Type
Article
Title
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance
In
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Author(s)
CAMPANTE Filipe - Harvard University (Author)
DO Quoc-Anh - Département d'économie (Author)
GUIMARAES Bernardo - São Paulo School of Economics (Author)
Editor
American Economic Association
Volume
11
Number
3
Pages
298 - 337 p.
ISSN
19457782
Abstract
EN
We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

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