Guillaume Plantin
Professor of Economics | Economies and finances
Département d'économie

32
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Guillaume PLANTIN is Professor of Economics at SciencesPo since 2016. He is also a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Until the creation of Sciences Po’s School of Management and Innovation, Guillaume Plantin was scientific director of the Master Finance & Strategy, programme formerly run by the Department of Economics. Guillaume Plantin is also a member of the Institute of French Actuaries since 1997 and is a Member of the Scientific Committee of the French Prudential Supervisory Authority. Before joining Sciences Po, Guillaume Plantin was Professor of Finance at the University of Toulouse 1-Capitole, and an Associated Researcher at the Toulouse School of Economics. He started his career as a supervisor at the French Insurance Supervisory Authority (1997-2001). He then was an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, PA-2003-2006), and at the London Business School (2006-2009). He was member of the French Economic Advisory Council to the French Prime Minister (Conseil d'Analyse Economique) from 2012 to 2014. He conducts research on the determinants of financial stability and on the regulation of financial institutions. His papers are published regularly in the American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Review of Economic Studies, and other journals as well as I a number of practitioner oriented journals. In 2015 his paper « Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation » was runner-up for the Review of Financial Studies Best Paper award. He has also published two books to date: Risk Theory and Reinsurance, co-authored with Griselda Deestra (ed. Springer-Verlan) that has been translated Théorie du Risque et Réassurance (ed. Economica), and When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Rile and Design of Prudential Regulation, co-authored with Jean-Charles Rochet (ed. Princeton University Press). He was awarded a prestigious ERC Starting Grant at the end of 2010 for his project « Risk Incentives in Financial Institutions and Financial Instability » (RIFIFI). Guillaume Plantin holds a PhD in Economics from University of Toulouse 1-Capitole.
32 Publications
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  • SHIN Hyun Song (7)
  • SAPRA Haresh (4)
  • LANDIER Augustin (3)
  • TIROLE Jean (3)
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  • Article (15)
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Le Monde d'aujourd'hui. Les sciences sociales au temps du Covid
Edited by LAZAR Marc, PLANTIN Guillaume, RAGOT Xavier Publication date 2020-10
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Dès le déclenchement de ce « fait social total » que fut la pandémie de Covid-19, la communauté scientifique de Sciences Po s'est lancée dans des analyses collectives et interdisciplinaires pour tenter de comprendre sa signification. Sidérant, impensable, incompréhensible, un événement-monde comme la pandémie de Covid-19, au moment où il se produit, prend autant de sens différents que d'acteurs chargés de le gérer et d'en parler : responsables politiques, scientifiques, médecins, médias, réseaux sociaux… Dans cette cacophonie interprétative, les sciences sociales sont d’une grande utilité. Dès le déclenchement de ce « fait social total », la communauté scientifique de Sciences Po s’est lancée dans des analyses collectives et interdisciplinaires pour tenter de comprendre sa signification. Il n’est pas seulement nécessaire d’éclairer les aspects éruptifs et disruptifs de telles crises, mais aussi de saisir ce qu’elles révèlent de nos sociétés et ce qu’elles leur font, alors que nous devons apprendre à exister avec le coronavirus, peut-être pour longtemps.
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Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability
Publication date 2019-02 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-01
ACHARYA Viral
PLANTIN Guillaume
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This paper studies a model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy in which a low policy rate lowers the cost of capital for firms thereby spurring investment, but also induces destabilizing “carry trades” against their assets. If the public sector does not have sufficient fiscal capacity to cope with the large resulting private borrowing, then carry trades and productive investment compete for scarce funds, and so the former crowd out the latter. Below an endogenous lower bound, monetary easing generates only limited investment at the cost of large and socially wasteful financial risk taking.
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Monetary Easing, Investment and Financial Instability
Publication date 2018-07 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : DP 13072
ACHARYA Viral
PLANTIN Guillaume
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This paper studies a model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy in which a low policy rate lowers the cost of capital for firms thereby spurring investment, but also induces destabilizing “carry trades” against their assets. If the public sector does not have sufficient fiscal capacity to cope with the large resulting private borrowing, then carry trades and productive investment compete for scarce funds, and so the former crowd out the latter. Below an endogenous lower bound, monetary easing generates only limited investment at the cost of large and socially wasteful financial risk taking.
