Trade-imbalances networks and exchange rate adjustments: The paradox of a new Plaza

Andrea Fracasso
Stefano Schiavo

Discussion Paper No. 24, 2008
The Discussion Paper series provides a means for circulating preliminary research results by staff of or visitors to the Department. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion prior to the publication of papers.

Requests for copies of Discussion Papers and address changes should be sent to:

Dott. Luciano Andreozzi  
E.mail luciano.andreozzi@economia.untn.it  
Dipartimento di Economia  
Università degli Studi di Trento  
Via Inama 5  
38100 TRENTO ITALIA
Trade-imbalances networks and exchange rate adjustments: 
the paradox of a new Plaza

Andrea Fracasso* † and Stefano Schiavo‡§

December 2008

Abstract

Global imbalances are not new as much as the effort to address them. In the mid 1980s the phenomenon led the most industrialised countries to orchestrate a devaluation of the US dollar so as to reduce the US trade deficit. Some economists have called for a similar “New Plaza” agreement to tackle the present situation. The feasibility of such a plan has not been thoroughly assessed so far. In this paper we apply complex network analysis to characterise the properties of the web of international bilateral trade imbalances. We study its evolution over time and the position of key players within it. We find that the complexity of the network has increased in several dimensions, and this casts doubts on the usefulness of a coordinated solution among industrialised countries only. In addition, we propose new effective exchange rate measures based on bilateral trade imbalances, and study their dynamics in the 1980s and in the 2000s. By distinguishing exchange rate movements against debtor and creditor countries we show that, so far, they have not been consistent with the simultaneous reduction in all trade bilateral imbalances. A paradox therefore emerges: the growing difficulty to orchestrate a plan involving a large number of partners is matched by the inability of so far uncoordinated exchange rate adjustments to close global imbalances.

JEL Codes: F31, F33, F42

Keywords: Plaza agreement, exchange rates, global imbalances, network analysis

---

*andrea.fracasso@unitn.it, Department of Economics and School of International Studies, Università di Trento, Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento, Italy. Corresponding author.
†sschiavo@economia.unitn.it, Department of Economics and School of International Studies, Università di Trento, Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento, Italy, & OFCE, France
1 Introduction

The United States has been running large trade and current account deficits since almost two and a half decades. Their size has grown remarkably (both in absolute and in relative terms) since the early 2000s and peaked in 2006 at $811 billion, i.e. 6.15% of the US GDP (see Figure 1).\(^1\) The debate regarding the causes of the evolution of the US current account balance has been long and lively. Ultimately, a consensus has emerged on a few key factors:\(^2\)

- the overvaluation of the US dollar, in particular vis-à-vis the currencies of a number of emerging market economies managing their bilateral exchange rates and accumulating large foreign reserves;
- the expansionary economic policy measures undertaken in the US after the year 2001;
- the reduction of global investments, which contributed to keep the world real interest rates low;
- the financial underdevelopment of many emerging economies, which favoured the flowing of capital from these countries towards the US;
- the extraordinary increase in the price of the commodities concentrated in few emerging markets.

Such an interpretation of the global imbalances is not much contested anymore, in particular after the emergence of the financial crisis in mid-2007. Nonetheless, disagreement remains as to what measures policymakers should undertake both to support the much needed process of adjustment and to prevent the latter from occurring in a disorderly manner (see Rogoff, 2006; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007).

A number of economists, among whom Cline (2005\textsuperscript{a}; 2005\textsuperscript{b}) and Bergsten (2008), have argued in favour of a new international exchange rate agreement among the major countries, aiming to achieve the realignment of exchange rates at the worldwide level.\(^3\) Such advocated plan has been dubbed as “new Plaza” after the famous agreement reached in 1985 by the representatives of the countries of the G-5. The global nature of the imbalances, is argued, calls for international policy coordination.

---

\(^1\)The largest part of the annual deficits is due to trade imbalances, while unilateral transfers and income payments tend to offset each other.

\(^2\)See Fracasso (2007) for a more detailed discussion.

\(^3\)Roughly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged. The first one maintains that exchange rate misalignments are at the heart of the imbalances and ought be at the centre of a highly managed adjustment process. The second one argues that global imbalances are mainly the result of different models of growth (i.e. debt-financed consumption growth in the U.S., export and investment-driven growth in China and in oil exporting countries), combined with some misalignment in the exchange rates. According to the latter school, whose position has been endorsed also by the IMF, the adjustment need encompass fiscal, monetary and exchange rate measures.
Not all economists have agreed with this proposal. Some have argued that coordinating exchange rate interventions is more difficult in recent times than it was in the 1980s. The number of parties involved in the imbalances is far larger and this would require more demanding negotiations, harder evaluations of the optimal exchange rates, and stronger enforcement mechanisms that, incidentally, are not in place at the moment. A large devaluation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis may dent current account imbalances only if most countries intervene contemporaneously and in a coordinated manner: all bilateral exchange rates need move in the appropriate way so as to close/reduce all imbalances at the same time.

Figure 1: The U.S. current account and its components, 1980-2007

Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

The recent debate on the evolution of the US dollar against the currencies of the main trade partners of the US fully reflects the complexity of the global network of bilateral trade imbalances. On the one hand, in the face of a large and steady depreciation of the dollar against the euro, European policymakers expressed concerns for the region’s loss of competitiveness. On the other hand, given the limited contraction of the US deficit in 2007, further depreciation has been invoked by the US authorities. Such contrasting claims are not at odds: the advocated depreciation of the dollar should in fact be the result of a differentiated adjustment against the diverse trading partners.

Notwithstanding the debate arisen on this proposal, little empirical research has so far been conducted to shed light on the degree of complexity of the trade imbalances network and on its relations with the movement of the bilateral exchange rate. In this work we shall tackle this issue by means of a complex network analysis and developing two indices of imbalances-weighted exchange rates.

More precisely, the paper unfolds as follows. We shall start in Section 2 with a brief discussion of the global imbalances at the time of the Plaza agreement and in the 2000s.
Section 3 will discuss how the network of trade imbalances has changed over time, both in the number of its members and in their relationships. This will help in the appraisal of its much discussed, yet little measured degree of complexity. In Section 4 we shall address the evolution of the exchange rates in the periods 1985-1987 and 2002-2006. We shall develop and examine two new trade-imbalances-weighted exchange rate indices. We shall then compare them with the (more traditional) trade-weighted effective exchange rates of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). This tentative exercise, to our knowledge new, will provide a summary metric of the movements of the bilateral exchange rates, which is helpful in assessing their consistency with the goal of closing/reducing all bilateral trade imbalances.

Our main conclusion, discussed in Section 5, is that, given the large differences in the global economic environments in the two decades, the parallelism of the current situation with the arrangements in the 1980s is somehow misleading. In the light of the fact that the recent, uncoordinated exchange rate movements did not tackle trade imbalances in a mutually consistent way, and given the high complexity of the current trade imbalances network, we argue that a paradox emerges. On the one hand, coordination plans become more complicated due to the growing number of potential partners. On the other hand, the more important the goal of closing/reducing trade imbalances in a smooth and mutually acceptable fashion becomes, the more essential coordination tends to be.

2 Global imbalances: from the mid 1980s to the early 2000s

2.1 The Plaza and the Louvre agreements

In early 80s, the US started running constantly growing current account and trade deficits. These were in part due to the overvaluation of the dollar which, at the end of the summer of 1985, had only partly declined from the peak reached in the February of the same year. On September 22, the Finance Ministers of the five largest industrial countries (i.e. of the G-5 forum) secretly met at the Plaza Hotel in New York to work out a package to produce a gradual and steady adjustment of the dollar against the currencies of the US major trade partners. Besides the immediate announcement effect (i.e. a 4.3% decline in the dollar), the dollar constantly depreciated against the Japanese yen, the German mark, the UK pound sterling and the French franc in the following months. By early 1987 the depreciation of the dollar was sufficiently ample and G-5 officials decided to back out the agreement. In February, the G-5 Finance Ministers met in Paris and agreed on designing adjustments in their economic policies and interventions in the exchange rate markets so as to stop the decline of the dollar. This plan took the name of Louvre Accord.

Because of the usual transmission lags between exchange rate and current account variations, the US current account did not immediately shrink. In fact, it reached its peak (i.e. 3.4% of the GDP) in very same 1987. As early as 1988, however, the deficit began to
narrow along a gradual but steady path that led the US to close its deficit in 1991.\textsuperscript{4}

### 2.2 Global imbalances in the 2000s: the case for a new Plaza?

Already in 1992, the US started again to run large and growing trade and current account deficits. Since the early 2000s, a large share of these deficits was the counterpart of the surpluses run by Asian countries and those exporting primary commodities, energy and food. Although the dollar declined against a number of currencies since 2002, the US trade and current account at the end of 2005 were still badly unbalanced. For this reason, the proposal of a new Plaza agreement re-emerged in 2005: such plan should consist in coordinated exchange rate interventions aimed to achieve the exchange rate realignments necessary for the adjustment of the international imbalances. One can find two main rationales for the proposal: the dollar was considerably overvalued on a trade-weighted basis, and the pattern of its “uncoordinated” devaluation against the foreign currencies was inappropriate. Cline and other economists argued that markets should not be left alone in setting the adjustment process because only coordination efforts may reduce the spillovers on third parties of the bilateral exchange rate adjustments (Cline, 2005\textsuperscript{b}, for instance, focuses on the 26 most important US trading parties).

