Auteurs Centres de recherche Disciplines et Collections Projets
Français English
 
 

Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

 

Notice

Type:   Article
 
Titre:   Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation
 
Auteur(s):   Plantin, Guillaume - Département d'économie (Auteur)
 
In:   The Review of Financial Studies
 
Date de publication:   2015-01
 
Volume:   28
 
Numéro:   1
 
Pages:   146-175  p.
 
ISSN:   08939454
 
DOI:   10.1093/rfs/hhu055
 
Mots-clés:   [en] Shadow banking activity, Banking system, Banking crisis, Unregulated Banking
 
JEL:   G1,  G21,  G28
 
Résumé:   [en] Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.
 
 

Fichiers

Version Format Fichier Taille
Version de l'auteur 2015-plantin-shadow-banking.pdf 0,21 MB
 

Résolveur de liens