W. Bush to the White House was “good news” to the Sudanese regime. This new line of cooperation would be further consolidated by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001.

**The 9/11-terror attacks and the meaning for the Sudan peace initiative**

Sudan was quick to proclaim its innocence and its continued willingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism following 9/11. Although many observers deemed the counter-terrorism efforts of Sudan to have been triggered by the events of 9/11, and seeing the increased US interest for Sudan as a result of the attacks orchestrated by one of Khartoum’s former protégés, both Khartoum and Washington were by then already well engaged on a new line of cooperation. Indeed, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington considerably increased US leverage over Khartoum. The Manichean discourse postulating “you are either with us or against us” made it even more important to the political leaders in Khartoum to show they were serious in their promises of cooperation in order not to find themselves associated with the wrong side.

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A range of new counter-terrorism initiatives were developed by the US after 9/11 to be implemented in partnership with various African countries, in order to counter the possible development of Al Qaida activities in the region\textsuperscript{577}. However, none of the initiatives included Sudan\textsuperscript{578}. Sudan seemed to constitute a category for itself, as a country that was not (yet) directly supported by the US, but which at the same time was not mentioned among the countries belonging to the “axis of evil” as outlined by President Bush\textsuperscript{579}. On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council voted a lifting of the sanctions imposed on Sudan in 1996, thanks to the abstention, and not the veto, of the United States.

3) Towards a moral agenda of condemning and punishing – aligned with public pressure

Despite this new line of cooperation between Washington and Khartoum in 2001, no US sanctions have been lifted since, only more sanctions have been applied. This is due to two factors: (1) the outbreak of the war in Darfur, visible to the world from 2004 and thus before the condition for any improvement in relations, the signing of the peace agreement with the South, was filled, (2) the continued pressure by US lobby groups skeptical to any promises of cooperation voiced by the leaders in Khartoum (a pressured that increased with the outbreak of the Darfur war). What this shows, is not that the pressure from the oil lobbies was non-existent or irrelevant, but that the pressure from the Christian and African-American lobbies eventually outweighed any other influence on US policy towards Sudan. As the North-South negotiations were indeed making serious progress in Naivasha during the spring 2004, the world and US public opinion learned about Darfur. The same negotiations had until then kept Darfur away from the radar. From then on however, policy speeches on Sudan went back to a harsh and threatening language directed at Khartoum. While negotiations continued to move forward, the deterioration of relations was a fact.


\textsuperscript{578} Ibid. The East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) included Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In addition, the thirteen African countries benefiting from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) did not include Sudan.

US reactions on Darfur while North-South peace talks were still going on

It would be wrong to say that nothing was done for Darfur until the signing of the CPA. Roger Winter, who had joined the USAID in early 2001 as the assistant administrator of USAID under Andrew Natsios, was alerted on the situation in Darfur in early 2003, when John Garang encouraged him to speak with the leaders of the SLA. The access for humanitarian aid was severely restricted in 2002, when the fighting escalated, but thanks to the tireless efforts of Natsios and Winter, access improved slowly from August 2003. Then, in January 2004, US State Department officials started to understand the graveness of the situation in Darfur. American and British diplomats were still reluctant to take Darfur up on the agenda within the Security Council however, still referring to the sensibility of the North-South process. Lacking the possibility to work on a political response, the US pushed for a humanitarian ceasefire, and according to Flint and de Waal, they flew the rebel leaders to N’Djamena for talks there. Sudanese security would have preferred the Americans not to be there, but on April 8 a ceasefire was signed, taking effect on April 11 and resulting in a considerable increase in humanitarian operations in the region. President Bashir had announced an end to the military operations, and lifted some of the restrictions on humanitarian activities in February 2004, already then improving the access for humanitarian aid.

On June 24, Resolution 467 was introduced to the US House of Representatives declaring that a “genocide” was going on in Darfur. It was voted a month later, under a suspension of the rules to keep the debate short in order to pass the resolution, which needed a two third majority. This is a measure taken for non-controversial legislations, and the roll call vote counted 422 Ayes, 0 Nays and 12 Present/Not Voting. During the preceding month a range of protests had been organized outside the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, pressuring for the resolution to be passed and calling on the government to lead an international intervention in Darfur, impose targeted sanctions and create a fund for humanitarian aid to Darfur. On

580 Flint and de Waal (2008), op.cit.
581 Ibid.
September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell in a speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that “genocide has been committed” in Darfur\(^\text{584}\). The declaration was significant, being the first time such as high-level US government official referred to an ongoing crisis as a “genocide”. A few weeks later, President Bush followed in the same path in a speech to the UN General Assembly. Although hopes had been high within the activist ranks that invoking the 1948 Genocide Convention would almost automatically trigger an international intervention in Sudan, no such response was mounted. Powell reminded that the qualification of genocide did not prompt any US intervention, but by placing the issue in a context of international law, he hoped and called for a strong international response to the crisis.

**Public policy: foreign policy made according to electoral concerns**

Although president Bush did not mention Darfur explicitly in his statement on April 7, 2004, commemorating the Rwanda genocide, the numerous explicit and implicit comparisons that were made at that time between the two, quickly placed Darfur on the agenda of the White House (and not only the State Department). A difficult issue emerged for the Presidency around the same time, which eventually would contribute to a heightened influence of the activist movement for Darfur: the Abu Ghraib scandal. The shocking pictures that came out in late April that year quickly made their way around the world, and constituted a severe setback for the already complicated American intervention in Iraq. Eventually, speaking to its domestic constituency about Darfur became a powerful strategy to direct attention away from Iraq and onto an issue that was much less ambiguous – at least in terms of US responsibility – and thus easy to condemn.

The Bush administration was also then entering an electoral campaign to ensure its reelection for a second mandate in office. In late summer months of 2004, as the Iraq war was becoming more and more of a quagmire, and as it became clear that no comprehensive peace agreement would be signed between North and South Sudan *before* the November elections (a key foreign policy success Bush had hoped to capitalize on), it became a central preoccupation for the administration to show its increasingly mobilized electorate that it too was concerned about the situation in Darfur. George W. Bush wanted to keep his promise, at least in words, if not in action, of not letting an ongoing genocide go by in silence. As had been picked up by

the activists, Bush had written “not on my watch” in the margins of a report on the Clinton administration’s handling of the Rwandan genocide. The fact that the Bush administration adopted a strong stance and showed itself as capable of saying the word “genocide” to qualify a situation that seemed to constitute one, contrary to what their predecessors had done ten years earlier, was a strategy more directed towards its domestic constituency than Khartoum. In the absence of the possibility to use the CPA as a voting credential, but also in the absence of the prospective of any international intervention into Darfur in any near future, the adoption of the activist language became the most efficient tool to tell them that they were being heard.

**US policy on Darfur: calling for sanctions and punishment, but a distant stance on the ICC**

The Security Council voted to refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on March 31st, 2005, under resolution 1593. The US abstained from voting the resolution, an exceptional position for a government that had continually opposed the creation of the ICC and which had refused to ratify the Rome Treaty. In other words, the Americans could never have voted for the resolution, but it was noteworthy that they did not veto the decision - something they would otherwise have done in questions concerning the ICC. According to a close observer of the debates within the Security Council at the time, the US abstention was clearly due to the public pressure it was under at the time. The aggressive criticism that was being voiced against the Sudanese regime by the advocacy community in the US indeed pushed the government to silently comply with the transfer of the issue to the ICC, seen as something that could appease the activists. Certainly, few imagined then where the “judiciarization” of the international response to the Darfur crisis would lead, but this was at a time when both political leaders in the US and leaders of other Western powers were seeking to activate a maximum of different channels of responses each potentially contributing to put an end to the situation in Darfur.


586 Interview, PV, former UN official, New York, 24.04.2008
While the US-Sudan relationship went from bad to worse during the 1990’s, and as the US gave priority to isolating and containing the regime over any sustained effort to seek a negotiated and peaceful solution to the war in the South, a regional response was slowly building up. The regional framework proposed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) became the cornerstone of the international engagement for the North-South peace process. Cooperation between regional and international instances, the UN and the African Union (AU), was far from as harmonious and coordinated when it came to Darfur a few years later.

1) The troika supported IGAD response to South Sudan

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was created in 1986, by the heads of state of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, following the severe droughts and other natural disasters that had ravaged the region in previous years. Eritrea became the seventh member after gaining independence in 1993. The organization decided to revitalize and expand its cooperation in 1996, and then took the simplified name of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The prolonged conflicts in more than one of the member countries conducted IGAD from the mid-1990’s to develop regional strategies for peace and security. Already in September 1993, during the organization’s summit, president Bashir invited IGADD to serve as mediator in the Sudanese conflict. The peace talks that opened the following year gathered together the heads of state of the neighboring countries determined to put an end to the conflict that affected them directly. The most substantial progress then was the production of a Declaration of Principles (DOP), but, as explained in the previous chapter, it was never signed as the talks were interrupted by Khartoum shortly after. With the reinvigoration of the IGAD in 1996, a renewed interest for the organization was manifested among the region’s international development partners. In 1997, the initially informal group of “Friends of IGAD” was formalized into the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), at first gathering Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The IPF held its first

587 Khalid, op. cit.
meeting in Rome in January 1998, and many other countries and international organizations, such as the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, have joined the IPF since. The explicit strategy of these partners was to provide their financial, technical and diplomatic support to the IGAD framework for peace talks for Sudan. A great importance was attached to the maintenance of a regional ownership of the peace talks.

Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Norwegian minister of International Co-operation and Development, became president of the Sudan committee of the IPF in 1998, after Jan Pronk, until then Dutch Minister of Development Co-operation, had held the position in the first few months. During her presidency, she worked to engage what she called the “key countries”:

“We couldn’t include absolutely everyone, so we created a core group, composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. We discussed different means to accelerate the negotiations”

Johnson, who was minister for two periods (1997-2000 and 2001-2005), dedicated a large portion of her time, if not most of her time, to Sudan during both her mandates. The Kenyans were in charge of supervising and organizing the negotiations on the IGAD side, and Johnson was frequently in contact with Bonaya Godana, the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs. Until 1998 there were regular biannual meetings, but never on the highest level, and according to close observers of the process, nothing was really happening at the time. There was still a lack of real willingness and commitment by the parties, and perhaps especially on the side of the government, in addition to a weak leadership by the Kenyans who served as chief mediators in the process.

The IGAD member states: from confrontation to assisting the peace process

Although Sudan’s neighbors and members of the IGAD had put in place a framework for the peace talks, politics of alliances with their neighbor countries’ internal opposition and rebel movement continued, and contributed to prolonging the conflict. The neighboring countries were at the same time the best potential partners in a future peace process and the main

588 Interview, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, 23.05.2006
589 Ibid. Point also put forward in other interviews with Norwegian delegates to Naivasha.
obstacles hindering any progress in the efforts to relaunch the negotiations. A first obstacle was of administrative nature, as meetings within the IGAD were initially only organized on a ministerial level. This was a structure where meetings became difficult to organize, infrequent, and when they took place, the participants had little time and hurried through the items on the agenda, never discussing the core issues in depth. Following a meeting of the IPF committee on Sudan, in Oslo in March 1999, the participants decided to change the structure of the negotiations. Special envoys were appointed, representing Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, and were mandated to serve as direct support to the Kenyan mediator, to facilitate the holding of more frequent meetings and to enhance the continuity between the meetings. It had a certain effect, but the positions of the parties remained as fixed as before\textsuperscript{590}. The SPLM called on the international community to exert further pressure on the Sudanese government, still reluctant to recognize the right to self-determination for the populations of Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile – states along the North-South border claimed by both parties.

*Ethiopia and Eritrea*

Initially, the new regime in Addis Abeba in 1991 adopted a rather favorable attitude towards Khartoum. This relationship however ended with the failed assassination attempt against the Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak in June 1995, in Addis Abeba. According to Marchal and Osman, "the Ethiopian leaders feared with reason to see Khartoum again play the role of coordinator of its multiple armed opposition movements\textsuperscript{591}". Ethiopia from then on gave its logistic and political support to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the multiparty coalition created in opposition to the NIF regime and gathering the Southern SPLM as well as Northern opposition parties. Eritrea went even further in its support to the NDA, by hosting it’s head quarter in Asmara from 1995. Already in 1994, the diplomatic ties between Asmara and Khartoum were broken, notably due to Khartoum’s support to the Eritrean opposition. The two neighbors of Sudan thus for a long time spent more efforts in supporting Khartoum’s internal rivals rather than pressuring Khartoum to deploy serious efforts in the negotiations. The war that broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 somehow changed the regional balance of alliances.

\textsuperscript{590} Khalid, *op.cit.*, 377.

\textsuperscript{591} Ibid.
As a Sudanese journalist puts it, “the two countries who played the role of a spearhead against Sudan found themselves waging a war against each other,” and since they both were supported by the US at that time, the resumption of the hostilities between the two lead the Americans to seize themselves of the issue while Sudan rushed to normalize its relations with Ethiopia. The IGAD structure was severely weakened by the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and consequently fewer efforts were spent on the South Sudan issue.

**Kenya and Uganda**

From 1993, it was the Uganda of President Yoweri Museveni that replaced Ethiopia as the main external supporter of the SPLA. Kampala maintained close ties with the Americans, while Khartoum was increasingly a source of concern for Washington. Ugandan support to the SPLA was tacitly supported by the Americans, who in turn supported Uganda as part of its Frontline States policy. Meanwhile, Khartoum provided assistance to the LRA in Northern Uganda, serving as a powerful buffer against the SPLA. The diplomatic bonds between Sudan and Uganda were broken in 1995. As Marchal and Osman note, “the significant advancement of the SPLA in South Sudan since the beginning of 1997 (taking back Kaya, Yei, Kajo-Kaji) makes one think that the Ugandan army was not entirely inactive” at that time.

Meanwhile, Kenya failed to efficiently fill its mandate within the IGAD and many external observers put forward the weaknesses of the Kenyan leadership as a main reason for the slow progress made in the negotiations at the time. Marchal and Osman explain that Kenya was the only one maintaining “almost cordial relations” with Khartoum at the time. This can be understood in light of the strained relations between the Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi and his Ugandan counterpart, as well as the relative weakness of Islamist activities in Kenya. Indeed, Kenya had also provided material and other forms of support to the SPLA, but was perhaps one of the few neighboring states then with a real stake in a future peace agreement, enabling the return to South Sudan of the many refugees who had come to Kenya from 1991 onwards. The first official Kenyan mediator for the IGAD process, Daniel Mboya, was widely considered as too weak to pressure for any significant progress on any level. Although Khartoum agreed to return to the talks and negotiate on the basis of the DOP in 1997, little

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592 Interview, Mohammed Nagy, journalist, Sudan Tribune, 22.03.2006
593 Marchal and Osman, *op.cit.* (*own translation*)
594 Ibid.
progress was made at that time, and it is widely seen as due to insufficient Kenyan leadership on the issue.

Egypt and Libya – presenting a competing peace initiative

A Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (JELI) was presented in August 1999, by the Egyptian President Hosni Moubarak and the Libyan President Muammar al-Gaddafi, following a meeting between the two in Marsa Matrouh, Egypt, on August 2, 1999. Initially, it was Libya that proposed a set of principles for the negotiations. It was supported by the NDA, who had given its principled support to the IGAD initiative, yet remaining skeptical to an initiative that only included the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan and not the other opposition parties. The JELI was disposed to include the entire Sudanese opposition, at least the members of the NDA. Sudan’s northern neighbors were naturally closer to the northern Sudanese opposition than to the SPLM, and were also strong partisans of the principle of a united Sudan. Egypt had its own interests in the resolution of the Sudanese civil war, and due to its attachment to the Nile waters, it was strongly opposed to any negotiating framework including the possibility for Southern secession. The relations between Egypt and Sudan have for a long time been complex: an estimated 1.5 million Sudanese refugees live in Cairo, not to mention the close relationship between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Turabi wing of the NIF. With the presentation of this initiative, it became clear for the other parties involved in the negotiations that Egypt’s support for a future peace agreement was essential. Despite the fact that the initiative came to compete with the IGAD framework, by altering the principles of the negotiations, it received some support both within and outside Sudan, essentially for its inclusiveness. Even the SPLM, aware of the support that this initiative garnered, and afraid it would lose the advantages it had obtained through the DOP of the IGAD, insisted on the importance to coordinate the two initiatives.

The IGAD process thus faced an increased number of obstacles towards the end of the 1990’s. In the meantime, the war continued in the South, with aerial bombardments carried out by the government. On May 8, 2000, the SPLM declared a suspension of the IGAD negotiations. A year later, in July 2001, President Bashir decided to give his full support to the Egyptian-

595 Khalid, op.cit.
596 Ibid.
Libyan initiative, citing Egypt’s role in the improved relations between Sudan and the US\textsuperscript{597}. However, the international support for the JELI was too weak for it to gain a more important role, notably because it ignored to a large extent the claims of the Southern rebels in the peace talks. The JELI was taken into account by John Danforth when he began his work on Sudan, but quickly all efforts were given to the IGAD framework.

**Central international supporters of the IGAD process: the role of UK and Norway**

The US engagement in favor of a relaunch of the peace negotiations was an important driving force for the other IGAD Partners, who would each play an important role in the future peace talks. Both Italy and the Netherlands maintained a solid engagement within the IPF, but it was the United Kingdom and Norway that came to play the most important role along with the US. The three formed what came to be called the troika group, and together they efficiently supported and pressured the parties to respect their promises and pursue the negotiations.

The UK had a natural role in this restricted group, for historical reasons. While the political engagement didn’t seem to be as strong as it was in the US and Norway, the anti-slavery constituency had been very active for many years and had established close relationships with the South Sudanese diaspora in the UK. However, on a political and diplomatic level, the British were known to communicate almost exclusively with Khartoum, they had very few links with South Sudan. Although they too had applied a policy of sanctioning the regime during the 1990’s, as soon as it became clear that the peace would resume, they favored a process of normalization with Khartoum. Mustafa Ismaïl, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, went on an official visit to London in September 2001, and Claire Short, the British Secretary of State for international development, went to Sudan in January 2001 to attend the IGAD summit. She was then the first British minister to visit Sudan in a decade\textsuperscript{598}. She also went to South Sudan, demonstrating that the British engagement was no longer only directed towards the North.


At the same time, Hilde Frafjord Johnson came back as Minister of International Co-operation and Development, following the elections in Norway in September 2001. Seeing the growing engagement in the UK, and especially in the US, not only with the appointment of John Danforth, but also with the change in the situation induced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, she decided it was time to seriously relaunch the mediation efforts:

"I was very clear on the fact that we couldn’t have a group of eight countries if we wanted to see the negotiations move forward. We had to establish a much smaller group and probably a troika. (...) My reasoning was that the Americans were absolutely decisive, nothing would happen without them, and the British had a much closer relationship with Khartoum than with the South, and we had a very close relationship with the South. (...) It became what we called the Troïka."

Johnson explains that the three came to play a complementary role in the mediation efforts: "the difference between the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom was that the United Kingdom followed Khartoum more closely, along a former colonial power perspective, while Norway and the United States had more connections with the South. In addition, the US had the greatest leverage of anyone on Khartoum, since the latter was eager to normalize relations with the Americans.

Khartoum hosted the IGAD summit on January 10-11, 2002, and it was during this meeting that the member states, with the support of the IGAD Partners Forum, decided to relaunch the negotiations. Shortly after, on January 19, a cease fire for the central region of the Nuba mountains was signed between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A, after intense mediation efforts carried out by the US and Switzerland. The Nuba mountains in South Sudan was one of the most hardly hit regions during the 1990’s, and had been sealed off from humanitarian aid for long periods of time. The Nuba mountains are in South Kordofan, where the North meets the South and its population is one third Muslim. According to Alex de Waal, who has been skeptical as to whether the violence in Darfur can be qualified as “genocide”, the situation in the Nuba mountains in the 1990’s was clearly a genocidal campaign in its intent. The ceasefire was one of the points John Danforth had aimed for since his appointment in September 2001, constituting one of his four “tests” of the willingness of the

599 Interview, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, 23.05.2006
600 Ibid.
parties to engage in comprehensive peace talks, and the signature was thus a highly symbolic affair and constituted an important first step towards a sustainable peace process. On July 20, 2002, the Machakos protocol was signed, an agreement on principles of governance and government of Sudan. It was the first in a series of protocols that would together constitute the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in Naivasha on January 9, 2005.

2) The AU/UN response to Darfur – reflecting internal discord within the Security Council

The international diplomatic reactions to Darfur can – somewhat paradoxically – be summed up as having been at first too weak, if not inexistent, only to become too much, in the wrong sense, once the door was levered open. In mid-2003, only a few human rights and humanitarian organizations were aware of the situation and attempted to alert the outside world. In mid-2004, foreign ministers and ministers of development and international cooperation of most Western countries were almost queuing to get their turn in a series of visits to Darfur. Such visits were at the time more intended to show concerned constituencies at home that the crisis was indeed a high priority on their agenda, rather than on supporting the efforts to find a solution to the conflict. This was also a time when humanitarian organizations on the ground were starting to sense a certain discrepancy between what they saw on the ground and what advocacy groups and activists were loudly voicing out in the Western capitals. Equally, diplomats based in Khartoum were often frustrated over the way their reports from the ground, after visits to Darfur, were modified or simply ignored over more alarmist activist reports.

Darfur reaches the international agenda when UN officials pull the alarm in April 2004

Despite a few early alerts, most reports on the “new” crisis, included from the UN IRIN, emerged from September 2003. The Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, appointed by Kofi Annan in early June 2003, describes Darfur as an issue that started occupying large amounts of his time from his third month in this position. During the fall 2003, the UN humanitarian envoy for Sudan, Tom Vraalsen, visited Darfur, encouraged the parties to talk and pledged the granting of close to USD 23 million to an

602 Egeland (2008), op.cit.
extended humanitarian operation for Darfur, called the “Greater Darfur Special Initiative”. This initiative was announced in mid-September, and shortly after, on September 17th, the Sudanese government and the SLA signed a first agreement to allow “free and unimpeded” access of humanitarian aid to Darfur. On December 5th, 2003, Jan Egeland held a press conference where he declared that Darfur had “quickly become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world”.

Egeland describes that period as one where seemingly no one was interested in hearing about Darfur. In February, during a lunch with the US Ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, Jan Egeland spoke about the dire situation in Darfur and asked if he could give a briefing to the Security Council. Negroponte was not against it, but reportedly, one of his advisors said that it was not a good idea, referring to policy orders from Washington, as well as British and Norwegian diplomacies, believing that it would be best to wait for another breakthrough in the peace talks with the SPLA. As seen in chapter II, things started moving forward in March, when Mukesh Kapila, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Khartoum voiced out his view on the situation in Darfur in particularly harsh terms, comparing the situation to Rwanda. As Pakistan then held the Presidency of the Security Council, the issue was still not put on the agenda. However, as Germany took over the Presidency in April, Jan Egeland was finally invited to give a briefing to the Security Council. The primary responsibility was, he said, referring to several reports, with the Janjaweed militia, and “the targets of the campaign are the region's black African population, especially the Fur, Zaghawas and Massalit ethnic communities”. Andrew Natsios, head of the USAID, on June 3, said “We estimate right now if we get relief in, we’ll lose a third of a million people, and if we don’t the rates could be dramatically higher, approaching a million people.” As Flint and de Waal point out, even the lower estimate turned out to be an over-estimation. Yet, it was these early dramatizations that led to an effective agenda setting of the Darfur issue, not to speak of the context of the Rwanda commemoration, that levered the diplomatic door open.

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604 Egeland (2008), op.cit., 89.
606 “US and UN Warn that Huge Toll in Darfur Crisis is Now Inevitable”, AFP, June 3, 2004, quoted in Flint and de Waal (2008), 170.
607 Ibid.
It was thus declarations from high-level UN officials that effectively placed the Darfur issue on the agenda of the UN. In the meantime, “older” activists from the South Sudan movement were increasingly becoming aware of the situation. The looming Darfur crisis would have been remarked at some point anyway, but the activists pushed the issue further out on the international radar, as their initially critical stance towards the negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLA led them to actively seek “failures” and points of accusations in the process. While Eric Reeves first wrote about Darfur in October 2003, the International Crisis Group, with John Prendergast as Co-Director of the Africa Program, first mentioned Darfur in a briefing released on June 25 that year. A report entitled “Sudan’s Other Wars” advocated for a national resolution of the multiple conflicts in Sudan instead of an exclusively North South framework. The report thus drew attention to the rebellion in the “Three areas” (Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile), and showed how “the recent outbreak of armed conflict in Darfur in western Sudan” and the Beja rebellion in the East illustrated the need to move towards a framework of resolution that could address Sudan’s overall issues of marginalization of its peripheries and not only the war in the South608. Another report published in December 2003 also mentioned Darfur, to make the case that the evolving peace process was an “incomplete” one609. It was only in March 2004 however, that a report was entirely devoted to Darfur, entitled: “Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis610”.

Yet it was the declarations of the UN officials that would truly trigger media interest for Darfur. This media coverage and the public pressure that would manifest itself over the coming months would have a strong effect of keeping up the pressure to maintain the issue on the agenda, to the point, that when looking back, a close observer of the process within the UN at the time credits them a central role in putting the issue on the agenda: “The domestic constituency that was created in the US from the very early days was absolutely instrumental, not only in putting it on the agenda, but generally in keeping up the pressure for action611”. As we shall see in the last chapters, they also played a central role in framing the way the issue should be treated.

611 Interview, former UN official, New York, 24.05.2008
The way the Darfur crisis was dealt with within the UN - including the Security Council and the Secretariat – should not only be understood in the context of the ten year commemoration of the Rwandan genocide, it should also be understood in the context of the US-led intervention in Iraq. The reminder about Rwanda in the spring of 2004 increased the pressure on policy makers and UN officials, who realized that something had to be said concerning Darfur in order to not be accused of the same wrongs as ten years earlier. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who served as head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN between March 1993 and December 1996, had in addition often been accused of “having blood on his hands” due to his failure to take early alerts from the UNAMIR and its top commander, General Romeo Dallaire, seriously. He was thus understandably wary when alerts were made about “a new Rwanda” in Darfur. However, the more immediate context of the post-Iraq intervention also seems to have played a role for the way the Darfur issue was dealt with by the UN. As the UN had become severely discredited following the US-led intervention in Iraq, as David M. Malone writes, “obituaries were written for the UN, as well as for the idea of international order that it represents”. However, as Guillaume Devin writes about the lessons learnt from the US-led Iraq intervention, “if it is still possible to make war against the will of the international institutions, it has from now on become virtually impossible to do without them to make peace”. Indeed, while failures to prevent and to react in the face of international crisis do put into evidence the critiques and the weaknesses of the UN system, the emergence of a new crisis also provided the UN with the possibility to “correct” its past mistakes. Moreover, Darfur arguably presented a type of crisis more in line with how many viewed the “original mandate of the UN, as a guarantor for peace and security, and not as an instance for ex-post legitimization of superpower interventions, called on to “clean up” and rebuild after the war. Darfur was not only a possibility for governments to redeem themselves from the failure of 1994, it was also an opportunity for the UN to prove its “raison d’être”.

612 Adam LeBor, “Is there blood on his hands?”, The Sunday Times, October 1, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article646673.ece (Accessed June 29, 2010)
615 Although what the “original” mandate of the UN is, is subject to debate, as the definitions and perceptions of this mandate have considerably evolved over the years since the creation of the UN. The different “generations” of UN peacekeeping missions is illustrative of this: Charles Létourneau, “Générations d’opérations de paix”, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, Université de Montréal, http://www.operationspaix.net/Generations-d-opérations-de-paix (Accessed June 29, 2010)
A particular interplay between the African Union and the UN over Darfur

Chad was the first external actor to become involved in the resolution of the Darfur conflict, although “external” is perhaps not the most correct term to describe the neighboring country increasingly affected by the war in Darfur. First of all, it was literally drawn into the conflict in 2003 as tens of thousands of refugees started to flow into Eastern Chad from Darfur. Secondly, the Chadian president Idriss Déby had to take position in the growing crisis. Until then, he had supported president Bashir without hesitating, something he owed him after the help he had received in seizing power in N’Djamena in 1990. However, from mid-2003, he had to face the increased frustrations of his peers among the Zaghawa in Darfur, being himself a Zaghawa, and especially within the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Those who had helped him take over the presidential palace in 1990 were then among the main victims of the violence in Darfur. Déby thus proposed to mediate the conflict and gathered the belligerents in Abéché in Eastern Chad. On September 2003, the “Abéché I” agreement was signed, establishing a ceasefire supposed to enable humanitarian aid to access the displaced populations in Darfur. In December however, the ceasefire was broken without any further talks having been able to start. From December 20, the government even returned to the “military option”, undertaking large-scale attacks against rebel positions. The success was relative, but indisputable. Bashir, then certain of having the upper hand in an eventual new round of talks, could then announce the end of operations while granting unhindered access to the humanitarian organizations.

