Type
Working paper
Title
The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly
In
GREDEG Working paper
Author(s)
MONDELLO Gérard - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (Author)
SALIES Evens - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Author)
Editor
Université Côte d'Azur
Collection
GREDEG Working paper : 14
Keywords
Tort Law, Strict liability, Negligence Rule, Imperfect competition, Oligopoly, Cournot competition
Abstract
EN
Summary: This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge. Key Words: Tort Law, Strict

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