Even letting aside the political issues that may prevent such a large and variegated number of countries from converging on a clear and uniquely identified exchange rates realignment plan, two major objections to the new Plaza proposal have been raised (Cohen, 2008). The first one stresses that the number of countries involved in the building up and in the maintenance of the global imbalances is much larger than that observed in 1985. The plan would require the daunting identification of a matrix of optimal bilateral exchange rates able to a) redress global imbalances (and in particular the US external deficits), and b) produce fluctuations of the bilateral exchange rates smaller than the variations to the overall trade-weighted rates. The second objection refers to the fact that while exchange rates do influence current account and trade balances, they are not their unique or even main determinants (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006). Domestic macroeconomic policies are as important as exchange rates, but much more difficult to coordinate, also because of the increasing importance of a number of big emerging markets.\textsuperscript{5}

Both the objections above revolve around the following observation: the world economic environment has deeply changed since the 80s, thanks to the rapid growth of several emerging markets and to the accelerated process of economic integration in Europe. How

---

\textsuperscript{4}One should notice that the trade balance has in fact never turned positive. The small current account surplus in 1991 was mainly due to exceptionally large and positive unilateral transfers.

\textsuperscript{5}A tangible example is the Multilateral Consultation established in 2006 by the IMF in order to provide a forum for the U.S., European Union, China, Saudi Arabia and Japan to discuss the problem of the global imbalances and to agree upon policy actions to tackle the vulnerabilities concerning each individual member. The Consultation has shown how reluctant to coordinate policy interventions sovereign countries tend to be.
it changed, however, has remained partially unexplained and, in the remaining of this work, we shall endeavour to improve on this.

2.3 Global imbalances: a few stylised facts

As argued, the extent of desirable policy coordination increasingly depends on the degree of complexity in the relationships between countries and on the strength of their interdependence. It seems thus fundamental that economists and policymakers map the network of economic relationships laying behind global imbalances before setting the features of any policy coordination plan. Later we shall tackle such a task that, surprisingly, has not yet received much attention in the literature.

The choice of the reference year

Cline (2005a, p. 5) claims that the situation at the end of 2005 was very similar to that in mid-1985. Both years share some common features, such as i) large and growing U.S. current account deficits; ii) an overvalued U.S. dollar on a trade-weighted basis; and iii) risks that an abrupt and disruptive dollar’s decline may be incepted by exogenous factors. If one takes such claim as correct, she would have to compare the trade-imbalances networks in 1985 and 2005. Yet, there are plausible reasons to envisage 2002 as an alternative candidate. To start, there is a clear difference in the path of the US dollar over the years preceding 1985 and 2005. While the dollar touched its absolute peak in February 1985 (and began its decline a few months before the Plaza), the US dollar has started falling against many currencies in 2002. This would suggest that 2002 is a more adequate year to look at. Furthermore, in both 1985 and 2002 the overvaluation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis reflected its bilateral undervaluation against the currencies of most US trade partners. In 2005, on the contrary, the dollar was allegedly overvalued against Asian currencies, but probably undervalued against the euro.

The issue is complicated by the fact that other stylised facts would instead indicate a similarity between 2005 and 1985. If one wants to match the length of the period passed from the moment when the dollar depreciation started, 2005 seems a more adequate reference. Furthermore, the US external deficit started shrinking in 1987 and 2007, with a two-year lag since the inception of the adjustment process. Finally, the decline of the dollar against the Chinese yuan-renminbi began only in 2005 when the Chinese central bank (PBC) abandoned the peg to the dollar and adopted a strictly managed floating system against a basket of currencies. Thus, it is only from 2005 that the exchange rate adjustment has regarded i) directly, the country with the larger bilateral current account surplus against the US, and ii) indirectly, those countries that track the PBC’s policy.

In the light of all these considerations, it seems difficult to determine which of the two years should be compared to 1985. Since such choice is not innocuous, we will adopt a conservative approach and look at both.
An overview of global trade imbalances

Global imbalances have characterised both the late 1980s and the 2000s, but are phenomena taking place in diverse environments. We start by looking at the overall net trade imbalances in 1985, 2002 and 2005. To allow a comparison across countries and years, we calculate their ratios over world GDP, both evaluated in US dollar at current market exchange rates.\(^6\)

As to the overall size of the imbalances, they amounted to 2.3% and 3% of world GDP respectively in 2002 and 2005, whereas they were close to 1.5% in 1985: global imbalances in recent years have outgrown those at the time of the Plaza agreement. The number of countries showing significant net trade imbalances has grown too. In 1985 the countries having a surplus larger than 0.1% (0.05%) of world GDP were Japan and Germany (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Netherlands) and those with a deficit larger than 0.1% of world GDP were USA and China.\(^7\) In 2002, the countries with a surplus larger than 0.1% (0.05%) of world GDP were Germany, Japan, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Ireland (Norway, Indonesia, Singapore, Netherlands, Malaysia, Argentina and Sweden) and those with a deficit larger than 0.1% (0.05%) of world GDP were USA, United Kingdom and Spain (Greece). In 2005 Germany, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Japan, Canada, Norway, Netherlands and Brazil (Singapore, Ireland, Malaysia, Kuwait, Korea, Venezuela, Nigeria) had a surplus larger than 0.1% (0.05%) of world GDP. Those with a deficit larger than 0.1% (0.05%) of world GDP were USA, United Kingdom and Spain (Greece, Turkey, India, France). This shows that the number of countries with large trade surpluses is bigger in the 2000s than in the 80s, while the number of countries with large deficits remains small.\(^8\)

These observations, although revealing, provide at most a prima facie evidence of the growing complexity in the global trade-imbalances network. The problem is that so far we have neglected all bilateral balances as much as the interdependence between countries. On these grounds, we move to a complex network approach to shed light on the international trade imbalances networks in both the 1980s and the 2000s.

\(^6\)The trade balance data come from the IMF IFS 2007, while the world GDP values from the WEO April 2008.

\(^7\)India, Italy, Egypt, Greece, France and Spain deficits were between 0.045 and 0.035% of world GDP.

\(^8\)These conclusions remain valid if one were to look at cut-offs other than 0.1% and 0.05%. Interestingly, results would not significantly differ if one were to look at the overall current account balances, but for those few countries, such as Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan and Belgium, that typically benefit from large positive income payments.
3 Network Analysis

3.1 A telegraphic introduction

Sociologists and psychologists have employed network analysis for the study of social interactions among people and groups since the beginning of the last century. Pioneering studies in this area include those by Milgram (1967) and Granovetter (1974), who studied the networks of social acquaintances and job market interactions. A number of powerful statistical tools for the analysis of network structures emerged outside the realm of social sciences thanks to the contributions of physicists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. Such methodological advances have then been applied to social analysis in recent studies by Goyal and Van der Leij (2006); Battiston et al. (2007); Hidalgo et al. (2007); Kali and Reyes (2007, 2008), where the interactions among academics through co-authorships, trade linkages among countries, networks within the “product space”, credit chains, and bankruptcy propagation are analysed using complex networks.

The use of network analysis to study international trade interactions was first introduced by sociologists and political scientists. Snyder and Kick (1979) used international trade data and network analysis to classify countries into a core-periphery structure. Other studies that explored this “dependency theory” using aggregated data include Nemeth and Smith (1985) and Smith and White (1992), while some other studies (Breiger, 1981; Kim and Shin, 2002) employed disaggregated trade flows. More recently, in the area of econophysics, a number of papers have focused on the structural and topological properties of the world trade network (WTN), with little or no emphasis on their economic implications (Serrano and Boguñá, 2003; Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2004). These findings show that the WTN is very symmetric, confirm the presence of a core-periphery structure, suggest the emergence of a “rich club phenomenon” whereby countries that have higher trade intensities trade a lot among themselves. Also, Fagiolo et al. (2008) find, somehow surprisingly, that the overall network structure is fairly stationary over time despite the recent wave of globalisation. Serrano et al. (2007) look at bilateral trade imbalances and highlight how a small number of connections carry a large part of the fluxes travelling through the network.

Recently, some papers have exploited this kind of analysis to answer some more economic-oriented research questions. For instance, Kali and Reyes (2007) and Kali and Reyes (2008) have used a network approach to explain macroeconomic dynamics such as economic growth and episodes of financial contagion. Finally, De Benedictis and Tajoli (2008) apply it to investigate the pro-trade effects of WTO membership.

In the present context, the appeal for using complex network analysis comes from the fact that a network approach is able to recover the whole structure of the web of trade interactions and by doing so it allows us to look at the evolution of the web of bilateral trade imbalances. In fact, by focusing on a small number of countries and only looking at few bilateral relations (as customarily done in the literature) one misses the complexity of
the overall system.

3.2 Methodology and data

In setting up the trade imbalances network, we have chosen to describe the world net trade relationship as a graph of N nodes, i.e. countries, connected by a set of bilateral links, each representing a trade relationship. While many papers concerned with trade flows have used undirected graphs because of the high symmetry of trade flows (see for instance Fagiolo et al., 2008), here we need consider directed bilateral flows. A link connecting two countries with a bilateral trade imbalance goes, in our representation, from a country in deficit towards the country in surplus. Potentially, from any node there might be both inward-oriented and outward-oriented links: country A may in fact run a deficit with country B (which we call a creditor of A), while having a surplus vis-à-vis country C (which we call a debtor of A).

In what follows we take into account the direction of the flows of goods by building two distinct networks: one made of bilateral trade deficits, the other considering trade surpluses. A first way to describe international economic integration is to count the number of (in-coming or out-going) links maintained by each node: this measure is referred to as node in-degree and out-degree in the network literature. If one is instead interested in measuring the overall connectivity of the network, it is possible to look at the density of the graph, which amounts to the number of actual links over the maximum number of possible connections given the number of nodes.

Following Serrano and Boguñá (2003) and Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004) we also investigate whether low degree nodes have the tendency to establish relations with partners characterised by high (or low) degree. The literature suggests that this feature is relevant for the diffusion of information, diseases or whatever flows through the network. The correlation between the degree of a node and the average degree of its partners (average nearest neighbour degree, or ANND) delivers the statistical information on this characteristic of the network. If the correlation is positive one is in presence of an assortative graph, where nodes tend to establish links with partners with similar level of connectivity; otherwise the network is said to be disassortative.