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Fiscal and Monetary Regimes: A Strategic Approach
Publication date 2018-05 Collection CEPR Discussion Papers : DP 12903
PLANTIN Guillaume
BARTHÉLEMY Jean
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This paper develops a full-fledged strategic analysis of Wallace’s “game of chicken”. A public sector facing legacy nominal liabilities is comprised of fiscal and monetary authorities that respectively set the primary surplus and the price level in a non-cooperative fashion. We find that the post 2008 feature of indefinitely postponed fiscal consolidation and rapid expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is consistent with a strategic setting in which neither authority can commit to a policy beyond its current mandate, and the fiscal authority has more bargaining power than the monetary one at each date.
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Exchange Rates and Monetary Spillovers
in Theoretical Economics Publication date 2018-05
PLANTIN Guillaume
SHIN Hyun Song
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When do flexible exchange rates prevent monetary and financial conditions from spilling over across currencies? We examine a model in which international investors strategically supply capital to a small inflation‐targeting economy with flexible exchange rates. For some combination of parameters, the unique equilibrium exhibits the observed empirical feature of prolonged episodes of capital inflows and appreciation of the domestic currency, followed by reversals where capital outflows go hand‐in‐hand with currency depreciation, a rise in domestic interest rates, and inflationary pressure. Arbitrarily small shocks to global financial conditions suffice to trigger these dynamics.
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Marking to Market versus Taking to Market
in American Economic Review Publication date 2018
PLANTIN Guillaume
TIROLE Jean
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Building on the idea that accounting matters for corporate governance, this paper studies the equilibrium interaction between the measurement rules that firms find privately optimal, firms’ governance, and the liquidity in the secondary market for their assets. This equilibrium approach reveals an excessive use of market-value accounting: corporate performance measures rely excessively on the information generated by other firms’ asset sales and insufficiently on the realization of a firm’s own capital gains. This dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals, thereby making it more costly for firms to overcome their agency problems.
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Taxing the Rich
in The Review of Economic Studies Publication date 2017-07
LANDIER Augustin
PLANTIN Guillaume
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Affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This article studies an economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidance technology with subadditive costs, and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit. Subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the top. This in turn may trigger excessive risk-taking. When the avoidance technology consists in costly migration between two countries that compete fiscally, we show that an endogenous increase in inequality due to risk-taking makes progressive taxation more fragile, which vindicates in turn risk-taking and can lead to equilibria with regressive tax rates at the top, and high migrations of wealth towards the smaller country.
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Marking to Market versus Taking to Market
Publication date 2016-11
PLANTIN Guillaume
TIROLE Jean
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While the debate on cost and market-value accounting has been raging for years, economists lack a framework allowing a comparison of their relative merits. This paper considers an agency model in which the measurement of an asset can be based on public market data (marking to market) and/or on the realization of its value through costly resale to an informed buyer (taking to market). At the optimal contract, noisier market data lead to cost accounting and gains trading (selling winners/keeping losers) whereas accurate data naturally favor market-value accounting. The quality of market data and the magnitude of resale costs both depend on the volume of transactions, and therefore on accounting rules. The paper studies the mutual feedback between individually optimal accounting rules and asset market liquidity. This equilibrium approach reveals a socially excessive use of market-value accounting that dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals.
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Exchange Rates and Monetary Spillovers
Publication date 2016 Collection BIS Working Papers : 537
PLANTIN Guillaume
SHIN Hyun Song
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When does the combination of flexible exchange rates and inflation-targeting monetary policy guarantee insulation from global financial conditions? We examine a dynamic global game model of international investment flows where, for some combination of parameters, the unique equilibrium exhibits the observed empirical feature of prolonged episodes of capital inflows and appreciation of the domestic currency, followed by abrupt reversals where capital outflows go hand-in-hand with currency depreciation, a domestic bond market crash, and inflationary pressure.
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Rewarding Trading Skills Without Inducing Gambling
in Journal of Finance Publication date 2015-06
MAKAROV Igor
PLANTIN Guillaume
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This paper develops a model of active asset management in which fund managers may forgo alpha-generating strategies, preferring instead to make negative-alpha trades that enable them to temporarily manipulate investors' perceptions of their skills. We show that such trades are optimally generated by taking on hidden tail risk, and are more likely to occur when fund managers are impatient and when their trading skills are scalable, and generate a high profit per unit of risk. We propose long-term contracts that deter this behavior by dynamically adjusting the dates on which the manager is compensated in response to her cumulative performance.
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