Type
Article
Titre
‘A Liberal Defence of Compulsory Voting’: Some Reasons for Scepticism
Dans
Politics
Éditeur
GB : Blackwell Publishing
Volume
28
Numéro
1
Pages
61 - 64 p.
ISSN
02633957
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9256.2007.00312.x
Mots clés
Voting, Inequalities, Political liberties
Résumé
EN
Liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin, insist that a just society must try to make sure that socio‐economic inequalities do not undercut the value of the vote, and of other political liberties. They insist on this not just for instrumental reasons, but because they assume that democratic forms of political participation can be desirable ends in themselves. However, compulsory voting laws seem to conflict with respect for reasonable differences of belief and value, essential to liberal egalitarians. Nor is it clear that such laws would actually achieve their intended purpose. Consequently, it is doubtful that there is a ‘liberal defence of compulsory voting’, as Lacroix, among others, maintains.

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