Trade links are characterized by strong heterogeneity in their intensity: to take this into account we need to discriminate among strong and weak links: we do so by weighting each connection by the value of the trade imbalance it represents. The relevant network statistics can be extended and applied to a weighted version of the network. Node in- and out-strength are the sum of weights associated with the links held by any node. The larger the strength of a node, the stronger its participation in international markets. To investigate the amount of heterogeneity in economic relationships we can associate with each node a Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, which increases in the heterogene-

---

9 See Fagiolo et al. (2007) for a more detailed exposition of network concepts.
ity of link intensities. Furthermore, we study the degree of network assortativity from a weighted perspective by looking at the correlation between strength and average nearest neighbour strength (ANNS). This tells us whether high-strength countries tend to establish links with partners that are also very active in international markets or not.

We exploit data from the COMTRADE database compiled by the World Bank. We used both import and export flows to compute bilateral net trade positions, i.e. bilateral surpluses or deficits. All data are expressed in million of USD. For each pair of countries we have 4 potential trade flows, since each exchange is reported as in import by the destination countries and as an export by the source country. In principle we can therefore build two measures for each bilateral net position: as usual, the two measures never match. Moreover, not all the countries appear in the database as both reporter and partner so that not always all the information is actually available. To minimise measurement errors, whenever possible we average across the two measures of trade imbalance.

We end up with a sample of 134 countries in 1985, which rises to 160 in 2002 and 2005. This change in sample size is due to three factors: i) the intensification and the liberalisation of international trade; ii) the political fragmentation of several countries during the 1990s, especially in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union; iii) the improvements in data availability in several developing countries.

3.3 Network results

Node Degree

As said, the number of nodes/countries analysed in the network increases over time, moving from 134 in 1985 to 160 in the 2000s. Nonetheless, the network density, i.e. the number of active links over the maximum possible number of relations given the number of players, has also risen. This means that trade relationships have grown faster than trading countries so that in the last 20 years globalisation has not only implied that more countries trade, but (and especially) that countries trade with a larger number of partners.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for node in- and out-degree. This is the simplest network characteristic and it associates with each node (country) the number of partners with which it runs a surplus or a deficit. Hence, to stick to our previous labels, in-degree represents, for each country, the number of its debtors while out-degree the number of its creditors. Results for density are confirmed by the larger mean and median values of node in- and out-degree over time. This pattern holds both looking at absolute values and in terms of the total number of potential partners in the sample (reported in parenthesis in Table 1). In the 1985, the median country has a surplus against almost 22 partners and a deficit with 29; in 2002 and 2005 the median country has a surplus with 45-48 countries.

\[\text{In what follows we will not investigate to what extent each of these reasons accounts for the enlargement of the trade imbalances web. Even though it could be interesting to distinguish the relative contribution of data availability from that of larger and more diversified exchanges of goods and services, data availability and trade intensity are likely correlated.}\]
and a deficit with 51-54. While the mean and median values of out-degree (i.e. number of creditors) are close, the mean value of in-degree (i.e. number of debtors) remains higher than the median one in all years. This implies that most countries have only few debtors, but some have surpluses with a numerous set of partners. This is confirmed by the fact that the maximum value of in-degree is larger than that of out-degree. These results represent a *prima facie* evidence of the increasing complexity of the trade imbalances network over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nodes</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-degree: mean</td>
<td>31.32 (23%)</td>
<td>52.86 (33%)</td>
<td>55.31 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-degree: median</td>
<td>22.00 (17%)</td>
<td>45.00 (28%)</td>
<td>48.50 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-degree: st. dev.</td>
<td>24.67</td>
<td>34.09</td>
<td>34.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-degree: max</td>
<td>101 (76%)</td>
<td>128 (80%)</td>
<td>131 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-degree: min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-degree: mean</td>
<td>31.32 (23%)</td>
<td>52.86 (33%)</td>
<td>55.31 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-degree: median</td>
<td>29.00 (22%)</td>
<td>51.00 (32%)</td>
<td>54.00 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-degree: st. dev.</td>
<td>15.49</td>
<td>17.17</td>
<td>17.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-degree: max</td>
<td>79 (60%)</td>
<td>100 (63%)</td>
<td>94 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-degree: min</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number in parentheses are relative to max number of possible links

Figure 2 reports the distribution of normalised in- and out-degrees for 1985, 2002 and 2005.\footnote{The normalisation is meant to offset the change in the number of countries analysed over the years.} One can notice that the distribution of in-degree is relatively more skewed (to the right) than the distribution of out-degree. Moreover, such asymmetry falls from 1985 to 2005 in both cases. Hence, consistently with the descriptive statistics discussed above, Figure 2 shows that countries tend to run surpluses and deficits with an increasing number of partners over time, thus corroborating the idea of increasing complexity. A formal test for the equality of the distributions rejects the null hypothesis and supports the visual intuition that the distributions of both in- and out-degree have changed from 1985 to the 2000s. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of in-degrees spans a wider support, something that one can appreciate also by looking at the ranges of in- and out-degree in the descriptive statistics summarised in Table 1. There in fact it appears that the difference between the maximum and minimum values taken by in-degree is larger than in the case of out-degree. Similarly, while the average number of both incoming and outgoing links has increased over time, the corresponding standard deviation has remained stable in the case of the latter, while increasing markedly for the former. This result is the likely outcome of the new and increased role played by a group of emerging countries.
(mainly exporting primary commodities) that in recent years display trade surpluses with many partners.

In Figure 2 we plot the distribution of the change in in- and out-degree between 1985 and 2002/2005. One can see that the mode of the distribution corresponds to higher values in the case of out-degree: this suggests that —for the representative country— the increase in the number of creditors is larger than the increase in the number debtors or, to put it differently, that the number of partners with whom the representative country runs a deficit has grown more than the number of countries with whom it runs a trade surplus.

In Figure 3 we plot the distribution of the change in in- and out-degree between 1985 and 2002/2005. One can see that the mode of the distribution corresponds to higher values in the case of out-degree: this suggests that —for the representative country— the increase in the number of creditors is larger than the increase in the number debtors or, to put it differently, that the number of partners with whom the representative country runs a deficit has grown more than the number of countries with whom it runs a trade surplus.

A further change in the topology of the network of trade imbalances is testified by the correlation between in- and out-degree. Positive and significant in 1985 (equal to 0.45) the correlation turns negative in 2002 and 2005, taking values of -0.13 and -0.24. Hence, while
in the mid 1980s countries with many debtors tended to have also many creditors, in more recent years a large number of debtors is associated with a small number of creditors. This is consistent with the previous findings suggesting that the number of bilateral deficits run by each country has grown faster than the number of trade surpluses. Also, we find that while there is not statistical relation between the overall net position of a country and the number of its debtors, larger deficits are associated with many creditors, and that this feature is strengthening over time.

**Average Nearest Network Degree**

The number of partners a country is related to is often a good signal of its importance in the network. Nonetheless, the relevance of two countries exhibiting the same node-degree statistics may differ according to the degree of connection of their respective partners. In an undirected network a measure that is often employed to quantify how a country’s partners are themselves connected is the average nearest-neighbour degree (ANND). For each node, ANND measures the average number of links maintained by its partners and, therefore, it deals with 2-step away relationships. In the present context this metrics does not say much about the nature of the relationships between each pair of partners: in a directed network, each country is, at the same time, potentially creditor to some partners and debtor to others. Rather than grouping them all together, we would like to distinguish between creditors of one’s creditors, creditors of one’s debtors, and so on. Accordingly, there are four possible variants of the average nearest-neighbour degree that can be used in a directed framework.\(^{12}\)

For each country one can in fact look at a) the debtors of one’s debtors; b) the creditors of one’s debtors; c) the debtors of one’s creditors; and d) the creditors of one’s creditors. We label these four measures as \(ANND_{in}^{in}, ANND_{out}^{in}, ANND_{in}^{out}, ANND_{out}^{out}\), where the superscript indicates the country of reference and the subscript the type of relation maintained by its partners.\(^{13}\) Table 2 summarises some descriptive statistics for the 4 indices. One can see that mean and median values always increase over time, while the standard deviation takes smaller values. This is consistent with a process of generalised increased interconnectedness among countries.

The correlation coefficients between the incoming and outgoing links and ANND provide us with some additional insights. This information is summarised in Table 3: the correlations are all negative and significant in 1985. Thus, for instance, we see that countries with many creditors (high out-degree) tend to run deficits with partners that, on average, are characterised by few bilateral surpluses and deficits. The same applies to countries running many trade surpluses (high in-degree) in 1985. In network analysis such

\(^{12}\)To the best of our knowledge, these four metrics have never been used in the literature so far.

\(^{13}\)Thus, \(ANND_{in}^{in}\) measures the number of debtors of one’s own debtors and \(ANND_{out}^{out}\) the number of debtors of one’s own creditors (other than itself). It is worth noticing that the country of reference is excluded from the count of its own debtors/creditors’ partners.
Table 2: Summary statistics on ANND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANND_in</td>
<td>ANND_out</td>
<td>ANND_in</td>
<td>ANND_out</td>
<td>ANND_in</td>
<td>ANND_out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>43.129</td>
<td>38.423</td>
<td>41.086</td>
<td>53.392</td>
<td>55.095</td>
<td>51.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>41.833</td>
<td>38.351</td>
<td>40.859</td>
<td>54.001</td>
<td>52.818</td>
<td>51.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>77.667</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>55.222</td>
<td>73.429</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>63.571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a negative correlation is usually interpreted as a signal of a hierarchical structure in the network since it suggests the existence of a subset of more central nodes connected with many partners and a periphery of players linked with the hubs, but scarcely connected among themselves. For three out of our four correlations the sign remains the same over the years, and although the values get smaller (in absolute values) they are always significantly different from zero. On the contrary, the correlation between out-degree and ANND\_out becomes positive in 2002 and further increases in 2005. Hence, we observe that in the 2000s countries running many bilateral deficits tend to be connected with partners that also run a large number of trade deficits.

