Co-auteur
  • SRAER David (2)
  • AUER Raphaël (2)
  • HASSAN Tarek A (1)
  • BUCHARDI Konrad B (1)
  • Voir plus
Type de Document
  • Article (11)
  • Working paper (2)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (1)
  • Contribution à un site web (1)
in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Publié en 2009-02
AUER Raphaël
1
vues

0
téléchargements
This paper extends the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of quality pricing under perfect competition. Exporters sell goods of different qualities to consumers who have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Production is subject to decreasing returns to scale and, therefore, supply and the toughness of competition react to cost changes brought about by exchange rate fluctuations. First, we predict that exchange rate shocks are imperfectly passed through into prices. Second, prices of low-quality goods are more sensitive to exchange rate shocks than prices of high-quality goods. Third, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts toward higher quality and more expensive goods. We test these predictions using highly disaggregated price and quantity U.S. import data and find only weak empirical evidence in support of our theory.

in COGITO, la lettre de la recherche à Sciences Po Publié en 2018-11
5
vues

0
téléchargements
Il existe en économie une régularité empirique étonnante exprimée par ce que l’on appelle l’équation de gravité : dans une année donnée, et ce depuis au moins un siècle pour lequel il existe des données précises, la valeur des échanges commerciaux entre deux pays est approximativement proportionnelle à leurs tailles, et inversement proportionnelle à la distance géographique qui les sépare. En d’autres termes, deux pays éloignés de 500 km échangent deux fois plus que deux pays éloignés de 1.000km, toutes choses égales par ailleurs.

11
vues

11
téléchargements
The gravity equation in international trade states bilateral exports are proportional to economic size, and inversely proportional to geographic distance. While the role of size is well understood, that of distance remains mysterious. I offer an explanation for the role of distance: If (i) the distribution of firm sizes is Pareto, (ii) the average squared distance of a firm’s exports is an increasing power function of its size, and (iii) a parameter restriction holds, then the distance elasticity of trade is constant for long distances. When the firm size distribution follows Zipf’s law, trade is inversely proportional to distance.

in The Review of Economic Studies Publié en 2018-10
BUCHARDI Konrad B
HASSAN Tarek A
16
vues

16
téléchargements
We use 130 years of data on historical migrations to the United States to show a causal effect of the ancestry composition of US counties on foreign direct investment (FDI) sent and received by local firms. To isolate the causal effect of ancestry on FDI, we build a simple reduced-form model of migrations: Migrations from a foreign country to a US county at a given time depend on (i) a push factor, causing emigration from that foreign country to the entire United States, and (ii) a pull factor, causing immigration from all origins into that US county. The interaction between time-series variation in origin-specific push factors and destination-specific pull factors generates quasi-random variation in the allocation of migrants across US counties. We find that doubling the number of residents with ancestry from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one local firm engages in FDI with that country by 4 percentage points. We present evidence that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in information frictions, and not by better contract enforcement, taste similarities, or a convergence in factor endowments.

in American Economic Review Publié en 2012-10
SRAER David
THESMAR David
6
vues

0
téléchargements
What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects. Through this collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact on aggregate investment. To compute the sensitivity of investment to collateral value, we use local variations in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. Over the 1993-2007 period, the representative US corporation invests $0.06 out of each $1 of collateral.

in Journal of International Economics Publié en 2018-01
AUER Raphaël
SAURÉ Philip
2
vues

0
téléchargements
This paper analyzes firm's pricing-to-market decisions in vertically differentiated industries. We first present a model featuring firms that sell goods of heterogeneous quality levels to consumers who are heterogeneous in their income and thus their marginal willingness to pay for quality increments. We derive closed-form solutions for the unique pricing game under costly international trade. The comparative statics highlight how firms' pricing-to-market decisions are shaped by the interaction of consumer income and good quality. We derive two testable predictions. First, the relative price of high qualities compared to low qualities increases with the income of the destination market. Second, the rate of cost pass-through into consumer prices falls with quality if destination market income is sufficiently high. We present evidence in support of these two predictions based on a dataset of prices, sales, and product attributes in the European car industry.

The gravity equation in international trade states bilateral exports are proportional to economic size, and inversely proportional to geographic distance. While the role of size is well understood, that of distance remains mysterious. I offer an explanation for the role of distance: If (i) the distribution of firm sizes is Pareto, (ii) the average squared distance of a firm’s exports is an increasing power function of its size, and (iii) a parameter restriction holds, then the distance elasticity of trade is constant for long distances. When the firm size distribution follows Zipf’s law, trade is inversely proportional to distance.

9
vues

0
téléchargements
By considering a model with identical firms, Krugman (1980) predicts that a higher elasticity of substitution between goods magnifies the impact of trade barriers on trade flows. In this paper, I introduce firm heterogeneity in a simple model of international trade. I prove that the extensive margin and the intensive margin are affected by the elasticity of substitution in exact opposite directions. When the distribution of productivity across firms is Pareto, the predictions of the Krugman model with representative firms are overturned: the impact of trade barriers on trade flows is dampened by the elasticity of substitution, and not magnified.

in Journal of Political Economy Publié en 2018-02
5
vues

5
téléchargements
The gravity equation in international trade states bilateral exports are proportional to economic size, and inversely proportional to geographic distance. While the role of size is well understood, that of distance remains mysterious. I offer an explanation for the role of distance: If (i) the distribution of firm sizes is Pareto, (ii) the average squared distance of a firm’s exports is an increasing power function of its size, and (iii) a parameter restriction holds, then the distance elasticity of trade is constant for long distances. When the firm size distribution follows Zipf’s law, trade is inversely proportional to distance.

in Journal of International Economics Publié en 2013-05
OSSA Ralph
3
vues

0
téléchargements
We generalize Krugman's (1979) ‘new trade’ model by allowing for an explicit production chain in which a range of tasks is performed sequentially by a number of specialized teams. We demonstrate that an increase in market size induces a deeper division of labor among these teams which leads to an increase in firm productivity. The paper can be thought of as a formalization of Smith's (1776) famous theorem that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. It also sheds light on how market size differences can limit the scope for international technology transfers.

Suivant