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The 'shadow banking system' refers to a system of credit-provision occurring outside of the official regulatory perimeter of commercial banks. Facilitated by securitization vehicles, mutual funds, hedge funds, investment banks and mortgage companies, the function and regulation of these shadow banking institutions has come under increasing scrutiny after the subprime crisis of 2007–8. Matthias Thiemann examines how regulators came to tolerate the emergence of links between the banking and shadow banking systems. Through a comparative analysis of the US, France, the Netherlands and Germany, he argues that fractured domestic and global governance systems determining the regulatory approach to these links ultimately aggravated the recent financial crisis. Since 2008, shadow banking has even expanded and the incentives for banks to bend the rules have only increased with increasing regulation. Thiemann's empirical work suggests how state-finance relations could be restructured to keep the banking system under state control and avoid future financial collapses. - Considers how globalization shapes the regulation of finance - Explains why regulation failed but also when and why it worked - Analyzes the rise of shadow banking in Germany, the Netherlands and France as well as the better known cases of the US and UK. (Publisher's abstract)

in Cambridge Journal of Economics Publication date 2017-10
ALDEGWY Mohamed
IBROCEVIC Edin
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Macro-prudential thinking and its emphasis on endogenously created systemic risks, marginal in the banking regulation discourse until the mid-2000s, has become central post-crisis. This paper analyzes this intellectual shift by using discourse and citation-network analysis of the most-cited scholarly works on banking regulation and systemic risk from 1985 to 2014 and six in-depth interviews with central scholars. It demonstrates that the predominance of formalism, particularly partial equilibrium analysis, in studies on banking regulation pre-crisis impeded economists’ engagement with the endogenous sources of systemic risks discussed in the systemic risk sample. These studies excluded observed phenomena that could not be accommodated in mathematical models, largely ignoring contributions based on historical and practitioners’ styles of reasoning. Post-crisis, while informal analyses gain prominence in studies on banking regulation, attempts to conceptualize systemic risk as a negative externality indicate the persistence of formalism and equilibrium thinking and its concomitant epistemological limitations that stymie theoretical progress.

in Industrial and Corporate Change Publication date 2016-10
GODART Frédéric C
CAVARRETTA Fabrice
THIEMANN Matthias
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Although it is often in the interest of individuals to implement networking strategies that erode their team’s social capital, it is unclear under what conditions such a social dilemma is more or less likely to occur. We focus on brokerage and closure as two dimensions of social structure where tension arises between individual networking strategies and team performance. Adopting a multilevel perspective, and focusing on closed teams with the presence of a clear leader, we analyze two complementary moderators of this social dilemma that are fundamental to the existence of teams: the task complexity facing the team under consideration, and the individualist versus collectivist shared value orientation of its members. We find that an increase in either of these makes the social dilemma more likely to occur. Counterintuitive conclusions pertaining to these moderators are discussed.

in Soziale Systeme Publication date 2007
WHITE Harrison
FUHSE Jan
THIEMANN Matthias
BUCHHOLZ Larissa
1
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Zusammenfassung: Der Aufsatz setzt Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie in Beziehung zur soziologischen Netzwerkanalyse, um Grundlagen für eine allgemeine Netzwerktheorie zu entwickeln. Er beginnt mit Luhmanns Diskussion von Sinn als einer zentralen Kategorie der Soziologie. Luhmanns Formulierung wird erweitert von einem Fokus auf die Dyade und doppelte Kontingenz hin zur Reichweite von Netzwerken und daher multipler Kontingenz. Während Kommunikations- und Handlungsaspekte von Sinn in Netzwerken ineinandergreifen, entflechtet der Aufsatz analytisch deren jeweils besondere Bedingungen und führt dabei die Konzepte Netdoms, Netdom Switching und Discipline ein. Netzwerktheorie lenkt damit den Blick auf das Zusammenspiel von zeitlichen, sozialen und interpretativen Dynamiken in der Konstitution und Verkettung von Sinnhorizonten. Darüber hinaus entfaltet der Aufsatz das Konzept »Style« als synkopierte Komplexität, um Luhmanns Top-Down-Ansatz bei der selbstreferentiellen Reproduktion von funktionalen Subsystemen zu ergänzen.

After the financial crisis, central banks were entrusted with implementing an ambitious macro‐prudential reform agenda. The goal was arguably twofold, to increase the resilience of the financial system and to lower the amplitudes of the financial cycle. A decade later, the implementation of the agenda is characterized by the pursuit of measures to raise the resilience of the financial system, while tools to smoothen the cycle have been rather sidelined. To explain this difference in implementation efforts, the paper combines ideational scholarship with the analytical stance of reputational theory and analyzes the technocratic debate over macroprudential strategy among policy‐makers of the Fed, the BoE and the ECB. The paper identifies reputational concerns linked to the need for discretionary interventions, the uncertain scientific status of the concept of the cycle and missing metrics as causes for concern, leading most central banks to shy away from forcefully implementing this policy goal.