During the first months of 2004, the management of the conflict was conferred to the then very young African Union (AU). Talks resumed in N’Djamena on March 31st, with the presence of the AU, the European Union and the United States. On April 8, a humanitarian ceasefire was signed, for 45 days renewable. The government engaged itself to disarm the militias and the AU was charged with putting up a Ceasefire Commission (CFC). The Sudanese government already then insisted on the fact that the crisis was an “African problem” and that only Chad and the AU should participate in the political talks. The international observers should accordingly only be included in the discussions related to the humanitarian affairs. However, on June 11, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1547.

616 Unicef estimated at the end of 2005 that there were more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur in Chad. “Darfur (Sudan/Chad) – Region in crisis, Childhood interrupted in Darfur’s refugee camps”, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/sowc/20297_30568.html (Accessed June 29, 2010)
on sending a UN advance team to Sudan. It was a political mission to prepare for the international monitoring foreseen by the September 2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements signed in Naivasha\textsuperscript{617}. A team was mandated for three months, under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). It was the beginning of the formal and judicial taking in charge of the Sudan crisis, in general, by the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat, initially foreseen to oversee the security arrangements between the North and the South, but then expanded to respond to the situation in Darfur as well. On July 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the Sudanese government and the UN, as a direct follow up to this resolution, signed a joint communiqué indicating that the UN was ready to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid to Darfur, to contribute to the deployment of ceasefire observers of the African Union, and to support the mediation processes “in the South and in Darfur”, as well as to facilitate the application of the agreements reached in the two regions\textsuperscript{618}.

The parties to the conflict in Darfur were supposed to meet in Addis Abeba mid July 2004, in order to reach a global agreement. The talks were interrupted when one of the rebel groups didn’t show up, and the other showed itself as unwilling to make any concessions. The government felt it had more or less won the war, but sought an agreement in order to make the rebels harmless. Facing this attitude and this unfavorable position, the rebels felt they had few other political options than to continue the war, if they did not want to end up with an agreement highly unfavorable to themselves. Responding to this deadlock, the UN adopted resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004\textsuperscript{619}. The Sudanese government was threatened with “measures” if it did not rapidly facilitate humanitarian access to the region by guaranteeing the security. Some concrete measures were announced by the government on August 5\textsuperscript{th}, indicating its willingness to respect the resolution. The Abuja process was launched in September, and despite renewed promises of engagement by the parties, there were still difficulties reaching an agreement on the specific functions of the CFC as well as the means


to neutralize and disarm the militias. The Security Council, seeking to speed up the process, adopted a new resolution on September 18 (resolution 1564\textsuperscript{620}) prompting the parties to cooperate under the auspices of the African Union in order to reach a political solution. This resolution again threatened with sanctions, notably in the oil sector, and recommended the creation of an international mission of inquiry into Darfur. On October 7, an ultimatum was launched, and Khartoum had the choice between accepting an African mission in Darfur or expecting sanctions. Shortly after, on October 20, an agreement was reached, preparing for the integration of the CFC into the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), a mission strong with 3320 peacekeepers. The mission was mandated to control the ceasefire and to establish a secured environment, in order to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid and then the return of the displaced and the refugees to their homes. The African Union however had, and still has, few means and was too poorly equipped to fulfill this mandate. These weaknesses were soon felt in the field.

In November, humanitarian and security protocols were signed after progress in the third round of the Abuja talks. However, as the security situation deteriorated later the same month, the agreements on the security lost much of their value. Despite this, as explained by Marc Fontrier, future resolutions would insist on the application of these protocols: “The Security Council intends to transform what has to, at any cost, appear as the success of the African Union… to which it still hopes it will never have to substitute itself\textsuperscript{621}. Resolution 1574 of November 19, essentially focused on South Sudan, but prolonged the mandate of AMIS to March 2005 and called for an increase in the number of troops. This renewed support to the AU could have been a positive evolution for Darfur, if the UN on its side had been able to support the troops. The sending of more AU troops, under-equipped and poorly trained, barely hindered the continued war in the region. In the meantime, internal dissensions within the rebel groups were growing, eventually leading to the internal splits that would make the negotiations even more complicated. Following the signing of the CPA in Naivasha on January 9, 2005, a historic moment in itself despite the circumstances, the UN changed its strategy towards Darfur: trying to apply a similar solution as adopted in the CPA to Darfur.


\textsuperscript{621} Fontrier (2007), op.cit., 410.
War crimes and crimes against humanity – UN increasing its involvement, new role for France in the response to the crisis

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, mandated by the Security Council, published its report on January 25, 2005. It concluded that there was not enough evidence to claim that genocide had taken place, however, it did consider that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Darfur. A list of 51 suspects was given to the Secretary General, and the commission recommended that the issue be transferred to the ICC, claiming that the Sudanese judicial institutions had neither the capacities, nor the willingness to pursue those responsible for the crimes. The Americans were not eager to push for a referral to an institution they don’t recognize, and some European countries were skeptical as well. France however pushed the issue, and prepared what was to become resolution 1593 referring the Darfur crisis to the ICC. The resolution was voted on March 31st, 2005. This probably marked an important turning point in France-Sudan relations. Until then, France was known to have a relatively favorable relationship with Khartoum, notably due to its close links with Idriss Déby in N’Djamena. But from then on, the relations between Khartoum and Paris would also become increasingly strained, due on the one hand to the deteriorating relationship between N’Djamena and Khartoum and on the other France’s role in seizing the ICC. An activist coalition similar to the Save Darfur was created in France in February 2005, and similarly increased the stakes for the French government to adopt a harsh policy on Sudan and Khartoum.

A few days before the resolution transferring Darfur to the ICC was voted, the Security Council formally established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), primarily responsible for supporting the application of the CPA. Darfur was mentioned in the introduction to the resolution 1590, but only one point linked UNMIS with the mandate of AMIS. It was however a resolution that gave a broad mandate to a mission supposed to treat the Sudanese issues globally. The mission initially disposed of 10 000 militaries and 715 policemen. It


seems that once this mission was created, the UN intensified its pressure on Darfur. On March 29, it adopted resolution 1591, denouncing the lack of progress and putting particularly harsh pressure on the Sudanese government – after all, the only party to be responsive to diplomatic and economic sanctions\(^{625}\). The resolution also decided to restrict international travels and block the bank holdings of any person who would hinder the peace process. The arms embargo, previously directed at all parties except the government, was then extended to the government too. The Sudanese leadership protested loudly and suspected the text of having been written by the US Congress, unaware of the situation in Darfur\(^{626}\). And two days later, the resolution on the referral to the ICC was voted.

**The last rounds of the Abuja talks**

The fifth round of talks in Abuja began early June 2005. Internal disagreements among the rebel movements, the JEM and the SLA, as well as increased splits within the movements, had developed since the last round of talks and this soon became visible. However, the parties managed to agree on a declaration of principles on July 5, creating the framework for political talks. An initiative named the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue was also created at the initiative of the parties, creating a framework for discussing future conflict resolution mechanisms for the region. Following an increased number of attacks and hindrances posed to the AMIS patrols, as well as the humanitarian convoys, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in July 2005 denounced the behavior of the rebel groups. Violent confrontations with the government resumed shortly after, and in the meantime, the new national constitution was signed and John Garang was sworn in as the new vice-President of Sudan and the new President of South Sudan. A brief confusion took place following the helicopter accident leading to the death of Garang on July 30, but Salva Kiir who succeeds him reaffirmed his commitment to work for the implementation of the CPA.

The sixth round of talks in Abuja resumed in September that year, and were effectively a mirror of the CPA negotiations: separate working groups discussed provisions for the wealth sharing, power sharing and security. The internal scission between SLA leader Abdulwahid el Nour and his deputy Minni Minawi had already become flagrant, as the two had

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\(^{626}\) Fontrier (2007), op.cit.
communicated separate lists of delegates to the talks. No agreement would come out of this session either, where only procedural issues were discussed. In early October, the rebel groups lost another piece of their credibility as a faction attacked AMIS troops. Reportedly, the attack on October 8 was orchestrated by the SLA and led to the death of four Nigerian peacekeepers. The next day, 38 AMIS personnel were captured by the JEM in Tiné, right across the border in Chad. A conference organized in Haskanita by the SLM resulted in the effective scission between the two leaders. However, with help from the Chadian government, the two accepted to present a common agenda for the negotiations that resumed late November.

Considerable progress was realized on several deep rooted issues during this 7th and final round of the talks, however, the situation on the ground deteriorated as a new war developed, by proxy, between N’Djamena and Khartoum. The latter sought to open a new front against the SLM and the JEM, by supporting Chadian rebels in the East of the country, where the Darfuri rebels have their sanctuary. As the nephews of Idriss Deby organized in opposition to the regime, after fifteen years as close collaborators, another rebel group was mounting in Eastern Chad, thanks to the support from Khartoum. The “Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés” (RDL) was led by Mahamat Nur. In return, Déby chose to actively provide his support to the Darfuri rebel groups, and by doing so, he also responded to the demands of many in his surroundings. The last months of the peace talks leading to the signing ceremony of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 will be studied in more detail in the next chapter.

**International efforts towards Darfur since the signing of the DPA**

The signing of the DPA made it possible for the UN and the Western governments involved in the mediation efforts in Abuja to more directly respond to the activist movements pressure for protection and the sending of peacekeepers to the region. The year that followed was mainly characterized by a thug of war between the international community (mainly the UN and Western powers) and Khartoum to make the latter accept a transfer from the under-equipped African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) of the AU to an UN-led peacekeeping mission. In June 2007, after much international pressure, the Sudanese government finally accepted the joint proposal from the UN and the AU for the deployment of a hybrid mission in Darfur. This in turn paved the way for the adoption of resolution 1769 on July 31st, preparing for the
deployment of 26,000 soldiers within the UNAMID mission. On December 31st, 2007, UNAMID formally took over for AMIS. On the Chadian side of the border, a European force was deployed in January 2008, acting under resolution 1778 of the UN Security Council and conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\(^\text{627}\). The tasks ensured by EUFOR were transferred to the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in March 2009. Early 2010, allegedly due to slow progress in deployment, but certainly also due to a rapprochement between Khartoum and N’Djamena, Chadian president Idriss Déby asked MINURCAT to leave the country by the end of the year\(^\text{628}\).

As noted during my field work in Sudan, the relationship between the African Union and the UN forces present (UNMIS and different UN agencies during the 2007 stay and the UNAMID in addition during stays in 2009) remained tense. The buildings of the African Union in Khartoum are located centrally in the area of Amarat, where most Embassies and NGOs find themselves as well. They were however in much more dire conditions than the vast and sophisticated UN compound on the other side of Khartoum International Airport\(^\text{629}\). AU officials met with in Khartoum would also share their irritation over the fact that “everyone knows where the UN compound is, but no one knows where the AU building is”\(^\text{630}\). Visitors to both headquarters would also notice that entrance into the AU building was relatively easy, while entering the UN compound was subject to heavy security.

When it comes to the peace talks, it wasn’t until September 2008, that a new impetus was found as the African Union and the Arab League chose Qatar as the new sponsor of the negotiations between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government. In the meantime, that is since the partial signing of the DPA by only one of three rebel leaders, the African Union and the UN had unsuccessfully attempted to relaunch negotiations with the non-signatory

\(^{627}\) “EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)\(^\text{a}\)”, European Security and Defence Policy, Consilium/Council of the European Union, 

\(^{628}\) John Karlsrud, Randi Solhjell, “An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT ?”, Policy Brief, NUPI, 3, 2010, 

\(^{629}\) Khartoum as a city has expanded with an amazing speed over the past few years, to the extent where the airport, initially finding itself at the outskirts of the city, now is situated in between two different neighborhoods.

\(^{630}\) Interview, African Union official, Khartoum, 22.11.2007
rebel leaders, through the joint mediation efforts of Salim Ahmed Salim for the AU and Jan Eliasson, former Swedish foreign minister, for the UN. Eliasson had been working on Sudan, and more notably the Operation Lifeline Sudan, as he served as Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs in the early 1990’s. In December 2006, he was appointed as the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Darfur. Throughout 2007, what came to be referred to as the joint mediation team, a mirror of the hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping operation that was being prepared, was increasingly criticized for failing to bring the warring parties to the peace talks. A reason often invoked was the difficulty to coordinate two chief mediators representing each their organization. An attempt to respond to this problem was made in July 2008, with the appointment of Djibril Bassolé, foreign minister of Burkina Faso, as single joint mediator for both the UN and the AU. However, as the US presidential elections of November 2008 approached, the parties to the conflict as well as the international mediators seemed to adopt a wait-and-see posture, as few expected anything to happen before the change of administration in the US. Finally, the first round of the peace talks in Doha started in February 2009. Bassolé has since then assisted the mediation efforts led by Qatar, on which various international actors placed a certain hope, notably saluting the fact that the Arab countries were “finally” playing a proactive role. These talks have however only managed to convene the Sudanese government and the representatives of the JEM, while Abdulwahid el Nour of the SLA has continuously refused to return to the negotiating table.

As the newly elected President Barack Obama took office in January 2008, the UNAMID peacekeeping mission that began its deployment a year earlier had only achieved 65% of the promised troops. Obama himself was largely expected to adopt a harsher policy towards Khartoum, due to his close relationship with key figures within the Save Darfur movement. Several of these key figures received key positions within the new administration: Samantha Power and Gayle Smith were both appointed to the National Security Council, while Susan Rice was appointed US Ambassador to the UN. However, he nominated a special envoy for Sudan, Scott Gration, a retired Major General, bent on returning to a policy of engagement with the Sudanese authorities, although on conditions of serious progress in the peace process, both in Darfur and in the South. Shortly after his nomination, Gration criticized the US sanctions policy on Sudan, saying it prevented “the development we absolutely need to to”\textsuperscript{631}, referring both to general development efforts in the South and the diplomatic efforts carried

out to solve the conflict in Darfur. This approach raised widespread criticism within the activist community in the US, however in Sudan, Gration quickly became known as the one having introduced a speech during his first visit to Khartoum with a “Salam Aleykum” (trans.: peace be upon you). In March 2009, after the international arrest mandate against President Bashir, the Western powers seemed increasingly disengaged from the political peace process, although continuing to support the Qatari mediation initiative. In the fall of 2009, a UNAMID general declared the war in Darfur to be over, despite the continued lack of a sustainable and widely supported peace agreement.

Following the international arrest mandate on Bashir, occurring a few weeks after the change of administration in the US, the ambiguous position of the US on the ICC has been well utilized. While silently complying to the ICC accusations, strongly supported by its domestic constituency, as well as by several close advisors and newly appointed members of the new administration, in talks with Sudanese officials, US diplomats continued to insist that the US does not support the ICC. Thus the US managed more or less successfully to maintain a good channel of communication with the Sudanese leaders, while France has been increasingly mistrusted by the Sudanese leadership. Many close observers of the situation on the ground, in Khartoum and in Darfur, voiced harsh criticism against the bad timing of the ICC indictment, arguing it would impede the peace process. A discussion emerged on whether the article 16 of the Rome statute could be invoked, allowing the Security Council, under chapter VII of the Charter, to ask for a 12 month renewable interruption of the prosecution. However, it was politically impossible for the US to ask the Security Council for a deferral of the ICC procedure, because of the public pressure, and also the fear of precedence by giving the Sudanese president a free “victory”.

**Conclusion**

While the international understanding of the Darfur conflict has for a long time seemed depoliticized – with a lack of understanding for the political dynamics causing the war, combined with an “evil against good” narrative – politics and negotiations seem to have been

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brought back into the game since Barack Obama took office in January 2009. However, the room for maneuver of the US administration is still restricted by its domestic constituencies at home, despite the activist community having lost some of its momentum since Obama took office. As we have seen in this chapter, the contributions of the foreign governments involved in the Sudanese peace processes are closely dependent on the Sudanese stakeholders, and especially the leaders in Khartoum, and their desire (or not) for new international allies. It is this desire that has given these external governments the leverage they have had over the different parties, a leverage they have lost when the parties became disinterested in the support external powers or neighboring countries were able to give or promise in the future (and thus also the threats used to coerce the parties to negotiate). As for the Western powers intervening, a central driving force behind their engagement has indeed been the public pressure they have been subject to at home. Thus, even when governmental policy decisions have gone against the general approach advocated by their domestic public opinions, the decision makers have had to take into account the public pressure in the framing of their proposed policies. Lastly, the treatment by international and regional organizations of the two Sudanese conflicts, respectively the IGAD supported by the IPF and the troika countries for the resolution of the war in the South, and the AU/UN, followed by the AU/Arab League, for the efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur, have put into evidence two very different configurations of cooperation between regional and international instances. I shall come back to this "coordination" factor in the last section of chapter VII.
Part III. How internationalization affects processes of conflict resolution
Introduction

The internationalization processes of the Sudanese conflicts, as seen in the two previous parts, should be understood both in terms of inside-out and outside-in processes, as well as in terms of responses from the “top” facing demands from “below”. The demands from “below” emerge from the affected populations, the rebels claiming to speak in their name, and the citizens overseas having mobilized themselves to make these human catastrophes become world issues and international responsibilities. The responses from the “top” include both the responses coming from the Sudanese state and authorities, those coming from involved governments overseas or more or less directly affected regional governments, and lastly from the United Nations and the regional organizations, IGAD and the African Union.

In this last part of the dissertation, I will examine how the internationalization process of the Sudanese crisis has affected the internal conflict dynamics, and the possibilities to solve the two conflicts. As “internationalization”, in the sense of the norm it constitutes, is often viewed as the ultimate way towards the resolution of protracted internal conflicts, the relationship between the fields of “conflict solving”, often carrying a clear prescriptive dimension, and the more objective study of the internationalization process of these conflicts, should be put into question. The approach chosen here to study the process and the norm of internationalization is an objective one, aimed at seeing how they have evolved and how they have affected the Sudanese conflicts. But the normative aspect put forward by the very advocates of internationalization makes it impossible to entirely disregard the effects internationalization as a process has had on the efforts to solve these internal conflicts. This does not mean that I will adopt a normative and prescriptive approach towards the resolution of the Sudanese conflicts, however, I will put forward what has emerged through this research as direct effects of the internationalization.

The trajectories of the Sudanese conflicts, moving from internal issues in Sudan, to international issues and lastly domestic issues in the countries where constituencies have mobilized in favor of governmental engagement in the conflict resolution process, will be the topic in the first section of chapter VI. The pressure generated by public attention and extensive media coverage, especially when a conflict becomes a domestic issue in an overseas
country and when it is qualified in terms that makes it almost impossible for policy makers to ignore it, is the topic of the last section of this chapter. It will notably address the question of how this pressure affects the conflict resolution efforts. A sustained pressure for immediate and visible results seem to have driven the mediation efforts in Darfur, a pressure present during the Naivasha talks too, yet to a lesser extent.

However, the main difference between the two conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur are the qualifications and narratives adopted to describe the conflicts. The way the two conflicts have been framed and understood by the international actors interfering has indeed been determinant for the dynamic of the internationalization processes, as well as the international responses proposed, and this will be examined in the first section of chapter VII. More concretely, a central point of difference between the international responses proposed to the two conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan, set apart the indispensable element of the parties’ own readiness to make peace, is the level of coordination among the international partners involved. This will be examined in the last section of chapter VII. In South Sudan, a small and coordinated group of friends pressured and supported the regional mediation initiative set forth by IGAD. The Darfur crisis has generated such a high-level interest that “everyone” wanted to do something, yet no one wanted to take full responsibility. A lack of coordination, and of real implication when necessary, seems to have marked the resolution process of the more recent Sudanese crisis.
Chapter VI - The internal / external interplay in the international efforts to solve the Sudanese conflicts

- So you say “Sudan” was important to push forward for President Bush during these first months in office, when he wasn’t yet very involved in any other foreign policy issues?

  - I don’t think the powers in the White House saw it as a foreign policy issue; they saw it more as a domestic issue.

Former senior official at the State Department

This quote perfectly sums up how the conflict in South Sudan had come to be seen, and how it was treated in the very first months of the new Bush administration. The Darfur crisis has also, and perhaps to an even larger extent, been treated more as a domestic issue than as a foreign policy issue, in the US and in many of the other countries where it mobilized constituents. What dynamics are generated when an internal Sudanese conflict is first externalized and then internalized into another country’s domestic political arena? This chapter will first explore the trajectories of the Sudanese conflicts, tracing how they have gone from being internal issues to international ones and then domestic issues in distant countries, while attempting to understand the very interplay between the internal and the international levels of policy making. The second part, studying the pressure generated by public mobilization and media coverage, will essentially focus on the international treatment of the war in Darfur, for two reasons. First of all, it is the process where such public pressure has played the most important role, where it has triggered hopes as well as frustrations. Secondly, the Darfur conflict having been on top of all the involved stakeholders’ agenda over the past few years, it is also the conflict and the internationalization process I have had the possibility to follow as it unfolded.

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633 Interview, DT, former State Department official, Washington, 23.05.2008
A - *The unexpected international trajectory of the Sudanese conflicts*

The two Sudanese conflicts studied here have gone through quite different internationalization processes, all the while the two processes are intimately linked since the internationalization of the Darfur crisis has largely been built on the international attention drawn to the Southern conflict. The first stage on this trajectory is the externalization of initially internal issues, which consists of the transformation of an internal problem into an issue that calls for an international response. This does not only mean that awareness is raised concerning the stakes of the conflict or the human suffering resulting from it, although they are important phases in the externalization process. It also means that the conflicts are brought to be understood as issues the stakeholders themselves cannot solve or put an end to by themselves. The conflicts are framed as situations that require external interference. The second stage on this trajectory is the formal agenda setting, which consists of the deliberate choice of decision makers outside Sudan to take the issue up on their foreign policy agenda in order to seek for a solution to the crisis. One could think that the agenda setting process stops here, however, a third stage should be added, and that is the transformation of the issue of foreign policy into a question of domestic politics. This stage can indeed take place after or in parallel with the formal agenda setting, but it can also occur before, and as a driving factor for the formal agenda setting process. It can, in fact, be as much the internal political forces in for example the US or in France that push a question such as the Darfur crisis to be taken up on the formal foreign policy agenda as it can be the external political forces related to the conflict itself. An important consequence of the public opinion’s meddling in the formerly exclusive spheres of foreign policy making is that foreign policy is no longer only formulated according to strategic interests or issues of home protection. Foreign policy today is also made according to the citizens at home and voters’ interests.

1) **Externalization of an internal Sudanese issue**

The process of externalization of an internal conflict can be the outcome of deliberate strategies to make the human suffering related to the conflict become internationally known, and to garner support for the cause of the combatants. However, it can also be non-deliberate, at least in the eyes of the parties to the conflict, when foreign actors interfere seemingly independently from any demand for help or foreign assistance.
Deliberate strategies to seek international support

As elaborated in chapter III, the internationalization processes of the internal Sudanese conflicts have amongst other things been driven by the rebel groups’ own deliberate strategies to garner international support and to make their cause become internationally known. Among local supporters in Darfur, Abdulwahid el Nour is seen as ”nothing” without his contacts with international media. Being inspired by John Garang’s vision for Sudan, he also quickly understood the need for international support if he was to be able to exert any pressure on his adversary in Khartoum. Garang in the 1990’s certainly granted great importance to his support in the field, and was thus aware that he should not spend too much time outside Sudan, to the risk of loosing his support base. However, the Darfur rebellion broke out precisely when the Southern rebels were reaping the benefits of many years of struggle, in the form of international legitimacy and support for their requests in the framework of formal negotiations. Whether there was a deliberate strategy of the Darfur rebels or not to carry out their attacks precisely when the negotiations in the South were moving forward and as great diplomatic attention was granted to the country can only be subject to speculation. The Darfur conflict had anyway been looming for a long time, and well before the renewed international interest in the Southern peace process was manifested. However, the Darfur rebels soon realized that their struggle could not be carried out without external support.

The charismatic leader of the SPLM had managed to garner support within the international NGO community, as well as within several Western diplomatic contingencies, although some were critical to the SPLA’s excesses during the war. Yet, if their warfare was seen with a sceptical eye, their claims were largely seen as legitimate, and that’s what gave them the opportunity to enter a sustainable negotiation process with their former war enemies. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) benefited from a double support from both former members of the government in Khartoum as well as from their connections in Chad. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), however, did not have such connections. Its leaders originated from a students’ movement in Khartoum, and since the outbreak of the war, it has benefited from a strong support within the internally displaced populations, especially within the Fur community, the largest tribal group in Darfur. Its local support basis has thus been strong, but connections with the outside world were necessary too. This support was sought
from early 2003, and although international activists and diplomacies really woke up only a year later, it was from the moment of the rebel’s early alerts that the outside world little by little started to learn about Darfur.

Although the Darfur rebels were back then probably far from aware of the extent to which their war would become a ”cause célèbre” in the world, their efforts to seek international support and awareness show that the option of keeping the war a matter between Darfur and Khartoum was not an option. Externalizing the struggle was not only a matter of receiving external support to put in the power balance, or to help them gain a few inches in the thug of war with Khartoum, it was also a way to change the battle ground. By bringing in the international community, or rather by placing their internal struggle on the international agenda, the premises of the war changed too. The Darfur rebels, previously unknown to the international community, had nothing to loose, only everything to win from an externalization of the conflict. The Sudanese regime however, eager to break the international isolation in which it found itself in at the end of the 1990’s, and just starting to regain a small share of legitimacy thanks to the IGAD framed and internationally supported negotiations, had everything to loose from an internationalization of the Darfur conflict. Seeking international sympathy was thus not only the weaker part’s strategy to seem stronger in the face of its internal enemy; it was also a way to hit its adversary where it would hurt the most. Any conflict that manages to attract widespread international attention today, and especially on the human suffering and the injustices that either cause the war or are caused by the war, will trigger international condemnations, mainly addressed to those seen as the main authors of the war. This is all the more likely when the main ”perpetrators” do not benefit from long existing and strong ties with major international powers, capable of protecting them, at least to a certain extent, against such condemnations. The Sudanese regime in 2003-2004, although it had embarked on a path towards international recognition, did not yet benefit from any such support. On the contrary, it was still stuck with a very negative image of a regime supporting terrorist networks, attempting to islamize South Sudan and widely responsible for the massive human suffering caused by the two decade long war there.

Internationalization coming from the outside

The question of how external actors come to see themselves as having a moral responsibility to ”do something”, to react and to interfere in order to stop the conflict and the human
suffering it entails is also central to understand the internationalization process of the Sudanese conflicts. Although media coverage of a far away human disaster will anyway trigger reactions of concern, and condemnation when due to human conflict, reactions of a "need to intervene" is due to more than the witnessing of human suffering directly broadcasted on international TV channels. The willingness to interfere emerges along with the perception of a situation that cannot be halted or solved by those directly concerned. It is a reaction to a situation seen as opposing an all-powerful perpetrator and an all helpless victim population. Mahmood Mamdani writes about Darfur and the way the conflict has been portrayed in most Western media and by activist briefings about the crisis. According to him, these external accounts portray Darfur as: "a world where atrocities mount geometrically, the perpetrators so evil and the victims so helpless that the only possibility of relief is a rescue mission from the outside, preferably in the form of a military intervention\textsuperscript{634}". Indeed, the direct result of describing the situation not only as unbalanced and confronting "evil" and "innocent", but also as a situation where the "evil" will not stop and the "innocent" ones are too weak to do anything, is a call for international intervention. This "worldview" can first of all be related to the broader debate on "weak" and "failed" states, and secondly to the debate on the "responsibilities" of the international communities in the face of internal conflicts, also known as the "responsibility to protect".

"Weak states" and "new wars"

First of all, the debate on weak and failed states draws on so many different concepts – from "rogue", to "weak", to "collapsed", to "failed" and to "quasi-states" – with so many different meanings, that it seems difficult to extract a common denominator. However, the very success of all these terms is telling of the way the role of the state is seen in many contemporary conflicts and political crisis situations. Some scholars have shown that the definition of these various situations of state breakdown or state failure have in common that they almost all refer to a Weberian ideal of the Western state\textsuperscript{635}. This results in a Western-centered judgment of a wide range of other forms of statehood\textsuperscript{636}. What most of them have in common however,

\textsuperscript{634} Mamdani (2007, London Review of Books), \textit{op.cit.}


is an underlying justification for external intervention. This is perhaps most visible in the theories using vocabulary from the fields of medicine and psychiatry, describing the internal problems in the weak states in terms of physical and mental illnesses. This school of thought, which some critically refer to as the "New Barbarism" thesis, implicitly or explicitly advocate that in order to "heal" these "illnesses" there is a need for "medical intervention" from the outside. Such situations are often described as a savage state of nature, characterized by irrational violence and barbarism, such as Robert D. Kaplan describes it in "The coming anarchy". The competent authority that has to intervene from the outside is defined as the international community, either in the form of the UN or in the form of a coalition of Western powers.

