Type
Article
Titre
Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps
Dans
American Economic Review
Auteur(s)
Éditeur
US : American Economic Association
Volume
104
Numéro
5
Pages
469 - 474 p.
ISSN
00028282
DOI
10.1257/aer.104.5.469
Résumé
EN
This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.

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