Co-auteur
  • JACQUOT Sophie (7)
  • BALME Richard (4)
  • GROSSMAN Emiliano (3)
  • CLIFT Ben (3)
  • Voir plus
Type de Document
  • Article (29)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (23)
  • Working paper (12)
  • Livre (5)
  • Voir plus
in Elites, ideas, and the evolution of public policy Sous la direction de MARC SMYRL , GENIEYS William Publié en 2008
4
vues

0
téléchargements

in Review of International Political Economy Publié en 2013-11
JOHNSON Juliet
MÜGGE Daniel
SEABROOKE Leonard
GRABEL Ilene
GALLAGHER Kevin
13
vues

0
téléchargements
An anniversary issue provides an inescapably inviting opportunity to reflect on the past, evaluate the present, and contemplate the future. Eschewing the self-congratulatory rhetoric of traditional anniversary celebrations, we have devoted this 20th anniversary issue of RIPE to contributions that critically examine the academic discipline of international political economy, focusing on our collective challenges and limitations as much as on our achievements. As every author knows, it is the thoughtful, constructive, and above all critical review that ultimately pushes us to produce better scholarly work. The global financial crisis mandates such a reassessment, as did the fall of communism that birthed this journal. [First paragraph]

in Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2006 Sous la direction de WEIDENFELD Werner, WESSELS Wolfgang Publié en 2006
WOLL Cornelia
0
vues

0
téléchargements
Viel ist passiert im vergangen Jahr. Durch die Krise der europäischen Verfassung ist die Kluft zwischen Bürgern und europäischen Institutionen in den Blick der Öffentlichkeit geraten. Für die Europäische Kommission war dies ein Anlass, politische Partizipation und Interessen- vertretung vermehrt zu fördern, sie gleichzeitig aber auch kritisch zu überprüfen. In diesem Sinne zielt das im Februar 2006 vorgelegte Weißbuch über eine europäische Kommunikations- politik auf eine stärkere Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft in den politischen Prozess. Vor dem Hintergrund des amerikanischen Skandals um den Lobbyisten Jack Abramoff versucht die EU aber zu vermeiden, dass die Offenheit des politischen Prozesses zu Missbrauch durch Inte- ressenvertreter führt. Somit ist die verstärkte Kontrolle von Lobbying in der EU Teil der im Mai 2006 vorgelegten Transparenzinitiative der Kommission. Der Konsultationsprozess zu diesen beiden Vorschlägen und die Debatte um die möglichen Konsequenzen zunehmender Regulierung von Interessenvertretung zeigen, wie sehr politische Partizipation von Schlüsse- lakteuren und Zivilgesellschaft ins Zentrum der europäischen Reforminitiativen gerückt sind.

The national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, seems to be an example of strong and unifi ed interest organization, especially since its reform in 1998. Through a study of the collective action of fi rms in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression. In fact, a central employers’ and industry association only constituted itself in France in response to state and trade union activism and struggled throughout history once these external threats lost importance. Like all encompassing business associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of groups of business actors and constantly has to manage its internal interest heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its latest reform demonstrates that the recent media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that MEDEF can claim legitimately as its responsibility.

The rise in inequality has been explained with reference to organized groups and the lobbying of the financial sector. This article argues that the image of politics as organized combat is contradicted by empirical evidence on lobbying in the United States, and does not travel well to Europe. The power of finance does not operate through organized political influence. Rather, politics in the interest of capital unfolds as a structural feature of advanced economies over time. Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, one of the most promising strategies of institutions seeking government support was not organizing for combat, but collective inaction. Our challenge, then, is to explain how the power of finance has built up and is playing out in creating inequality. A more structural, less agency-focused perspective highlights how the rise of finance has been supported by actors that few would accuse of being finance-friendly, such as the European center-left parties and consumers. Reconceptualizing the power of finance has important implications for political solutions to rising inequality.