The authors behind the most anarchistic and doomsday inspired theories are a minority within a broader "weak states" literature and "new wars" theories, but they have inspired a wide range of discourses on contemporary crisis situations in Africa. The "new wars" literature is another branch of scholar work attempting to understand the nature of contemporary, often intra-state wars. These theories have instituted a rather superficial line of separation between so-called "old" and "new" wars, where some draw the line at the end of the Cold war and others at the beginning of the 1980's and the acceleration of globalization, in order to comprehend the dynamics of contemporary conflicts, generally seen as deprived of any political logic. Some writings only vaguely refer to the general "novelty" of contemporary wars, whereas others have developed a thorough theory in order to grasp what is so new with contemporary internal conflicts. The most comprehensive theory in the latter category is the one developed by Mary Kaldor. Her three main arguments are based on the motivation for the new wars (identity vs. universalistic ideologies in the old wars), the type of warfare (directed against civilian populations vs. the search for popular support in the old wars) and the economy of war (informal, illegal and transnationalized economic activities vs. centralized economies of the old wars). A comprehensive criticism of this ensemble of scholarly work has been carried out by Roland Marchal and Christine Messiant, who deconstruct the new wars theories and show how they often idealize the coherence and idealism of "old wars" in front of the "new wars", which are generally described as barbaric, perhaps first and foremost

639 Kaldor, op.cit.
because "we", the scholars and the public in the Western and pacified part of the world, have lost the capacity to understand the violence we observe, from the outside, in contemporary wars in distant regions. They also take up the medical terminology and make it their own, but clearly with the aim to show the inconsistency of many of the "new wars" theories that have precisely tried to develop a consistent "diagnostic" of the different symptoms observed. As Marchal and Messiant write:

"it appears with this analysis in fact that old wars and new wars constitute rather two syndroms, that is – and we can take up here the definition of the Petit Robert – two ensembles of symptoms that are certainly well defined, but which, being observed in several [pathological] states do not allow in and by themselves to determine the cause and the nature [of the sickness]⁶⁴⁰.

Indeed, the listing of observed symptoms does not necessarily enable the external observer to reconstruct the underlying dynamics of the war. On the contrary, relying simply on observed phenomena and their alleged justifications, without seeing them in a wider historical context, can lead to erroneous conclusions. For example, violence along ethnic lines, even accompanied by slogans justifying the violence because of ethnic enmity, does not necessarily mean that the ethnic belonging of the groups at war with each other is necessarily the central motivating factor of the violence and the explanatory variables of the conflict.

The relevance of these theories and their critiques here is both to understand the general context in which the international community has comprehended the Sudanese conflicts, as well as to understand the path between these interpretations and the justifications for external intervention. Defining the internal conflicts in Sudan within this framework, as animated by ethnic hatred and discrimination against the “non-Arab” tribes of Darfur and directed first and foremost against the civilian population, contributes to the wider externalization of the responsibilities to put an end to the situation. Two widespread ideas about Sudan, which at first sight might seem contradictory, should be noted here as they are both worthy of critique: 1) there is a widespread idea of the Sudanese society as too weak to solve the conflict by itself, and this is a vehicle for its internationalization, 2) simultaneously as the war and its unfolding is portrayed as being fully controlled by the state.

⁶⁴⁰ Marchal and Messiant (2003), op.cit., 94. (own translation)
The paradox of the Sudanese state is that it is strong and weak at the same time. Alex de Waal describes the Sudanese state as “turbulent”, as a combination of “hyper-dominant” and “instable” at the same time. As he writes in the introductory chapter to the book entitled *War in Darfur and the search for Peace*:

“The hyper dominance of the national capital is the single most important reality in Sudan today. Khartoum and its environs consist of a middle-income enclave surrounded by provinces that are not only poor but in important respects are suffering from development processes running in reverse. (...) The second most persistent fact in Sudanese political history is the inability of any one elite faction to establish unchallenged political dominance over the state. The center possesses sufficient economic, social, cultural, and political infrastructure that it can support not one but multiple elite groups. After independence, these contending groups competed for power, but none of them was able to dominate the others, leading to chronic political instability.”

This instability at the center is seen as the main cause for the state’s incapacity to govern its peripheries or to achieve any sustainable peace, as the internal power struggle in Khartoum has prevented the state from becoming powerful enough to play a stabilizing role when needed. As de Waal writes, the instability within the ruling elite(s) has been projected onto the peripheries where the provincial elites have neither been capable building any consistent challenge to the center, nor of building any clientelistic relations with a center that is constantly in turbulence between different factions trying to keep or to obtain the grip on power. As such, the Sudanese state does not fit into the stereotype of the weak state. It is rather a powerful one in the sense that it controls all powers and resources, yet it is incapable of governing the whole of the country, precisely because of this instability at the center. The turbulence at the center is not only between former and current leaders of the regime, but among different factions within the ruling elite, between delegates sent to the various peace talks, army commanders, security and intelligence chiefs and the Islamist intelligentsia.

Perceptions of relative internal weakness make states and societies on the international arena all the more vulnerable to external interventions. Situations of internal crisis in weak states are in a way absorbed onto the world arena, whereas strong states manage to stay out of international interventions and interferences in their internal affairs. In the case of Sudan, the state is first of all seen as strong and all-powerful, but unwilling to work for the peaceful

resolution of the conflicts in its peripheries. This combined with the society’s portrayed weakness serves as a justification of the international meddling into the conflict. However, seeing the state, and especially the president, as controlling every facet of the violence on the ground, is just as misleading as seeing the Sudanese society as only weak and incapable of taking responsibility in a peace process.

This configuration is in contrast with for example the internal wars in Somalia and Congo, where the image that is reflected is the one of states that have disintegrated and a violence that no one really has any control over. Yet, as the rebel groups’ responsibility in putting an end to the war too has become increasingly recognized, it is their internal fragmentation that has been emphasized more than their eventual capacity to influence the situation. Khartoum’s unwillingness on an internal level is doubled by its first perceived and then more and more real refusal to cooperate with the international community on the resolution of the conflict. As the Sudanese authorities are judged as unwilling and the Darfuri society as incapable of stopping the violence, the international advocacy community has been able to justify its calls for a military intervention. Then, as the Sudanese authorities are portrayed as unwilling and incapable of judging its own war criminals, the same advocates have been able to justify their support for the International Criminal Court to handle the case.

As for the Darfuri society it has generally been depicted as needing the immediate, massive and constant support of the international community. Many early reports on Darfur estimated that if help didn’t get in to the region immediately, hundreds of thousands, maybe a million, would die. As seen previously, most estimates were highly exaggerated. Later on, after the announcement of the international arrest mandate on President Bashir on March 4th, 2009 and the latter’s subsequent order to expel a large number of humanitarian NGO’s from Darfur, and replace them by Sudanese organizations, most international observers feared the whole humanitarian apparatus would break down and the Darfuri population depending on them along. The questions of why the humanitarian organizations had not prepared for this departure, that they had for a long time foreseen, and of why they for example had not prepared any of the local communities to make them capable of managing the infrastructure and the humanitarian assistance that would continue to come, have not been thoroughly up to discussion.
The responsibility to protect: a direct product of the “weak states” and the “new wars”

The debate on the responsibility to protect, has greatly contributed to the externalization of the responsibilities to solve the Darfur crisis. The responsibility to protect is to many extents a product on the one hand of the phenomena (or idea) of weak and disintegrating states as well as strong and “unwilling” states, and on the other the search for means to respond to conflicts and crisis that are occurring within states, affecting civilian populations, and falling outside the provisions of the UN Charter. The emergence of the responsibility to protect, or the “R2P”, has both influenced the internationalization of the Darfur conflict, in the sense of its externalization, as it has influenced the very way it has been framed. Evans and Sahnoun, the “fathers” of the 2001 report on the responsibility to protect, wrote in 2002, after pointing out the prevalence at the time of issues of military interventions caused by motivations of self-defense (Iraq, Afghanistan): “Meanwhile, the debate about intervention for human protection purposes has not gone away. And it will not go away so long as human nature remains as fallible as it is and internal conflict and state failures stay as prevalent as they are.”

The debate on the responsibility to protect was well engaged when the Darfur conflict became known to the international community in 2003. And when the ”R2P” principle was adopted during the World Summit in New York in September 2005, the Darfur crisis was already notorious. The responsibility to protect is founded on one major principle justifying its raison d’être, and which is of interest to understand the internationalization process of the Darfur conflict. It is justified by a humanist principle saying that the international community should intervene to protect human beings when the state that is supposed to guarantee their protection fails to do so or is unwilling to do so. This is how the authors of the report have sought to redefine sovereignty, not as something state leaders can protect themselves behind, but sovereignty as responsibility. Thus if a state fails to protect its own citizens, the responsibility shifts to the international community.

Although there are no such mentions in the ICISS report, responsibility can also be defined as self-interest. As the report of the high-level panel ”Threats, Challenges and Change” issued in

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642 Evans and Sahnoun (2002), op.cit, 100.
December 2004 argues, the different threats we are faced with today are interdependent. The panel was charged with evaluating current threats to international peace and security and the means to address them. Threats such as mass conflicts, poverty, environmental degradation, terrorism, diseases and so forth, were presented as interconnected and interdependent, and the responses to each threat should thus be done in consultation with other responses. Furthermore, the report stresses that due to the interdependency between the states of a globalized world, a threat in one place of the planet is a threat against all other states. This is valid both on a normative level (all states should be concerned with the threats against peace and security in other states), but also on a very concrete level (pandemics for example do not respect international borders, and a devastating conflict in one place of the world usually triggers flows of refugees into other neighboring or distant countries). By redefining internal conflicts and humanitarian crisis not as something that is merely occurring within a given state’s borders, but as something that should concern us all, the conclusions drawn in this report contribute to internationalize the responsibility to respond to internal crisis.

It is thus not difficult to understand how Darfur, portrayed as a conflict where a strong state attacks its own civilian population, without means to defend itself, rapidly became a major interest for the advocates of the responsibility to protect. Not only that, the Darfur crisis indeed became a test case for the relevance and capacity of the R2P to serve as a guiding principle for the international community in its search for appropriate responses to such internal crisis. As David Lanz writes in 2009:

"Save Darfur focuses on external intervention to solve the conflict in Darfur, rather than on domestic processes. This reflects an assumption of R2P, namely that when a certain level of violence is reached, international actors must step in and provide protection to the most vulnerable. There is therefore a tendency to portray people affected by conflict as helpless victims, who need to be saved from the outside – hence the name Save Darfur."  


It is interesting to note how both the principle of the responsibility to protect and the idea of an interdependent world have contributed to the overall process of externalizing the responsibilities to put an end to and to solve the Darfur crisis. The responsibility to protect internationalizes the crisis on the basis of internal weakness and helplessness on the one hand, and state incapacity and unwillingness on the other. The interdependence of threats however, internationalizes internal crisis on the basis of ideas of self-interest and that early crisis responses may be more “cost-efficient” than later on interventions. The advocates of the responsibility to protect however have attempted to present it as a humanist principle more concerned with the fate of victims and threatened civilians than with “making the world safe for big powers”\textsuperscript{646}. Yet, the two are still part of the same discourse justifying internationalization of internal conflicts.

Externalizing the responsibilities – whose issue is it after all?

The Darfur crisis has gone from being an internal Sudanese political question to become an international one. However, this process has also been carried out at the expense of the concerned actors’ ownership of the issue and its resolution. The overall international approach, prioritizing threats and pressure on Khartoum, has led the international actors to overlook the internal processes “in the field” in Darfur. As many observers have pointed out, the Darfur conflict has over the past few years been internationalized to such an extent that it has become more an issue between Khartoum and Western powers, rather than an issue treated between the Darfuri population and their government in Khartoum. One of the consequences of the international arrest mandate on President al Bashir in is illustrative of this, as the government came to spend “150 % of its time” on dealing with ICC issues, according to the formula of Western diplomats in Khartoum at the time, instead of working on other issues, such as the peace talks in Doha and preparing for the national elections\textsuperscript{647}. In a report published in late 2009, this configuration is seen as a consequence of not only international actors pressure on Khartoum, but also the ex-Southern rebels of the SPLM’s disengagement of issues of national concern:

“Since 2007, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has prioritised


\textsuperscript{647} Interviews realized during field work, 18.03.2009-04.04.2009
self-determination over unity with Northern Sudan, and its solidarity with the Darfuri insurgency has loosened. Consequently, Darfur increasingly has become an issue between Khartoum and the international community, rather than a question discussed on the national agenda.\footnote{648}

Indeed, as the SPLM has increasingly lost faith in “making unity attractive”, the slogan of the CPA, it has also become less preoccupied with its role as a potential national broker. Indeed, the massive international interest that has been triggered around Darfur has led to a situation where every qualified international organization, every human rights organization with international ambitions and every Western diplomacy eager to capitalize on the possibility to solve the conflict, have wanted to “do something”. This has led to a sort of race, with each and everyone wanting to show that they were capable of triggering forceful initiatives to “Save Darfur”. Few initiatives were however coordinated. And all the while “everyone” has wanted to do “something” for Darfur, the failure to do anything to stop the conflict has been no ones real responsibility. Although the externalization of the conflict was something some of the parties to the conflict themselves called for, the internationalization of the Darfur conflict, once it was triggered, has been going on auto-pilot. This situation of hyper-internationalization is in turn something the parties themselves have known how to exploit, each in their ways. The regime in Khartoum has skillfully played the different interfering actors against each other, by exploiting the differences in the approaches advocated. As some external actors have threatened with sanctions and some with an international prosecution, others have encouraged negotiations, or even cooperation on certain issues such as counter-terrorism. It has thus been easy for Khartoum to not take the threats seriously. In response to this attitude, the activist community has generally called for even more sanctions. The Darfur rebels on their side have felt empowered by the widespread criticism directed against their rival in Khartoum, and have as a consequence opted for a “wait and see” attitude, hoping for the president to be arrested, rather than engaging in serious peace talks.

2) Internalization of the issue of foreign policy in the countries where the public became engaged

The fact that a conflict is framed in terms of an international responsibility does not automatically lead international powers, external to the conflict, or international organizations, to take the issue up on their agenda. However, the advocates of the externalization of a crisis may have as their primary objective that the foreign policy makers in their respective governments take the issue up on their formal agenda. If such mobilized constituencies manage to pressure their governments to take the issue up on their agenda, then one can speak of an “internalization” of the conflict issue into domestic politics in the country in question.

Activism becoming a central motivating factor for governments’ policy making on Darfur

The most striking case is yet again the United States, where the Darfur conflict has imposed itself as a central issue defining the relationship between the government and large segments of the population. Darfur, a conflict where the US does not have any troops involved, and a conflict that does not threaten any US strategic interests per se, was a central issue in the past two presidential elections. George W. Bush used the condemnations of the situation in Darfur skillfully in 2004 to show his electorate that he took the situation seriously. In the 2008 presidential elections, the Darfur issue also occupied a central place, however more in the earlier phases of the campaign (2007 and beginning of 2008) when foreign policy issues were still in focus, than in the last few months which were rather focused on issues more directly concerning the US electorate (whether US troops abroad or everyday issues at home). However, as the different candidates to represent the Democrats confronted each other in 2007, Darfur was one of the most often evoked issues next to other foreign policy issues such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

The public pressure was indeed making the Darfur crisis become more an issue of domestic politics than of foreign politics. However, this was not something entirely new with the Darfur movement, it was an already old characteristic of how the Sudan-portfolio was dealt with within US politics, as a senior official at the State Department said about the place of the conflict in South Sudan in the beginning of the first mandate of George W. Bush quoted in the
introduction to this chapter: it was more a domestic issue than a foreign policy one. As South Sudan was already perceived as a domestic issue in 2001, the massive public mobilization the Darfur conflict triggered in the following years made it quite easy for this issue to become an issue of domestic politics too. In France too, the activist mobilization in the months preceding the presidential elections in May 2007, made all the candidates’ voice strong declarations outlaying their intentions to take decisive action on Darfur if elected. The nomination of Bernard Kouchner as Foreign Minister by the newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy, a personality who had been among the most vocal activists on Darfur in the preceding months while also famous for his attachment to the “right to intervene”, was widely interpreted as a declaration of the new governments’ intention to take the Darfur issue up on its agenda. The very first meeting Kouchner organized at the Quai d’Orsay convened actors from the civil society, engaged in the Darfur campaign. In June, only weeks after the new government had taken office, an international summit on the Darfur crisis was organized in Paris. It gathered all the main international powers engaged on the crisis, including China and Russia. The list of absentee is more illustrative however, neither the African Union, nor the Sudanese government were represented, showing how the crisis was then perceived. It had certainly become an issue of high-level concern among the international powers and international organizations present. Yet it was an issue on which the very parties to the conflict themselves were not seen as essential, despite claims from the organizers that they had been convened, but had refused to come. The situation was similar in other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. The domestic pressure, becoming the main motivation behind the Western powers’ interference in Sudan, did not go unnoticed in Sudan, as evoked in chapter III. The vision of a member of one of the opposition parties, having exchanged with a Western diplomat, was disillusioned:

"The public pressure exerted by NGO’s, churches and other organizations pressured their governments on Darfur, and they talked about the horrors of Darfur on TV. A (Western) diplomat even told me: "We are pushed into Darfur by the public pressure, but hadn’t it been for that, we wouldn’t have given a damn". It would be just like another conflict, as in Congo or other places."

649  Interview, DT, State Department official, Washington, 23.05.2008
650  Interview, Bashir Adam Rahma, Khartoum, 14.11.2009
Members of the Sudanese government however usually see the Darfur activists as very close to their respective governments. Indeed, a recurrent vision among members of the government and the NCP is to see the international Darfur activists and the humanitarian organizations working in Darfur, as working for their respective governments. As a member of the government delegation to the various peace talks put it: “their NGOs, which quite a number I believe are just intelligence representatives, moved to Darfur\(^{651}\)”, from the South as the peace process there was going forward. He pursues: “you can’t dissect these groups from their governments, they have very close ties with the intelligence services, the political parties, the Churches\(^{652}\)”.

**Activist strategies to “Save Darfur”**

To understand how the internationalization of the Darfur conflict has gone from an externalization of the responsibilities to solve it, to an internalization into domestic politics of several Western powers, it is essential to study the very strategies, aims and objectives of the activist movement. The activist community’s objectives can be divided into three categories, the first one being to raise awareness in their home countries concerning the situation in Darfur, the second being to have their governments send peacekeepers, and the third being to judge the war criminals and bring about a just peace. An important distinction can be made between here between the objectives concerning the activists’ success in making a difference on the political arena in their own countries (first objective) and their capacity to change the situation in the target country (second and third objective). In short, a difference between the means and the end. Although many would say that the two latter are ultimately the most important, disagreement exist around the question of where the activists’ responsibilities and true leverage lie. Those who have applauded the Darfur activists for their success have done so because of their capacity to mobilize large segments of the population, to raise widespread awareness and to keep political “momentum” around the Darfur issue. More critical voices judge them according to the evolution of the situation on the ground, in other words on their capacity to trigger efficient policies capable to put an end to the conflict.

One of the most harsh critiques addressed towards the Save Darfur movement is the one formulated by Mahmood Mamdani, in his book *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and*  

\(^{651}\) Interview, Abderrahmane Ibrahim el-Khalifa, Khartoum, 16.11.2009  
\(^{652}\) Ibid.
the War on Terror. He raises many important questions, especially on how the conflict has been framed by international activists. However, he probably attributes them more power, more intentions and not the least a more interventionist agenda when he describes the "Save Darfur" movement as a "the humanitarian face of the War on Terror". Indeed, the activists’ success in mobilizing such vast constituencies has also attracted a consistent portion of criticism. Mamdani further writes that "the movement to save Darfur, which initially had the salutary effect of directing world attention to the horrendous violence in Darfur in 2003-4, must now bear some of the blame for delaying reconciliation by focusing on a single-minded pursuit of revenge as punishment". As David Lanz writes, "with influence comes responsibility", the question however remains what responsibility these groups can rightfully be attributed. Their often-simplistic discourses opposing "victims" and "perpetrators", "Africans" and "Arabs" and calling for military intervention, have raised concerns about their naïveté and the possible negative consequences of these misrepresentations. (But again if the approach they advocate for become the adopted policy, is it their responsibility if it fails, or the governments’, or both?) Alex de Waal is an important representative of this latter point of view, criticizing the activists for their naïveté, while he still recognizes positive aspects around the international mobilization for an African conflict. Mahmood Mamdani, however, represents the more extreme version of this critique, attributing the movement the role of "child soldiers" working for the great powers’ eagerness to intervene where they can to extend their influence.

**Strategy number one: make Sudan become an issue of domestic politics**

The ultimate goal of the activist movement has been to trigger a reaction on behalf of the decision makers, and in extenso on behalf of UN officials, by raising awareness within the larger public. This has had the effect of sometimes directing more attention to the means, raising awareness and mobilizing the "masses", than to the end, finding a workable solution for Darfur. In the activist campaign, the need to "lift the silence" has been at the center of the strategies, according to the saying that it is "the silence that kills". This approach is closely linked to the main lesson that the civil society and NGO circles seem to have drawn from the genocide in Rwanda. What is indeed retained from Rwanda is the failure of the international

653 Mamdani (2009), op.cit., 6.
654 Ibid, 8.
655 Lanz (2009), op.cit., 675.
community and public to understand what was happening, and thus failure to react. The result in the face of Darfur has been a massive focus on not letting politicians say this time “that they didn’t know”.

The aim of “lifting the silence” follows two sets of logic. First of all, if a sufficiently large part of the population mobilizes and calls for action on Darfur, then policy makers will have a real self-interest in addressing attention to the issue. Public pressure will not necessarily lead to concerted action, however, the political costs of not acting are increased. And indeed, the activists themselves have been highly aware of where their power lies: in their role as voters. By mobilizing within different communities, the activists made “Darfur” become an electoral issue and an issue of domestic politics. The lobbied Congressmen were sensible to this issue mobilizing such large parts of their constituencies, and decided to address the Darfur item raised on their agendas. The activists made it their trademark to not be “simply” a communitarian lobby, or a sum of different communitarian groups, but rather a widespread, even mainstream movement, represented in most different communities across the United States. Steven Fake and Kevin Funk indeed describe the movement as more “mainstream” than controversial in any sense. Although they too express a rather critical view of the Save Darfur movement, they note: “while there is great variance in the ideologies of Darfur activists, on the whole they are likely to have establishment-friendly political beliefs, be they liberal or conservative, rather than a leftist outlook656. It is in its quality of being broad-based in its support and mainstream in its views that the movement has achieved its most important influence. It also shows that responding to the activists’ demands probably did not require great sacrifices on behalf of the policy makers they lobbied – what the activists demanded already lied close to the views these policy makers, especially in Congress, have had on Sudan for many years. What the activists achieved was to make Darfur a priority, as well as to determine the dynamic of how the conflict was to be treated, beyond the Congress and within the US executive.

The second motivation behind the aim to raise awareness is the belief among human rights activists that “lifting the silence” carries an intrinsic value, that it is not only a means, but also an end in itself. Indeed, spreading the word about the crimes perpetrated in Darfur is a way of “naming and shaming” the perpetrators. The underlying message is that this will make it more

656 Fake and Funk, op.cit.,106.
difficult for the perpetrators to pursue their crimes, since they are no more shielded by the world’s ignorance. It’s a belief shared by many high ranking international officials and diplomats, as for example Luis Moreno Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, who rhetorically asks: "What message does silence bring to the victims in Darfur? What message does the silence bring to the perpetrators?" In the case of the ICC, the need to “lift the silence” is closely linked with the obligation to hold accountable the perpetrators of the crimes. This connection between the ”outcry” inside the US and the imagined effect it would have on the conflict shows how the activists legitimated the internalization of the Darfur issue into US domestic politics. In their view, the mobilization carried in itself a sense of doing something ”real” for the victims of the conflict in Darfur.

The mobilization also created opportunities for the activists. Some representatives of activist organizations were more open to admit this, while others preferred to remain focused on the ultimate end, improving the conditions for the people in Darfur. These activists were generally unwilling to discuss what the campaign might have done for them, as individuals and for their organizations’ position within the American civil society. Some critics have indeed pointed out the “career opportunities” that the Darfur campaign has created for many activists: new organizations entirely dedicated to Darfur advocacy and the fight against genocide have been created, such as the Enough campaign and the Genocide Intervention Network (GI-Network), not to speak of the Save Darfur Coalition who has become a million dollar enterprise. These critiques have however mostly been dismissed as ill-considered attempts to draw the attention away from the moral aim of their mobilization. Other locally based organizations have been less shy to admit that this engagement did create opportunities for them, especially in the sense of strengthening their network with other grass-roots organizations. As the PR official from the JCPA said about the local mobilization for Darfur:

"This created possibilities. Where on some issues it was a little tense, and we couldn’t reach them (the Muslim organizations), Darfur was a group of really good issues for us to unite against (violations) of human rights, which is a view shared by a lot of other groups. And if we can’t work with you on this we can probably work with you on Darfur. So there’s a kind of a trade-off, because number one you’re talking about genocide, which is...

This again shows the "mainstream" aspect the Darfur issue gained within US politics, it became an issue everyone agreed on and that highly different organizations could work together on. As Fake and Funk point out concerning "Save Darfur": "the broad nature of the Coalition’s membership is indicated by the inclusion of both the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), organizations which each have profound suspicions regarding the other’s very purpose." This broad "entente" between such different organizations increased the stakes for US policy makers; it indeed became an issue of domestic politics to respond to this mobilization.

**B - Dilemmas of publicity and timing: between resource and constraint for conflict solving**

Once it was made aware of the situation in Darfur, and pressured by activists, the US government’s willingness to show it was concerned with the situation was quickly manifested. However, the “recognition of genocide” followed by statements that this would not automatically trigger any kind of intervention by the US, actually spurred even more activism and strengthened the internalization of the issue into US domestic politics. Making Darfur more a domestic issue than an external one has however not only had positive consequences for the political responses to the crisis. As Hamilton and Hazlett note: "To date, the movement’s efforts to pressure the U.S. government may have, somewhat perversely, forced the Administration to place a higher priority on "managing” activists than finding a workable solution for Darfur." While the widespread public pressure increased the political capital invested in the treatment of the crisis, it also raised the time pressure on the policy makers looking for quick and visible solutions to be applied to the crisis.

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658 Interview, NN, JCPA Public Relations Officer, 12.05.2008, New York
659 Fake and Funk, op.cit., 106.
1) Public pressure and publicity: increasing the political capital spent on “solving” the problem

The broad public mobilization created a unique political dynamic in the countries where such protests found place. The large publicity given to the crisis by the activists was specifically sought in order not only to “lift the silence”, but also to increase the stakes for policy makers to take the issue up on their agendas.

Darfur frenzy and assessing the activists’ successes

As seen previously, public celebrities have been actively involved in activism for Darfur and have played an important role in attracting widespread public attention to the campaign. The question should nevertheless be raised as to whether the public success, based on the celebrities’ engagement as well as the high turnout at the different ”Darfur events”’, has drawn the attention away from the real issues on the ground. As Alex de Waal writes, ”the size of the audience and the length of the ovation are not the measure of success (…) unlike a Hollywood opening weekend, critical acclaim and box office receipts mean nothing unless they bring leverage for effective action”661. He is indeed critical of the over-enthusiasm the public turnout has achieved reminding that it does not necessarily trigger the needed responses in Darfur.

Looking at the different evaluations done by observers and by the activists themselves give an interesting picture of the way their success is perceived, as well as the type of attention and publicity the campaign has received. Quantitative indicators of the activists’ success may the amount of space and time granted to Darfur in the media as well as the number of people joining for public meetings and protests. As shown in previous chapters, Darfur has been covered extensively in European and US media. Fake and Funk have proposed to compare the media coverage of the large Darfur rally that took place on April 30th 2006 in Washington with the coverage of a demonstration against the war in Iraq organized the day before in New York. Interestingly, the turnout seemed to be much higher for the antiwar demonstration (ranging from ”at least 350,000” according to the organizers to ”tens of thousands” according to the press) than for the Darfur rally (going from 75,000 according to the organizers to

"thousands" reported in the press)\textsuperscript{662}. However, the Darfur rally was given much more space and importance in most newspapers. The notable exception is The New York Times, which however operated another interesting distinction, as it "relegated its coverage of the Iraq war protest to local/regional news, while covering the Darfur rally in the "national" news section\textsuperscript{663}". In other words, not only was the Darfur protests judged more newsworthy, and deserving of more space, the protests calling for an international intervention into Darfur were judged as more deserving of a "national" status than the three-year old war in Iraq, where thousands of American troops were involved.

The attendance at the Darfur rally on April 30th 2006 was seen as spectacular and went beyond the organizers’ expectations. Following this protest, the movement was called the "largest and loudest American outcry against an African crisis since the anti-Apartheid movement two decades earlier\textsuperscript{664}". Likewise, most activists do refer to this rally when asked what successes they have obtained, which was just days before the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja. This signature, seen as a "breakthrough" by the activists, rapidly became the most important proof that their activism was succeeding - in pressuring for a consistent policy and in obtaining results on the ground. As the PR-official from the Jewish Council for Public Affairs describe it:


\textit{"Through our local coalitions and through our JCRC’s (Jewish Community Relations Council) we were able to get some 50-70 000 people to come to this rally. There was a lot of international press coverage; we had a lot of members of Congress, a lot of politicians, and a lot of entertainment figures. It was a very high profile event. And because of that, the very next day President Bush appointed his very first envoy to Sudan (...). I think that is probably the best example to say that because of the visibility that we created on the grassroots level, we were actually able to move the president to do something, just days later\textsuperscript{665}".}

Another activist from Human Rights First said: \textit{"Can it be a coincidence that a deal is at hand after a major peace rally in Washington, D.C. and in other U.S. cities\textsuperscript{666}?"} Indeed, it seems

\textsuperscript{662} Fake and Funk, \textit{op.cit.}, 109.
\textsuperscript{663} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{664} Hamilton and Hazlett, in de Waal (2007), \textit{op.cit.}, 338.
\textsuperscript{665} Interview, NN, JCPA Public Relations Officer, 12.05.2008, New York
\textsuperscript{666} Quoted in Hamilton and Hazlett, in de Waal (2007), \textit{op.cit.}, 363.
that the enthusiasm created in the aftermath of this large rally quickly led the activists to interpret every new declaration or initiative undertaken by the government as happening thanks to the pressure of the activists. In fact, no envoy was nominated in the days after. That happened only five months later, and it would have been quite remarkable if a special envoy could be picked in just a few days. It is as if the speed with which news are propagated thanks to internet, makes some of the stakeholders in this political dynamic believe that politics too ”happen” at the same pace.