**Weighted Analysis: Node Strength and ANNS**

Fagiolo et al. (2007) have shown that limiting the analysis to a binary characterisation of the network can lead to overlook relevant information about its structure. Although here the reflection focuses on the increased complexity of the web of bilateral net trade, and therefore it is concerned more with the number of players than with the size of their imbalances, one cannot disregard this latter aspect: it is exactly to this issue that we turn now, by looking at the weighted version of the network. In so doing, we attach to each link a weight equivalent to the size of the trade imbalance it represents: relationships
Table 3: Degree-ANND correlation coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-degree</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-degree</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-degree</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-degree</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
<td>ANND_{in}</td>
<td>ANND_{out}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-degree</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out-degree</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All coefficients are significant at 5%

cease to be treated as homogeneous (as we have done so far), but are evaluated on the basis of their importance (i.e. magnitude). The weighted counterpart of node degree is node strength: in-strength is given by the sum of all bilateral surpluses run by a country, while out-strength measures the total value of bilateral deficits. The distribution of node strength is, as usually, very skewed as the vast majority of bilateral trade imbalances is very small.

Table 4 reports summary statistics for node strength. We see that mean and median values have significantly increased, not only between 1985 and the 2000s, but also between 2002 and 2005. Heterogeneity across links has also grown markedly, something that suggests how treating all relationships as equal can be misleading. (From the Table 4 one can also appreciate how the median deficit is substantially larger than the median surplus.)

We can assess more precisely the degree of heterogeneity by looking at node disparity, which is nothing else than a Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index applied to the strength of each country’s relationships. Thus, larger values imply larger concentration of bilateral trade imbalances or, in other words, that a small number of links account for the majority of a country’s overall trade imbalances. It appears that disparity is consistently higher for incoming links (i.e. surpluses) than for outgoing (i.e. deficits) ones, suggesting that deficits tend to be more evenly distributed. This result is consistent with what previously found for node degree.

For what concerns correlations, in- and out-strength are positively correlated. Furthermore, the correlations between in- and out-degree and the corresponding strengths are positive as expected, indicating that countries with many creditors tend to run larger bilateral deficits.

In a similar fashion as before, we can look at 2-step away relationships by means of
Table 4: Summary statistics on node strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-strength</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>3,384.00</td>
<td>9,655.72</td>
<td>17,754.69</td>
<td>Disparity</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>374.12</td>
<td>879.14</td>
<td>1558.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>st. dev.</td>
<td>9,305.91</td>
<td>24,644.93</td>
<td>46,193.55</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>88,565.40</td>
<td>176,967.08</td>
<td>409,481.27</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Out-strength</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>3,384.00</td>
<td>9,655.72</td>
<td>17,754.69</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>533.53</td>
<td>1,920.18</td>
<td>3,885.65</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>st. dev.</td>
<td>12,214.04</td>
<td>38,337.80</td>
<td>65,227.92</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>132,977.51</td>
<td>460,040.79</td>
<td>770,254.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>33.05</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in million USD (except disparity, which is an index number)

ANNS. These measures allow to analyse the behaviour of each country’s partners. The correlation analysis (not reported) suggests that partners of countries running large surpluses are characterised by small surpluses and large deficits. Similarly, countries running large bilateral deficits tend to be connected to partners that also display large deficits or small surpluses.

An interesting way to look at degree and strength at the same time is to work with the ratio of out-over in-degree and the ratio of out-over in-strength for each country. After normalisation, both ratios range between 1 and -1: they take a positive value if the country has more creditors than debtors (in the case of node degree) or if it is running an overall trade deficit (in the case of node strength). Focusing on the ratios between out- and in-strength, it can be noticed that both the mean and median values are positive and increase over time. Also, the number of countries in surplus in 1985 that turn into deficit in 2002 is larger than the number of countries moving in the opposite direction (19 Vs. 11).

Figure 4 combines the two ratios and identifies the dynamic of a few countries between 1985 and 2005. The two panels of the figure are divided in four parts: in the upper left quadrant there are countries that run an overall trade deficit and are also characterised by a number of debtors larger than the number of creditors (in-degree larger than out-degree). Similarly, in the upper right part one finds countries that have more creditors than debtors while running an overall trade deficit. The interpretation of the bottom quadrants is similar, save for the fact that countries displaying an overall trade surplus are clustered there.

Some countries do not change quadrant over time: Germany, Japan, France and the US display little or no change at all. The first two countries keep running trade surpluses and having a large number of debtors, France is still in deficit but has more debtors than
creditors, while the US runs bilateral deficits with many countries, something that makes it an overall debtor. Other countries, on the contrary, modify their situation. One of the most significant changes concerns China that, not surprisingly, moves from a deficit to a surplus position and that increases the number of its creditors. Italy improves its net position over time, while Canada displays a smaller trade surplus in 2005 than in 1985.

**Big players in the network**

Having discussed the position of a few key players we now turn to a picture of the whole network of trade imbalances, as represented in Figure 5. A few features emerge quite clearly from this graphical representation: in 1985 the centre of the stage is taken by (current) G7 countries, which dominate the scene and which we have highlighted by putting them in the middle of the graph. The main trade imbalance is the deficit of the US versus Japan, which in fact was one of the triggers of the Plaza agreement. The contribution of countries not belonging to the G7 club is very limited and mainly due to Hong Kong, which at that time operated as a platform to/from China, and Saudi Arabia because of its oil exports. The picture changes in 2005 and, consistently with what discussed above, the number of important players increases. Previously peripheral
economies such as China and Mexico rise to the stage and, in particular, the relationship between China and the US shadows all other links. Germany reinforces its position as a global creditor, while the UK moves in the opposite direction becoming a global debtor.

Figure 5: The network of trade imbalances in 1985 and 2005

In terms of node degrees, the US in 1985 has almost the same number of creditors and debtors (around 60). Over the years, thanks to the globalisation process and to the
extension of its trade network, both its creditors and debtors increase in number. The
group of debtors grows to 72 and creditors reach 86 in 2002. In 2005 the US has 91
creditors and 68 debtors. A movement in the opposite direction characterises China that,
over the last 20 years, doubles the number of its bilateral surpluses (from 59 to 121), while
slightly reducing the number of countries against which it runs a trade deficit. Table 5
reports the values for a number of economies.

3.4 Network analysis: conclusions and implications

With this analysis we endeavoured to shed some light on the degree of complexity of the
trade imbalances networks in the 1980s and 2000s. Before moving on, we draw a few closing
remarks so as to link the discussion above with the proposal of a new Plaza agreement.
The description of the evolution of the imbalances networks over time reveals an increase
in complexity along, at least, three dimensions. The first one is the number of nodes,
i.e. countries linked by a trade imbalanced relationship with its partners. The second one
refers to the number of imbalanced relationships which each country entertains. The third
one is the increasing degree of heterogeneity in the countries’ net bilateral positions: a) for
the average and median country, the number of creditors progressively outgrows that of
debtors, b) the number of countries in surplus with many partners rises (probably because
of the performance of the new emerging markets and commodity exporters), and c) the
degree of concentration of surpluses is higher than that of deficits.

The question one could reasonably ask is how these results bear on the proposal of a
new Plaza agreement. We argue, without pushing the argument too far, that this map of
the trade imbalances networks in 2002 and 2005 informs policymakers in, at least, three
ways. In the first place, it reveals that the existence of a parallelism between 1985 and the
2000s cannot be given for granted in all dimensions. Differences are numerous, difficult
to ascertain and relevant for any adjustment process. In the second place, the number
of players significantly involved in the matrix of bilateral imbalances is nowadays indeed
extremely vast. In effects, it is not just the network of trade flows to grow over time,
as shown in Fagiolo et al. (2008), but also of that of net trade imbalances. Finally, the
analysis shows that the group of countries running both numerous and large surpluses is
much narrower than that including countries with several and large deficits. This implies
that the former should be at the centre of any politically feasible attempt to redress global
imbances. This is at odds with the restrictive groups of (mainly industrialised) countries
which have met so far in order to tackle (or, better, to plan to tackle) global imbalances.
Our descriptive analysis thus corroborates the position of those who favour the involvement
of a greater number of emerging markets in any international coordination plan, and it
also casts some doubts on the effectiveness of those agreements concerning just a handful
of countries. As argued elsewhere (see Targetti and Fracasso, 2008), this situation calls for
a renewed and strengthened role of the international financial institutions, most notably

