Type
Article
Titre
One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime
Dans
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Auteur(s)
DO Quoc-Anh - Département d'économie (Auteur)
NGUYEN Kieu-Trang - London School of Economics and Political Science (Auteur)
TRAN Anh N. - Indiana University (Auteur)
Éditeur
American Economic Association
Volume
9
Numéro
4
Pages
1 - 29 p.
ISSN
19457782
DOI
10.1257/app.20130472
Mots clés
patronage politics, Vietnam, hometown
Résumé
EN
We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

CITATION BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
EXPORT