What did happen however, was that Robert Zoellick, the US deputy Secretary of State and in charge of following the Darfur issue, rushed to Abuja the day after the Washington rally. This was most probably more due to the evolution of the situation on the ground, as the negotiations reached an impasse when the Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha suddenly left the negotiations and the rebels were still opposing the draft proposal presented by the mediators and not the rally a few hours before. A failure of those peace talks would have represented a serious setback in a process the US had already heavily invested in. However, the great public mobilization probably further increased the political cost of failure for Zoellick and the US government. The accounts on how he pressured the parties on every point to sign, and to sign quickly, are numerous.

Activism has however had some “measurable” effects on US policy, and even on Sudanese politics, but that neither the activists themselves nor the media seem to be very aware of. First of all, activism has directly and indirectly contributed to the high levels of human and financial capital allocated to Darfur and Sudan within the US government compared to the levels for the rest of Africa. While there in 2008 were two employees at the State Department that were working full-time on the Democratic Republic of Congo, there were sixteen working full time on Sudan. The numbers are noteworthy, since these are two countries one might think would present quite similar policy challenges to the US. State Department officials themselves clearly see this as connected with the level of national activism. Secondly, this pressure has also contributed to the improved access to Darfur for humanitarians and high-level diplomats. As an OCHA official at the time put it, ”no other

668 E-mail exchange with KE, US State Department official, 30.10.2008, as follow up to interview, Washington DC, 23.04.2008
government issues visas in 24 hours” when needed. According to him, this was clearly a result of the general international pressure exerted on Sudan. He also suggested that if the Sudanese really wanted to block the access to Darfur or to throw out the humanitarians, they could have done it whenever they wanted. That’s indeed what they did in March 2009, after the international arrest mandate against president Bashir.

**Raising the stakes: activist demands shaping the Western policy response to Darfur**

The majority of Western advocacy groups have attached more importance on pressuring their governments and the UN to send peacekeepers to the war-torn area, than on other issues such as humanitarian aid (the first response from the international community, being rather successful judging by the circumstances) or political negotiations (also set forth rather early, as the activist community was still trying to understand what was happening). This became even more pressing after May 2006 and the signing of the DPA, which made it technically easier to call for a UN peacekeeping mission, rather than a vague form of international intervention. The very existence of a peace agreement, although rejected by two of the major rebel leaders and widely seen as an insufficient document to work for peace in the region, nevertheless made it possible for the activists to call for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to ensure the application of the DPA. On September 17, 2006, on the first anniversary of the commitment of UN member states to the “responsibility to protect”, a vast ”Blue helmet” campaign was organized in New York and many other cities around the world, where activists were encouraged to wear blue hats to reflect their call for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Darfur.

There were however two major obstacles for the creation of such a peacekeeping mission: the refusal of the Sudanese president to accept a transfer from the AU observers to a UN mission, and the refusal of countries such as China and Russia to adopt a resolution authorizing a peacekeeping force as long as Khartoum objected. However, once the Sudanese government finally accepted the proposal of a hybrid mission in Darfur in June 2007, the resolution preparing for the deployment of 26,000 peacekeepers was voted just a few weeks after in New

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669 Interview, PV, former UN official, New York, 24.04.2008
York. The adoption of resolution 1769 was indeed seen as a great success, by diplomats and activists alike, and as a great step forward towards an improvement of the situation in Darfur. The great priority that was given to the deployment of peacekeepers over other pressing issues, from 2006 until then, can to a large extent also be attributed to the activists’ pressure. As a State Department official explains:

“If you look at where we’ve put our resources over the past three years, I would say 90% of money, time, political capital is going to peacekeeping because that’s what the advocacy is pushing for and because it’s a demonstrable effect. Troops getting off the plane, is “look, we’re deploying the troops”. Even if it doesn’t make the situation any better.”

He also pointed out how unimaginable it was some years ago that the US government would spend “half a billion dollars on peacekeeping in Africa outside of its UN dues”. According to him, “it’s amazing what has been achieved, and I think that’s in large part due to the advocacy”. Furthermore, he explained that this focus on sending peacekeepers gave them much less time for issues he himself judged to be at least as important, such as a resumption of the peace talks and pushing the rebel groups to coordinate and agree on a set of common positions for the negotiations.

The amount of time and political capital spent on pressuring for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Darfur, both in terms of pressuring Khartoum as in terms of pressuring the other members of the Security Council to accept the premises of such a mission, was however not only a consequence of the activists’ demands. It also served US policy makers’ eagerness to find a quick and visible solution to the crisis. In other words, it also served US policy makers in their immediate need to « manage » the activists. A former UN official at the time confirms this:

”The Save Darfur Coalition and many others managed to convince everybody that the solution to the problem was the peacekeepers, which… no one in the UN was thinking that that was the solution to the problem. I mean it is one aspect of it, but


671 Interview, KE, State Department official, Washington DC, 23.04.2008
672 Ibid.
there are also many other things (...) And I think it is not a coincidence that that happened, because it is something that is much easier to mobilize around, than say "let’s demonstrate in favor of a political solution", which is much more abstract, it’s not something you can mobilize money or people (with), or get passionate about. Sending people, troops to protect women and children from being killed, is something you can much more easily generate attention for and mobilize action for. (...) you’re not going to mobilize people by explaining them how complex it is\textsuperscript{673}.

Indeed, the simpler the issues and the more contrasted the images of the conflict, the more people will be sensitized and the more will chose to become engaged. Once a broader public was mobilized and made aware about the situation in Darfur, they required concrete, quick and visible solutions to put an end to the unbearable situation. In addition to the fact that the humanitarian assistance to Darfur was already relatively successful, the concrete and visible aspects of the deployment of peacekeepers made this aspect become prioritized. When it comes to the actual deployment of peacekeepers however, activists’ impact on ”real politics” manifests its limits. Despite a strong stated willingness to support the AU/UN hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID) on behalf of most of the Western diplomatic powers, it has been a struggle for the UN to find enough equipment and resources for the troop deployment. The activists were thus successful in shaping the discourses and in imposing the objective of ”protection of civilians” through the means of ”sending of peacekeepers” as priorities on the international agenda. However, the dynamics they triggered on this topic as well as the pressure they indirectly created on the negotiations in Abuja are symptomatic for the general international response to the Darfur crisis. Quick fix, visible and concrete solutions designed to protect the victims from the perpetrators are given priority over complex solutions to complex issues. However, high publicity and sensitive conflict resolution processes are not always compatible, which will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.

Public diplomacy and behind-the-scenes resolution: towards a backstage and a frontstage internationalization?

Activist pressure on the foreign policy making has led to the development of a public diplomacy, directed at the Western governments’ own constituencies. With this type of policy making, playing out on the frontstage of the political arena, in front of the mobilized

\textsuperscript{673} Interview, PV, former UN official, New York, 24.04.2008
audience, the question of the link between these announced policies and the processes unfolding “backstage” should be posed. Erving Goffman in 1959 developed a theory of social interaction and interpersonal behavior based on an analogy with the dramaturgic scene, distinguishing between “frontstage” and “backstage” behavior. When individuals interact, they are “on stage”, or rather “frontstage”: here they need to control their ”performances” and the signs they ”give” and ”give off” (consciously and unconsciously) according to logics of ”impression management”. After their ”performances”, or their social interaction, they go backstage, where they will assimilate and prepare for the next frontstage “performance”. Backstage is the area of intimacy, where ”true” behavior is unveiled.

The distinction can, with some adjustments, also be applied to the behavior of policy makers and diplomats, at least in order to understand the dynamics between public pressure and the formulation of foreign policy. The main difference however is that interpersonal interactions are at the center of attention for Goffman, while what is at stake here is the relationship between the “actors” on stage and the audience watching and giving their opinion about what they see on stage. The mobilized public and the activist community can be assimilated to the audience in a theatre, while diplomats and elected policy makers can be assimilated to the actors, moving between the frontstage and the backstage, and who adapt their “script” according to the demands from the public. Although foreign policy making and diplomacy have for a long time been perceived as the area of secrecy, and as the “backstage” where the perceived “real” decisions are taken, the analogy is used here rather to point out the dynamic between the audience and the “play” taking place on stage. In fact, the very demands of the public to have a say in the policies made on the political stage transforms the dynamics of the latter. Policy responses to matters in which the public meddles can no longer be made only “backstage”, far away from the public’s views.

Some policy matters are nevertheless kept away from the frontstage. The issue of counter-terrorism cooperation between Washington and Khartoum for example is rarely discussed “in public”, and little information is available on exactly what this cooperation consists of. On other issues, there is a discrepancy between the public discourse and the actions taken, and

sometimes even between some of the decisions taken, motivated by public demands, and the actions taken afterwards. Concerning the recognition of genocide for example, there is a clear tendency of frontstage and backstage policy. On the frontstage, it became important for US politicians to show they were concerned and that they dared call the crimes by “their rightful name”. However, backstage policy considerations made it impossible to “act on” this recognition in the sense of staging any kind of intervention. This was however admitted by Colin Powel in his speech, who in exchange called for the international community as a whole to mobilize to take action in Darfur. As for the issue of peacekeepers, the countries that were at the forefront of the efforts to have such a mission authorized, both by the Sudanese government and by other (permanent) members of the Security Council, have not necessarily been at the forefront afterwards, in supporting the mission financially and logistically. The deployment of UNAMID troops since January 2008 has advanced at a very slow pace, due notably to problems of logistics provisions.

Visualizing the interaction between policy makers and the mobilized public opinion in terms of “frontstage” and “backstage” behavior is thus useful to understand the dynamics both between the policy “actors” and the ”public”, but also the different levels of policy making, ”frontstage” and ”backstage”. Pressure from the public stimulates and provides incentives to the policy makers, who are encouraged to develop policies that are most likely to please the audience. Pressure from the public also increases policy makers’ imperative of accountability, at least when the pressure is prolonged over time: when intentions of action to be taken are announced, the public will, at some point, want to see concrete results as well.

This creates a real challenge for policy makers: the balancing between the desire to find quick fix and visible solutions to satisfy constituencies at home and the need to find workable solutions on the longer term to the crisis in question. Prioritizing the first runs the risk of applying policies that fail on the ground shortly after, while prioritizing the second will increase the need to actively “communicate” on the adopted policy. When concerns to “manage the public” distracts attention away from managing the issue itself, the policy response adopted may, in the long run, disserving the public’s initial intentions as well as the issue itself. As pointed out by Alex de Waal in the context of the engagement of celebrities in the activist campaign for Darfur, the audience’s instant appraisal is not worth much if the policies triggered do not at the same time lead to effective results on the ground. Yet, policies with “efficient” results on the ground are not always instantly measurable.
2) Public pressure leading to the development of a “deadline diplomacy” – for whose benefit?

Public pressure does not only trigger dynamics favoring policy responses that are visible and concrete, over more complex and abstract negotiations for example, it also increases the time pressure for delivering results. However, the process seeking to internationalize internal conflicts, in the sense of setting them on an international agenda, and the process of conflict resolution itself may obey to different temporalities. While public pressure may well attract more political capital to be invested in the search for a solution to the problem, it might also pose certain challenges to the conduct of peace negotiations.

Publicity and negotiations: behind closed doors-diplomacy or a publicly monitored process

The dilemma between publicity and secrecy in negotiations is a well-known issue in the field of conflict resolution and negotiations675. The example of the establishment of the secret channel between the Palestinians and the Israelis in 1992 by Norwegian researchers and diplomats, eventually resulting in the Oslo Agreements, has become a classical example. The high-level secrecy around the first contacts - reportedly not even the Mossad had detected the opening of this channel of communication during the first months - was absolutely essential to make the meetings possible at all, as well as to develop a first framework for further negotiations676. Pressure from the media or from the public on both sides would have discouraged the parties from making concessions and would have made them more entrenched in their respective positions. At the same time, broad based popular support is required in order to ensure the support to and the application of a signed peace agreement in a later stage. This was perhaps the first failure of the Oslo peace process. Despite unforeseen success in making the representatives of the parties talk and come up with an agreement, as the process became official and public, the parties failed to gather the necessary support within their respective populations.


A similar dilemma has been weighing over the peace negotiations in Darfur, yet characterized more by a high-level of international publicity than any form of secrecy. Activist pressure on their respective governments created incentives for these to closely follow the peace talks between the parties in Darfur. For the diplomats working in and on the region, it contributed to inject further political capital into an issue they would have followed to some extent anyway. Yet, as a European diplomat put it in late 2009, the decrease in public pressure for some time had also lead to a decrease in the political capital invested in dealing with Darfur. Diplomats and members of the executive are indeed able to grant more time and resources to the treatment of a given issue when politicians have this issue on the top of their agenda and are pressuring for results to be obtained. When public pressure decreases, and thus political capital with it, diplomats and bureaucrats are led to invest their time and resources on other more pressing issues defined by the current context.

The high public pressure on the American diplomats during the final days of the Abuja peace talks manifestly increased their pressure on the parties, and especially on the rebels, to sign the proposed agreement. According to reports from close observers of the process, it appears to have made them less sensitive to the rebels’ demands for more time or for a revision of certain issues, notably the security questions and the power sharing aspects. As Laurie Nathan writes in 2007 in the book edited by Alex de Waal, *War in Darfur and the search for peace*:

"the Abuja talks had three primary dynamics: the negotiating parties were unwilling to engage in negotiations and failed to forge agreements; the AU and its international partners, desperate for a quick accord, pursued a counterproductive strategy of “deadline diplomacy” that inhibited progress; and the mediators were consequently unable to undertake effective mediation."

Each dynamic spilled over on the other, and prevented a sustainable peace process from being initiated. As the parties were not ready to negotiate, pressure for quick progress made the talks even more tense. And as the parties supporting the negotiations, such as the UN, the UK,

677 Interview, UD, European diplomat, 26.11.2009
678 Alex de Waal and Laurie Nathan quoted here were both part of the AU mediation team in the last months of the Abuja negotiations. Alex de Waal served as an advisor to the chief mediator, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim.
the US and other international partners, only pressured for rapid results, the mediators certainly found themselves faced with an impossible task.

In the same book, Alex de Waal writes about the final days of the peace talks in Abuja, and describes them as a set of prolonged deadlines, each time for another 48 hours. An initial deadline for the seventh and final round of the peace talks had been set for April 30. However, as the mediation team presented its draft proposal, the draft for a future agreement, on April 25, it was received with shock and protests from the rebel movements and the final deadline was progressively delayed. On May 2, "an array of politicians and diplomats descended upon Abuja" to "unlock the impasse", among them US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and British Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn⁶⁸⁰. Along with the Canadian ambassador to the UN, John Rock and the EU’s special envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, they divided the tasks and tried to improve the proposals and convince the parties to give their consent and support to the proposed agreement. The chief delegate of the Sudanese government, Dr. Majzoub al Khalifa, had then expressed the government’s intention to accept the agreement as it was. According to Alex de Waal, during the "last four days, the members of the AU mediation team were almost entirely spectators⁶⁸¹".

During the final mediation session, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim expressed his fierce disagreement with the proposed accord, and claimed radical modifications were needed. The mediators, having already lost faith in Khalil Ibrahim, asked his delegation to leave, amid accusations from all over that he was untrustworthy, arrogant, and would be responsible for future evolutions in Darfur. Khalil Ibrahim reportedly tried to apologize for the offence taken, and argued "we need knowledge and patience. I represent the people, the will of the people⁶⁸²". Abdulwahid el Nour, however, asked for pursued negotiations in the fields of power sharing and compensation for the IDPs, claiming that there were the requests from his supporters in the field, including commanders and IDP camp representatives. Robert Zoellick, who had spent the last two days attempting to respond to Abdulwahid’s concerns, replied that he was simply not serious about the negotiations and threatened him with strong words that

⁶⁸¹ Ibid, 270.
⁶⁸² Ibid, 275.
this was his last chance. During the final day of the talks, on May 5th, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, Zoellick and Benn each attempted, in a separate room and face-to-face, to pressure Abdulwahid to sign. He then consulted with his delegation, and reportedly, the majority of his close supporters were favoring a signature. Abdulwahid however refused to vote on the issue, and decided not to sign. Minni Minawi had also presented objections, especially to the power sharing provisions, requesting higher representation, "parity", in the Darfur legislative councils. Under harsh pressure, being seen as "the one most likely to sign", he finally said that despite reserves among his supporters, the final decision was his, and that he would sign. He asked at the same time for the possibility to discuss with Abdulwahid el Nour and Khalil Ibrahim, but the mediators preferred him to sign first, and then use that as a pressure on the two others. Minni Minawi had just lost his brother in an attack the same morning, some rumors saying it was the government and others that it was his own men, either way as a means to pressure him. The final signing ceremony is described by de Waal as a "joyless climax\(^{683}\)."

In the days after, Abdulwahid el Nour wrote a letter to Salim Ahmed Salim, the AU chief mediator and former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity, explaining that he was ready to sign if additional discussions with the GoS could be held, on power sharing, leading to a supplement to the DPA, and if clarifications could be made on some issues concerning compensation and disarmament of the janjaweed. The response he received expressed that the AU was ready to facilitate discussions between the parties on the implementation, but that the agreement could not be re-opened for new negotiations. It seems as Abdulwahid el Nour wanted to have every element and every guarantee written down on paper, before signing. He was told that some items in the agreement would anyway be subject to renegotiations, underway, on how to implement them. But this wasn’t enough for him. The DPA remained a paper signed by one out of three rebel leaders, and in the months to come the combats between government forces and rebel groups, as well as among rebel groups, would intensify. The complexification of the conflict, with new internal splits within the rebel groups, as well as the promise of new and more inclusive negotiations to be held, led to a proliferation of rebel groups. Reportedly, as negotiations were supposed to resume in Sirte in

\(^{683}\) Ibid, 279. The account here is largely based on the above mentioned chapters written by Alex de Waal and Laurie Nathan.
Libya in November 2007, estimates claimed between 12 and 25 rebel factions existed. Several of them went to Sirte, and as a result, the two rebel leaders having refused to sign in Abuja, Abdulwahid el Nour and Khalil Ibrahim, refused to attend the talks at all. What was supposed to constitute a relaunch of negotiations came to be referred to as a consultation phase.

**Negotiations: between the need for a timeline and the dangers of the “deadline diplomacy”**

The term “deadline diplomacy” has become a recurrent term to describe the Darfur negotiations in Abuja. The term encapsulates the very dilemmas that mediators and facilitators are faced with in the framework of negotiations in internal civil wars. On the one hand, there is a need to impose a timeline, and even deadlines, in order to push the negotiations to move forward and to exert a certain pressure on the negotiating parties. Ever ongoing negotiations aren’t serving anyone. On the other hand, the risk is that the focus on the deadlines may distract attention away from the problems to solve, and prevent mediators from granting necessary time to follow up the parties on sensible points where more time is needed. Nathan draws two conclusions from the Abuja negotiations regarding mediation in the context of civil wars:

"First these wars are not conducive to a viable quick accord. They have multiple historical, structural, political, social, and economic causes that are complex, deep-rooted, and intractable. (...) However grave the situation, mediators have no option but to be patient. Second, an enduring peace agreement cannot be forced on the parties."

The first lesson shows the incompatibility between intense time pressure and the conduct of viable peace agreements. The second is partly a result of the first, as the time pressure took focus away from other important issues, such as working for a viable local ownership to the process. Indeed, it appears in reading Nathan’s report from the Abuja process that the final agreement, widely criticized in the aftermath, was not necessarily a bad agreement, but there was a lack of sense of ownership to the agreement among the parties, especially on the rebels’ side. Nathan also shows that the always tight deadlines prevented the mediators from


developing a general strategy: "If the talks were always due to shut down in a matter of weeks, then there was no need to prepare a plan of action for the following six months". He also shows that the need to achieve quick results severed the mediators’ control over the negotiations process. The pressure from the international community was high, and as the mediating team moved "from one monthly deadline to the next, top officials from the UN, the AU, the EU, and donor governments complained that the negotiations were proceeding too slowly. Their constant refrain was that the "patience of the international community is running out". They threatened the parties with sanctions and warned that funding for the mediation could dry up in the absence of a quick accord." The deadline diplomacy had other negative effects on the talks, according to Nathan, more than restraining the mediators’, notably it reduced the time available for direct negotiations between the parties. The mediators preferred preparing ready position papers, which the parties then accepted or rejected. The result was that the parties focused more on lobbying and negotiating with the mediators than with each other. The tight deadlines also made it difficult for both mediators and rebel leaders to communicate and consult efficiently with the population and the civil society in Darfur. All in all, the result was a lack of ownership of the DPA, among the parties present in Abuja as among the different stakeholders in Darfur.

Differences in timelines and temporalities between "internationalization" and "resolution"

The conflict resolution process is thus faced with two constant dilemmas: the amount of publicity that should be given to the negotiation process, and the type of timeline and deadlines that should be imposed on it. Campaigns aiming at "lifting the silence" and in raising awareness around a conflict obey to logics of publicity, mass mobilization and grand declarations on behalf of the activists, hoping to trigger similarly grand declarations of intentions on behalf of their governments. The Darfur conflict, in the framework of the public mobilization campaign, has generally been presented as "worsening every day", followed with claims that "killings are taking place at this very moment". Some claims may very well be related to the reality, while others may be conscious or unconscious dramatizations in order to guarantee public attention and attention from the policy makers. The focus on the time pressure in activist campaigns is the result of two factors. First of all, it is the

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686 Ibid, 259.
687 Ibid, 248.
manifestation of a deep-rooted belief that if nothing is done immediately, thousands of lives will be lost. Secondly, it is part of a strategy to increase public attention as well as the stakes for policy makers, who are pressured to take action quickly.

Peace negotiations however obey other logics of temporality. Aiming for quick results in negotiations is contrary to the very dynamics of a sensitive process where former enemies in a war are supposed to meet, talk and eventually make (more or less) equal concessions. This does not mean that deadlines and a concrete timeline for negotiations are not necessary, on the contrary they are needed on a local level of conflict resolution as well as on an international level of support for the process. Deadlines are not just final dates aimed for comprehensive and final agreements; they are also means to progress all along the negotiation process. Deadlines may be set for each item on the negotiation agenda (power sharing, wealth sharing, border demarcations etc.), and although each deadline may be altered, they are a means for the parties and the mediators to foresee the evolution of the talks and to plan their comprehensive strategies. On a local level, deadlines and a general timeline are necessary in order to impose certain conditions and exert indispensable pressure on the parties, who might feel they have more to win from prolonging the status quo. Deadlines may also be important to show the local populations and the war-affected victims that negotiations are moving forward, and not the least to (as soon as possible) show them that there are benefits of negotiating with the enemy. Likewise, deadlines may be an important motivating factor for the parties negotiating, by showing them, step by step (deadline by deadline) that the negotiations are advancing and that they in fact have more to win from “jaw jaw” than “war war”\textsuperscript{688}. On an international level, deadlines and a concrete timeline are necessary first of all for financial reasons, as no donor government can accept to sponsor talks indefinitely. Secondly, when there is a consistent domestic pressure on the governments supporting a peace process, deadlines and proofs of advancement are important to show these constituencies that an effective deal is being brokered. Deadlines are thus essential for negotiations, yet they should be realistic (giving enough time before the deadline for progress to be made), and be flexible when needed. The challenge for international mediations to end civil wars is to create a dynamic where local and international imperatives converge, instead of diverging.

Scholars of negotiation often refer to the state where the parties are “ripe for resolution”, as the moment where both parties are ready to negotiate and give concessions. This is also called the “mutually hurting stalemate”, which William Zartman define as the moment “when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they tend to seek a Way Out. The search for a way out is often triggered with an “impending or recently avoided catastrophe”. While the idea of ripeness in itself might be a pertinent concept to explain the failure of certain attempts to solve conflicts, it would be frustrating for mediators and external parties seeking to support the search for peace to simply sit back and wait for the parties to be ready. It might take a long time for them to reach a mutually hurting stalemate, if they ever reach it. As Zartman shows however, the mutually hurting stalemate can to a certain extent be created by external parties, by convincing the parties of the “painful present and a preferable alternative”. The perceptions of the way out can also be stimulated by external mediators, and for the parties to seek the way out, they need to perceive that a negotiated solution is possible and that their adversary also seeks a way out. The problem of the different rounds of negotiations in Darfur is that such a mutually hurting stalemate and a situation of mutual search for a way out have seemingly not been reached at the same time. While pursuing negotiations on the one hand, the parties have constantly sought to gain the upper hand militarily on the ground on the other, in order to have more leverage back at the negotiating table. According to Zartman, the role of the mutually hurting stalemate is only valid in an initiating phase of negotiations and not during negotiations. He further argues that the perspective of a negotiated solution, in his terms the mutually enticing opportunity, is thus important during the negotiations. While the mutually hurting stalemate will push the parties into negotiations, the perspective of resolution will pull them through the process. In the case of the Darfur peace talks, it seems that the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate was lacking when negotiations started, and the perceptions of the preferable alternative on the other side has not been successfully achieved either.

691 Ibid, 232.
The activists’ view on the negotiations in Darfur

Although public pressure and international eagerness to put an end to the conflict in Darfur weighed heavily over the final months of the Abuja talks, the activists in the Western capitals were not yet fully aware of the complex realities of the negotiations. The main focus were “do something” to stop the unbearable situation, and preferably intervene by force to protect the civilians. For the diplomacies involved in the mediation efforts in Naivasha, the easiest and less costly response was however to pursue the same efforts for Darfur. It was also in their own interest, in order to finish properly the mission they had embarked on: assisting Sudan in its search for peace.

Following the acceptance and the beginning of the deployment of UNAMID, the activists addressed more focus on the negotiation aspect of the need to “do something”. Some activists, generally those rooted in the students’ movement, had by then gone through a learning process, since after the UN Security Council unanimously voted the resolution authorizing the deployment of the UNAMID, they realized something more needed to be done to solve Darfur’s problems. Critics of the deployment of the hybrid mission argued that it would be nonsense to deploy a peacekeeping mission “with no peace to keep”, and this contributed to draw attention back to the need to pursue peace talks. Other activists have remained critical of any negotiation that involves representatives of the regime they see as responsible for having committed a genocide in its Western province, who they deem should rather be judged than negotiated with. Should an agreement be signed, these activists remain convinced it will never be applied by the latter.

When the activist community actually did advocate for a relaunching of the political process, a central focus remained the deadlines. As the State Department official notes, “as the advocacy is waking up a little bit to the political process and to Sudan outside Darfur, they’re still looking for qualifiable, demonstrable effects. So what everyone is talking about is when are the next peace negotiations?” Implicitly, he suggests that giving a date for the start of the negotiations before the parties are even ready to talk is not the solution. Many close observers to the peace process indeed claim that efforts to unify the rebel movements should

be a prerequisite for negotiations, which then should be taking place behind closed doors. However, this would take a long time, and not be immediately visible to the public. The other facet of the activists’ position towards peace talks is their claim that achieving peace without justice, by holding the perpetrators of violence accountable for their crimes, is not worth anything. The demands for justice to be made in Darfur will be further explored in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Internationalization does not go without influencing both the course of the conflict, the internal dynamics, as well as the conflict resolution process. Efforts to put an end to or solve a conflict may be facilitated, as they may be complicated by the external interference. We have seen in this chapter how public pressure and time pressure have influenced, and put severe constraints on the mediation efforts in Darfur. What seems important to retain is that the temporalities of an internationalization process does not necessarily obey to the same logics of temporality that a conflict resolution process requires. How the internationalization dynamics influence the conflict resolution efforts will be further explored in the next chapter.
Chapter VII – The influence of the framings and the qualifications on the international responses to the Sudanese conflicts

The dilemmas encountered in an internationalization process are multiple, many related to the amount of pressure that should be exerted from the outside (time pressure on negotiations, media publicity and public pressure, as well as the balance of threats of sanctions and promises or incentives, the so-called “carrot” and the “stick”) in order to achieve positive results. Too much pressure may be counter-productive; all the while the “right” amount of pressure is seen as a necessary “push” to make things move forward. Incentives must be real, that is, in order for promises to work as incentives, they must correspond to something the parties to the conflict actually desire. All in all, there are no magic formula indicating the type and amount of pressure that should be applied in order to guarantee a successful resolution of internal conflicts. Too many case-specific factors enter into the account, although some general tendencies have been advanced in the works of William Zartman\textsuperscript{694}, in his discussions on conflicts’ “ripeness” for resolution, as well as in a series of works on multiparty and international mediation carried out by Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall\textsuperscript{695}. Indeed, the academic field of “conflict solving” and “peace studies” carries an intrinsic “activist” and normative character, as David P. Barash shows\textsuperscript{696}. Johan Galtung, usually recognized as the father of the field of peace studies, in a way set the standard for a normative approach to the field through the development of the much used terms of “negative” and “positive” peace\textsuperscript{697}. He was furthermore not afraid of referring to himself as an

\textsuperscript{694} I. William Zartman (2008), \textit{op.cit.}


\textsuperscript{696} David P. Barash, \textit{Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies}, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 271.

activist, something other scholars in the field today are reluctant to do. The most difficult in
the field of peace research is the central object of study, peace, and the difficulties to define it,
otherwise than either negatively (peace as the “absence of war”) or normatively (“positive
peace”). The study of internationalization as a possible determinant variable of peace
inevitably leads to question the position to adopt for the researcher studying
internationalization processes. Internationalization has here been studied as the process
through which an internal conflict comes to be seen as an international responsibility. Yet,
although internationalization is in many circles seen as an indispensable tool in the search for
a resolution to internal conflicts (while others affirm the opposite), it does not mean that our
approach to internationalization is here a normative one. The conclusions drawn here, on the
effects of internationalization on the search for peace in Sudan may however potentially be
used in other contexts for prescriptive reasons, but it is not the objective here.

