Type
Article
Titre
Communication with evidence in the lab
Éditeur
US : Elsevier
Volume
112
Pages
139 - 165 p.
ISSN
08998256
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.002
Mots clés
Sender–receiver game, Hard evidence, Information disclosure, Skepticism
Résumé
EN
We study a class of sender–receiver disclosure games in the lab. Our experiment relies on a graphical representation of sender's incentives in these games, and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the incentive graph to explain behavior and performance of players across different games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while other types use vague messages. Receivers take the evidence disclosed by senders into account, and perform better in games with an acyclic graph. Senders perform better in games with a cyclic graph. The data is largely consistent with a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking based on the iterated elimination of obviously dominated strategies.
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