19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In degree</th>
<th>Out degree</th>
<th>In strength</th>
<th>Out strength</th>
<th>Net trade</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5 031.04</td>
<td>6 485.11</td>
<td>-1 454.08</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14 542.49</td>
<td>1 438.72</td>
<td>13 103.77</td>
<td>-9 555.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>20 676.12</td>
<td>5 879.65</td>
<td>14 796.47</td>
<td>-8 555.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4 555.88</td>
<td>14 980.44</td>
<td>-10 424.56</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9 229.97</td>
<td>18 185.77</td>
<td>-8 955.81</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47 783.42</td>
<td>13 864.16</td>
<td>33 919.27</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9 342.18</td>
<td>9 757.99</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
<td>-415.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12 214.09</td>
<td>17 134.43</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88 565.40</td>
<td>33 538.87</td>
<td>55 026.53</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8 185.59</td>
<td>7 457.87</td>
<td>727.72</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10 890.62</td>
<td>1 190.57</td>
<td>9 700.06</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12 866.20</td>
<td>6 841.53</td>
<td>6 024.67</td>
<td>-4 920.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>883.33</td>
<td>7 177.29</td>
<td>-6 293.95</td>
<td>-6 293.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15 197.01</td>
<td>19 630.65</td>
<td>-4 433.64</td>
<td>-4 433.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15 546.71</td>
<td>132 977.51</td>
<td>-117 430.80</td>
<td>-117 430.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In degree</th>
<th>Out degree</th>
<th>In strength</th>
<th>Out strength</th>
<th>Net trade</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13 972.13</td>
<td>19 637.77</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21 359.17</td>
<td>7 422.02</td>
<td>13 517.15</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66 964.62</td>
<td>28 610.72</td>
<td>38 353.90</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>176 967.08</td>
<td>28 244.00</td>
<td>148 723.08</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>39 340.59</td>
<td>45 122.93</td>
<td>-5 782.34</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>150 884.05</td>
<td>27 026.72</td>
<td>123 857.33</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23 349.64</td>
<td>78 406.76</td>
<td>-55 057.11</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53 048.59</td>
<td>42 858.48</td>
<td>10 190.11</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>162 135.20</td>
<td>59 062.29</td>
<td>103 072.91</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53 714.00</td>
<td>37 918.83</td>
<td>15 795.17</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>40 440.52</td>
<td>30 907.28</td>
<td>9 533.24</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38 623.56</td>
<td>8 771.37</td>
<td>29 852.19</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20 860.21</td>
<td>8 961.64</td>
<td>11 898.57</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>22 169.78</td>
<td>85 859.77</td>
<td>-63 690.00</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>26 305.94</td>
<td>460 040.79</td>
<td>-433 734.85</td>
<td>-5 665.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In degree</th>
<th>Out degree</th>
<th>In strength</th>
<th>Out strength</th>
<th>Net trade</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21 547.76</td>
<td>38 538.22</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55 851.88</td>
<td>6 851.31</td>
<td>49 000.56</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>104 168.86</td>
<td>49 222.19</td>
<td>54 946.67</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>409 481.27</td>
<td>78 875.51</td>
<td>330 605.76</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48 768.69</td>
<td>97 644.24</td>
<td>-48 875.55</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>257 378.93</td>
<td>59 334.43</td>
<td>198 044.50</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26 895.16</td>
<td>130 866.10</td>
<td>-103 970.94</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81 142.93</td>
<td>90 742.46</td>
<td>-9 599.53</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>219 519.25</td>
<td>116 464.97</td>
<td>103 054.28</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>107 823.71</td>
<td>63 923.23</td>
<td>43 900.48</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>66 887.90</td>
<td>50 487.97</td>
<td>16 399.93</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>122 868.68</td>
<td>10 662.87</td>
<td>112 205.81</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33 461.71</td>
<td>26 952.61</td>
<td>6 509.10</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>43 806.32</td>
<td>152 754.86</td>
<td>-108 948.54</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>38 650.70</td>
<td>770 254.82</td>
<td>-731 604.12</td>
<td>-16 990.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the IMF.

4 Trade imbalances-weighted effective exchange rates

4.1 Motivations and methodology

The complexity of the network of trade imbalances bears not only on the difficulty to orchestrate a multilateral plan of interventions to redress such imbalances, but also on the synthetic measures normally adopted to track the evolution of exchange rates over time. In particular, in what follows, we shall focus on the nominal effective exchange rate (EER), that is a synthetic way to seize the evolution of a currency vis-à-vis its bilateral exchange rates (see MacDonald, 2007, for a discussion). In general, the EER is a weighted average of a basket of bilateral exchange rates. The choices of the currency basket, the weighting scheme, the base period and the updating method in case of time-varying weights touch on the EERs: central banks and international institutions have developed various alternative indices, which precisely differ in one or more of these dimensions.

In most cases, researchers have developed EERs which serve as indicators of countries’ levels of competitiveness. In such a case, the ideal approach to build EERs would be to use a global model-based weighting scheme of bilateral trade flows. The high degree of complexity of such theoretical approach, however, has led researchers and policymakers to rely on simpler indices (based on actual trade flows), that give a qualitative picture of the movements in the level of countries’ competitiveness. Among these indices, the most common schemes to weight bilateral exchange rates are the global, bilateral and double weighting approaches. The latter is the most complete and considers the local competition which domestic exporters face in the export markets, the foreign competition that domestic exporters meet in third markets and the competition domestic producers face at home. The BIS trade-weighted effective exchange rate index (TWI hereafter) is built along this method. The broader basket composition of the TWI currently encompasses 52 economies (see Klau and Fung, 2006).

The variety of EER measures is not exclusively the product of competition among research centres. In fact, the very concept of EER is not univocally defined and can be declined according to the economic issue to analyse. In particular, the choice of the weighting

\[14\] Among the first works endorsing EERs we recall Artus and Rhomberg (1973); Black (1976) and Hooper and Morton (1978).

\[15\] Several existing indices, for instance, differ in terms of the scope of their currency basket. This is due to the fact that currency baskets are not based on a single theoretical foundation and are also influenced by data availability and integrity.

\[16\] Such scheme descends from Armington’s (1969) demand equations and requires a certain amount of information on domestic and international market shares. The bilateral scheme, instead, ignores third-market competition, whereas the global scheme overlooks both third-market competition and domestic competition.
scheme and the basket of currencies hinges on the phenomenon under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{17} This is clearly illustrated by the fact that, besides various trade-weighted EERs, researchers also developed capital-weighted EERs (Makin and Robson, 1999).

Since country competitiveness is usually the issue addressed by EERs, the indices do not take into account trade imbalances, but gross trade flows. It follows that such EER measures, while usefully condensing in a unique figure the average evolution of various bilateral exchange rates, do not help to discern whether exchange rates move so as to close bilateral and overall trade imbalances. The question, then, is whether it would be possible to build alternative EER indices which take into account bilateral trade imbalances, rather than competitiveness. These measures would be useful to interpret the evolution of bilateral exchange rates while taking trade imbalances into account.

Positive and negative bilateral imbalances are to be treated separately if one wants to build EER measures that convey information about both exchange rates and trade imbalances. Accordingly, we build two imbalances-weighted indices. SWI is a surplus-weighted EER index. In the SWI for country $i$, the basket includes all the currencies of the countries which the country $i$ has a trade surplus with. The currency of country $j$ enters in the SWI for $i$ weighted by the ratio of country $i$’s bilateral trade surplus with $j$ over country $i$’s overall surpluses. DWI is a deficit-weighted EER index: the calculation of such EER for country $i$ is based on a basket including all the currencies of the countries which country $i$ has a deficit with. The weight attached to the currency of country $m$ is proportional to ratio of the bilateral trade deficit of $i$ with $m$ relative to $i$’s total deficits.

Having set the criteria to form the baskets of currencies entering into the SWIs and the DWIs, a decision need be made in terms of i) the extension of the overall sample of currencies, and ii) the year of reference for the weights. Starting with the latter, we decide to use the bilateral trade imbalances in 1985 and 2002 to build the weighting schemes for the two decades. To allow comparability, all indices are then normalised and set equal to 100 in 1985 and 2002. As to the composition of the samples, we will adopt two: one (which we call broad) consists in the entire set of countries considered in Section 3 above (i.e. respectively 134 countries in the 1980s and 160 in the 2000s); the other (narrow) is the BIS sample of countries for which we have trade and exchange rate data (that is 42 in 1980s and 49 in 2000s). The former measure will bring into the picture the complexity of the network of imbalances, while the latter will be used to compare to which extent SWIs and DWIs diverge from the TWIs calculated by the BIS, once an (almost) equivalent sample is used to build the indices.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17}See Turn and Van’t dack (1993); Klau and Fung (2006) and Erlandsson and Markowski (2006) on this.

\textsuperscript{18}Admittedly, our restricted sample and that used by the BIS do not perfectly coincide. First, we exclude Taiwan and Romania for the lack of trade data. Secondly, while the BIS treats the euro-area as a single entity in computing the EER indices for the other economies and calculates a set of EER indices for each euro-area country taking intra-euro area trade into account, we deal with euro-area countries as independent ones. This complicates the interpretation of the indices for the countries of the area (since there cannot be bilateral exchange rate changes between them in the 2000s, the variability of the indices is
Once endowed with these new synthetic indicators, we shall concentrate on the evolution of the exchange rates during the 1985-1987 and 2002-2006. While our statistical analysis will be based on the entire samples at hand, for the sake of keeping tables and graphs readable, in what follows we shall discuss the indices for a limited number of countries. As explained above, however, they do not coincide with the baskets and the samples used to calculate the indices.

4.2 The evolution of the exchange rates in the 80s

Table 6 reproduces 24 among the 134 SWIs and DWIs calculated for the period 1985-1987. We report both broad DWIs and SWIs including 134 countries and narrow DWIs and SWIs taking into account the 42 countries that belong to the BIS sample.\(^{19}\) The comparison between our narrow and broad indices will allow to draw some insights on the relative importance of the choice of the basket of currencies. We will start with a few statistical findings and we shall then move to discuss the case of specific countries.

The correlation between the broad DWIs and SWIs amounts to 0.60 in 1986 and to 0.30 in 1987. The indices move in the same direction (with respect to 1985) in more than 70 of the countries both in 1986 and 1987.\(^{20}\) If we focus on the narrow indices (e.g. based on the sample of the 42 BIS countries), the correlation is about 0.60 both in 1986 and 1987, and their changes have the same sign in more than 70% of the countries. These findings show that SWIs and DWIs tend to move in the same direction most of the times, but relatively less often in the developing countries excluded from the BIS sample.\(^{21}\) The fact that SWIs and DWIs move in the same direction suggests that the nominal exchange rates in the 80s did not change so as to close the bilateral imbalances. Over the period 1985-1987, we find no statistically significant association in the direction of change of the (both narrow and broad) SWIs and DWIs, on the one hand, and, the overall trade balances, on the other.\(^{22,23}\)

This does not mean that exchange rates did not affect trade imbalances at all. Several reasons may in fact account for the apparent independence in the data. The first limited to the differences in their trade imbalances), but it avoids cancelling out the intra-European trade imbalances.