The pertinence of studying internationalization as an isolated and determinant variable is
because we can observe that different manifestations of internationalization more and more
interfere into conflict resolution processes, yet the emphasis in the discipline of conflict
solving is often to isolate a x or y local factor, or x or y things external mediators should do
and not do, instead of looking globally at how internationalization per se influences the
sensitive conflict and conflict resolution dynamics. The aim in this dissertation is first and
foremost to look at internationalization as a dependent variable, influenced by various factors
seen in the previous chapters – yet the great implications of this variable on its very
objective makes it difficult to oversee internationalization as an independent variable, in
turn influencing the dependent variable of conflict resolution.

The study of the internationalization processes of the Sudanese conflicts also puts into
evidence some factors, which although they might be specific for these cases, nevertheless
seem noteworthy in terms of general lessons on the influence of external actors in the search
for peace in internal conflicts. In this last chapter, it is the leverage of the internationalization,
and of the entrepreneurs of internationalization, from civil society activists to state level
diplomats, that will be examined. In other words, what has “internationalization” brought to
the conflict resolution efforts, defined here as the broad ensemble of responses proposed by

698 If we define internationalization as the process of internationalizing the responsibilities to solve internal
conflicts, then the ultimate objective is effectively the resolution of these conflicts.
the international community to put an end to the conflicts. How have the framings and the qualifications of the conflicts influenced the international responses proposed? The argument will here be twofold: firstly, the main contribution of the international activist networks has been their ability to impose their qualifications of the conflicts they have mobilized around, and this influences the following resolution process and the type of responses proposed by state actors. Secondly, once international diplomats decided to become engaged in the Sudanese peace processes, the way in which this support was organized and coordinated have had a considerable influence on the conflict resolution efforts. The focus of this last section will indeed be on the importance of so-called “groups of friends” in the facilitation, organization and success of international mediation initiatives.

A - Naming the game: the power of those imposing their qualification of the conflicts and the corresponding solution

An important aspect in the study of the framing of issues is what the framing of a problem says about the corresponding solution that is advocated. In other words, different narratives of conflicts implicitly or explicitly refer to different types of responses, and also advocate for the involvement of different types of actors. While some qualifications advocate for the involvement of humanitarian aid workers, other stress the importance of peacekeepers. Some narratives will put into evidence the importance of political negotiations between the parties involved, while others again will insist on the moral and ethical importance to “do justice” to the victims and send the perpetrators of crimes committed during the war to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Every “solution” that is advocated correspond to a qualification and a certain way of seeing the conflict: as a humanitarian issue, a security issue, a political conflict, or, lastly, a question of crimes against humanity. Hence, within the broader formal agenda, different agendas can be distinguished, appealing to different actors and solutions: the humanitarian agenda calling on humanitarian agencies, the negotiations agenda calling on international diplomats, facilitators and mediators, the security/protection agenda calling on an intervention or a peacekeeping mission, and finally the international justice agenda calling on the ICC to examine the criminal responsibilities.

Hence, observing the internationalization of the conflicts in Sudan is not only about how they go from being a lower to a higher priority on different formal agendas internationally, but
about what type of agenda they are set on. And one conflict may be set on different agendas at the same time, and result either in a synergy or a competition between the different agendas. Hence, the influence of the agenda setting entrepreneurs, within and outside Sudan, should not be measured simply quantitatively, in terms of how much they have weighed in formal decision making processes considering whether to deal with Sudan or not. Their influence should be appreciated through their capacity to frame a certain issue and impose a certain understanding of the situation. This understanding might then influence the way the conflict is "managed" within the governments and international organizations involved.

The qualification of the Darfur crisis as a "genocide" is probably the qualification that has triggered most attention and been the topic of most controversies. Other qualifications have however also contributed to forge the different responses to the situation in Darfur. Two controversies in the qualification of the conflict will be analyzed, first of all the humanitarianization versus the securitization of the conflict, and secondly, the criminalization versus the politicization of the conflict. Luc Boltanski defines the actions that witnesses of distant suffering can take in two categories: "paying" and "speaking".\footnote{Boltanski, \textit{op.cit.}, 17.} Both actions need a series of intermediaries to reach those who suffer (humanitarian organizations for example in the first case, and a public opinion and political institutions to respond in the second). However, they are based on clearly different ideas of the witnesses’ capacities to aid the distant victims: concrete, but individual action in the first case (in the sense that the "donations are aggregated, but not the donors")\footnote{Ibid, 18.} and more abstract, but collective actions in the second case. Both types of actions have been taken by the distant witnesses of the situation in Darfur. While not excluding the fact that individuals may have recourse to both types, the two categories are also useful to reflect on the controversies between the different responses advocated for Darfur. While a humanitarian approach to the conflict will ask well-off citizens in Western countries to finance humanitarian agencies to enable them to provide direct and basic assistance to the victims, a security approach to the conflict will give priority to the need to send peacekeepers, something citizens of Western democracies can increase their chances of achieving by "speaking out" and pressuring for such action to be taken. On the other side, while a political approach to the conflict, giving priority to the need to facilitate negotiations between the parties, requires "paying" for the holding of peace talks (although in
a more indirect fashion for the distant witnesses, since it is rather their tax money than their voluntary donations that will finance such facilitation initiatives), a judicial approach to the conflict, will require a "speaking" type of action rather than a "paying" type of action on behalf of the citizens in better-off countries. These two categories of action will structure the following analysis of the qualification process of the Darfur conflict. Finally, it will be argued that the timing and the international context in which a conflict emerges onto the international spotlight are crucial to determine the reach of the different qualifications and which qualifications become “dominant” over others.

1) Defining the stakes: between a humanitarianization and a securitization of the conflict

Both the conflict in South Sudan and the conflict in Darfur were at first ”discovered” by the international community as humanitarian crisis. It is in this field too that the international community responded at first, before eventually seeing that to stop the human suffering, the underlying political conflicts needed to be resolved as well. The greatest difference between the two conflicts however, is that the first one came to be defined as a political issue that could be solved through negotiations, whereas the other has been simultaneously defined as a criminal affair which should be solved through the means of international justice and as a political affair.

The protection of civilians and the humanitarianization of the conflict

The war in South Sudan was for a long time understood through the prism of the Cold War, and what ”mobilized” the international community at first, essentially through the alerts set out by Unicef, were the human suffering related to the 1984-85 famine. As seen in chapter two, the international engagement spurred at that time eventually led to the creation of the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). It was the result of negotiations and an agreement signed between the UN, the Sudanese government and the SPLA, however the essence of the agreement was the provision of humanitarian aid. The war continued throughout the 1990’s, as the OLS continued to pour humanitarian aid into South Sudan. The coup d’Etat in June 1989, a few months after the first deployment of humanitarian assistance through the OLS prevented further talks between the parties to take place.
Throughout the 1990’s, the conflict in South Sudan was mainly seen as one of the by-products of the Islamist policies of the regime in Khartoum, and was mainly treated as a humanitarian issue. The humanitarian response worked rather well, and attempts to push for negotiations were rare, as it implied negotiating with the more and more sanctioned and isolated regime. However, the lack of a thorough political analysis of the conflict itself and thus a lack of a proposed political solution to the conflict did not mean that the humanitarian framing was an apolitical one. The focus on the humanitarian side of conflicts, rather than their political causes, might well correspond to political choices on behalf of the international powers providing such aid. Choosing humanitarian assistance over other forms of intervention or facilitation may be either a substitute for political action or in some cases an instrument to hide politically motivated interferences in the conflict, to support one party in the internal balance of power. The analysis proposed by Séverine Auteserre mentioned earlier shows how the framing of the conflict in South Sudan essentially in humanitarian terms, and the adoption of US responses to the situation accordingly, also served the general US policy approach towards Sudan at the time. She argues that:

"humanitarian aid is one of the main channels of the US’s Sudan policy. To successive US governments, funding relief aid is not a “fig leaf” for political action but a real tool in the pursuance of the US’s perceived best, but conflicting, interests: containment of the Khartoum government, pursuit of the civil war within Sudan, strong support of the rebels, but one which is not too open, and not enough to enable them to win."

She further argues that "Sudan is constructed as a nutritional crisis in most academic, media and NGO reports, and that as a result, the majority of humanitarian assistance to South Sudan took the form of food aid. Furthermore, providing food aid to South Sudan was a useful tool for the US in its general ambition to contain Khartoum, all the while refusing to provide direct military assistance to the Southern rebels. She concludes with saying that:

“Food aid is especially useful: it directly counteracts Khartoum’s strategy (starving the South into submission) and directly helps the rebel movement and army in a number of ways (bringing them resources, as well as domestic and international legitimacy). Food aid also has the crucial advantage of fitting perfectly into Western prejudices about Africa (a starving continent dependent on the West) and on humanitarian aid (humanitarian aid is neutral, etc).”

701 Auteserre, op.cit.
702 Ibid.
703 Ibid.
Food aid thus served US political interests on many levels: strengthening the internal opposition to Khartoum, without helping them too much, nor too ostensibly, but also in appeasing its domestic constituencies concerned about the fate of the Southern Sudanese population affected by the war. As such, it wasn’t until a renewed interest in engaging with Khartoum in the early 2000’s, that a redefinition of the conflict was undertaken. Early signs of this willingness came about towards the end of the Clinton administration in 2000, yet it was during the early months of the Bush administration that a clear redefinition of the situation in South Sudan came about. Rapidly, the conflict went from being seen as a humanitarian crisis to be seen as a political conflict, opposing stakeholders with more or less legitimate claims, and thus a conflict that could be solved through negotiations.

When it comes to the war in Darfur, it too was first framed as a humanitarian crisis by diplomats and aid workers who first became aware of the situation, and the first responses took the form of humanitarian assistance. While it can be argued that providing humanitarian aid can be a substitute for political approaches to assist the parties in their search for a “way out” and a resolution to the conflict, the humanitarian aspect of conflicts is also what is most likely to attract the attention of foreign audiences, and thus also decision makers in these countries. The very first alerts triggering the agenda setting process are thus generally at least partly motivated by elements of human suffering.

The first activist demonstrations on Darfur however stressed the need to intervene in Darfur, in order to protect the civilians threatened by the attacks of government forces. Although the broad definition of the “protection of civilians” (PoC), as understood in recent debates in academia and among international organizations, includes humanitarian and development efforts, the concept is most often understood as the need to ensure physical protection of civilians against violent attacks. In other words, there was little focus among the activists on the need to support the provision of humanitarian assistance, nor on the relative success experienced within this facet of the international response to the crisis. It is certainly partly due to the fact that when activism really started to take shape, humanitarian aid had already started flowing into Darfur. Although important financial support from donors was still

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704 Sande Lie and de Carvalho, op.cit.
needed to provide the necessary assistance, it was not seen as the main priority by the activists.

Indeed, Darfur from 2004 and for the following years was generally presented in activist ads as the most neglected area on the planet, certainly to justify international action to ”save” the Darfuris. During the same time, Darfur came to host the world’s largest humanitarian operation. Somehow paradoxically, it was notably thanks to widespread activism and awareness around the situation, that it became relatively easy for aid organizations to find the needed funds, private or governmental, to finance their work on the ground. Before the expulsions in March 2009, around 13 000 humanitarian aid workers and one hundred different relief agencies worked in Darfur. Julie Flint argues in an op-ed in *The New York Times* in July 2007:

“The one bright light in the dismal international response to the slaughter and starvation in Sudan’s Darfur region has been a humanitarian effort that has kept more than 2 million displaced people alive. In the fifth year of the war, mortality levels among Darfuris reached by relief agencies are marginally better than they were before the war and lower than in the capital, Khartoum. In Southern Sudan, where conflict is stilled, children have higher death rates and lower school enrollment.”

The activists, who recognized the presence and the relative success of the humanitarian assistance in Darfur, often insisted that it was far from sufficient. Others equaled humanitarian aid with putting « a band-aid on a cancer », something barely efficient and not treating the real symptoms and causes of war. This view justified the advocacy groups’ focus on pressuring their governments and the UN to send peacekeepers to the war-torn area. Choosing to focus on security aspects over humanitarian aspects was certainly partly also due to the fact that the humanitarian assistance was the facet of the international response that actually seemed to work rather well when it came to “saving Darfur”.

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There were however some unintended consequences of picturing Darfur as the most neglected area on the planet and its population as entirely helpless and waiting for outside rescue. Visibly believing that “no one” was doing anything for Darfur, and believing that Western governments would take far too long before managing to put in place a protection force, a small French NGO in 2007 decided to take action in its own hands. The organization, calling itself the “Arche de Zoé”, or Zoe’s Ark, was created in the aftermath of the tsunami in South East Asia in December 2004, in order to rescue orphans of the disaster. In the spring 2007, it set its eyes on Darfur and started planning a “rescue operation”, consisting in taking orphans from the war in Darfur with them to France where families having paid large sums of money were waiting to adopt them. On October 25, 2007, six members of the NGO were arrested at the Abeché airport, in Eastern Chad, as they were preparing to take 103 children from the region, aged one to ten. It would soon be revealed that many of the children were Chadian and many were not orphans at all. A senior protection officer working with UNICEF in Chad, Jean-François Basse, reportedly told Reuters newsagency: “When the children came out of the plane, many had bandages on their legs and arms and heads, but later when they were taken off, there was nothing (no injuries) there. The operation had no official authorization and was severely condemned by French authorities, which had been aware of and tried to warn against the organization’s activities in the preceding months. The affair was also massively exploited by both Sudanese and Chadian authorities, rejecting the Western interventionism kidnapping their children. The affair seem to be a direct product of the general discourse on the population in Darfur as being in imminent danger and the international community as doing nothing to stop it. The end justified the means, in the eyes of the instigators of the initiative, who were well aware that they might get troubles with the authorities when returning to France, yet believing that what they were doing belonged to a higher moral ground.

Along a similar vein, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, as he took office in May 2007, called for the establishment of a humanitarian corridor into Darfur from Chad. This was before the principle of a hybrid mission had been accepted by the Sudanese government, but Kouchner argued for the application of the “right to intervene”. The initiative was criticized on many grounds, first and foremost as it seemed to be based on a vision of Darfur as entirely closed to humanitarian assistance, which was not the case. Secondly,

militarily securing such and access into Darfur could worsen the already tense relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena. The initiative was however soon blown off as the new government became more aware of the needs in Darfur and as progress was made towards an acceptance of a hybrid UN/AU peacekeeping mission.

**Competition or cooperation between (Western) capital-based and field-based actors?**

The relatively well-functioning humanitarian assistance, combined with continued alerts of the deteriorating situation, not only triggered reservations among activists arguing that this didn’t suffice to ”save” Darfur, it also triggered a vivid debate among activists and humanitarians. Contrary to a widespread belief that humanitarians on the ground and activists are necessarily playing on the same team, the international engagement for Darfur has shown a widening the gap between the two types of actors. The disagreement has been especially fierce on the issue of military intervention, which many humanitarians have been highly skeptical to, at least any intervention without a proper peace-agreement to implement, nor the consent of the Sudanese government. The activist community in the US and in Europe however for a long time made the demand for a military intervention or a peacekeeping mission their most important demand. The pressure for peacekeepers became especially strong after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja in May 2006. The fact that it was only signed by one out of three rebel leaders, and that the period following the signing ceremony actually witnessed increased violence on the ground with inter-tribal fighting, made many close observers of the conflict dismiss the DPA as worthless. These critiques would advocate for the organization of new peace negotiations with the rebel leaders who didn’t sign the first time, leaders of other newly emerged movements as well as representatives of the Darfuri civil society. For them, this would be the sole way to improve the security situation on the ground. Among these critiques, humanitarian organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), have frequently warned against the undesirable effects of aggressive campaigning against the Sudanese government, pointing to how they, as humanitarians, are the ones paying for this through increased controls over their work and the constant risk of being expelled from the country709. In turn, activists have regularly criticized the humanitarians for not taking a tougher stand against the Sudanese government.

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Jacky Mamou, president of the French NGO Médecins du Monde until 2000, and then honorary president, found himself in 2004 discussing with his colleagues on how to approach the Darfur crisis. His view was that they needed to speak out, to criticize and condemn the violations taking place. Many of his colleagues were however worried about the consequences of such proactive activism for the security of their mission and the aid workers in the field. This approach prompted Mamou to leave the humanitarian organization and create Urgence Darfour, an umbrella organization dedicated to activism on Darfur and very much the French equivalent to the Save Darfur Coalition, in February 2005.710

During the spring of 2007, a fierce debate took place in French media, essentially between the members of the Urgence Darfour coalition and representatives of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). While Urgence Darfour was calling for the "immediate" sending of an international force to Darfur in order to "efficiently protect the populations from a generalized massacre", MSF tried to warn that such an intervention might have dangerous consequences.711 Fabrice Weissman and Jean-Hervé Bradol of MSF then argued that the height of the killings in Darfur had already happened, in 2003-2004. A resurgence in violence since the partial signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement led to a new increase in mortality rates, however, not as dramatic as it had been in the first two years of the conflict. According to them, this was due to the simple fact that large parts of the areas hit by the new vague of violence were already emptied of their populations. Their main argument against an intervention, was the Sudanese government's opposition to it, which would make any forced intervention the equivalent of "a declaration of war".712

A few months later however, in June 2007, the Sudanese government agreed to the joint proposal from the UN and the AU for the deployment of a hybrid mission in Darfur. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 1769 on July 31, preparing for the deployment of 26,000 soldiers within the UNAMID mission, as a replacement of AMIS. The debate however put to the fore two very different ways of seeing both the conflict and the potential for assistance from the outside: on the one hand, it was seen as a situation needing

710 Interview, Jacky Mamou, President of Urgence Darfour, Paris, 29.02.2008
711 Bradol and Weissman, op.cit.
712 Ibid.
humanitarian aid first and foremost, encouraging political negotiations to end the source of the conflict. On the other hand, it was seen as a security issue, where what the threatened civilians first and foremost needed was physical and military protection to end the source of the suffering. David Rieff, in an article published in the Los Angeles Times, points out that this is a classic opposition and not a "Darfur-specific" phenomenon. As he sums up, "human rights groups want solutions to crises -- including military solutions if necessary -- whereas humanitarian relief NGOs seek to palliate the effects of war and ethnic cleansing, and they believe that outside military interventions make their position on the ground untenable because neutrality is at the core of the humanitarian enterprise".

Another issue around which activists and humanitarians have confronted each other is the question of imposing a no-fly zone over Darfur. It was seen as one of several possible attempts to stop the killings by preventing the government from dropping bombs from planes over Darfur. This claim gained currency during the presidential campaign in the US in 2007, when Senator Hillary Clinton argued that a no-fly zone was the only way to get the Sudanese regime’s attention. The international authority that would eventually be willing to impose the no-fly zone (unclear exactly who, the Americans? NATO?) would thus be authorized to shoot down Sudanese planes flying over Darfur. As such, it was perceived among activists and many US politicians, as potentially the most efficient tool to pressure the Sudanese government to accept an UN-African Union peacekeeping mission. However, as Julie Flint argues, the activists were "reading from an outdated script". As she writes in an op-ed in The New York Times in July 2007:

"During the height of the conflict in 2003-4, the worst violence in Darfur was caused by coordinated ground and air attacks against villages accused of supporting the rebels. But this year it has been caused by battles on the ground between Arab militias fighting one another over land and by attacks by rebels now aligned with the government. Not once this year has there been aerial bombing "before, during and after" these offensives, as Clinton claimed. Today, stopping military flights wouldn’t make much of a difference to the Darfuri people."

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713 Rieff, op.cit.
715 Ibid.
716 Ibid.
It would however make a great difference to them if all flights over Darfur were banned, as a large part of the humanitarian aid, up to 90% for some agencies, was then delivered by aircraft. Imposing a no-fly zone would make Darfur become a potential combat zone, and the UN would likely have restrained its humanitarian flights into Darfur. David Rieff in the *Los Angeles Times* also refers to humanitarian NGOs such as MSF or Action Against Hunger who at the time warned that imposing a no-fly zone would be done without the Sudanese government’s consent and thus the potential shooting down of a Sudanese plane could have disastrous consequences, triggering an escalation of violence and severely putting the humanitarian aid that millions of displaced depended on at risk.

2) Between the search for a political solution and a criminalization of the conflict

Approaching a conflict to propose facilitation efforts and support to peace negotiations requires a minimum recognition of the parties’ legitimacy, both as representative groups and as groups with more or less legitimate claims. In the case of the conflict in Darfur, such a perception has lacked for the parties on both sides of the negotiating table. Khartoum has been presented as criminally responsible and as the party that should be punished by international instances, while the rebel groups have been perceived as internally fragmented and with unclear political claims. The international mediators seem to have pushed the negotiations forward more because they themselves needed the war to end (and thus its roots: the rebels confronting the government, who ripostes, and so on), than because they believed in the claims of the parties and that a negotiated solution was possible.

The second civil war in South Sudan went from being non-existent on the international agenda of conflict resolution in its first years to becoming an issue of partisan Western support to the South and tough containment against the North. Finally, in the early 2000’s it became an item on the agenda for conflict resolution, through the convergence of two evolutions. First of all, the parties were “ripe” for resolution, they both wanted to find a way out as the war couldn’t continue without each party loosing more than they would win. Secondly, the need to solve the conflict through negotiations came to receive firm support on behalf of regional as well as international partners. The Darfur conflict however, was internationalized at a much faster rate and reached proportions beyond anyone’s expectations. While civil society actors in the US and Europe strongly contributed to raise awareness, they
indirectly contributed to put the conflict on an international agenda for conflict resolution through negotiations as well. Their own framing of the conflict however has continued to advocate more for sanctions and punishment of Khartoum, than for any form of engagement with the latter.

The only forms of engagement with Khartoum that the activists would advocate for, was the engagement and direct contact needed in order to obtain Khartoum’s consent for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. As the security agenda slowly advanced towards the deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur, the proponents of a political reading of the conflict, and thus a political resolution to it, have received a new challenger: the proponents of a judicial reading of the conflict, and thus the application of international criminal law in order to put an end to the conflict. Behind this international justice agenda lies an emerging international norm that certain war crimes and crimes against humanity are to be prosecuted in an international court and not through national mechanisms (from courts to negotiations), which are, according to the contexts, presented as unable and inappropriate to deal with the crimes committed.

**International justice as the “ultimate” way to end war crimes and prevent future ones**

Indeed, along with the evolution of the war in Darfur, there seems to have been a shift in the international spheres of conflict management. While in the couple of years following the recognition of the principle of the responsibility to protect in New York in September 2005, all the NGOs of conflict resolution spoke and wrote about was the question of how to apply the R2P to different conflict situations. The general discourse on the R2P, emphasizing the “responsibility” of the international community to “protect”, when sovereign states fail in their duty to protect their own citizens fitted perfectly with the emerging discourse on Darfur. Yet, just as the Darfur crisis was for long seen as a test-case for the proponents of the R2P, the perceived failure of the international community to effectively apply it in order to put an end to the crisis in Darfur is now used as the main proof of the concept’s untenability by its critics. The “new” principle in fashion today, seen as the priority in the face of new or intractable civil wars, is the need to fight impunity by putting potential cases of war crimes under the scrutiny of the ICC. The underlying idea is that punishing those responsible for crimes committed during wartime is the most efficient way to build peace and to securitize
the civilian populations affected by the war, and the best way to prevent future war crimes. Punishing those responsible for such crimes is also efficiently dealing with what chocks and concerns Western publics the most717.

The move from “responsibility to protect” to the need to fight against impunity does not mean that the two ideas are contradictory, simply that there has been a shift in the priorities of the same discourse. The priority given by the activist campaign to an intervention or to sending peacekeepers is closely linked with their qualification of the situation in Darfur as a ”genocide”, as a ”place where international crimes are committed” and not as a place where a ”political struggle takes place”. The immediate response according to them was to send peacekeepers, to protect the victims, but the solution advocated to actually stop the ”genocide” has been to prosecute those responsible for the crimes in front of the International Criminal Court. As seen in previous chapters, it was the first suspicions of genocide that forged the very strategy of attempting to produce the largest international outcry ever by civil society activists, along the logic that ”it is the silence that kills”. The credo ”never again” stipulates that if the international community is not left ignorant about the ongoing ”genocide”, then the “genocide” will not be able to continue. The focus on the term genocide has had a double meaning, the first one being the need for political recognition of the situation, in respect for the victims as well as to “name and shame” the perpetrators. The second meaning relies on the belief that if international leaders were brought to recognize the situation as a case of genocide, then an international intervention would be automatically authorized. While the activists in the US realized, after the high level declarations of government officials, that a formal recognition did not automatically trigger an intervention, the use of the ”G-word” has still been an efficient tool of pressure. Qualifying the situation as ”genocide” implies disqualifying all those who either turn away, do nothing or not enough to stop the ”atrocities”.

While US officials have since 2004 qualified the situation in Darfur as genocide, neither the UN nor the EU (nor individual EU member states) have adopted the term. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which was mandated by resolution 1564 to investigate

717 A few years ago, the International Crisis group, then headed by Gareth Evans, one of the main authors of the ICISS report, overwhelmingly focused on the R2P in its briefings and reports. Today, the organization is headed by Louise Arbour, a lawyer and former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. The organization today lists “peace and justice” among its key issues, and the section on the responsibility to protect is much harder to find on its website : http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/peace-justice.aspx (Accessed May 27, 2010)
“reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable\textsuperscript{718}. The report concluded that acts of genocide had not been committed, mainly due to the missing aspect of genocidal intent, however it insisted that:

“The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken as in any way detracting from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. Depending upon the circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity or large scale war crimes may be no less serious and heinous than genocide\textsuperscript{719}.”

The UN Commission of Inquiry thus got round the genocide definition dilemma. It certainly remained true to what the commission members had effectively observed on the ground, yet there was visibly a need to state that this did not in any way mean that the militias in Darfur and the Sudanese government were exempted from the gravest accusation of all. The commission members could not find enough proof of intent in legal terms, however they expressively state that what has happened in Darfur should be seen as just as grave. The same rhetoric was adopted by most European actors as well. The symbolic power of the term genocide however gives little place for nuances. Despite the findings of the UN commission of inquiry, and despite many political experts and researchers’ insistence that what had happened in Darfur did not amount to genocide, the general impression the public is left with is still the picture of a situation that is either “potentially a genocide”, “almost a genocide”, or at least a situation that resembles what happened in Rwanda. Most activists however easily rejected the conclusions of the UN report, by saying it was a way for the UN to avoid its responsibilities, as it would have much more pressured to intervene without the Sudanese government’s approval, had the findings concluded that a genocide had/was taking place.

The activists seeking a strong international intervention in Darfur thus built up an entire ”genocide” narrative, with clearly distinguishable groups of victims and perpetrators. Attempts to nuance or provide alternative visions, no matter if they also took into account the


severity of the violations, were quickly ascribed as attempts to deny the reality and helping
the international community to escape from its responsibilities. The extent to which attempts
to provide alternative narratives were overrun by the dominant and simplistic narratives is
visible in Alex de Waal’s account of how he changed his mind about qualifying the situation
in Darfur as ”genocide”, or as he put it ”genocide by force of habit”. In 2004, he wrote in the
London Review of Books that the violence in Darfur was a result of the ”routine cruelty of a
security cabal, its humanity withered by years in power, it is genocide by force of habit”. He
however reckoned that the intent of the Sudanese government was a campaign of counter-
insurgency, and not genocide, but argued that this did not exclude the fact that ”acts of
genocide” had been committed. In 2009, he writes about how he changed his mind
progressively. Among the reasons for this shift, he refers to the ”law”, as lawyers convinced
him that the ”intent” was an essential component to qualify a crime as ”genocide”, as well as
the ”facts”, which changed as violence dropped drastically in 2005. Interestingly, he also
refers to ”politics”, or what could also be qualified as a dispute over the right to qualify the
situation:

”Among the activists who called it genocide in those early days, some were doing
so less because they had studied the facts and the law and mostly because they
believed it was the best way to get a military intervention. This was intellectually,
politically and ethically wrong. However, my efforts to establish an alternative
genocide narrative, true to the realities of Sudan, and compatible with finding
effective solutions, didn’t get far – it was swamped by the powerful simplicities of
the conventional story that presumed a genocidal plan and had international
military intervention as its only acceptable outcome.”

