Type
Working paper
Title
Organization, Learning and Cooperation
In
Newark Working Paper
Author(s)
BARR Jason - Rutgers Department of Economics (Author)
SARACENO Francesco - (Author)
Collection
Newark Working Paper : 2004-001
Keywords
Artificial Neural Networks, Prisoner's Dilemma, Cooperation, Firm learning
Abstract
EN
This paper models the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly setting. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but must also learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters and to its rival’s willingness to cooperate. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival’s output. We show how profit and cooperation rates are affected by the sizes of both firms, their willingness to cooperate, and by environmental complexity. In addition, we investigate equilibrium firm size and cooperation rates.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC QUOTE
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