\(^{19}\)In what follows, however, we will not compare our narrow indices with those calculated by the BIS for the 80s because until 1994 the BIS produced an even narrower (and therefore not comparable) TWI basket.

\(^{20}\)Looking at the broad and narrow indices for the common sample of 42 countries, the correlation between the broad and narrow measures is high (i.e. 0.85 in 1986 and 0.93 in 1987 for DWIs, and 0.99 in 1986 and 0.98 in 1987 for SWIs).

\(^{21}\)For instance, this happens for Antigua, Belize, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mongolia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and others.

\(^{22}\)The Fisher exact test, the likelihood ratio G2 statistics and the Chi square Pearson statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that the changes in the indices and in the trade balance measures are independent.

\(^{23}\)This holds true both if we take either the change in the values of DWIs and SWIs between 1987 and 1985, or the change between the average values of DWIs and SWIs in 1986-1987 and those in 1985.
explanation is that changes in nominal exchange rate may not be as effective as those in real exchange rates in affecting trade balances: this is most likely in the 80s when several countries were facing relatively high inflation rates. The second explanation is that in that decade several countries were pegging their currencies to baskets of foreign stable currencies in the attempt to control domestic inflation. France and Italy, for instance, although both recording an overall trade deficit, saw their currencies appreciate in nominal terms, probably after the appreciation of the German mark (Germany, on the contrary, was running large surpluses). The third plausible explanation is that the impact of exchange rate variations on the trade balances ultimately depends on the demand and supply elasticities, which differ across countries and goods: there is therefore no theoretical reason to expect the existence of a one-to-one relationship between the changes in the exchange rates and those in the trade balances.

As to the indices for the various countries, the first observation to make is that the US dollar, maybe thanks to the Plaza agreement, depreciated in nominal terms vis-à-vis the currencies of both creditor and debtor countries. This is consistent with the evolution of the US trade-weighted EERs as calculated by the Fed, which indicates a (modest) nominal depreciation of the dollar. Our findings show that, on a trade-imbalances weighted basis, the US dollar adjustment went into the direction of closing the overall trade deficit by reducing the bilateral deficits and increasing the bilateral surpluses. Interestingly, our broader indices signal a relatively smaller US dollar nominal depreciation in the period 1985-1987 than the narrow ones. Most likely, this is the by-product of the Plaza agreement, which concentrated on coordinating the movements of only a very restricted number of countries. This finding suggests that focusing on the movements of a narrow group of currencies may lead to a misleading appraisal of the evolution of a currency against all its trading partners.

The Japanese yen appreciated both against creditors and debtors. The reverse of what argued for the US can be said for Japan, which is among the countries with the largest overall trade surplus in the 80s: the narrow indices indicate a larger appreciation than the narrow ones. This may contribute to account of what is perceived as an excessive appreciation of the Japanese currency, an appreciation which contributed to incept the dynamics which led to the crisis of the 90s. As the yen, also several European currencies appreciated in the period, regardless their initial overall trade balances. Most likely, this is due to the Plaza agreement since countries with relatively low inflation rates were forced to pursue relatively larger nominal exchange rate movements. The fact that the appreciation is most often larger against debtors than debtors supports such a claim. We plot the patterns of the indices for the countries of the G7 and China in Figure 6 so as to facilitate the comparison across the various indices.
Table 6: EER indices 1985-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>148.8</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118.9</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>151.8</td>
<td>109.2</td>
<td>117.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>127.4</td>
<td>162.9</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>137.9</td>
<td>112.7</td>
<td>131.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>136.3</td>
<td>112.6</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>131.6</td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>127.1</td>
<td>149.2</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>159.4</td>
<td>176.7</td>
<td>271.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>103.3</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101.4</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>212.6</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>161.9</td>
<td>263.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103.7</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>126.5</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103.6</td>
<td>105.8</td>
<td>142.7</td>
<td>180.7</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DWI and SWI calculated on baskets of 134 and 42 currencies. Reference year 1985

4.3 The evolution of the exchange rates in the 2000s

Table 7 reproduces the SWIs and DWIs for a subsample of 24 countries. We report both broad indices including 160 countries and narrow indices taking in the 49 countries that belong to the BIS sample. In addition, the broader TWIs provided by the BIS over the same period is also reproduced. Even though our measures are not directly comparable to those of the BIS because of the differences in the methods used to construct the indices, in what follows we shall compare the various measures to see to which extent they convey diverging or compatible information. As before, we shall start with a few statistical findings and then move to analyse the experience of a few selected countries.

The correlations between the broad DWIs and SWIs in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 are, respectively, 0.68, 0.47, 0.25, and 0.05. These statistics convey the impression that the movements of SWIs and DWIs are not correlated over the medium term. However,

---

24Both EERs are computed over the period 2002-2006.
if we focus on the narrow indices, the correlation between DWIs and SWIs remains in all years high and close to 0.75.\textsuperscript{25} Broad and narrow indices vary in the same direction (with respect to 2002) in 80-85\% of the countries in each year. As in the 80s, therefore, the SWIs and DWIs of the largest trading countries move in the same direction, whereas those of the remaining countries tend to diverge. Notably, this is particularly true for the SWIs.\textsuperscript{26} Broad and narrow DWIs and SWIs are positively correlated with the TWI of the BIS. The correlation does decline from about 0.8 in 2003 to circa 0.6 in 2006, but it remains substantial. The pairwise comparison of the direction of change of the narrow indices (with respect to 2002) reveals that in 80\% of the cases TWI changes have the same sign as, respectively, those of DWIs and SWIs. The three indices change in the same direction in 60\% of the countries in 2003, 70\% in 2004 and 2005, and 80\% in 2006. These statistical findings suggest that our indices are not at odds with traditional trade weighted EERs and allow to draw additional information. For instance, they reveal that from 2002 to 2006 the exchange rates tended to move not so as to close bilateral imbalances, but rather the overall imbalances of the single countries.

It should be noted that this conclusion bears some implications for the issue we addressed in Section 3 of the paper. The very fact that bilateral exchange rates do not change so as to close the bilateral imbalances means that the uncoordinated exchange rate movements observed in recent years cannot be presumed to have worked for the simultaneous adjustment of the imbalances of all countries.

Admittedly, as can be seen in Table 7, the patterns of DWIs and SWIs, on the one hand, and the TWIs, on the other, sensibly diverge for three countries: Argentina, Japan and Singapore. In the case of Japan, this is particularly significant for the DWI measures and probably due to the limited number of creditors the country has. In the case Argentina and Singapore, instead, no simple explanation can account for the divergence. However, we argue, this might not be a real problem. Our indices, in fact, mirror the EERs calculated by the central banks of those countries, i.e. the Multilateral Real Exchange Rate Index calculated by the Central Bank of Argentina and the NEER of the Singaporean dollar elaborated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This result is encouraging given that the MAS monetary policy is an exchange rate-based policy, that is a managed float against a basket of foreign currencies.

As over the period 1985-1987, also in the 2000s we find no statistically significant association in the direction of change of the SWIs and DWIs, on the one hand, and, the overall trade balances, on the other hand. The plausible reasons why this might be the case have been discussed in the previous section.

We move now to consider the evolution of the indices for a few currencies and we plot

\textsuperscript{25}In addition, the correlation of the broad indices of only the 49 countries entering the BIS sample is high and close to 0.70

\textsuperscript{26}The correlation between broad and narrow SWIs falls over time (from 0.77 to 0.54), whereas it remains almost constant and close to 1 (i.e. 0.97) in the case of broad and narrow DWIs.
the DWIs and SWIs for China and the G7 countries in Figure 7. The US dollar, around which any international adjustment process must revolve, did depreciate against foreign currencies in the period 2002-2006. The depreciation was larger towards the currencies of the debtors, rather than the creditors of the US. This finding, which maybe due to the very limited appreciation of the Chinese renminbi over this time period, confirms that the depreciation of the dollar was not mainly directed towards the countries against which the US was running its largest deficits. Thus, it is not a case that, notwithstanding the overall depreciation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis, neither the US gross bilateral imbalances nor its overall deficit were reduced in the time span 2002-2005. The appreciation of the euro and the Canadian dollar against the US dollar was not sufficiently ample to outweigh the movements of the currencies of China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{27}

The Chinese renminbi depreciated against both creditors and debtors, yet more largely against the former. This finding goes along with the limited depreciation of the US dollar against its creditors and shows that the Chinese authorities effectively prevented their currency from gaining value against the dollar. According to our findings, the Swiss franc appreciated against the currencies of the debtors and depreciated against those of the creditors, in a way consistent with the reduction of both positive and negative imbalances. This finding sheds light on why the Swiss overall surplus fell even though its TWI depreciated over time. The UK pound sterling remained almost constant against the creditors of the UK and appreciated against its debtors. It could be argued that this has contributed to the enlargement of the net overall deficit of the country.

The DWIs and SWIs of France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain went in the same direction, most likely because of the appreciation of the euro against several non-European currencies. By the same token, the patterns of the DWIs and the SWIs for these countries mirror those of the TWIs. With respect to TWIs, our indices allow detecting a relatively larger appreciation of the Italian EERs against the debtors of Italy than its creditors; this is consistent with the overall net surplus that the country was running in 2002.

As in the case of Italy, the Canadian dollar, the Korean won, the New Zealand dollar and the Swedish krone appreciated more against the debtors than the creditors of their countries. Notably, notwithstanding the common appreciation of their currencies, Canada, Sweden, Korea and Germany did not reduce their net surpluses by 2005, while Italy and New Zealand did. This finding explains why, as we discussed, there seems not to be any significant association between the variations in the exchange rates and the trade imbalances in the 2000s.

