Type
Article
Title
Lobbying under Pressure : The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation
In
Journal of Common Market Studies
Editor
GB : Blackwell Publishing
Volume
51
Number
3
Pages
555 - 572 p.
ISSN
00219886
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02314.x
Keywords
Lobbying, Economic interests
Abstract
EN
The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.

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