First paragraph: The move towards global history is now commonplace in history departments across the world. For scholars of international political economy, it is easy to understand the importance of transcending national boundaries in order to account for the evolution of social and economic relations across centuries. The thematic rather than regional focus of world history helps to reveal dynamics across civilizations that intricately link their evolutions, sometimes even in the absence of political decisions. Commercial relations fall in this category and a series of excellent historical studies examine economic development, social, technological and scientific evolution by focusing on specific commodities such as salt or oil. Cotton by Giorgio Riello, Professor of Global History at the University of Warwick, is an impressive work in this tradition.

First paragraph: One of the motivations for establishing a European banking union was the desire to break the ties between national regulators and domestic financial institutions in order to prevent regulatory capture. The centralization of supervisory authority under the auspices of the European Central Bank aims to prevent conflicts of interest that can exist between national authorities and financial institutions operating in global markets. In particular, critics have pointed at regulatory leniency towards national champions, the protection and promotion of domestic regulatory standards at the disadvantage of foreign competitors or implicit encouragement to hold domestic sovereign bonds. One of the most glaring lessons of the recent crisis seems to be that elite failure – both on the side of the public authorities and the private sector – was the result of complacency, misjudgment and sometimes even outright manipulation that could have been avoided if supervision and regulation happened at a greater distance. By centralizing these functions at the European level, financial institutions will no longer be able to play their domestic advantage, or rely to the same extent on much criticized sources of proximity with regulators such as schooling and education, rotating doors or joint golf excursions.

in Crisis and Control: Institutional Change in Financial Market Regulation Sous la direction de MAYNTZ Renate Publié en 2012
3
vues

0
téléchargements

in Europe, Canada and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Sous la direction de HÜBNER Kurt Publié en 2011
3
vues

0
téléchargements
First lines: The envisioned Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU figures prominently in the competitive regionalism strategies that mark the relationship between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Following the conclusion of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the EU negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA) with Mexico in 1999 (Dür 2007) and now seeks to establish another foothold in the North American market with a partnership agreement with Canada. The EU’s recent turn to bilateral and regional trade negotiations marks an important break with the multilateral commitment and its interest in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round, championed by former EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy. The current CETA talks thus have to be studied in the context of EU trade policy-making in general. Who is behind the political decision to engage in bilateral trade talks? What explains the move from multilateralism to FTAs such as the EU-Canada agreement? In all industrialized countries, domestic support for such initiatives is tepid – in part because the public perceives that these agreements benefit big business rather than workers or the general public.

in Politiques européennes Sous la direction de DEHOUSSE Renaud Publié en 2009-09
35
vues

0
téléchargements
1ères lignes: Leu d’interventions européennes sont autant médiatisées et contestées que la politique de concurrence. Alors qu’un grand nombre d’Européens n’ont pas caché leur satisfaction quand Microsoft s’est vu infliger une amende de 497 millions d’euros pour abus de position dominante en 2004, ils sont plus inquiets quand la Commission européenne remet en question des éléments de leurs économies nationales. La politique de concurrence touche à de nombreux domaines : de l’ouverture des services publics, comme les télécommunications, l’électricité ou les services postaux, en passant par la gestion d’entreprises considérées comme des fiertés nationales, comme en Allemagne avec l’abrogation de la loi Volkswagen en octobre 2007, et jusqu’au financement du football professionnel. Comme l’ont montré les décisions sur Bœing/McDonnell Douglas en 1997 ou General Electric/Honeywell en 2001, le rôle de Bruxelles dans les fusions et les acquisitions s’étend au-delà des frontières européennes et notamment jusqu’aux États-Unis. Cette activité en plein essor a des conséquences financières très lourdes pour les entreprises affectées. Le montant des amendes infligées aux entreprises en 2001 ou encore en 2006 a dépassé les 1 800 millions d’euros, un total annuel plus important que l’ensemble des amendes imposées avant 2000

Suivant