In other words, one of the reasons for abandoning the efforts to provide an alternative
genocide narrative was that it would too easily be assimilated with a stronger and much less
nuanced narrative seeking to solve the Darfur problem by intervening militarily. It shows the
powerful reach of the black-and-white and interventionist genocide discourse, seeing anything
else than intervention to protect (the victims) and to punish (the perpetrators) as merely means
of giving the perpetrators extra time.

720 Alex de Waal, “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap”, London Review of Books, 26, 15, August 5, 2004,
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de-waal/counter-insurgency-on-the-cheap (Accessed May 5, 2010)
721 Alex de Waal, “Genocide by force of Habit ?”, Making Sense of Sudan, SSRC Blogs, March 23, 2009,
722 Ibid.
Ending the conflict and ensuring a just peace

Activists, especially those related to the Human rights organizations, insist on the necessity of justice to be established, arguing that a peace agreement is not worth anything if it does not bring along a *just* peace, restoring the rule of law and punishing those who’ve committed criminal acts during the war. The approach is still entrenched in the logic of the “Protection of Civilians”, or of placing oneself on the side the “victims” of the war, but it also follows the logic of “giving the good example”. As Luis Moreno-Ocampo insists: “It is about putting an end to impunity and thus contributing to the prevention of future crimes.” Activists from organizations such as the Genocide Intervention Network or the Enough project also argue that indicting those who are responsible for the crimes committed in Darfur is at the same time a way of deterring future criminals from taking up a similar enterprise.

Whether defining Darfur as a security issue or as a criminal issue, the international activist movement has widely succeeded in qualifying not only the very problems in Darfur, but also the appropriate solution. As clear, unambiguous and black-and-white accounts of the conflict were put to the fore in order to attract attention, from the public and from policy makers, little space was left to nuanced narratives or alternative and critical approaches. While the security agenda provides solutions to “heal the wounds”, the judicial agenda provides solutions to remove the source of the problem, by prosecuting and punishing the criminals. What the two approaches have in common however, is a tendency to neglect less visible, less time efficient and more complex approaches such as peace talks to find a politically negotiated solutions. What has often been put forward in the Darfur context is how the justice approach and the peace approach have become competing responses to the crisis. Andrew Natsios argued shortly after the international arrest warrant on President Bashir that it would neither serve peace nor justice for Sudan. In order for the security, and especially the judicial agenda, to be efficient and unchallenged, political talks have been disqualified by activists as naïve attempts to treat a government responsible for international war crimes as an “honest broker”.


This approach has been possible notably thanks to media and human rights organizations framing of the conflict as an apolitical one, where victims are nothing but victims, and where perpetrators seem to have no other (political) motive in mind than racially grounded violence. Some even reject the term “conflict”, generally used by observers and researchers as the most “neutral” term in a series of other terms such as “war”, “crisis”, “civil war”, “ethnic cleansing”, “genocide” and so on. The activists most bent on an apolitical representation of the crisis argue that the term “conflict” encapsulates a sense of political confrontation, and a confrontation between two (more or less equal) parties. As Bernard-Henry Lévy put it in 2007, “Stop talking about ‘conflict’! When a government is fighting its own population, when, in certain areas, it liquidates it and when this population is as perfectly destitute as the civilians massacred in Darfur are, then we are no longer in presence of a conflict, nor of a war, nor of anything like it.”

3) Timing the internationalization: international context matters

The security approach, the judicial approach, and the activist and human rights groups’ strategy to obtain maximum attention all converge around one qualification of Darfur: as the first ”genocide” of the 21st century. However, why was this specific qualification, as well as the entire narrative surrounding it, so successful? Apart from the unforeseen mobilization of a wide range of every-day human rights advocates and new-in-the-game activists specifically mobilized on the situation in Darfur, a large part of the success of this qualification is its timing and the international context in which it emerged. Being qualified as ”ethnic cleansing” and as a potential ”new Rwanda” on the eve of the ten-year commemoration of the Rwandan genocide had a tremendous effect on the echo the genocide narrative would receive.

Implications of defining Darfur as “the new Rwanda”

The first alerts voiced by high-ranking UN officials on Darfur, in the Spring of 2004, coincided with a renewed debate on the failures in Rwanda and the commemoration of the ten years since the genocide in the Great Lakes region. As seen in the precedent chapters, the first explicit and implicit comparisons with Rwanda made by high-ranking UN authorities were quickly picked up by journalists and activists alike. The qualification of a « new Rwanda »

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was efficient in striking the Western countries still troubled about the consequences of their non-intervention in Rwanda, and as such it hit where it hurt the most. As seen above, the qualification of “genocide” is far from having been unanimously adopted. On the contrary, it has triggered an intense debate around the appropriateness, as well as the implications, of calling Darfur “genocide”. Some have even deplored the way this debate has attracted more attention and focus than the very search for solutions, as Scott Straus wrote in early 2005:

“Much of the public debate in the United States and elsewhere, however, has focused not on how to stop the crisis, but on whether or not it should be called a “genocide” under the terms of the Genocide Convention. Such a designation, it was long thought, would inevitably trigger an international response.”

While the “genocide” qualification was not applied by all international stakeholders, and while it did not automatically trigger an international intervention, the qualification nevertheless raised the stakes and contributed to a stronger international response. An important part of the general picture that has been dressed of Darfur over the past few years however is not only the picture of a genocidal situation, conveying the image of a strongly asymmetric power balance. An almost as important part of the picture is the qualification of being a “new Rwanda”. This does not only refer to the similarities the international advocacy community sees between Darfur and Rwanda in terms of an African “genocide”, “ethnic violence” and asymmetry between the parties. The qualification also encapsulates the entire “Rwanda narrative”, with the condemnations against the international community and especially the Western powers, for failing to stop the killings. By invoking Rwanda, the activists have not only qualified Darfur as “another African genocide”, but also simultaneously called Western governments and heads of state for intervention. The situation in Rwanda in the beginning of the 1990’s was, like all conflicts, a complex one, with a civil war evolving into a genocide in the spring of 1994. However, the main lesson retained from Rwanda by human rights groups, as well as the Western public opinions, and transmitted to the younger generations, is how the international community failed to intervene. The message sent when invoking Rwanda to describe Darfur, is that to avoid the public and international shame that followed the failure to “protect”, to “react”, to “intervene” in 199, a strong international response should be mounted to stop the atrocities in Darfur. As seen in previous chapters, part of the lesson drawn from this narrative was that State leaders 1) said they didn’t understand what was happening before it was too late, 2) weren’t pressured by constituencies

726 Straus, op.cit., 123.
at home to do anything, and 3) didn’t want to recognize what was happening as a “genocide” while the massacres were going on. Each of these lessons have to a large part influenced the very strategies of the Darfur movement: focusing on letting everyone know what was happening, state leaders included, so that no one could say that they didn’t know, encouraging citizen pressure on their elected representatives, and finally seeking to make heads of states recognize the situation as “genocide”, since, to paraphrase the two advocates from Africa Action, for effective action to be taken, Washington must say the word727.

However the comparison with Rwanda carries with it some shortcomings. The condemnations against the international community’s failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda is not only an accusation against the failure to intervene, it is an accusation against the international presence (French, Belgian and UN troops) that withdrew when the violence escalated. Indeed, the great difference between Rwanda and Darfur is that the international community was heavily involved in Rwanda when the violence broke out, while Darfur was pretty much ignored by the international community before the violence escalated in 2003. In Rwanda, the forces present failed to alert the rest of the international community and instead left the Rwandans on their own. In other words, it was not only a failure to intervene to protect victims of a distant conflict, it was a failure to protect victims of mass massacres in a place where foreign troops were already present. However, the idea of Rwanda as the place where the international community first and foremost did not want to intervene has also contributed to strengthen the idea that the international community should intervene in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur has often been qualified as a ”genocide in slow motion”, because the killings have gone on for several years, contrary to the Rwandan genocide, which was over in a matter of weeks. However, it is not only the pace of the killings which distinguish Darfur from Rwanda, it is the pace of the reactions. On the one hand, the international response to Rwanda came all too late, also considering the fact that international actors, notably the UN, were already present in the country. However, an international peacekeeping mission was in place in the end of June, barely three months after the mass killings started. As for Darfur, it reached the international headlines and the agenda of the UN Security Council a whole year after the first large scale rebel attack and the first massive retaliations by the government forces. Darfur in fact reached the international headlines just as mortality rates were starting to drop drastically.

Following this formal agenda setting, the security and peacekeeping was left to the African Union, while the UN didn’t start to deploy troops until almost five years after. The duration of both the unfolding of the conflict, the insistence in activist ads that “the genocide is still going on” as well as the hesitation of the international powers and international organizations on the appropriate response to adopt have been constitutive factors permitting the international activist movement to build up. While some question retrospectively why there was no such public engagement in favor of Rwanda, an important part of the answer is that there was barely any time for the international human rights and activist community to organize protests or initiatives destined to rise awareness rising before it was all over. The time during which the Darfur crisis has unfolded under the international spotlight, while public protests and official condemnations kept multiplying, has also influenced the number and types of international players who have become involved in the international search for peace in Darfur.

B - International diplomatic responses, between competition and cooperation in the search for peace

The general qualifications that have been used to describe and explain the wars in Sudan have affected not only their place on the international agenda and the relative importance given to the different attempts to resolve them, but they have also clearly influenced the type of solutions proposed. The difference between the internationalization of the war in South Sudan and the war in Darfur, not only relies on the levels and types of activist mobilization they have generated, but also on the types of diplomatic responses that have been built up. In other words, the states deciding to engage in the peace efforts, have they come together to coordinate their responses or does each state or international organization push forward separate policies? A major difference can indeed be noted between the diplomatic group of friends constituted as a support for the peace process in South Sudan, and the relative lack of coordination between the international parties mobilized for Darfur.

The multiple efforts of civil society movements, within and outside Sudan, have together contributed to make South Sudan and Darfur the priorities they have been on the international agendas over the past few years. Some differences between the two conflicts are however notable. The Southern conflict’s path to the international agenda in the early 2000’s went
through the US government’s decision to change its general Sudan policy in favor of pushing for and facilitating peace negotiations, an approach that initially went against what the South Sudan lobbies advocated for. The Darfur crisis’ path to the international agenda however has to a much larger extent been guided by activist mobilization and political leaders’ eagerness to ”show” they were doing something. As seen in previous chapters, the Darfur crisis has also been much more defined as a humanitarian crisis and a security issue, than a political conflict. These different paths towards the international agenda have also influenced the way the conflicts have been dealt with, the solutions that have been proposed and the types of international partners who have been involved. In the following section, the way activist pressure has influenced the policy priorities towards Darfur will first be examined. It will be argued that this pressure has also indirectly contributed to forge a policy of activating all channels of international responses at the same time, in order to maximize the chances of success. This should first and foremost be understood in relation with the usage of the term “genocide” to describe the situation in Darfur, hence making it become an issue most Western powers and the UN could not afford to disregard. The result, however, has been a competition between the priorities and the responses proposed. Secondly, the coordination and the cooperation between the parties involved in the search for peace in Sudan will be examined. This section will show how a large part of the success of the peace negotiations to end the war in South Sudan was the continued pressure and support by a small “group of friends”, a type of group which has lacked in the international efforts to solve the Darfur crisis.

1) Official responses to activist qualifications

How has the pressure from activist groups influenced the policy responses adopted towards Darfur? Besides the fact that they have maintained a pressure, to keep ”Darfur” as a priority on the foreign policy agenda, to what extent have the activist pressure also influenced the very policy priorities that have been made towards Sudan as well as the responses adopted? As seen in chapter VI, the activist community managed to raise the pressure on the policy makers in the US, who spent large amounts of political capital to “deal with” Darfur, while favoring concrete solutions that would be visible to the public. The testimony provided by officials within the US executive as well as within the UN provide an interesting picture of how public mobilization has not only increased the very resources spent on ”responding to Darfur”, it has also shaped the very types of responses adopted.
Securitization of the responses to the conflict

The issues of a forced military intervention as well as a no-fly zone that some activists advocated for eventually faded away as concrete progress was achieved on the issue of sending peacekeepers to the region. But the continued public and activist pressure on this question, requesting that peacekeepers should be deployed immediately (and if the Sudanese government refused, then more sanctions and pressure should be applied), had a direct effect on the shaping of policy priorities in Washington, as well as in other Western capitals. As the previously quoted State Department official explains, an estimated 90% of his and his colleagues’ time spent on Sudan dealt with issues of peacekeeping. The pressure to send peacekeepers was so strong from the activist constituency, that it became the priority issue for the representatives in Congress, who in turn set the order of priorities for the executives at the State Department. The latter, following the situation on the ground closely, at the same time expressed a desire to put more efforts into facilitating a relaunch of the peace talks. The pressure to focus on the peacekeeping issue however overshadowed any other issue, especially less concrete and less visible ones, as the former UN official explains. Two considerations seem to have led to this securitization of the responses to the Darfur crisis. Firstly, the combination of the norm of the international community’s responsibility to protect and the perception of the Darfuris as defenseless victims, made physical protection provided by the international community seem as the only appropriate and moral answer. Secondly, the activist pressure triggered a search among policy makers for the most visible and “demonstrable” responses, favored over more abstract, time-demanding, and complex processes such as peace negotiations.

When it comes to the actual deployment of peacekeepers however, the pressure generated by activist mobilization seems to have lost some of its effect. Despite a stated willingness to support the AU/UN hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID) within most Western powers, it has been a struggle for the UN to find enough equipment and resources for the troop deployment.

728 A range of publications have dealt in recent years with the concept of “securitization” and the new ways of understanding security after the end of the cold war. The literature is abundant, but some references have been studied here to better understand some of the key concepts. However, “securitization” in the context of internationalization of conflicts as conceptualized here is a distinct process from the securitization usually referred to in this field – however there seems to be close inter-connections. See notably: Olivier Borraz, Les politiques du risque, (Paris: Les Presses de SciencesPo, 2008), 294; J. Peter Burgess (ed), The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, (London, New York: Routledge, 2010), 316; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 237.
In June 2009, that is 18 months after the beginning of the deployment of UNAMID, only 68% of the troops were deployed\textsuperscript{729}. Whether this is the result of the limits of the influence of activist coalitions on “real politics” or simply a loss of momentum within the activist pressure-executive priorities nexus is hard to evaluate, although it seems to be a bit of both. Although activists’ influence on the actual deployment in the field, with all the complexities it carries, is indeed more limited than their influence on their own policy makers at home, the fact that it suddenly became so hard to find material and funds for the same governments who just before had fought so hard for the peacekeeping mission to be accepted seems to indicate something else. The activist movement indeed lost some of its momentum once the hybrid mission had been accepted by resolution 1769, the issue around which it has focused so much energy. It seems that once an issue is driven up on the agenda by activist pressure, it remains dependent on continued pressure throughout the process, not only in the decision-making, but in the implementation as well. Also, shortly after the beginning of the deployment of troops in Darfur, another issue came to the fore, taking over as the new “appropriate and moral” answer to the crisis: the accusations of the chief prosecutor of the ICC.

**Judiciarization of the international response to the conflict**

As seen above, another process of qualification of the conflict and the appropriate solutions to be applied is the criminalization of the violence and the judiciarization of the solutions. This process has accompanied, rather than competed with the security approach, but has in the past few years taken the frontstage of the international responses to the Darfur crisis. The formal setting on the judicial agenda of the Darfur case resulted from a series of consecutive events. First of all, following the conclusions of the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur, although claiming that the intent of genocide could not be proved, it did not exclude that “acts with genocidal intent\textsuperscript{730}” may have been committed on an individual basis. “Whether this was the case in Darfur, however, is a determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case basis\textsuperscript{731}”, the authors of the report wrote. This remark was picked up notably by French diplomats, who drafted the proposal for resolution 1593, which on March 31\textsuperscript{e}, 2005,


\textsuperscript{731} Ibid.
referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court\textsuperscript{732}.

Once the ICC was seized of the case however, its investigations were carried out independently of any state or international organizations’ preferences, although constrained by the restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government. Notably, the decision to accuse the Sudanese president himself of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is a decision taken by the prosecutor, and him alone. Whether he has been influenced by certain policy makers and activists eager to see the top of the Sudanese leadership be prosecuted for the crimes committed, or not, remains subject to speculations. Some critics of Luis Moreno-Ocampo have made the remark that the ICC as well as the prosecutor himself needed a “powerful” action in order to prove the competence of the young international court, as well as for Ocampo to show he would not fall short of accusing those responsible for the crimes committed, even if they reveal to be state leaders. What is certain is that once the prosecutor made public his decision to accuse the Sudanese president in the Summer 2008, the judicial process had a direct effect on the other international initiatives to put an end to the conflict. First of all, it intervened at a moment where little progress was made on these other levels (slow deployment of UNAMID, no new negotiations between the warring parties since May 2006), and as such relieved state leaders and international officials in loss of impetus on their efforts towards Darfur. The accusation and the international arrest mandate were symbolically the strongest international actions against the Sudanese regime Western leaders could imagine, showing their constituencies that at the end, strong action was being taken, without being themselves behind the diplomatic complication entailed by the accusation.

The invocation of the ICC has led to a widening gap between the “peace”-approach and the “justice”-approach to the Darfur conflict. Proponents of the first argue that the arrest warrant on President Bashir is an obstacle to peace negotiations, while proponents of the second argue that peace without justice is not worth anything, while crystallizing the culpability of the atrocities around the personality of the president. The fundamental issue is that of the confusing messages conveyed by the international community to the different stakeholders in the conflict. How can it simultaneously hope to negotiate, that is be in a transactional relationship with Khartoum, all the while seeking to judge the same stakeholders in an

international court? How can it simultaneously seek to arrest and judge the head of state all the while encouraging rebel leaders to negotiate with representatives of the same head of state? The competition between the different international diplomats, state and citizen diplomats alike, to win the qualification battle has resulted in a no-win situation, where the different priorities end up in a competing relationship, preventing each priority from progressing. As David Lanz puts it:

“resources are scarce and effective conflict management requires priorities. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan.”

In other words, the multitude of “must do’s” activists and other players have pressured for simultaneously has led to an impasse on every level more than real but not necessarily visible results on some levels, one at a time. The ICC prosecutor’s accusations of crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of genocide against president Bashir, in July 2008, certainly also served the interests of heads of state and UN officials, in loss of impetus in their responses to the situation in Darfur. If not a substitute for other types of responses, the ICC accusation came as a strong and powerful blow against the Sudanese regime at a time where diplomatic engagements had reached a high level of confusion around how to best respond to the crisis.

2) The role of “group of friends” – what are good friends?

Not only the different international responses set out to put an end to the ongoing conflict in Darfur ended up being competing priorities, instead of creating synergy effects, the international players involved in the search for peace have themselves ended up competing on several issues rather than cooperating, dividing the tasks and ranking the priorities. A comparison with the resolution of the Southern conflict puts into evidence several factors explaining the success of the international efforts deployed in that process and the, for the time being, failure to resolve the conflict in Darfur.

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733 Lanz (2008, FRIDE), op.cit.
Some conditions for failure and success of international mediation efforts drawn from the Sudanese peace processes

A first element pertains to the internal dynamics, as explored in chapter VI, and consists of the readiness of the parties to negotiate and to settle around a compromise, the state that Zartman refers to as the "ripeness" for resolution. International mediators can encourage the parties to negotiate, inform them on the benefits of negotiating over those of warring, and even threaten with sanctions to push the parties towards the negotiating table. But as long as the parties are not ready to talk, or rather, as long as they fundamentally believe they can achieve more on the battleground than through negotiations, no mediator will obtain any sustainable agreement. The study of the international efforts to solve the conflicts in South Sudan and in Darfur also reveal the importance of external mediators granting the principal responsibility to the parties themselves. As a member of the government delegation to the Naivasha negotiations put it, "they (the international mediators) were catalysts, and they accelerated the process, but they were not the ones who made the peace." What he stresses is the importance of the parties’ own willingness to move forward in the negotiation process. Indeed, the parties seemed definitely more ripe for resolution when the North-South negotiations started in 2002, than what the parties to the Darfur peace talks were in 2006 and after. However, this does not mean that "ripeness" is something that only comes with time, parties to a conflict can move in and out of a state of ripeness, be more or less ripe for resolution at different points in time, and as said above, international mediators can to a certain extent “help” them move in the direction of increased ripeness. In Darfur, the parties seem to have reached different levels of ripeness at different points in time, and thus never really reaching the “mutually hurting stalemate”.

Another element distinguishing the international efforts to support the peace process in the South from those in Darfur pertains to external dynamics, or more precisely the international partners engaged in the efforts to put an end to the conflicts. South Sudan benefited from the engagement of a small group of states, committed to facilitate the negotiations and to support the IGAD framework. Darfur however has not benefited from any kind of defined and coordinated group, instead many more states and international organizations have wanted to have their share in the process. As explained above, this should be understood in the context

734 Interview, Abderrahmane Ibrahim el Khalifa, member of the NCP, lawyer and legal advisor, member of the government delegation to the negotiations in Naivasha, Khartoum, 22.11.2007
of the high political and moral stakes in the internationalization of the Darfur crisis, linked to the “genocide” narrative. The idea that informal, but clearly defined “groups of friends” may play a significant but positive role in the resolution of internal conflicts has been put into practice for several years, gaining currency after the end of the Cold War, but has only recently been conceptualized and studied by scholars. Theresa Whitfield has studied different “groups of friends” within the UN, defined as restricted but informal groups supporting the Secretary General’s initiatives to search for peace. She argues that although the impact of groups of friends may vary from conflict to conflict, they have become part of a new post-cold War system of global security governance and a new tool for conflict resolution. The Human Security Report of 2005, which created many headlines for concluding that the number of inter- and intra-state wars has decreased since the end of the Cold War, singled out the efforts of coordinated groups of friends as the most significant factor contributing to this decrease. According to Whitfield, the idea of “groups of friends” was first identified in the works of Michael Doyle and others in the mid-1990’s, on Cambodia and El Salvador.

Some of the benefits of groups of friends on conflict resolution processes were identified as their leverage on the parties, the sharing of information, practical help, technical and other types of assistance, attention given to the conflict, as well as resources and strategic coordination of the peace process. Whitfield insists that the engagement of groups of friends should not be treated as a measurable variable, however she points out some factors which, according to her observations, are important for the work of groups of friends: the regional environment (whether there are cross-border conflicts in addition to the internal conflicts), whether there are regional powers with certain interests in the outcome of the conflicts), the nature of the parties to the conflict (non-state and state-actors, level of international legitimacy), the composition of the groups of friends (size, mixture) as well as the timing of the formation of such groups. As for the composition of the groups, the importance of the size is reflected in the “perennial balancing act between the efficiency of a

738 Whitfield, op.cit
small group and the legitimacy offered by a broad representation of states. The composition of the different groups she has studied (in support of the peace processes in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Georgia/Abkhazia, Western Sahara and East Timor) reflects a combination of "Security Council members (including the five permanent members), interested regional actors, and midsized donor states or helpful fixers with experience of the conflict.

These various factors have also influenced the conflict resolution process of the Sudanese conflicts. The regional environment, such as the proxy war between Sudan and Chad, has severely hampered the conflict resolution efforts in Darfur. As seen in previous chapters, the rebel groups in South Sudan and in Darfur have benefited from different types of international support, granting them more or less legitimacy. Based on the overall observation of the internationalization process of these conflicts, as well as on interviews with different types of stakeholders in Sudan (members of official delegations to the negotiations, civil society and human rights activists, lawyers), this last section will argue that the most important contribution of external parties to a peace processes is threefold: they can pressure the parties (on the condition that they have a certain level of leverage on them), they can play the role as guarantors of a (future) peace agreement, and lastly, they can assist and facilitate the peace negotiations with their expertise in different areas.

The use of the carrot and the stick: external actors with leverage on the belligerents

The main idea behind the concept of the "carrot and the stick" in international negotiations, is that external mediators may use incentives and pressure/threats in order to alter the belligerents’ calculations and make them favor peace negotiations over the battleground. While non-state actors and facilitators may play a positive role in encouraging the belligerents to go to the negotiating table, state actors have the possibility to offer incentives that go beyond the mere compensation that a future "peace" in itself constitutes. State issued mediators may advance promises of financial and technical aid in a post-conflict situation, or more simply, but at least as importantly, they may promise international recognition, the (re)establishment of diplomatic bonds or the suppression of already existing sanctions. The

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739 Ibid, 4.
740 Ibid, 14.
effect of the incentives advanced increases with the leverage the external actors have on the parties, and the leverage depends on the extent to which the compensation or the “carrot” offered is something the belligerents’ desire.

During the North-South peace talks, the US had real leverage on the Sudanese government, as the latter’s greatest desire was a lifting of US sanctions and international recognition, which would go through improved diplomatic relations with Washington. The UK also had some leverage, but didn’t have such a strained relationship with Khartoum as the US had from the outset. The UN as the world body has also had a certain leverage throughout the internationalization of the two Sudanese conflicts, however within the UN Security Council, Khartoum has often been defended by countries such as China and Russia, as well as Pakistan and Qatar. When international efforts to mount a UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur dragged on, China came to be described by the international advocacy movement, and some diplomats, as the sole State with a real leverage on Sudan. In fact, a central obstacle in the international efforts towards Sudan the past few years has been that the carrots and the sticks have been used inconsistently by some, and in an uncoordinated manner among the different external actors intervening. The result has been that Khartoum has received contradictory messages, making the option of "wait-and-see” become an easy exit strategy. Indeed, not only the promises of compensation have to be desired by the belligerents in order for the pressure to have an effect, the threats also have to be perceived as credible by the actors whose behavior is to be altered.

In the case of South Sudan, the international mediators came in at a suitable moment when both parties were ready to go to the negotiating table and actively sought a negotiated peace as the best and only issue to the conflict. In the process leading up to the Naivasha negotiations, the three countries constituting the troika, US, UK and Norway, all played different, but complementary roles in persuading the parties to come together at the negotiating table as well as pressuring them to move forward in the negotiations by accepting to give concessions. Norway had good relations with the South and the leadership in the SPLM, which enabled them to pressure and encourage them in the negotiations. The UK had a direct line of communication with Khartoum stemming from its historical ties with the country, and thus had a relatively good audience there. The US, although widely perceived to be more supportive of the Southerners than the ruling elite in Khartoum, did however have
leverage on both parties. An important aspect to take into account here is that at that time Khartoum showed a real desire to break out of its international isolation.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur however, it seems that the ruling elite in Khartoum has felt that no-matter what it did (giving concessions, signing a peace agreement with the South or proposing to negotiate with the rebellion in Darfur), it would always be threatened with more sanctions. While the restrained group of friends supporting the Naivasha peace talks managed to have a balanced level of pressure on the different parties, the same division of labor has not existed in the case of Darfur. It’s not only about the amount of pressure as it is a matter of who exerts what type of pressure. In Darfur, Western powers and the UN have all exerted a high level of pressure on all parties, the Darfur rebel groups and the government, instead of those with a real leverage respectively exerting pressure on that party. As the non-signatories of the DPA have since 2006 been pressured to return to the negotiating table, the government has, at least on the surface, showed itself as willing to talk. It has however enabled the war to continue on the ground, and the pressure addressed against the rulers in Khartoum has rather addressed the need to end the aerial attacks in Darfur and to disarm the janjaweed, as well as the need to give concessions to the rebels in order for the negotiations to become attractive for them. The main issue is thus not the level of pressure, but the way it has been exerted. Yet, as the pressure has revealed to not have the desired effects, the reaction has often been to heighten the level of pressure instead of reorganizing it and rethinking its underlying mechanisms.

Teresa Whitfield explains that there is a certain prestige attached to the involvement in groups of friends, offering states a ”significant opportunity to maintain a front-row seat in the diplomatic process”. Thus, especially when it comes to highly publicized and mediatized conflicts such as the one in Darfur, the pressure to be one of the ”friends” contributing to a future resolution of the conflict may be high. She also insists that even for the most devout international actors, seeking to promote peace and security, there will always be a part of self-interest:

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741 Interview, Kjell Hødnebo, Senior Advisor to the Regional section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 18.05.2006

742 Whitfield, op.cit., 8.
"States motivated by the most exemplary of motives – like the UN secretariat, or nongovernmental peacemakers – will always, for example, have an interest in raising their international standing through their successful participation in a peace process. Pressure to be included as a Friend will therefore be high, and the potential for cooperation will be vulnerable to institutional and other rivalries as well as the capacity of conflict parties to shop around among multiple actors vying to engage them\textsuperscript{743}."

