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  • ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (6)
  • FRIEBEL Guido (5)
  • SONIN Konstantin (4)
  • BHATTACHARYA Sudipto (3)
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  • Article (30)
  • Working paper (11)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (9)
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Publié en 2021-04 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2021-05
FISMAN Raymond
IORAMASHVILI Carolin
PLEKHANOV Alexander
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We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level data set that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006-2020, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.

in Etudes du CERI Sous la direction de Centre de recherches internationales Publié en 2021-02-03
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2020 a été une année singulière dans le monde entier, mais en Russie et au Bélarus, deux régimes autocratiques qui se heurtaient à des difficultés bien avant la pandémie de Covid-19, elle a été celle de bouleversements saisissants.

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Fonder les politiques sur des preuves scientifiques est crucial pour maximiser le bien être. Ces dernières années, gouvernements, organisations internationales et recherche académique ont généralisé la nécessité d’utiliser des données et des preuves pour la conception, la mise en place et l’évaluation des politiques publiques. Tandis que les évaluations randomisées apparaissent comme l’un des moyens les plus précis pour identifier l’effet causal des politiques, de nombreux programmes gouvernementaux ne sont pas conçus de manière à permettre leur évaluation ex-post. Pourtant, les décideurs publics ont besoin de preuves scientifiques pour ajuster les politiques, réallouer le budget et adapter leurs actions de sorte à maximiser le bien-être des populations tout en tenant compte des ressources disponibles. Cette thèse présente trois cas où l’évaluation ex-post de politiques est possible, soit grâce à l’exploitation de discontinuités géographiques dans la mise en place de la politique (Chapitres 1 et 3), soit grâce à des discontinuités régionales créées par une réglementation attachée à la politique (Chapitre 2). Chaque chapitre se concentre sur des défis différents de l’Agenda 2030 et des Objectifs de Développement Durable (ODD). Tandis que le Chapitre 1 évalue l’impact de la sécurité sociale universelle sur la mortalité maternelle et périnatale, le Chapitre 3 explore l’effet de la décentralisation sur des indicateurs liés à l’objectif mondial d’éradiquer la faim, dont celui sur la sécurité alimentaire relève. Le Chapitre 2 étudie comment les fonds d’aide stimulent la création d’entreprises et la productivité, ce qui fait partie de l’ODD pour la prospérité économique.

Publié en 2020-06 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2020-06
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina
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Using an online randomized experiment in the context of the 2019 European elections campaign in France, we study how fact-checking affects sharing of false news on social media. We exposed over 4200 voting-age French to statements on the role of the EU made by the extreme right populist party Rassemblement National. A randomly selected subgroup of experiment participants was also presented with fact-checking of these statements; another subgroup was offered a choice whether to view the fact-checking or not. Then, all participants could choose whether to share the false statements on their Facebook pages. We show that: (i) both imposed and voluntary fact-checking reduced sharing of false statements by more than 25%; (ii) the size of the effect was similar between imposed and voluntary fact-checking; and (iii) each additional click required to share false statements reduced sharing by 75%.

Publié en 2019-06 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-13
MELNIKOV Nikita
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina
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How does the internet affect government approval? Using surveys of 840,537 individuals from 2,232 subnational regions in 116 countries in 2008-2017 from the Gallup World Poll and the global expansion of 3G networks, we show that an increase in internet access reduces government approval and increases the perception of corruption in government. This effect is present only when the internet is not censored and is stronger when traditional media is censored. Actual incidents of corruption translate into higher corruption perception only in places covered by 3G. In Europe, the expansion of mobile internet increased vote shares of anti-establishment populist parties.

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This article draws on a natural experiment to identify the relationship between income and trust. We use a unique panel data set on Russia where GDP experienced an 8% drop in 2009. The effect of the crisis had been uneven among Russian regions because of their differences in industrial structure inherited from the Soviet period. After instrumenting average regional income by Soviet industrial structure, we find that 10% decrease in income is associated with a five percentage point decrease in social trust. We also find that post-crisis economic recovery did not fully restore pre-crisis trust level.

in Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization Publié en 2019-03
SPECIALE Biagio
TUCCIO Michele
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We study wage adjustment during the recent crisis in Italy using a unique dataset on immigrant workers that includes those employed in formal and informal sector. We find that before the crisis immigrants’ wages in the formal and informal sectors moved in parallel (with a 15% premium in the formal labor market). During the crisis, however, formal wages did not adjust down while wages in the unregulated informal labor market fell so that by 2013 the gap had grown to 32%. The difference was particularly salient for workers in occupations where the minimum wage is likely to be binding, and in “simple” occupations where there is high substitutability between immigrant and native workers. Calibrating a simple partial equilibrium model of spillovers between formal and informal markets, we find that less than 10% of workers who lost a formal job during the crisis move to the informal sector. We also find that if the formal sector wages were fully flexible, the decline in formal employment would be in the range of 1.5–4.5%—much lower than 16% decline that we observe in the data.

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Chris Miller’s book is a historian’s account of Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Soviet economy. Miller focuses on the question of why Gorbachev did not follow Deng Xiaoping and did not manage to reform the economy. Miller argues that it was not for the lack of understanding (Gorbachev did invest in learning China’s approach to reform and did understand it well), nor for the lack of trying. In fact, Gorbachev did try to implement Deng’s agricultural and industrial enterprise reforms. However, Gorbachev’s reforms were blocked by powerful vested interests. An inability to tackle the agricultural and industrial lobbies eventually resulted in the bankruptcy and collapse of the Soviet Union. While I generally agree with the political economy argument, I discuss a number of alternative explanations. I also discuss sources of Gorbachev’s weak state capacity and offer an evaluation of Gorbachev’s and post-Gorbachev reform efforts and mistakes based on the political economy research carried out in the last twenty-five years.

Publié en 2018-12 Collection Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2018-09
BARRERA Oscar
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina
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How effective is fact checking in countervailing “alternative facts,” i.e., misleading statements by politicians? In a randomized online experiment during the 2017 French presidential election campaign, we subjected subgroups of 2480 French voters to alternative facts by the extreme-right candidate, Marine Le Pen, and/or corresponding facts about the European refugee crisis from official sources. We find that: (i) alter- native facts are highly persuasive; (ii) fact checking improves factual knowledge of voters (iii) but it does not affect policy conclusions or support for the candidate; (iv) exposure to facts alone does not decrease support for the candidate, even though voters update their knowledge. We argue that the main channel is that fact checking increases the salience of the immigration issue.

in Journal of Comparative Economics Publié en 2018-09
MELNIKOV Nikita
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The “transition happiness gap” has been one of the most robust findings in the literature on life satisfaction. Until very recently, scholars using various datasets have shown that residents of post-communist countries were significantly less satisfied with their lives than their counterparts in non-transition countries (controlling for income and other socio-economic characteristics). The literature has explained this finding by the great macroeconomic instability of the 1990s, by a substantial decrease in the quality and accessibility of public goods, by the major increase in inequality, and by the rapid depreciation of pre-transition human capital. All these factors were expected to subside over time – at least after the post-Great-Recession recovery. In this paper, we consider two most recent datasets – the third wave of the Life in Transition Survey (administered in 2015–16) and the 2010–2016 waves of the annual Gallup World Poll. We find that by 2016 the transition happiness gap had closed. This convergence has taken place both due to a “happiness recovery” in post-communist countries after the Great Recession and due to a decrease in life satisfaction in comparator countries in recent years. We also find that the convergence in life satisfaction was primarily driven by middle-income young, educated individuals, regardless of gender.

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