Type
Working paper
Titre
The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly
Dans
GREDEG Working paper
Auteur(s)
MONDELLO Gérard - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (Auteur)
SALIES Evens - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Auteur)
Éditeur
Université Côte d'Azur
Collection
GREDEG Working paper : 14
Mots clés
Tort Law, Strict liability, Negligence Rule, Imperfect competition, Oligopoly, Cournot competition
Résumé
EN
Summary: This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge. Key Words: Tort Law, Strict

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