Auteurs Centres de recherche Disciplines et Collections Projets
Français English
 
 

Varieties of Risk Regulation in Europe: Coordination, complementarity & occupational safety in capitalist welfare states

 

Notice

Type:   Article
 
Titre:   Varieties of Risk Regulation in Europe: Coordination, complementarity & occupational safety in capitalist welfare states
 
Auteur(s):   Rothstein, Henry - King‘s College London [London] (Auteur)
Demeritt, David - King‘s College London [London] (Auteur)
Paul, Regine - Universität Bielefeld (Auteur)
Beaussier, Anne-Laure - Professions, institutions, temporalités (PRINTEMPS) (Auteur)
Wesseling, Mara (Auteur)
De Haan, Maarten - Maastricht University (Auteur)
Howard, Michael - King‘s College London [London] (Auteur)
Borraz, Olivier (1964-...) - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Auteur)
Huber, Michael - Fakultät für Informatik (TU München) (Auteur)
Bouder, Frederic - Maastricht University (Auteur)
 
In:   Socio-Economic Review
 
Date de publication:   2017-09
 
Éditeur:   ROYAUME-UNI  :  Oxford University Press
 
ISSN:   14751461
 
DOI:   10.1093/ser/mwx029
 
Mots-clés:   [en] regulation, labor law, capitalism, welfare state
 
Résumé:   [en] This article tests the extent to which the organization and stringency of occupational health and safety regulation complements the dominant mode of coordination in the political economy. While the UK explicitly sanctions risk-cost-benefit trade-offs, other European countries mandate ambitious safety goals. That contrast appears to reflect cleavages identified in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which suggests worker protection regimes are stronger in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies. Our analysis of Germany, France, UK and the Netherlands, shows that the varied organization of their regulatory regimes is explained through a three-way complementarity with their welfare systems and modes of coordination. However, despite varied headline goals, we find no systematic differences in the stringency of those countries’ regulatory protections insofar as they all make trade-offs on safety. Instead, the explicitness, rationalizations and logics of trade-offs vary according to each country’s legal system, state tradition and coupling between regulation and welfare system.
 
 

Résolveur de liens