Type
Article
Titre
Sanctions that signal: An experiment
Auteur(s)
GALBIATI Roberto - Département d'économie (Auteur)
SCHLAG Karl H. - University of Vienna (Auteur)
VAN DER WEELE Joël J - (Auteur)
Éditeur
NL : Elsevier
Volume
94
Pages
34 - 51 p.
ISSN
01672681
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002
Mots clés
Sanctions, Beliefs, Expressive law, Deterrence, Coordination, Minimum-effort-game
Résumé
EN
The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.
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