The stakes to find an issue to the Darfur crisis have been raised continually since its outbreak, so that it was quickly not only a matter of doing good by helping to resolve a devastating civil war, but also a matter of domestic politics in many of the Western countries engaged. This pressure has effectively led the international parties seeking to be part of the mediation efforts to find themselves in a competing relationship, not necessarily to exclude other mediators, but each and everyone has wanted to be part of the efforts and the potential future “success” of the resolution of the conflict. As the war has dragged on, and the possibilities for an impending successful issue have seemed more and more distant, international mediators have also disengaged.

As for the effects of activism on the parties’ positions, the often aggressive campaigning against Khartoum internationally has boosted the self-esteem of the rebels. A US State Department official remarked that the great amount of mobilization internationally against Khartoum made the rebels feel they had massive international support in their back\textsuperscript{744}. While being strongly pressured themselves in Abuja, it may have made them less willing to make concessions afterwards thinking that either a victory on the battlefield would be possible, if not, at least new negotiations should not be entered unless they found themselves in a more advantageous position compared to Khartoum. Aware of the international rejection against their number one enemy, the rebels have felt comforted by the idea that if they manage to take over power in some way, they would likely benefit from strong international support. The leader of a Washington based advocacy NGO said in May 2008, shortly after the failed attack of JEM troops on Khartoum, that he only regretted “that they did not succeed in their attempt\textsuperscript{745}”. It was not a testimony of particular support for the JEM, as he seemed unaware of the fact that the JEM is mainly composed of Islamists; it was rather a testimony of the extent of rejection of the Sudanese regime: any movement trying to replace it would be a better

\textsuperscript{743} Ibid, 9.
\textsuperscript{744} Interview, KE, State Department official, Washington DC, 23.04.2008
\textsuperscript{745} Interview, official from a Washington based advocacy group
alternative. While his opinion certainly represents a minority within the activist community, at least few are those who would explicitly say that they would like the rebels to take over by a coup, it however says something about how the crisis has come to be seen. Since the ICC prosecutor has accused the Sudanese president became accused of war crimes and genocide, it has become even less interesting for the rebels to negotiate with their adversary. A young student in Khartoum, affiliated with one of the rebel groups in Darfur, said in 2009, "it is good that the international community has accused the president, now they have to come and arrest him".

However, not only has the rebel groups’ demands and pre-conditions for negotiations increased (while JEM has negotiated with Khartoum in Doha since 2008, the leader of the SLA has continued to refuse to go back to the negotiating table), the Sudanese governments’ positions in the negotiations have hardened as well. As an example, the government delegation to the negotiations has evolved from being one led by Ali Osman Taha in Naivasha, who eventually developed a close relationship to John Garang, to one led by Majzoub al Khalifa followed by Nafie Ali Nafie for Darfur, the latter known as a tougher hardliner than the first. This is also a result of the internal power struggle in Khartoum. As seen in chapter IV, the hardliners in Khartoum were disappointed by the concessions made to the Southerners on the security provisions negotiated in 2003, and thus the responsibility over the “Darfur” file, security wise and negotiations wise, came to be confined to the hardliners. A sign that the Sudanese government officials seems to have become increasingly disillusioned with Western governments’ efforts to support the search for peace in Darfur, is their suspicion that the Western NGOs working in Darfur are working for the intelligence services of their country of origin as well as with the ICC. The fact that the ICC may have received large parts of its information from NGOs working in the field is undoubtable since the ICC investigators themselves did not have access to the field. Whether the ICC based itself on confidential information provided by the NGOs or simply on publicly accessible reports is uncertain however. As for the suspicion that the NGOs are all “agents of their governments” also expresses a feeling of distrust in what Western diplomats or government officials may promise in their interactions.

746 Interview, NL, Khartoum, 13.11.2009
Guarantors of the implementation after the signing of a peace agreement

Another important role the external partners to a peace process can play is the role of guarantors of a future peace agreement. This is a role that is not only played after the signing of an agreement and during the implementation phase, the mere perspective of certain states playing the role as guarantors may work as an important incentive for the parties to sign an agreement as well. As the negotiations process may not provide enough time for confidence among the parties to be sufficiently repaired, the parties’ knowledge that they have external witnesses they can complain to should the other not respect the agreement in the future can be an important factor in the decision to sign or not sign a peace agreement.

This prospective of having external guarantors is perhaps just as important as the assistance international partners may provide during the negotiations, as it constitutes a driving force to push the negotiations forward by contributing to build an image of the issue of the conflict as something attractive for each party. In the case of South Sudan, it was the IGAD Partners Forum, and especially the troika of the US, the UK and Norway, who played this role in supporting the negotiations framework proposed by the IGAD. They have also taken a lead role in the aftermath of the signing of the CPA, through the organization of a donors’ conference in Oslo in April 2005 and May 2008. An internationally monitored Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) was established in October 2005, as foreseen by the CPA, with a broad mandate to supervise and evaluate the implementation of the peace agreement. Tom Vraalsen, the former UN special envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan and Norwegian Ambassador, was appointed leader of the commission. The commission further included members of the Government of National Unity (thus three from the NCP and three the SPLM), Kenyan and Ethiopian representatives as members of the IGAD and finally representatives of Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US as members of the IGAD Partners forum. The African Union, the Arab League, the European Union and the United Nations have had observer status.

It is often being said that during the five years period following the signing of a peace-agreement settling a civil war, the chances that the war will erupt again are the highest. As shown by Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rotchild, the survivor rate among settlements five years after signing a peace agreement is much higher (68% in their survey) where there is an external assurance, compared to (32%) where such an assurance is
lacking\textsuperscript{747}. The AEC has had a hard task carrying out its job, in a context where another conflict was ravaging in the Western province of the country, a conflict that eventually attracted most of the international attention granted to Sudan. Although its role has remained crucial for the continued implementation of the CPA, there were no clear provisions in the agreement for how internal disputes between the SPLM and the GoS should be resolved. The CPA refers to "consultation by the parties to the agreement", however this can refer just as well to the SPLM/NCP as well as to IGAD, observer states and international bodies witnessing the signing of the agreement\textsuperscript{748}.

When it comes to Darfur however, the international partners involved have at times had competing agendas and at other times they have simply sent contradictory messages and contributed to contradictory priorities being followed. The amount of public pressure to "do something on Darfur" has raised the stakes and increased pressure on a variety of different types of international diplomatic powers who have all wanted to be part of the "Darfur process". Looking to the CPA as a model, some organizations, notably the Enough project, the Save Darfur Coalition and the Genocide Intervention Network have put forward the idea of setting up a quartet of the countries with the most leverage on Sudan, that is the UK, US, France and China. As John Prendergast and Jerry Fowler argue in a joint report:

"Each of these countries has particular, limited leverage in Sudan. But combined, their leverage and influence can be decisive. The Quartet should consult closely with—and in some cases apply pressure to—regional states with interests in Darfur and Sudan, including Egypt, Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia, and work with key AU states, such as South Africa\textsuperscript{749}.

This was in March 2008, and no such quartet was ever created. A few months later, Qatar was chosen by the African Union and the Arab League to sponsor peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Darfur rebels, and the first round of the peace talks between the JEM and the government found place in Doha in February 2009.


Expertise and leverage in the mediation process

A fundamental idea behind the establishment of “group of friends” is also that each member of the group can exert leverage on the party to the conflict it has most leverage over. In the case of Darfur, it seems that this sharing of tasks has not been well attributed, with the Western powers pressuring Khartoum more and more all they while they kept losing leverage, while neighboring states, Arab countries and China have not exerted pressure where they could have had a considerable amount of leverage.

Yet, external parties can contribute with more than only pressure. Another important resource they can bring into a peace process is their expertise on different areas of the negotiations. Whether they were members of Sudanese NGOs well-connected with Western organizations, or members of the ruling NCP, most of the people met with in Khartoum and in Juba in the framework of this research agreed on the fact that the most important thing external partners could contribute with was precisely their “expertise” and their assumed impartiality as a third party coming from the outside. As a member of the government delegation to the Naivasha and the Abuja talks said: "When people come to a deadlock, they need a third party. The most important contribution (from the international mediators) was the technical assistance, and on certain technical issues, they were very helpful." He gave examples of experts from Australia, the US and Europe, assisting in legal matters, oil sharing issues and questions concerning federalism.

However, they were all concerned with the fact that external partners should not tell them what to do, but help them and advise them. As a Sudanese Human rights activist, put it: "you help me find a solution, but you don’t find the solution for me." He continued by saying that "people living in rural areas, have the best solutions for their own problems. We cannot come and impose solutions from the outside. (...) The external actors are catalysts for solutions, they can assist, help, but shouldn’t be leading the solution." This point is important not only to understand the potential support external partners can contribute with in a negotiation, by being “catalysts”, but most of all to understand where they can fail. If the external mediators are perceived as threatening, dominating or out of touch with the real issues at stake by the

750 Interview, Abderrahmane Ibrahim el Khalifa, 22.11.2007
751 Interview, Mudawi Ibrahim, Chair of the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO), 11.11.2007
752 Ibid.
parties at war, they will always have the option to break out of the negotiations. A breakdown of negotiations or unsuccessful negotiations is costly for the parties as well as the external partners having invested a lot of money and time in the process. The very sense of local ownership is essential in every phase of a peace process: during the negotiations, for the parties negotiating and the populations supporting them to believe in and support the process, as an agreement is signed and in the following implementation process as well. When external contributions to a peace process are perceived more as orders than as advice of “good friends”, the risks of a loss of ownership increase.

External assistance can also cause internal splits in a conflict, notably when the international support becomes either a resource to fight over or something the parties use to discredit each other as vassals of this or this external mediator. When the international mediators pushed the SLA faction of Minni Minawi to sign the DPA in May 2006, this subsequently led to further internal dissent between the different rebel factions and notably infighting between the SLA of Abdulwahid el Nour and the JEM on one side, and the SLA of Minni Minawi aligned with the government on the other. As a Khartoum based independent consultant, Hassan Abdel Attai, said in 2007: "When Jan Pronk (the former UN special envoy to Sudan) came, I told him that the Abuja agreement has transformed the conflict in Darfur from a government-Darfur conflict to a Darfur-Darfur conflict".

**On weakness and strength as tools in the efforts to solve internal conflicts**

As evoked in previous chapters, the internationalization of Sudan’s conflict as coming from within Sudan is the “arm of the poor”, of the weakest part in a conflict. It is precisely because they seem so weak in their confrontation with the seemingly all-powerful government that they manage to garner international support. Khartoum however finds itself trapped: attempting to win the war by classical means of power, notably military power where they clearly have the upper hand, it is precisely by using these means that it looses the struggle for international support and legitimacy. It is the powerlessness of the powerful, to paraphrase Bertrand Badie. On another level of the confrontations, that is between Sudan and the Western powers on the international arena, it is the Western powers that seem to be hit by the

753 Interview, Hassan Abdel Attai, Khartoum, Sudan, 21.11.2007
754 Bertrand Badie, L’impuissance de la puissance : essai sur les incertitudes et les espoirs des nouvelles relations internationales, (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 293.
paradox of the powerlessness of the powerful. Despite their perceived strength and power, on different levels, compared to Sudan, and despite the immense resources deployed in their efforts to put an end to the crisis in Darfur, they have not been able to reach their objective. The more weight they put in their efforts to pressure Sudan, the less these efforts seem to have any effect.

Conclusion

Drawing on the observation of the international efforts to solve the war in South Sudan as well as in Darfur, the emerging norm of “internationalization” as a means to resolve internal conflicts seem to be powerful when international actors’ involved are playing on the same team and coordinate their efforts, and when their interference and assistance is desired by the parties at war. It might however be a potential source of complexification when international actors are competing between each other, are undesired as external mediators, or are seen as biased towards one of the parties in their efforts by the belligerents. Generally, the engagement of a group of friends in the efforts to put an end to a conflict is seen as a positive thing, without which there would be little or no international interest in the peace process. In the case of Darfur, one can wonder if it is possible to have “too many friends”, especially when these friends do not agree on how to help out.
At the time of writing, the Darfur crisis has relapsed into the shadow of international attention. The "issue" that monopolizes international attention on Sudan today is the upcoming referendum on independence for South Sudan, scheduled for January 2011, although it does not receive the same level of attention as the "genocide in Darfur" used to receive. The challenges related to this deadline are enormous, not only because of the unknown consequences of an eventual (but very likely) Southern demand for independence, but also because the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 expires as the Southerners go to the voting polls. An often criticized aspect of the international approach to the conflicts in Sudan over the past few years is that the conflicts have been largely viewed as separate from each other and that the international efforts, in developing two sets of separate policies, have ended up undermining both. While the implementation of the CPA has suffered from the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the high level of international attention devoted to it, if the CPA breaks down, or the North and the South go back to war, Darfur would probably move even further away from any settlement.

Assessing internationalization

What can be said about internationalization, after this thorough study of the international emergence of the Sudanese conflicts? Is internationalization as a process measurable, or theoretically predictable according to certain factors? Is there an objective threshold, level of conflict, above which internationalization is automatically triggered? Are there certain fixed "elements" inherent to the conflicts (great powers’ strategic interests, level of mortality, "gravity", etc.) that necessarily lead to their internationalization? Or is internationalization a purely subjective matter, depending only on the evaluation and perceptions of external actors judging a conflict "worthy" or "needy" enough of internationalization, possibly encouraged by voices from parties to the conflict calling for international assistance? There seems indeed to be a sort of tension between the two types of definitions, a tension that is manifested just as
well within the disciplines of international relations and conflict analysis, as within the practices of advocacy, human rights defense, conflict resolution and international criminal law. The temptation to understand conflict dynamics and the reasons for international implication in quantitative terms seems to be great for many, in order to rationalize not only the causes and the consequences of the conflicts\textsuperscript{755}, but also the reasons for international involvement as a dependent variable. Yet few attempts to put numbers as well on the probabilities for conflicts (according to the presence of natural resources for example), as on the probabilities for internationalization, stand the test when confronted with other similar cases with highly different outcomes. The confrontation of the different examples mentioned in the dissertation (DR Congo, Iraq) and the case of the Sudanese conflicts studied here, indicate that it would be unwise to settle exclusively with one definition, an objective or a subjective one.

As I have argued, the norm entrepreneurs (or agenda setters), the timing and context of the first alerts, and finally the general qualifications used to describe the conflicts and the issues at stake have played a tremendous role for the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts. The role of the internationalization entrepreneurs, seizing the agenda they may have a direct or indirect influence over, is arguably the most important in the sense that no issue, no matter how well "framed" or how well "timed" will not be set on the agenda by itself. A specific spectacular event may push an issue into the international spotlight, however the issue will only become a veritable item on various agendas when seized and pushed forward by social or political entrepreneurs. The international context, including the domestic context in countries potentially serving as resources or mediators in the conflict, may facilitate or complicate the international emergence of a crisis. Again, few armed conflicts in the world today are not covered at all by international media, but some are only briefly mentioned, while others are subject to intense coverage and investigation over longer periods. Whether a given context might become a facilitating or a hindering one is difficult to foresee, but as a general rule it seems that few "hot spots" can be on the top of the agenda at the same time. An emerging crisis may hence not receive much attention if other crises occupy the full attention of the great powers or the United Nations at that time (Darfur vs. Iraq in 2003), while it may

also lead to a shift in attention when the international efforts towards the first crisis reach a deadlock (Iraq vs. Darfur in 2004).

As for the role played by the qualifications given to a conflict and the issues at stake, it seems that two central elements contribute to a wider internationalization: the simplicity (in the sense of comprehensible) of the discourse and the extent to which the narrative is connected to other universal and symbolic causes. The conflict in South Sudan eventually managed both to be narrated as an easily understandable confrontation, notably with the "Islamist vs. Christian" aspect of the conflict, and to attach itself to a universalistic struggle against slavery and for religious freedom. As the Southern rebels received more and more support from the West in the 1990’s, the representations of the conflict were also increasingly simplified (so as to occult the violence caused by the SPLA for example). The conflict in Darfur "succeeded" in being narrated through a simplistic discourse, of victims and perpetrators and of Africans vs. Arabs. Yet it has not to the same extent managed to associate itself with any universalistic causes, despite efforts of some of the rebels in that direction (e.g. struggle for democracy, secularism, against racism), without success. The Darfur rebel groups most active in seeking international support also attempted to attach their cause to a broader struggle against genocides. The fundamental difference with the Southerners however, is that they received sympathy for their cause as linked to the origins of the conflict, while the rebels in Darfur have received sympathy due to the outcome of the conflict ("genocide"), but not the underlying reasons causing the conflict in the first place.

The elements identified here as being constitutive of the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts can also be said to be lacking in other conflicts of seemingly similar or higher "gravity"756, but which have not received the same level of international attention. This is the case notably of the war in DR Congo, where there has not been any similar coalition of norm entrepreneurs attempting to place the conflict on an international agenda, as there were in Darfur. The mobilization has been much more specialized, focusing notably on gender based and sexual violence, and thus with a different reach; and beyond this, there has been no simple and easily understandable narratives about this conflict. Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the Darfur crisis with a conflict of much higher strategic interest, at least for the Americans: the war in Iraq. The US intervention in Iraq did spur the mobilization of large

756 I say "seemingly similar or higher "gravity"" here because I consider that gravity is something pertaining to subjective evaluation and not objective criteria.
constituencies, especially before March 20, 2003. However, taking into consideration continued anti-war protests and a high level of strategic interests involved in Iraq, it is remarkable that the Darfur conflict, involving few or no strategic interests for the US, at least in the classical sense of the term, has to such an extent managed to become a central issue in US domestic politics. Also, and perhaps because of the difficulties and the sensitivity attached to Iraq related issues, Darfur has even become a tool for US presidential candidates to gain voter support.

However, the elements identified as central for the internationalization of the Sudanese conflicts (activists mobilizing, international context and narrative adopted) are, as such, independent from the conflicts themselves - with the exception of the internationalization from within, as pushed forward notably by rebel groups seeking overseas support. But such contenders may exist in many different conflicts without the conflict reaching the same levels of internationalization as the Darfur conflict has for example. Indeed, for the calls for outside support made by parties to the conflicts to be efficient in terms of international projection, these calls need to have a certain echo within an international audience receptive to their calls. A rebel leader may well have a satellite phone and the direct number to international news desks, it does not mean that his or her "cause" will be covered in the media. Does this mean that internationalization is only dependent on the international community and not the conflict itself and its local dynamics?

We should not jump to the conclusion that internationalization only depends on external judgements, external context, and external actors willing to engage and to seize themselves of the issue. Internationalization is inherently dependent on the "facts on the ground", although these "facts" may be transformed in the internationalization process. Furthermore, although there seems to be little connection between the levels of mortality and the levels of international attention (cf. Darfur vs. Congo), internationalization, and especially a sustained internationalization, seems unlikely if the level of victims is low or if the flow of refugees into neighboring countries is not spectacular compared to previous flows of migrants. Internationalization as a process and as a norm is produced in the interaction between the internal and the external levels of a conflict, between the "national" or "local" levels and the international level. A qualification as "genocide" for example can not be purely taken out of the blue, invented by external actors with "a certain agenda".
Yet, although conclusions on broad narratives or more specific qualifications, such as the qualification as "genocide", are in some way or another related to "facts" observed on the ground, this does not mean that the terms used are absolute and incontestable. The intense debate around the qualification as genocide in Darfur illustrates this well, where the most in-depth report evaluating the situation leaves the observer in a dilemma.\textsuperscript{757} The rigorous observer and researcher will prefer to stay to "the facts", that no genocide has been committed \textit{as such}, perhaps waiting to see if ICC judges will conclude that "acts of genocide" have been committed. The activist eager to make the world become aware of the gravity of the crisis however will rely on the statements that what had happened in Darfur was "no less serious and heinous than genocide."\textsuperscript{758} In the rhetoric on conflicts, it is however easier to step up a level on the scale of "gravity", than to step down. Thus it is easier for an activist to remain legitimate while stepping up the rhetoric from "no less serious and heinous than genocide" to "a genocide", than it is for the rigorous observer to step down the rhetoric and state that there has been no genocide in Darfur. Denying or putting into question the possibility of what is considered as being the worst crime of all receives little understanding, at least in the spheres of activism. All in all, the different qualifications and narratives produced concerning a conflict, to a large extent determining the reach and the extent of its internationalization, relate to observations made on the ground or through reports from the ground, made by different social entrepreneurs, where timing and general international context (normative, symbolic, or related to specific events) have an important influence.

\textbf{Interconnections between the domestic and foreign policy levels in the field of internationalization}

Each process of internationalization is unique, and each conflict’s potential for internationalization may be, at least partly, determined by the conflicting parties’ place on the international arena (geographically, politically) and their connections (or absence thereof) with the outside world preceding the outbreak of the conflict. It is however not because a minority community or a rebel group has few or no connections with the outside world that it

\textsuperscript{757} Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{758} Ibid, 161.
will necessarily have a harder time to project its cause on the international arena. The mere
fact that no specific characteristics are attached to them as they first emerge on the
international arena may also grant them a sort of “original innocence”. While some conflicts
may be slowly internationalized over a long time, as was the case for the war in South Sudan,
others seem to emerge much more rapidly on the international agenda, although it does not
need to be synchronized with the evolution of the so-called “gravity” of violence on the
ground. Darfur came under the international spotlights more or less around the time where
violence seriously decreased. Conflicts may also be internationalized or re-internationalized
seemingly overnight in relation with specific events. The declarations by high-level UN
officials in March and April 2004 in the context of the ten year commemoration of Rwanda
propelled the Darfur crisis to the top of international agendas.

The “trajectories” of the conflicts studied here have not only brought them from the level of
internal conflict to become the central issue defining the relationship between Sudan and the
international community, they have also become an issue of domestic politics in the states
where activist communities have raised to protest against the conflict. This internalization
increases the pressure on the governments, lobbied from the inside and from the outside.
However, the externalization of a conflict from the local and national levels to the
international level may lead to a disappropriation of the search for a peaceful solution for the
very stakeholders in the conflict. As has been pointed out in the context of Darfur, the conflict
has turned out to become more an affair between Khartoum and the international community,
than between Darfur and Khartoum (or simply as an issue on the national agenda). A risk is
that the high level discourse produced internationally on the need for and the intentions of
immediate action modifies the calculations of the parties to the conflict. The weaker party to
the conflict, as seen in Darfur, proceed to transfer to the international community what was
previously seen as responsibilities of the government, but also areas traditionally taken in
charge by local communities are left to the external actors759. It is a classical problem
encountered in the field of development as well: what type of international assistance will
genuinely help the local communities, and what type of assistance might provide a certain
relief in the short term, but lead to dependency on the longer term? The question is as relevant

759 Ben Wallace-Wells, “Darfuristan: How the world’s campaign to stop a genocide created a quagmire”,”
March 16, 2010)
and important in the field of internationalization and conflict solving, although matters are often dealt with in a more urgent manner and with less time to reflect upon different options.

**Pressure as an instrument of change in international relations**

Conditions for exerting pressure is also at the center of these trajectories from the internal to the external, and sometimes to another internal level. Who can exert pressure on whom? With what results? Indeed, leverage is an essential condition for pressure to be efficient. Pressure works where there is leverage, that is when the threat used to exert pressure is counterbalanced with something the pressured actor deeply wants or deeply fears. In other words, the ”carrot and the stick” will only work when these are respectively wanted and feared by the pressured party.

**Activist leverage in the domestic arena in the US**

Illustrative of this is the relative leverage activists have had on the policies of respectively President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama in the US. In many ways, Bush ”needed” Darfur much more than Obama does. Bush had placed a lot of prestige in the signing of the CPA, and Darfur became the test for his engagement. Furthermore, Darfur became the ”easy” issue, at least easy to react to in words, next to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which were becoming increasingly difficult, and difficult to speak about as well. Darfur, which had the attention of his own constituencies, became the perfect channel to get ”back in touch” with his electorate as well as his opponents. Obama however was already close to the Save Darfur movement before his election as president of the United States, and thus benefited from a positive image within the Darfur lobby. Although expectations towards him from these ranks were great, pressure was much tougher from other groups the domestic arena, expecting that he would not be ”strong” enough on issues of terrorism and in the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Where Darfur became the issue on which Bush could ”soften” his image towards his electorate, Obama did not need this. On the contrary, what he needed was to show that he is able to use a strong hand against the enemies of the US, and show that he is capable of finishing the war in Iraq. Also, a few months after Obama took office, in August 2009, the commander of the joint UN/African Union force in Darfur, Martin Luther Agwai, declared that there was no longer a war going on in Darfur, only ”very low intensity”
engagements and banditry\textsuperscript{760}. Despite the widespread criticism this declaration spurred within the activist community still mobilized on Darfur, and despite the fact that the conflict was and is still not resolved, the statement however did contribute to lower the sense of urgency concerning Darfur.

\textbf{When logics of naming and shaming meet politics of deviance and defiance}

Speaking of pressure and leverage, it is worth to come back to the question of the efficiency of one of the activists’ main tools of pressure, the ”naming and shaming”. As seen in this dissertation, the underlying assumption behind the ”naming and shaming” is that such pressure would affect the Khartoum government as it has affected and changed the behavior of other social actors or private businesses where such tools have been applied. But what is the leverage of ”naming and shaming” in an international context where some states use ”deviance from the norm” as a tool to exist on the international arena? Indeed, Khartoum has been heavily criticized for its internal civil war in the South and its support to international terrorist networks in previous years, in addition to being under heavy economic sanctions imposed by the US and the UN (the latter lifted in 2001). It is thus worth asking the question of whether all this pressure in the years preceding the Darfur crisis has made the Sudanese regime immune to additional pressure from activist groups. Leaders in Khartoum have certainly not been totally insensitive to this pressure, since they have clearly felt that it has had a strong influence on some of the international powers they hoped to rebuild new alliances with (while often seeing the activist groups as agents of these governments). The fact that the Khartoum government had little political capital to loose (as opposed to pressure exerted towards an already well considered government in the international arena), and only credibility to win, may indicate that leverage is greater when the pressured actor is threatened to lose something it already has than to lose the opportunity to win something it has little knowledge of. Also, with the manifested support of other states in the international arena – China, Russia, several Arab states and African states, although the two latter groups often send mixed messages according to the issues – the pressure from the Western bloc has been somehow diluted.

The usage of politics of defiance and deviance is observed in the cases of other countries under hard pressure from the United States and European countries as well, with Iran as probably the most significant example. Playing the cards of deviance is done by defying and challenging the "norms", often defined, or seen as defined by the Western countries. However they are often destined to generate and capitalize on support from a national or regional public opinion, equally skeptical to what is branded as "Western interventionism". Links built between the countries relying on the politics of defiance and deviance clearly demonstrate the deliberate aspect of this policy practice: Iran and Venezuela have entertained close relations for many years, just as Iran and Sudan have cooperated closely for a long time, especially on the level of military affairs, and more recently, President Bashir was invited by President Hugo Chavez to visit Venezuela. The political logic behind efforts to dialogue with these regimes, as the Obama administration has attempted to do with all three of these countries, is that pressure in these cases only strengthens the defiant, while attempts to dialogue and negotiate may weaken it, in the sense that its discourse of defiance loses its appeal and validity.

Is Sudan about to become Africa’s defiant power, building regional popularity on its capacity to resist pressure from the West? It was feared for some time that the arrest mandate set out by the International Criminal Court (ICC) would strengthen Omar al Bashir and his Khartoum based regime, nationally and in the region, as he multiplied his visits to neighboring countries in the weeks following the arrest mandate, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya and Qatar. Many African countries, despite a general critical stance towards the regime and the war in Darfur, also spontaneously declared their support to the suspected President. A year after the arrest mandate and following the holding of national elections in Sudan, unsurprisingly reelecting Bashir as President, it seems however that the only legitimacy he has been able to strengthen is on the internal level. Uganda and South Africa, both state parties to the ICC, have openly warned Bashir that they are legally obliged to arrest him if he sets foot on their territory, and thus dissuading him from attending the inauguration of President Jacob Zuma and two high-level meetings in Uganda. As a recent article in The New York Times states, "on the international summit circuit, no one can clear a room more

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quickly than Sudan’s president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir\textsuperscript{763}. Somehow paradoxically, the national elections, foreseen in the CPA and thus strongly supported by the international community, became the ultimate tool for Omar al Bashir to renew his grip on power nationally and to a certain extent his legitimacy as well. Vice president Nafie Ali Nafie proclaimed before the results of the elections were ready that the reelection of Bashir would prove the allegations made against him as false, thus showing the main issue at stake for the regime in the April 2010 elections. According to Jérôme Tubiana, some observers have argued that without the arrest mandate, President Bashir could have left his place over to someone else\textsuperscript{764}.

**Time factor and rhetorics of dramatization and pressure**

Reports on decreasing mortality levels in Darfur came out from late 2004 and 2005, and during several periods, attacks were said to be significantly fewer, only replaced by acts of banditry. However, advocacy groups did not have any interest in saying: ”the worst of the massacre is over, but we want to protect the refugees”. It was much more powerful to say: ”the genocide is still going on”, and ”in response to the worsening situation in Darfur\textsuperscript{765}”, while showing a clear rise in casualties every week or month. Some of the main ”personalities” within the advocacy movement, Eric Reeves on his own blog and Nicholas Kristof through his op-eds in *The New York Times*, at some periods even suggested that thousands died every week, something that was at the time of their writings a considerable exaggeration\textsuperscript{766}.