\textsuperscript{27}This, in a way, corroborates the observation that the dollar has remained considerably overvalued on a trade-weighted exchange rate basis also because the pattern of its devaluation has so far been inappropriate.
4.4 EERs: conclusions and implications

The measures we propose here are meant to help interpreting the evolution of the exchange rates while taking trade imbalances into account. As said, they are not meant to predict the prospective exchange rate adjustments that one would need to close bilateral and overall imbalances. In fact, the descriptive analysis reported above indicates that there is not a significant association between changes in the indices and in the trade positions of the countries. This is not surprising. Exchange rate movements are not the only (and probably not even the main) determinants of trade flows: international relative prices, domestic public expenditures and, as many argue, transnational capital flows play a role in the determination of trade imbalances as much as important as exchange rates. The adoption of such measures in a multivariate study will certainly be the object of future analysis. However, our indices do not aspire to represent a summary of all bilateral exchange rates: given that we weight the bilateral rates by the bilateral imbalances, our indices do not consider the currencies of the countries with balanced trade relationships. Accordingly, the baskets of currencies on which the indices are calculated can be sometimes broader and sometimes narrower than the basket used by the BIS for the TWIs.

This notwithstanding, we believe that our results improve the understanding of the movements of exchange rates in a context of numerous bilateral trade imbalances. At the general level, for instance, we show that i) traditional trade-weighted measures, by not taking into account the trade balance position of the various trading partners, are of limited help in interpreting exchange rate dynamics, and that ii) the currencies of most countries tend to appreciate (or depreciate) against the majority of the trading partners, independently from these latter being creditors or debtors.

This intriguing result can be interpreted in two contrasting ways. It could be argued, on the one hand, that it is good that exchange rates move so as to close the overall net trade imbalances, not the bilateral ones. In such a case, the currency of a country with an overall deficit will depreciate against the currencies of all partners so as to boost surpluses and reduce deficits at the very same time. On the other hand, it could be argued that this solution is not compatible with a coordinated adjustment at a multilateral level in which all countries run acceptable trade balances and enjoy sustainable bilateral exchange rates. For instance, think of a country A which runs an overall trade deficit. The enlargement of country A surpluses against its debtors B and C would entail the worsening of their deficits and the adjustment of the imbalances of countries B and C would be factually prevented by that of country A.

5 Closing Remarks

The analysis carried out in Sections 3 and 4 sheds some new light on the feasibility of a new Plaza agreement. Our results suggest that uncoordinated adjustments may fail to
achieve adequately ample and fast exchange rate movements so as to tackle all bilateral imbalances at the same time and in a mutually consistent way. In addition, given that several macroeconomic determinants affect trade balances, exchange rate adjustments can hardly work if other adequate economic policies are not jointly put in place by countries equally committed to heal global imbalances. From this one could conclude, as the advocates of the new Plaza do, that only a strong form of policy coordination has chances to produce a balanced adjustment. However, network analysis indicates that, to be effective, an agreement need encompass a very large number of countries and take into account the whole web of bilateral positions. Such a kind of coordinated efforts is hardly conceivable in the currently fragmented political environment.

Our findings, thus, strengthen an apparent paradox inherent in any plan aiming to close global imbalances: the more complicated and far reaching the coordination plan is, the more necessary it becomes to ensure that adjustment occurs in a smooth and mutually consistent fashion.

Acknowledgments

The authors blame each other for any remaining mistakes. They nevertheless agree on the need to thank Giorgio Fagiolo for sharing the codes used for network analysis, and participants to the “Workshop International trade: a global perspective for the 21st century” at Staffordshire University for insightful comments.
Figure 6: Plot of EER indices 1985-1987

Canada

China

France

Germany

Italy

Japan

UK

USA

DWI_all and SWI_all calculated on 134 currencies. DWI_BIS and SWI_BIS calculated on the BIS sample. Reference year 1985.
Figure 7: Plot of EER indices 2002-2006

DWI_all and SWI_all calculated on 160 currencies. DWI_BIS and SWI_BIS calculated on the BIS sample. Reference year 2002.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DWI whole sample</th>
<th>SWI whole sample</th>
<th>DWI BIS sample</th>
<th>SWI BIS sample</th>
<th>TWI BIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>92.6 85.4 86.2 82.2</td>
<td>104.3 98.8 94.8 87.7</td>
<td>92.4 85.1 86 82</td>
<td>107 103 102.8 101.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>110.1 119.4 124 121.1</td>
<td>113.2 122.7 123.9 123.6</td>
<td>109.5 118.3 122.8 119.9</td>
<td>109.6 116.6 116.6 116.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>87.7 88.6 106.3 119.8</td>
<td>93.7 95.9 113.6 126.4</td>
<td>84.5 85 101.7 115.6</td>
<td>90.2 90.9 107.7 119.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>104.5 107.4 114 120.7</td>
<td>112 120.6 129.5 138.3</td>
<td>103.7 106.3 112.4 118.9</td>
<td>112 120.6 129.4 138.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>96 107.4 112.4 119.5</td>
<td>98 105.1 113.5 120.6</td>
<td>95.5 106.7 111.5 118.7</td>
<td>94.2 102.2 110.5 117.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>99 96.4 92.9 91.3</td>
<td>96.6 94.1 94.7 97.3</td>
<td>96.1 92.4 87.5 85.3</td>
<td>96.2 93.6 94.1 96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>105.8 109 108.8 109</td>
<td>110.9 115 113.9 114</td>
<td>103.9 106 105.6 105.6</td>
<td>108.8 111.6 110.1 109.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>107.6 111.4 111.4 113.3</td>
<td>109.7 113.7 113.1 113.4</td>
<td>104 107.1 106.5 107.9</td>
<td>107.9 110.9 110.3 110.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>96.2 93.3 92.4 91.3</td>
<td>98.2 96.5 96.3 96.3</td>
<td>96.2 93.2 92.3 91.2</td>
<td>97.5 95.4 94.9 94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>111.3 112.7 114 114</td>
<td>106.3 109.5 109.4 109.8</td>
<td>110.6 111.1 111.5 110.7</td>
<td>110.5 109.8 108.7 109.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>107.5 110.9 110.7 110.5</td>
<td>112.2 117.8 116.7 117.1</td>
<td>103.4 104.8 104.4 104</td>
<td>111.3 116.2 114.8 115.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>105.5 111.7 110.4 103.5</td>
<td>104.9 109.9 106.4 99.6</td>
<td>99.6 103.1 101.7 94</td>
<td>104.5 109.3 105.7 98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>98.6 98.2 110.5 120.6</td>
<td>103.7 106.5 118.2 125.8</td>
<td>94.9 92.2 104.1 115</td>
<td>102.7 105 116.2 123.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>93.3 90.6 92.3 95</td>
<td>96.7 94.3 94 96.3</td>
<td>92.6 89.6 91.3 93.9</td>
<td>96 93.3 92.7 94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>82.8 74.9 75.9 74.7</td>
<td>89.6 85.5 87.8 87.6</td>
<td>82.6 74.7 75.7 74.5</td>
<td>88.7 84.4 87 86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>110.9 116.8 121.9 112.1</td>
<td>122.3 135.7 140.7 127.8</td>
<td>108.7 113 117.5 107.9</td>
<td>120.6 132.8 137.3 123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>100.4 99.1 104.4 104.6</td>
<td>101 98 101.9 101.1</td>
<td>97.7 94.8 99.5 98.6</td>
<td>100.3 97 100.9 100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>97.6 97.3 99.5 104.5</td>
<td>99.3 100.3 101.5 106.7</td>
<td>95.6 94.1 96.6 101.7</td>
<td>98.2 94.8 98.9 103.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>128.6 146.3 144.6 134.4</td>
<td>146.1 182.9 206.9 226.2</td>
<td>122.4 133.3 133.5 123.4</td>
<td>126.3 137.5 139.1 130.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>108.6 110 110 110.3</td>
<td>107.1 110.3 108.7 109</td>
<td>103.9 105.9 105.5 106.5</td>
<td>103.9 105.1 104.1 103.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>102.8 104 102.4 103.4</td>
<td>113.2 119.7 116.3 117.2</td>
<td>101.7 102.2 100.3 101.2</td>
<td>111.7 117.3 113.6 114.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Surplus 100</td>
<td>99.4 98.8 98.6 97.1</td>
<td>112.4 118.6 116.7 115.4</td>
<td>97.8 96.6 96.2 94.4</td>
<td>111 116.4 114.1 112.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>96.9 102 100.7 101.6</td>
<td>104.7 114.3 112.6 113.1</td>
<td>96.4 101 99.3 99.6</td>
<td>100.9 108.3 106.3 106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Deficit 100</td>
<td>95.5 92.2 90.9 89.8</td>
<td>92.2 87 86.8 86.1</td>
<td>93.8 89.9 88.2 86.9</td>
<td>83.6 75.1 73.7 73.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DWI and SWI calculated on baskets of 160 and 49 currencies. TWI (BIS) calculated on a basket of 52 currencies. Reference year 2002.
References


Fracasso, A. (2007), Taking stock: global imbalances. where do we stand and where are we aiming to?, Department of Economics Working Papers 0730, University of Trento.


Elenco dei papers del Dipartimento di Economia

2000.1 A two-sector model of the effects of wage compression on unemployment and industry distribution of employment, by Luigi Bonatti

2000.2 From Kuwait to Kosovo: What have we learned? Reflections on globalization and peace, by Roberto Tamborini

2000.3 Metodo e valutazione in economia. Dall’apriorismo a Friedman, by Matteo Motterlini

2000.4 Under tertiarisation and unemployment. by Maurizio Pugno

2001.1 Growth and Monetary Rules in a Model with Competitive Labor Markets, by Luigi Bonatti.

2001.2 Profit Versus Non-Profit Firms in the Service Sector: an Analysis of the Employment and Welfare Implications, by Luigi Bonatti, Carlo Borzaga and Luigi Mittone.


2001.4 The monetary transmission mechanism in Italy: The credit channel and a missing ring, by Riccardo Fiorentini and Roberto Tamborini.