Analyses of transnational governance formation point to the destabilizing effects transnational standard setters have upon national institutional configurations. Isomorphic pressures, it is argued, lead to the standardization of procedures used and actors involved in standard setting processes. What is not clear, however, is to what extent this meta-standardization increases the chances for convergence of national with transnational standards. This article explores this question for the case of the international accounting standard for off-balance-sheet financing in the Netherlands, France and Germany. It argues that the reconfiguration of domestic governance architectures had a decisive impact on convergence processes. Counter-intuitively, copying goals, membership and procedures of the transnational, private International Accounting Standards Committee limited the chances of rule convergence, as it threatened to deinstitutionalize the standard-setting role of an important national champion of rule-convergence, the banking regulator. The institutional template developed at the transnational level created actor-mismatch at the national level between those formulating and those implementing the rules, thereby weakening the coalition for rule change. A strong coalition, however, is needed to overcome vested business interests that favor convergence with transnational templates for legitimacy gains at the same time that they oppose convergence to contentious rules that limit their business activities.

in Competition and Change Publication date 2012-02
THIEMANN Matthias
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This article focuses on national variations in the engagement of banks in off-balance sheet securitization in three case study countries: Spain, France and Germany. It is argued that the failures in prudential regulation that underpinned the recent financial crisis are not predominantly situated at the international level. This article focuses on the way that national accounting rules determine whether the Special Purpose Entities of banks are off- or on-balance sheet. The analysis shows that national accounting norms are an important building block for prudential regulation, and these are prone to wider political influences.

This paper examines the European Union’s strategy of governing the economy through financial markets by focusing on the largely unacknowledged role of public development banks, including the multilateral European Investment Bank. It argues that these state-owned financial institutions have moved into a key position in the recent evolution of the European financial system and economic governance. Since the crisis, policy makers have used them to address the intrinsic volatility and excess liquidity of contemporary financial markets, as well as offset the constraints on public investment imposed by institutionalized fiscal austerity. The paper provides evidence for this claim through an analysis of the emergent policy nexus between the Investment Plan for Europe and the Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union. Based on official documents and interview data, it specifically traces the risk-sharing devices for small- and medium-sized enterprise and infrastructure finance set up by development banks within these initiatives. Equipped with public guarantees, they have been instrumental for the promotion of securitization markets and public–private partnerships through increased multilevel collaborations among development banks. The anchor role of such quasi-fiscal state actors in shaping capital markets, the paper concludes, has profound political implications, and therefore warrants further scholarly attention.

in Soziale Systeme Publication date 2007
WHITE Harrison
FUHSE Jan
THIEMANN Matthias
BUCHHOLZ Larissa
0
views

0
downloads
Zusammenfassung: Der Aufsatz setzt Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie in Beziehung zur soziologischen Netzwerkanalyse, um Grundlagen für eine allgemeine Netzwerktheorie zu entwickeln. Er beginnt mit Luhmanns Diskussion von Sinn als einer zentralen Kategorie der Soziologie. Luhmanns Formulierung wird erweitert von einem Fokus auf die Dyade und doppelte Kontingenz hin zur Reichweite von Netzwerken und daher multipler Kontingenz. Während Kommunikations- und Handlungsaspekte von Sinn in Netzwerken ineinandergreifen, entflechtet der Aufsatz analytisch deren jeweils besondere Bedingungen und führt dabei die Konzepte Netdoms, Netdom Switching und Discipline ein. Netzwerktheorie lenkt damit den Blick auf das Zusammenspiel von zeitlichen, sozialen und interpretativen Dynamiken in der Konstitution und Verkettung von Sinnhorizonten. Darüber hinaus entfaltet der Aufsatz das Konzept »Style« als synkopierte Komplexität, um Luhmanns Top-Down-Ansatz bei der selbstreferentiellen Reproduktion von funktionalen Subsystemen zu ergänzen.

in New School Economic Review Publication date 2007
THIEMANN Matthias
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3
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This paper traces the history and current state of international economic development through its institutions and attempts to reassess these institutions and their processes in a heterodox manner. There are many stereotypes and clichés to the foreign assistance industry: that it takes from the poor in rich countries and gives to the rich in poor countries; that it provides laboratories for economists and other social scientists to apply theories abroad that they would never attempt at home (the most obvious examples of these are population control programs and the privatization of pension funds); and that development creates “brain drain” from indigenous 2 institutions to the very institutions of development itself. Although a brief summary of the major research programs in development is given, the paper does not attempt to falsify or confirm any of these or other research programs and their corresponding policy recommendations. The purpose of the paper is to question the very nature of international economic development itself through an historical and philosophical re-examination of its institutional constructs. The Hegelian dialectical method of analysis is applied to the institutions of economic development and is used to ask, “what next and why?

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