Type
Working paper
Titre
Regulation and Distrust
Dans
NBER Working Paper Series
Auteur(s)
CAHUC Pierre - École polytechnique (X) (Auteur)
SHLEIFER Andrei - Harvard University (Auteur)
AGHION Philippe - Harvard University (Auteur)
ALGAN Yann - Département d'économie (Auteur)
Éditeur
Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research
Collection
NBER Working Paper Series : 14648
Résumé
EN
In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government’s role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

CITATION BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
EXPORT