2001.5 Vat evasion: an experimental approach, by Luigi Mittone

2001.6 Decomposability and Modularity of Economic Interactions, by Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali and Marco Valente.

2001.7 Unbalanced Growth and Women’s Homework, by Maurizio Pugno

2002.1 The Underground Economy and the Underdevelopment Trap, by Maria Rosaria Carillo and Maurizio Pugno.


2002.3 Firms’ bankruptcy and turnover in a macroeconomy, by Marco Bee, Giuseppe Espa and Roberto Tamborini.

2002.4 One “monetary giant” with many “fiscal dwarfs”: the efficiency of macroeconomic stabilization policies in the European Monetary Union, by Roberto Tamborini.

2002.5 The Boom that never was? Latin American Loans in London 1822-1825, by Giorgio Fodor.
2002.6 L'economia senza banditore di Axel Leijonhufvud: le ‘forze oscure del tempo e dell’ignoranza’ e la complessità del coordinamento, by Elisabetta De Antoni.

2002.7 Why is Trade between the European Union and the Transition Economies Vertical?, by Hubert Gabrisch and Maria Luigia Segnana.

2003.1 The service paradox and endogenous economic growth, by Maurizio Pugno.

2003.2 Mappe di probabilità di sito archeologico: un passo avanti, di Giuseppe Espa, Roberto Benedetti, Anna De Meo e Salvatore Espa. (Probability maps of archaeological site location: one step beyond, by Giuseppe Espa, Roberto Benedetti, Anna De Meo and Salvatore Espa).

2003.3 The Long Swings in Economic Understanding, by Axel Leijonhufvud.

2003.4 Dinamica strutturale e occupazione nei servizi, di Giulia Felice.

2003.5 The Desirable Organizational Structure for Evolutionary Firms in Static Landscapes, by Nicolás Garrido.


2003.7 Essays on Computable Economics, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science, by Kumaraswamy Velupillai.


2003.9 Contratto d’area cooperativo contro il rischio sistemico di produzione in agricoltura, di Luciano Pilati e Vasco Boatto.


2004.2 The economic consequences of Mr. G. W. Bush’s foreign policy. Can the US afford it? by Roberto Tamborini

2004.3 Fighting Poverty as a Worldwide Goal by Rubens Ricupero

2004.4 Commodity Prices and Debt Sustainability by Christopher L. Gilbert and Alexandra Tabova
2004.5 A Primer on the Tools and Concepts of Computable Economics by K. Vela Velupillai

2004.6 The Unreasonable Ineffectiveness of Mathematics in Economics by Vela K. Velupillai

2004.7 Hicksian Visions and Vignettes on (Non-Linear) Trade Cycle Theories by Vela K. Velupillai

2004.8 Trade, inequality and pro-poor growth: Two perspectives, one message? By Gabriella Berloffa and Maria Luigia Segnana


2004.11 A Social Contract Account for CSR as Extended Model of Corporate Governance (Part II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity by Lorenzo Sacconi

2004.12 A Fuzzy Logic and Default Reasoning Model of Social Norm and Equilibrium Selection in Games under Unforeseen Contingencies by Lorenzo Sacconi and Stefano Moretti


2005.1 The happiness paradox: a formal explanation from psycho-economics by Maurizio Pugno


2005.3 On Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Operational Loss Distributions by Marco Bee

2005.4 An enclave-led model growth: the structural problem of informality persistence in Latin America by Mario Cimoli, Annalisa Primi and Maurizio Pugno

2005.5 A tree-based approach to forming strata in multipurpose business surveys, Roberto Benedetti, Giuseppe Espa and Giovanni Lafratta.

2005.6 Price Discovery in the Aluminium Market by Isabel Figuerola-Ferretti and Christopher L. Gilbert.

2005.7 How is Futures Trading Affected by the Move to a Computerized Trading System? Lessons from the LIFFE FTSE 100 Contract by Christopher L. Gilbert and Herbert A. Rijken.
2005.8 *Can We Link Concessional Debt Service to Commodity Prices?* By Christopher L. Gilbert and Alexandra Tabova

2005.9 *On the feasibility and desirability of GDP-indexed concessional lending* by Alexandra Tabova.

2005.10 *Un modello finanziario di breve periodo per il settore statale italiano: l’analisi relativa al contesto pre-unione monetaria* by Bernardo Maggi e Giuseppe Espa.


2005.12 *Conformity and Reciprocity in the “Exclusion Game”: an Experimental Investigation* by Lorenzo Sacconi and Marco Faillo.


2005.18 *Capabilities, the self, and well-being: a research in psychoeconomics*, by Maurizio Pugno.


2005.20 *Semiparametric Evidence on the Long-Run Effects of Inflation on Growth*, by Andrea Vaona and Stefano Schiavo.


2006.2 *Back to Wicksell? In search of the foundations of practical monetary policy*, by Roberto Tamborini

2006.3 *The uses of the past*, by Axel Leijonhufvud
2006.4 Worker Satisfaction and Perceived Fairness: Result of a Survey in Public, and Non-profit Organizations, by Ermanno Tortia

2006.5 Value Chain Analysis and Market Power in Commodity Processing with Application to the Cocoa and Coffee Sectors, by Christopher L. Gilbert

2006.6 Macroeconomic Fluctuations and the Firms’ Rate of Growth Distribution: Evidence from UK and US Quoted Companies, by Emiliano Santoro

2006.7 Heterogeneity and Learning in Inflation Expectation Formation: An Empirical Assessment, by Damjan Pfajfar and Emiliano Santoro

2006.8 Good Law & Economics needs suitable microeconomic models: the case against the application of standard agency models: the case against the application of standard agency models to the professions, by Lorenzo Sacconi

2006.9 Monetary policy through the “credit-cost channel”. Italy and Germany, by Giuliana Passamani and Roberto Tamborini

2007.1 The Asymptotic Loss Distribution in a Fat-Tailed Factor Model of Portfolio Credit Risk, by Marco Bee

2007.2 Sraffa?s Mathematical Economics – A Constructive Interpretation, by Kumaraswamy Velupillai

2007.3 Variations on the Theme of Conning in Mathematical Economics, by Kumaraswamy Velupillai

2007.4 Norm Compliance: the Contribution of Behavioral Economics Models, by Marco Faillo and Lorenzo Sacconi

2007.5 A class of spatial econometric methods in the empirical analysis of clusters of firms in the space, by Giuseppe Arbia, Giuseppe Espa e Danny Quah.

2007.6 Rescuing the LM (and the money market) in a modern Macro course, by Roberto Tamborini.


2007.10 Spatial Models for Flood Risk Assessment, by Marco Bee, Roberto Benedetti e Giuseppe Espa
2007.11 Inequality across cohorts of households: evidence from Italy, by Gabriella Berloffa and Paola Villa

2007.12 Cultural Relativism and Ideological Policy Makers in a Dynamic Model with Endogenous Preferences, by Luigi Bonatti

2007.13 Optimal Public Policy and Endogenous Preferences: an Application to an Economy with For-Profit and Non-Profit, by Luigi Bonatti


2007.15 Home Production, Labor Taxation and Trade Account, by Luigi Bonatti.

2007.16 The Interaction Between the Central Bank and a Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Uncertainty about Monetary Policy Reduce Average Inflation?, by Luigi Bonatti.


2007.18 Dual Licensing in Open Source Markets, by Stefano Comino and Fabio M. Manenti.


2007.20 Aggregation of Regional Economic Time Series with Different Spatial Correlation Structures, by Giuseppe Arbia, Marco Bee and Giuseppe Espa.

2007.21 The Sustainable Enterprise. The multi-fiduciary perspective to the EU Sustainability Strategy, by Giuseppe Danese.

2007.22 Taming the Incomputable, Reconstructing the Nonconstructive and Deciding the Undecidable in Mathematical Economics, by K. Vela Velupillai.


2007.24 Models for Non-Exclusive Multinomial Choice, with Application to Indonesian Rural Households, by Christopher L. Gilbert and Francesca Modena.


2007.27 Local Credit ad Territorial Development: General Aspects and the Italian Experience, by Silvio Goglio.

2007.28 Importance Sampling for Sums of Lognormal Distributions, with Applications to Operational Risk, by Marco Bee.


2007.30 Taking stock: global imbalances. Where do we stand and where are we aiming to? by Andrea Fracasso.

2007.31 Rediscovering Fiscal Policy Through Minskyan Eyes, by Philip Arestis and Elisabetta De Antoni.


2008.3 A look at the relationship between industrial dynamics and aggregate fluctuations, Domenico Delli Gatti, Edoardo Gaffeo, Mauro Gallegati.


2008.9 Does forest damage have an economic impact? A case study from the Italian Alps, Sandra Notaro, Alessandro Paletto, Roberta Raffaelli.

2008.10 Compliance by believing: an experimental exploration on social norms and impartial agreements, Marco Faillo, Stefania Ottone, Lorenzo Sacconi.


2008.16 Financial Constraints and Firm Export Behavior, Flora Bellone, Patrick Musso, Lionel Nesta and Stefano Schiavo


2008.18 CSR as Contractarian Model of Multi-Stakeholder Corporate Governance and the Game-Theory of its Implementation, Lorenzo Sacconi

2008.19 Managing Agricultural Price Risk in Developing Countries, Julie Dana and Christopher L. Gilbert

2008.20 Commodity Speculation and Commodity Investment, Christopher L. Gilbert

2008.21 Inspection games with long-run inspectors, Luciano Andreozzi

2008.22 Property Rights and Investments: An Evolutionary Approach, Luciano Andreozzi

2008.23 How to Understand High Food Price, Christopher L. Gilbert

2008.24 Trade-imbalances networks and exchange rate adjustments: The paradox of a new Plaza, Andrea Fracasso and Stefano Schiavo
PUBBLICAZIONE REGISTRATA PRESSO IL TRIBUNALE DI TRENTO