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Plan de l'article : - Les quatre gestes esthétiques qui rendent la possibilité de la guerre nucléaire imaginable par la fiction et le rôle de la hantise ; - La possibilité de la guerre nucléaire dans la culture populaire visuelle des années 1950 aux années 1980 ; - Comment la possibilité de la guerre nucléaire a disparu de la culture populaire visuelle après la guerre froide ; - Comment les codes du héros-guerrier-protecteur rendent la guerre nucléaire impossible : Le Chant du loup et la franchise Mission: Impossible ; - Comment rendre la guerre nucléaire imaginable

in Futures Sous la direction de KEMP Sandra, ANDERSSON Jenny Publié en 2021-04-22
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This chapter reconnects modes of futures-making with the requirements of democracy by focusing on the naturalization of nuclear weapons and their removal from the realm of de- mocratic choice at a particular point in time. The chapter revolves around the concept of ‘nuclear eternity’ as a means of reducing public choices about the use of nuclear weapons. It critiques the idea that nuclear weapons have always been perceived as ‘here to stay’ and reassesses the dominant narrative about the 1960s as an emancipatory decade by arguing that the decade actually witnessed a significant shrinking of future po- litical possibilities. Finally, the chapter identifies three shapes of the future which pro- duce ‘nuclear eternity’—an absent post-nuclear future, an inconsistent post-nuclear future, and a disconnected post-nuclear future—and illustrates them with historical exam- ples

in European Security Publié en 2021-04-22
EGELAND Kjolv
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In February 2020, French president Emmanuel Macron invited all interested European states to a “strategic dialogue” on the supposed contribution of France’s nuclear arsenal to European collective security. While certain media commentators relayed Macron’s intervention with approbation and excitement, framing the proposal as an exciting new idea that, if implemented, might boost Europe’s clout on the world stage, the dominant reaction was one of ennui. After all, the argument for Euro-nukes is far from new. In fact, several (mostly French) actors have unsuccessfully attempted to persuade European policymakers of the necessity of European nuclear weapons cooperation for more than half a century. In this article, we investigate the history, merits, and longevity of the case for European nuclear arms. Drawing on secondary literature, policymakers’ writings, and two hitherto untapped surveys of European public opinion conducted by one of the authors, we argue that the case for Euro-nukes is critically flawed with respect to security, strategic autonomy, futurity, and democratic good governance. We maintain that the continuous resurfacing of the “zombie” case for Euro-nukes is made possible by powerful organisational interests, as well as conceptual reversification resulting in enduring contradictions between nuclear vulnerabilities and claims of protection and autonomy.

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En 2021, il existe sur notre planète plus de 13 000 armes nucléaires dont la plupart ont une capacité de destruction supérieure à l’explosif qui a rasé la ville d’Hiroshima le 6 août 1945. Plus de 1600 d’entre elles, aux Etats-Unis et en Russie, sont en état d’alerte. Elles peuvent être lancées en moins de quinze minutes et une guerre impliquant moins de 1% des arsenaux nucléaires actuels mettrait en péril l’approvisionnement en nourriture de la planète. Au moins depuis l’invention de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux, qui ne peuvent pas être interceptés ou rappelés, la protection des populations contre une attaque nucléaire délibérée ou accidentelle n’est plus possible. Le conseil pour la science et la sécurité du Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists a ainsi considéré que le danger nucléaire contemporain demeurait, fin janvier 2021, à un niveau aussi élevé que l’an passé, le plus haut depuis le début de l’âge atomique.

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This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history.

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This video is based on the following research on nuclear vulnerabilities, from the Nuclear Knowledges program at Sciences Po, CERI

in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Publié en 2020-08-03
EGELAND Kjolv
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Did the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki shorten the war, and were they necessary to force the Japanese surrender? Many people believe the answer to both questions is yes: In dropping the Bomb, America chose the lesser of two evils. Although historians have long challenged this narrative as wrong or misleading, a significant number of Europeans still believe it. That is the primary result of a recent survey of European views on nuclear affairs generally and the atomic bombings of Japan specifically. The survey, carried out in October 2019, involved approximately 7,000 respondents aged 18 and upward, carefully selected to ensure representative samples from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom...

in The National Interest Publié en 2020-06-23
HERZOG Stephen
FIALHO Fabrício
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Polls in the United States and nine allied countries in Europe and Asia show that public support for a nuclear test is very low. If the Trump administration conducts a test, then it shouldn’t expect backing from Americans or its closest U.S. partners.

in Israël et la bombe. L'histoire du nucléaire israélien Publié en 2020-05-25
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[résumé de l'ouvrage] Bien qu’Israël ait franchi le Rubicon nucléaire à l’aube de la guerre des Six Jours, en 1967, il entretient toujours l’ambiguïté au sujet de ses capacités en ce domaine. Comment cette attitude d’« opacité » est-elle possible, et comment a-t-elle évolué ?

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This contribution argues that the concept of protean power opens a space to think about the limits of control and knowledge about catastrophic possibilities such as nuclear war. To do so, it offers the first distinctive definition of nuclear luck, which has long been acknowledged by policy and military leaders but remains unaccounted for in scholarship. It further shows that the nuclear realm is defined by two key unknowables. However, it argues that protean power perpetuates a survivability bias which has characterized scholarship so far, before suggesting ways to overcome that bias and modify scholarly ethos to acknowledge such catastrophic possibilities.

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