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Family Values and the Regulation of Labor

 

Notice

Type:   Article
 
Titre:   Family Values and the Regulation of Labor
 
Auteur(s):   Alesina, Alberto - Department of Economics (Auteur)
Algan, Yann (1974-...) - Département d'économie (Auteur)
Cahuc, Pierre - Department of Economics (Auteur)
Giuliano, Paola - Anderson School of Management - Global Economics and Management (Auteur)
 
In:   Journal of the European Economic Association
 
Date de publication:   2015-04
 
Éditeur:   ROYAUME-UNI  :  MIT Press
 
Volume:   Forthcoming in print
 
Notes:   NBER Working Paper Series - number 15747
 
ISSN:   15424766
 
DOI:   10.1111/jeea.12121
 
Mots-clés:   [en] Regulation of labor, Family values, Labor market, Market regulation
 
JEL:   J2,  K2,  Z0
 
Résumé:   [en] To be efficient, flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers. Otherwise firms can take advantage of workers' immobility and extract rents at their expense. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, to limit the rents of firms and to avoid moving, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets, even though regulation generates higher unemployment and lower incomes. Empirically, we find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages and higher unemployment, and support more stringent labor market regulations. We find a positive association between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the 21st century and family values prevailing before World War II, and between family structures in the Middle Ages and current desire for labor market regulation. Both results suggest that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots.
 
 

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Version de l'auteur 2010-alesina-algan-cahuc-giuliano-family-values-and-the-regulation-of-labor.pdf 0,7 MB
 

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