Co-auteur
  • DABÈNE Olivier (1)
  • MARTINEZ TRUJILLO Maria (1)
Type de Document
  • Article (4)
  • Communication non publiée (1)
  • Thèse de doctorat (1)
  • Mémoire universitaire (1)
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This paper intends to analyze the historical evolution of military involvement in internal security affairs of Mexico since the late 1940s. Recently, many critics have written extensively about Mexico’s heavily militarized policy towards drug trafficking and the organized crime (f.ex: Moloeznik 2010; Manaut 2009; Artz 2003). But without recognizing the historical continuities underlying such policy model, we cannot fully comprehend its origins and effectiveness. Historical-institutionalism is a useful theoretical approach when we are dealing with slow-moving process not captured by a short-time perspective. This approach has emphasized how things that have been institutionalized are inert and un-changed (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). They consider institutions to generate different sets of power distribution that can be changed according to the actors’ will. Pierson (Pierson 2000) in the work “Politics in Time” has argued that since what characterizes science is the discovery of causal relations we should consider time itself as an intervenient variable. In fact, causes and consequences may be separated over time and it may be useful to stretch the temporal horizon of a given analysis. (First paragraph)

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This study analyses the institutional reforms that took place inside the Brazilian Ministry of Defense between 2007 and 2011. By stressing the strategic interaction between civilian and military members, we shed light on recent advances in institutionalizing civilian control. More precisely, measures such as creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on military budget proposal and on promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian staff at the Ministry of Defense. These initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high degree of autonomy of each service branch’ commanders vis-à-vis the Minister. As a conclusion, we say that the adoption of monitoring and intrusive mechanisms reveals the logic of delegation and division of labor, thus indicating a higher degree of professionalization among the Brazilian armed forces.

In Brazil, the gradual democratic transition process has generated political institutions with authoritarian characteristics, such as a blurred distinction between internal and external security, as well as a low control under security activities in general. More specifically, the late creation of a Ministry of Defence shows how difficult is to control the military in this country. However, Nelson Jobim’s administration (2007-2011) is an advance comparing to the previous ones, having exerted an effective political authority that has improved democratic civilian control. The National Strategic Defence (2008), the Complimentary Law nº 136 (2010) and the White Book (2012) have contributed for important changes in the Ministry. The objective is to understand the impact of these changes on civil-military relations, based on the concept of democratic civilian control, as well as to identify the reasons behind them. After the civilian aviation crisis, there was a change in the internal State’s balance of power, which helped to consolidated the civilian authority in the Ministry of Defence after Nelson Jobim’s nomination in 2007. In conclusion, a number of factors (personal characteristics, national and international conjunctures and the Executive support) made possible these strucutural changes to happen, which effectivelly created a civilian strucuture in the Ministry.

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This study analyses the institutional reforms that took place inside the Brazilian Ministry of Defense between 2007 and 2011. By stressing the strategic interaction between civilian and military members, we shed light on recent advances in institutionalizing civilian control. More precisely, measures such as creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on military budget proposal and on promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian staff at the Ministry of Defense. These initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high degree of autonomy of each service branch’ commanders vis-à-vis the Minister. As a conclusion, we say that the adoption of monitoring and intrusive mechanisms reveals the logic of delegation and division of labor, thus indicating a higher degree of professionalization among the Brazilian armed forces

Cette thèse étudie pourquoi et comment les forces armées déploient des activités anticriminelles, et évalue l'impact de ces interventions sur les régimes démocratiques. À partir de l’institutionnalisme historique et de la théorie du choix rationnel, la thèse porte sur deux villes, Rio de Janeiro (Brésil) et Tijuana (Mexique), où les gouverneurs de l'Etat ont demandé aux militaires d’assister dans les tâches de sécurité publique entre 2007 et 2014. À partir de l'analyse des 100 entretiens semi-structurés, des archives historiques et des informations obtenues grâce à des lois sur la liberté d'information, la recherche suit les différentes phases des opérations militaires en matière de sécurité, de la prise de décision à la mise en œuvre de ces politiques. L'analyse systématique des statistiques criminels avant et après les opérations montre que ces actions ont un effet très limité sur la réduction permanente de la violence criminelle. En autre, les interventions militaires sont généralement suivies d'une série d'actions sociales susceptibles d'améliorer la réputation des forces armées au détriment de l'image des agences civiles. Finalement, la recherche montre que ces interventions militaires transforment la législation, la juridiction, la doctrine militaire et l’éducation, et entraînent des changements permanents dans la portée des activités militaires et des actions policières. En raison de ces modifications institutionnelles, les politiciens de façon générale et les gouverneurs des États en particulier sont plus que jamais tentés d’utiliser les forces armées pour obtenir des gains politiques à court terme, même au détriment de la dimension libérale de la démocratie.

Domestic internal security missions have become a centrepiece of Brazil and Mexico’s counter-narcotic efforts. Relying on a set of interviews, this article addresses narratives of elites engaged in the decision-making process and implementation of military operations to counter drug trafficking crimes in Rio de Janeiro and Tijuana. In spite of different levels of drug trafficking organisation and international ramification, this article points out the existence of shared narratives of growing insecurity and criminal strength in Brazil and Mexico, justifying state military reaction against a perceived national security threat. The article thus suggests the relevance of civil–military elites’ perception in defining public policies’ instruments and, ultimately, in upholding the militarisation of security in democratic regimes.

La coïncidence entre les transitions démocratiques survenues en Amérique latine dans les années 1980-2000 et l’explosion de la violence dans la région a fait l’objet d’une vaste littérature. Cependant, ces travaux n’ont pas cherché à établir de liens de cause à effet, mais plutôt à dévoiler des configurations et des dynamiques d’acteurs violents. Ils ont toutefois pris en compte la transformation du modèle économique qui s’est notamment traduit par une contraction importante de l’appareil bureaucratique et la délégation de tâches au secteur privé. A la lumière de ces travaux, le texte qui suit se penche sur une dimension peu explorée : les transformations des tâches policières et leurs conséquences substantielles en termes de justice, d’équité dans l’accès à la protection et de qualité des services offerts par les agences publiques...