The speed with which information is propagated and news are succeeding each other creates a dynamic where events have to be happening ”right here and now” for the public to be interested. At the same time, the constitution of an organized advocacy network, such as the Save Darfur Coalition, and the building up of a consistent citizen movement, in the US as well as in Europe, is a process that requires time. Indeed, the fact that the crisis continued over time, although the killings decreased, made it possible for this vast activist coalition to

\textsuperscript{763} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{766} Mamdani (2009), *op.cit.*
be created. The same would not have been possible in the weeks during which the Rwandan genocide took place. In reference to this, some activists have called Darfur a ’genocide in slow motion’.

Time is a complex issue in the evolution of a conflict, as well as in the efforts to put an end to it. While a conflict may theoretically be easier to resolve in its early stages, before grievances grow old and before the claims from the different parties are multiplied, it is difficult to encourage parties to go to the negotiating table when they believe they will achieve more on the battlefield. Despite the fact that news are propagated rapidly once an issue is set on the public and media agendas, and despite the fact that state leaders may be alerted quite quickly about the outbreak of new crisis, it often takes time for democratic governments to set forth concrete responses and measures. Therefore, the recourse to public speeches, firmly condemning the ”authors of the crimes committed” and ”calling on the international community to take strong action”, becomes a highly favored tool to respond ”quickly” to public pressure.

**Humanitarianization, securitization and criminalization of the Darfur conflict, or the general depoliticization of the international approaches**

Damián J. Fernández, mentioned in the introduction, notes that ”Ideology plays a pivotal role in conflicts so far as fixed beliefs determine the way problems are analyzed and solutions are defined. (...) In conflict situations in the Third World, issues are not only adjudicated but redefined as well.” He further argues that this makes them more difficult to resolve. Although the language of ideology seems far from contemporary means to describe conflicts, the idea is still valid. Conflicts are effectively constantly redefined and interpreted, by the political and normative context in which they take place. Contradicting and competing narratives may be produced by different stakeholders, creating ”wars of words” around the conflict. On a practical level, the problem seem not so much to be that such narratives are produced, there will always be different narratives, more or less connected with the ”realities on the ground”. What seems problematic is rather when these narratives create a veil between the different stakeholders preventing any communication from moving forward.

As I have shown in this dissertation, the qualification process of the Darfur crisis has consecutively led to a humanitarianization, a securitization and then a criminalization of the
crisis. The humanitarianization of the Darfur issue leads to a focus on the provision of humanitarian aid – food, medicins, shelter – to the displaced. The securitization of the conflict argues for a priority to be given to the protection of the threatened and vulnerable civilian population. And last, but not least, the criminalization of the conflict justifies the interference of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to judge and punish the criminals authors of the unprovoked attacks. None of these processes are in and by themselves condemnable or ”wrong”, simply they contribute to the sense that the conflict can be solved if only its symptoms are stopped, treated or contained. What the different approaches and readings of the issues at stake have in common is a general depoliticization of the conflict and the fact that they contribute to justify the need for international presence, through humanitarian assistance, peacekeepers or an international criminal court. Among the three approaches, the judicial approach is the closest to seek an issue to the conflict, as the two others merely provide relief and protection against the threats of the war. The judicial approach seeks to stop the fighting by punishing the ”perpetrators”, introducing a rule of law where this seems to have disappeared and thus help the ”victims” to continue to live their lives peacefully knowing that they are no longer threatened. A message often conveyed by supporters of this approach is that the process of criminal investigation and of judgment will provide a certain sense of reconciliation with the past for the civilian population. However, the judicial approach does not necessarily look at what caused the conflict in the first place in order to resolve the underlying issues, through negociations with the parties involved. Thus, neither this approach, nor the previous ones, deal with the deeper resolution of the causes of the conflict, nor do they give much space for the ”local communities” and parties to the conflict to solve the issues themselves. These processes first of all treat the symptoms of the war, which is also what is most visible to the world, while what caused it in the first place is much more difficult to seize.
Theoretical references and general literature

Literature listed here has either been referred to in the thesis, or have been used as theoretical material to conceptualize my research topic.

Monographies


ALDEN, Chris, LARGE, Daniel, DE OLIVEIRA Ricardo (eds), China returns to Africa: a rising power and a continent embrace, (London: Hurst, 2008), 382.


BADIE, Bertrand, L’impuissance de la puissance : essai sur les incertitudes et les espoirs des nouvelles relations internationales, (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 293.


KALDOR, Mary, New and Old Wars: Organized violence in a global era, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 192.


Articles and chapters


GOBILLE, Boris, ”Les altermondialistes : des activistes transnationaux?”, *Critique internationale*, 27, (04/06, 2005), 131-145.


**Working papers**


**PhD dissertations**


**Specialized literature on international organizations and international interventions**

**Monographies**


**Articles**

ALAGAPPA, Muthiah, ”Regional institutions, the UN and international security: a framework for analysis”, *Third World Quarterly*, 18, 3, (1997), 421-441.


GRIFFIN, Michèle, ”Retrenchment, reform and regionalization: Trends in UN peace support operations”, *International Peacekeeping*, 1, (Spring 1999), 1-31.

WILSON, Gary, ”UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organizations versus ”Coalitions of the Willing”, *International Peacekeeping*, 2, (Summer 2003), 89-106.

**Specialized literature on media, public opinion, social movements and agenda setting**

**Monographies**


**Articles**


**Specialized literature on conflict analysis, conflict solving and negotiations**

**Monographies**


**Articles and chapters**


**PhD dissertations**


**Specialized literature on international Justice, included articles on the ICC and Darfur**

**Articles**


Literature on Sudan

Literature on Sudan, and especially on Darfur, has been abundant over the past few years. Listed here are the references quoted in the thesis as well as references used for a broader understanding of the country and the conflicts.

Monographies

AHMED, Abdel Ghaffar M., MANGER, Leif (eds), *Understanding the Crisis in Darfur: Listening to Sudanese voices*, (Bergen: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, 2006), 113.


**Articles and chapters**

*Mentioned here are also chapters of above-mentioned collective publications, when these have been the subject to specific quotations in the thesis.*


BECHTOLD, Peter K., ”Darfur, the ICC and American Politics”, *Middle East Policy Journal*, VXI, 2, (Summer 2009), 149-163.


HOLSLAG, Jonathan, “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Question of Darfur”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17, 54 (February 2008), 71-84.


SMITH, Gayle, “The Famine This Time”, *Middle East Report*, 166, (September-October 1990), 12-14.


Biographies and novels on Sudan


Master’s dissertation


Methodology


**Grey literature on Sudan (NGO and think tank reports)**

**Authored publications**


**Reports and briefings without authors (chronological order)**


**Primary sources**

**International organizations**

**UN resources**


**UN resolutions**


International organizations’ reports and briefings


**Governmental or governmental commissioned reports**

The United States


Department of State, States Sponsor of Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (February 26, 2010)


Other countries


Speeches


Ghassan Salamé, “A clash of norms”, A speech at the UN on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, December 10, 2008
Peace Agreements


Media sources

Media sources and press articles have been consulted regularly to follow the course of events in Sudan over the past few years, as well as to understand the very moment where the Darfur crisis started to become an issue of preoccupation in international media channels. Listed here are the sources especially quoted in this present thesis.

International and national media channels and press releases


Specialized African and Arabic news agencies


Press articles (authored, chronological order)


Adam LeBor, “Is there blood on his hands ?”, The Sunday Times, October 1, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article646673.ece (Accessed June 29, 2010)


**Web articles posted by religious organizations, interest groups and advocacy networks**

The Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa (Amecea), ”Important dates of the Church’s History in Sudan”, [http://www.eglisesoudan.org/english/dates.htm](http://www.eglisesoudan.org/english/dates.htm) (Accessed July 10, 2010)

CASMAS, Coalition for the Abolition of Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan, ”Congressional Black Caucus’ response to slavery”, 1995, [http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/black.htm](http://members.aol.com/casmasalc/black.htm) (Accessed February 26, 2010)


Save Darfur Coalition, Joint statement by the three former candidates to the US Presidency, Hillary Rodham Clinton, John McCain and Barack Obama, ”We Stand United on Sudan”, 2008, [http://www.savedarfur.org/page/content/Candidates_Statement/](http://www.savedarfur.org/page/content/Candidates_Statement/) (Accessed June 11, 2010)
Advocacy groups websites and specialized sources on Sudan consulted on a regular basis

Amnesty International USA: http://www.amnestyusa.org/

Coalition for the International Criminal Court: http://www.iccnow.org/

ENOUGH project: http://www.enoughproject.org/

Gurtong: http://www.gurtong.net/

Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/


Norwegian Support Group for Peace in Sudan: http://sudansupport.no/English/

Save Darfur Coalition: http://savedarfur.org/; http://www.voicesfromdarfur.org

Sudan Tribune: http://www.sudantribune.com/

Blog articles

Several blogs have been followed closely throughout this research project, and perhaps especially the regularly updated blog of Eric Reeves (sudanreeves.org) and the blog of Alex de Waal, “Making Sense of Darfur”, recently renamed to “Making Sense of Sudan” (blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/), functioning as a central meeting place for observers and scholars on Sudan. Listed here are the articles referred to in the thesis:


Other electronic sources


Films, videos and documentaries


"Living Darfur”, Mattafix, music video available on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STRHe7xWia0 (Accessed July 11, 2010)

Appendixes
Map of Sudan, with neighboring countries
Interviews

Interviews have been carried out in Sudan, in the United States, in Norway and in France. Due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed with many of my interviewees, many have here been anonymized, especially when I have quoted them directly in the text, when these quotes have been sensitive for them in their positions, and when they have themselves asked to not be referred to by name. Some others listed below have also been anonymized, as a measure of precaution, due to the positions of the actors. The initials used here to anonymize the interviewees are not their real initials, but have been found according to a system where each letter of the real initials receives another letter in the alphabet. Two interviewees from Darfur however have been entirely anonymized (xx), for reasons pertaining to their security. The persons who are not anonymized here and who are not quoted directly in the thesis have provided general background information and information on their own roles, but specific information they may have given me has not been used in this thesis.

The contexts for conducting research in these four different countries have been extremely different, each proposing different types of challenges. While most interviews in the United States were recorded (except when the interviewees asked for them not to be), most interviews in Sudan were not recorded. The sensitivity of the issue I brought up and the general political context in Sudan would have introduced a negative bias in these exchanges had I brought a recording device with my note book. However, many of these interviews took the form of in-depth discussions, and there was often ample time to write down what my interviewees told me. Around half of the interviews carried out in Norway and in France were recorded, while some, due to the positions of the persons met with, were not. I can assert that the passages quoted in this thesis are in accuracy with what my interviewees told me, should there be any mistakes however, they remain entirely my own.

Sudan

Khartoum

Abdul Abderrahmane, Embassy of Chad to Sudan, 30.03.2009
Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, Professor, Ahfad University, 05.12.2007
BSB, Senior official, Joint Mediation Team, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 22.11.2007
Mohammed Addouma, Assistant president for Peace, National Umma Party, 11.11.2007
Hassan Abdel Attai, independent consultant, Khartoum, Sudan, 21.11.2007 and 21.03.2009
Ahlula Barhe, Editor, Sudan Vision, Khartoum, 10.11.2007 and 15.11.2007
Atta el Battahani, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, 02.12.2007
PE, Embassy of the United Kingdom to Sudan, 13.11.2007

Joshua Doha, Leader of Commission for the protection of Non-Muslims’ rights in Khartoum, 07.11.2007

Cyprien Fabre, Head of Office, European Commission, 03.12.2007

Barakat Musa al Hawati, Professor of law, former ombudsmann, 18.11.2007

(xx), Darfur institution in Khartoum, 01.04.2009

Haydar Ibrahim, Sudanese Studies Center, Khartoum, 06.12.2007

Mudawi Ibrahim, Chair of the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO), 11.11.2007

Alexander Jones, Country director Sudan, Norwegian Refugee Council, 08.11.2007

Abderrahmane Ibrahim el Khalifa, member of the National Congres Party, lawyer and legal advisor, member of the government delegation to the negotiations in Naivasha, Khartoum, 22.11.2007 and 16.11.2009

Sayeed al-Khatib, Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Khartoum, 05.12.2007

Mary Kona, Sudanese Women Christian Mission for Peace, 30.10.2007

Payton Knopf, Political Officer, Embassy of the United States of America, 13.11.2007

NL, Massalit rebel/student, Khartoum, 24.03.2009, 28.03.2009 and 13.11.2009

Ahlam Mahdi, Chair of Ahlam Charity Organization for Women Empowerment and Child Care, originally from Nyala, South Darfur, Khartoum, 26.03.2009

Hassan Matti, Professor at the International Africa University, 10.11.2007

Ali McNimr, member of the National Congres Party, 25.11.2007

Iris Céline Meierhans, Communications Director, International Committee of the Red Cross, 12.11.2007

Mohamed Mokhtar, Center for Peace and Development, University of Juba, 25.11.2007

(xx2), Darfur institution in Khartoum, 24.03.2009

Henrik O. Nordal, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy to Sudan, 25.03.2009

AP, Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger), Khartoum, 14.11.2007

Rose Lisok Polino, Network for Southern organization for peace and development, 10.11.2007 and 13.11.2007

SQ, French Embassy to Sudan, 12.11.2007

KR, civil society activist, Khartoum, 29.03.2009

Bashir Adam Rahma, First Advisor, Popular Congress Party (PCP), Party headed by Hassan al Turabi, Khartoum, 03.11.2007 and 14.11.2009

Jean Regal, Head of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France in Sudan, 05.11.2007

PS, UN Mission in Sudan, Khartoum, 17.11.2007

Abdelbasit Saïd, independent consultant, 26.03.2009

Svein Sevje, Norwegian Ambassador to Sudan, 19.03.2009

Åsmund Skeie, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy, 05.11.2007
Sjoerd Smit, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 08.11.2007
BT, French Embassy, 14.11.2007
Al Tajani Al Tayib, eldest member of the Sudanese Communist Party, 21.11.2007
Fridtjof Thorkildsen, Norwegian Ambassador to Sudan, 31.10.2007
Dr. Babiker Mohamed Tom, National Congress Party, National Assembly, 03.12.2007
Rosalind Yarde, BBC World Service Trust (Humanitarian radio services in Darfur), 13.11.2007

Juba

Ajing Deng Bar, Manager Office For Minister in the Office of the President, 29.11.2007
Patrick Butler, Norwegian People’s Aid, 27.11.2007
Ferdinand von Habsburg, Technical Advisor Peace and Development, United Nations Development Programme, 30.11.2007
Marit Hernes, Norwegian People’s Aid, 28.11.2007
Nelson King, HIV/AIDS officer, Sudan Council of Churches, 27.11.2007
Gérard Larome, Head of office of the French Embassy in Juba, 28.11.2007
Nicolas Louis, European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 30.11.2007
Ken Miller, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid, 27.11.2007
Youssef Fulgensio Onyalla, Senior Inspector for Museums and Monuments, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport, Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), 29.11.2007
Jérôme Surur, Deputy Country Representative, Norwegian Church Aid, 30.11.2007
Helge Rohn, Former Representative of Norwegian People’s Aid in South Sudan (1992-1996), 30.11.2007
Ian Ruff, office of the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Juba, 29.11.2007

United States

I met with and interviewed 11 activists during a “Global Day for Darfur”, organized in Washington D.C., on April 13, 2008, and 4 activists at a public protest organized by students from STAND, in front of the Coca Cola Headquarter, on April 27, 2008. The interviews were recorded and served as a background to different sections on the motivations of the activists.

New York

Selena Brewer, Sudan Researcher, Human Rights Watch, 12.02.2009
TC, Permanent Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, 28.05.2008
Francis Deng, United Nations Special Adviser for Prevention of Genocide, former Sudanese diplomat and Ambassador, 09.05.2008
NH, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, team managing the two peacekeeping operations in Sudan, UNMIS and the AU/UN operation in Darfur, UNAMID, 07.05.2008
CI, Norwegian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, 08.05.2008
DM, French Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, 09.05.2008
Ruth Messinger, President, American Jewish World Service, 09.05.2008
NN, JCPA Public Relations Officer, 12.05.2008
Eric Sears, Program Officer, Crimes Against Humanity Program at Human Rights First, 14.05.2008
PV, former UN official, 24.04.2008
Thomas G. Weiss, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, and co-director of the UN Intellectual History Project (CUNY), 05.05.2008
Gitta Zomorodi, Senior Policy Associate, American Jewish World Service, 28.04.2008

Washington

Sam Bell, National Advocacy Director for the Genocide Intervention Network, 14.04.2008
SD, State Department official, 21.05.2008
Ted Dagne, Congressional Research Service, 22.05.2008
KE, US State Department official, 23.04.2008 and e-mail exchange as follow up 30.10.2008
John W. MacDonald, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), 22.05.2008
KN, Former state department official, 22.04.2008
SP, State Department official, 22.05.2008
John Prendergast, co-founder of the Enough Project, 22.05.2008
KQ, State Department official, 21.05.2008
Reid Rector, International Associate, Save Darfur Coalition, 23.04.2008
David Shinn, Former Ambassador, 23.05.2008
Adam Sterling, Director of the Sudan Divestment Task Force, 14.04.2008
Michael Swigert, Program Associate, Africa Action, 23.04.2008
DT, State Department official, 23.05.2008
Colin Thomas-Jensen, Policy Advisor, Enough Project, 21.05.2008
Mohammed Yahya, Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy, Founded by Leaders of the Representatives of the Massaleit Community in Exile, 21.05.2008
Norway

Oslo

Åge Antila, Executive Committee, The Norwegian Support Group for Peace in Sudan, 31.01.2008
Pio Deng, Norwegian Church Aid, 01.02.2008
Jan Egeland, Director of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), former UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, 25.09.2007 and 25.02.2009
WF, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19.05.2006
Trude Falch, Norwegian People’s Aid, 21.09.2007
Stein Erik Horjen, visiting researcher at Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), former member of the Norwegian Church Aid having worked in Sudan, 03.02.2006
Kjell Hødnebø, Senior Advisor at the Regional Section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 05.05.2006 and 18.05.2006
Walter Lodwa, SPLM Representative in Norway, Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM Chapter in Norway, Oslo, 31.01.2008
Tom Vraalsen, former Special envoy for the UN Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, chairman for the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), 28.02.2006
Helge Rohn, Former Representative of Norwegian People’s Aid in South Sudan (1992-1996), 30.01.2008
Kristine Thorsen, Steering Committee, The Norwegian Support Group for Peace in Sudan, 07.02.2008
Arne Ørum, Norwegian People’s Aid Desk officer for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa (1987 to 1994), Oslo, 05.02.2008
Kari Øyen, Programme Coordinator, Norwegian Church Aid, 05.02.2008

Bergen

Liv Tønnessen, Researcher, Christian Michelsen Institute, 17.09.2007
Leif Manger, Professor, Institute of Anthropology, University of Bergen, 17.09.2007
Olav Aanestad, Social Anthropologist, Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (NORDECO), 18.09.2007

France

Paris

Christophe Ayad, journalist at the French daily newspaper Libération, Paris, 09.03.2006
TC, Sudan activist, 19.03.2007
GI, former official from the Political Affairs Division of the UN Mission in Sudan, 15.10.2007
IMH, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10.05.2006
FM, Sudanese diplomat, 10.05.2006
Jacky Mamou, former president of Médecins du Monde and then president of the Collectif Urgence Darfour, Paris, 29.02.2008
MN, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13.03.2008
Mohamed Nagi, Sudanese journalist, director of Sudan Tribune, 22.03.2006 and e-mail exchange as follow-up, 25.07.2006
Abdulwahid el Nour, leader of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Paris, 08.03.2007 and 14.03.2007
Lionel Vairon, Former French diplomat and China expert, 18.03.2008

Others

UD, European diplomat, 26.11.2009
IKG, Western diplomat, 16.05.2007

Phone interviews (recorded)

David Del Conte, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 18.04.2008
Jerry Fowler, founding director of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience, President of the Save Darfur Coalition, 27.05.2008
Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Former Norwegian Minister of Development, phone interview, 23.05.2006
Nicola Reindorp, Former Head of the New York Office at Oxfam International, 01.05.2008
Jean-Philippe Rémy, Africa correspondent for the French daily newspaper Le Monde, 22.03.2006
Endre Stiansen, Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Member of the Norwegian delegation to Naivasha, 15.03.2006
Tasha Coleman, International Affairs Consultant, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 29.05.2008
Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Brookings Institution, 03.07.2006

Public meetings, conferences and demonstrations attended

Conference on Darfur organized at Sciences Po in Paris, “Que faire face aux crimes contre l’humanité” (trans: “What to do in the face of crimes against humanity”), Amphithéâtre Leroy Beaulieu, with the presence of the leaders of Urgence Darfour, representatives of the Fur community in Paris, and SLA leader Abdulwahid el Nour, 01.03.2007
Meeting at "La Mutualité" in Paris, organized by “Urgence Darfour” to raise awareness about Darfur, a few weeks before the French presidential elections, 20.03.2007


Public protest in front of the Coca Cola Headquarter in New York, organized by STAND, 27.04.2008

Conference organized at the town hall of the 5th arrondissement in Paris to present a special issue on Darfur of the review "Outre Terre”, with the presence of the Sudanese Ambassador to France and SLA leader Abdulwahid el Nour, 21.10.2008
Sudan timeline

1899-1955: Sudan is under Anglo-Egyptian rule.

1955: Beginning of the Anyanya rebellion in the South

1956, January 1st: Sudan is one of the first African countries to gain its independence. Promises to the South of creating a federal system are not kept.

1972: Peace agreement signed between the government and the Anyanya, grants the South a relative autonomy and its own parliament.

1978: Oil is discovered in Bentiu, in South Sudan.

1983: President Nimeiri breaks the Addis Abeba agreement by dividing the South into three administrative units instead of one as the agreement foresaw.

1983, March: Mutiny in Bor, in the South. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is founded by former commanders of the army, notably John Garang and his assistant Salva Kiir Mayardit.

1983, September: Sharia, the Islamic law, is imposed on the whole of Sudan.

1985: Nimeiri is deposed after popular revolt, instauration of a Transitional Military Council.

1986: General elections are held, and a coalition government is formed with Sadiq al Mahdi as prime minister.


1988: The Democratic Unionist Party, party to the coalition, drafts a cease-fire agreement with the SPLM, but it is never implemented.

1989, April: Operation Lifeline Sudan is established, following a tripartite agreement between the SPLM, the Government of Sudan and the UN, authorizing UN agencies and around 35 NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance to the South.

1989, June: Military coup by the National Salvation Revolution, Omar Hassan al Bashir becomes president.

1991: Internal divisions within the SPLA, the Nasir faction rises against the leader John Garang.

1993, September: The US State Department puts Sudan on the list of States sponsors of terrorism. President Bashir invites IGAD to serve as mediator in the war with the South.
1994, March: IGAD launches peacetalks, guided by the Declaration of Principles (DOP), including the right to self-determination for the South and a separation between religion and the state.

1994, September: The government leaves the peacetalks, to return only in July 1997.

1995: Assassination attempt against the Egyptian President Hosni Moubarak, Sudan accused and sanctions by the UN follow.


1998, summer: Great famine in Sudan, the Southern region of Bahr el Ghazal is especially affected.

1998, August: The US launch a missile attack against a pharmaceutical factory, al Shifa, in Khartoum, presuming it produced chemical weapons. It was a retaliation against the bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam in the beginning of the same month.

1999: Sudan begins exporting oil through Port Sudan.

1999, December: Following an internal feud with Hassan al Turabi, president Bashir dissolves the National Assembly and declares a state of emergency.

2000, spring: Beginning of cooperation between the CIA and the Sudanese government.

2001, February: Hassan al Turabi is arrested the day after signing a memorandum of understanding with the SPLA.

2001, July: The government accepts the Egyptian Libyan initiative to mediate an end to the civil war.


2001, November: The US prolongs for a year its unilateral sanctions on Sudan.

2002, January: The government and the SPLM/A sign a cease fire agreement for six months renewable in the Nuba mountains. During the IGAD summit earlier the same month, the member states declare the relaunch of the negotiations and their intention to coordinate the international efforts.

2002, July 20: The Machakos protocol is signed, constituting the first major breakthrough in the peacetalks.
2002, October: The Sudan Peace Act is voted by the US Congress, threatens Sudan with sanctions if peace talks break down.

2003, February 26: Rebels in Darfur carry out their first attack on government garrisons, in Golo, which is taken note of by the outside world.


2003, April 25: Major rebel attack on the airport of el Fasher, severely humiliating the Sudanese Armed Forces.

2003, spring – 2004, spring: A major and brutal ”counter-insurgency” campaign is carried out by Sudanese Armed Forces, supported by Janjaweed militias.

2004, September 17: Tom Vraalsen, Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan, announces the Greater Darfur Initiative, appealing for $23 million to the region.

2004, December 5: Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland announces that Darfur “has quickly become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world”

2004, April 2: Egeland speaks in front of the Security Council, and says at a press conference that a coordinated, “scorched-earth” campaign of ethnic cleansing by Janjaweed militias against Darfur’s African population is taking place. The Council issues a presidential statement expressing its “concern” and calling for a ceasefire.

2004, 7 April: On the day of the 10th anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expresses concern on reports from Sudan saying a similar tragedy could happen in Darfur, while calling on the international community to act.

2004, November: George W. Bush reelected for a second mandate as President of the United States of America.

2005, January 9: The Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A sign the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Naivasha, Kenya, including a permanent cease-fire, and agreements on power and wealth sharing.

2005, January 25: UN Commission of Inquiry in Darfur presents its report to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

2005, March 31: UN Security Council refers the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

2006, May 5: Darfur Peace Agreement is signed by a representative of the GoS and Minni Minawi, chief of one of the factions of the SLM/A.

2007, July 31: The UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1769 to send a hybrid peacekeeping force of up to 26,000 troops and police to Darfur.

2008, January 1: Beginning of deployment of UNAMID troops in Darfur.
2008, July 14: The chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, accuses President Omar al Bashir for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

2009, February: First round of Qatar sponsored peace talks begin in Doha.

2009, 4 March: The ICC issues an arrest warrant on President Omar al Bashir.
The “Save Darfur” movement in images

Activist protest in front of the Coca Cola Headquarter in New York, organized by students from STAND, 27.04.2008 (Photo: Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert)

Cartoon portraying President George W. Bush watching new on TV about the “genocide” in Darfur. (Source: Save Darfur Coalition, My Local Cause.com)
Genocide scholar Samantha Power, Africa policy expert Gayle Smith and International Crisis Group Special Advisor John Prendergast spoke about the need for intervention in Darfur, Washington D.C., 19.05.2006. (Photo: Rita Kamani for the Genocide Intervention Network)

Hollywood celebrity George Clooney during a visit to Darfur with his father and journalist Nick Clooney, April 2006 (Photo: ABCNEWS.com)
George W. Bush Address to the United Nations
New York, September 21, 2004

Highlighted here is the passage in the speech where US President George W. Bush mentions the “genocide” in Darfur.

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for the honor of addressing this General Assembly. The American people respect the idealism that gave life to this organization. And we respect the men and women of the U.N., who stand for peace and human rights in every part of the world.

Welcome to New York City. And welcome to the United States of America. During the past three years, I’ve addressed this General Assembly in a time of tragedy for our country, and in times of decision for all of us. Now we gather at a time of tremendous opportunity for the U.N., and for all peaceful nations. For decades the circle of liberty and security and development has been expanding in our world. This progress has brought unity to Europe, self-government to Latin America and Asia and new hope to Africa. Now we have the historic chance to widen the circle even further, to fight radicalism and terror with justice and dignity, to achieve a true peace, founded on human freedom.

The United Nations and my country share the deepest commitments. Both the American Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaim the equal value and dignity of every human life.

(...)

At this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide. The United States played a key role in efforts to broker a cease-fire, and we’re providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people. Rwanda and Nigeria have deployed forces in Sudan to help improve security so aid can be delivered. The Security Council adopted a resolution that supports an expanded African Union force to help prevent further bloodshed and urges the government of Sudan to stop flights by military aircraft in Darfur. We congratulate the members of the council on this timely and necessary action.

I call on the government of Sudan to honor the cease-fire it signed and to stop the killing in Darfur. Because we believe in human dignity, peaceful nations must stand for the advance of democracy. No other system of government has done more to protect minorities, to secure the rights of labor, to raise the status of women or to channel human energy to the pursuits of peace. We've witnessed the rise of democratic governments in predominantly Hindu and Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish and Christian cultures.

(...)

History will honor the high ideals of this organization. The Charter states them with clarity: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to promote social progress and better standards of life and larger freedom. Let history also record that our generation of leaders followed through on these ideals, even in adversity. Let history show that in a decisive decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our duties or waver in meeting them.

I'm confident that this young century will be liberty's century. I believe we will rise to this moment because I know the character of so many nations and leaders represented here today, and I have faith in the transforming power of freedom. May God bless you.

Source: Presidential Rhetoric.com, database of presidential speeches
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