Type
Working paper
Titre
Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence
Dans
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers
Auteur(s)
CAMPANTE Filipe R. - Harvard University (Auteur)
DO Quoc-Anh - Département d'économie (Auteur)
GUIMARAES Bernardo - Sao Paulo School of Economics (Auteur)
Collection
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2014-13
Mots clés
Capital Cities, Governance, Institutions, Conflict, Civil War, Revolutions, Insurgencies, Population Concentration, Democracy, Power Sharing, Inefficient Institutions
Résumé
EN
We investigate the links between capital cities, conict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that this threat is rendered less e_ective by distance from the seat of political power. We develop a model that delivers two key predictions: (i) conict is more likely to emerge (and to dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capital cities are associated with misgovernance. We show evidence that both patterns hold true robustly in the data, as do other ancillary predictions from the model.

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