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  • SUMPF Denise (1)
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  • Article (4)
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[Abstract editor: This paper presents a statistical study of public antitrust enforcement in developing countries. It illustrates what really happens with antitrust laws in developing countries after they are put into force. Counter to predictions predominant in the literature, this research shows that developing countries do enforce their antitrust laws with a trend to increase enforcement over time. This disqualifies arguments that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to signal compliance to donor institutions and to secure trade deals with no real intention to enforce these adopted legislations. It also shows that collecting enforcement data for developing countries is a practicable undertaking. The paper puts together an original dataset that can be complemented and refined by researchers interested in studying actual antitrust enforcement instead of relying on ready-made proxies. In this research 20 antitrust enforcement variables for 50 developing countries over a mean period of 10 years were collected. The data presented here also allows an in-depth look at the activities of antitrust authorities across developing countries. It highlights activities particular to developing countries’ antitrust enforcement, it shows in detail what activities are performed at these public authorities and allows an observation of the varying intensities of enforcement not only across countries but also within the same country. With the help of this dataset the relationship between the enforcement data collected in this research and the ready-made proxies frequently used to measure antitrust enforcement in developing countries is analyzed. The results show that many of these widespread measurements are not associated with the different aspects of the enforcement process.]

[Abstract: This paper extends the critique of efficiency and disregard for redistribution in mainstream law and economic analyses to development studies. It presents, through the work of Duncan Kennedy on left-wing law and economics, an alternative framework for development that is liberated from the confines of the neoliberal development approach: calling for static allocative efficiency goals, perfect competition and disregard for the redistribution of wealth, income and social power through the modification of private law rules. The analysis shows that once the empty promises of efficiency-talk are exposed, alternative policy frameworks that take equity and redistribution considerations into account can be constructed. These are illustrated by looking into market structure analyses in the ‘South’. The paper aims to show how the tools and methods of economic analysis of law can be used opportunistically to create resistance-from-within-camp, which does not shy away from using the ‘master's tools’ to resurrect heterodox ideas about development and growth.]

[Abstract editor: This article explores alternatives to the proscribed ideal of perfect competition and allocative efficiency that are more suitable to countries in the Global South. Seeking perfect competition in order to realize allocative efficiency is not only an unsuitable guide for competition enforcement in countries in the Global South, but it also leads to an undesirable competition policy. An alternative competition policy seeking dynamic efficiency, innovation and growth is proposed to replace the static ideal of allocative efficiency. Under this proposed alternative the ideal market structure, necessary to realize these goals, is no longer confined to perfect competition, but is one that strikes a balance between competition and concentration. Under this alternative, the concentrated enterprises are considered beneficial for society as they can innovate, spend on R&D, and in the long run can reduce their cost functions to allow for even lower prices than those prevailing in perfectly competitive markets. This proposal relies on a redistributive mechanism that is integral to the pursuit and realization of this alternative policy and market structure. With redistribution pursed within the implementation of this alternative, the background rules of competition law are thereby changed. Support for this proposed alternative, where competition policy and market structure analysis deviate from the dominant discourse, is drawn from historical evidence, empirical studies and progressive economic thought.]

Publication date 2010
WAKED Dina
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[Abstract: This paper empirically investigates whether developing countries can enforce their antitrust laws or not by measuring potential antitrust enforcement using two proxies: budgets and staffing levels of antitrust authorities. Data was collected from 40 developing countries since the adoption of the law until 2009. This dataset presents an alternative method to measure antitrust enforcement compared to the widespread use of formal enforcement proxies. The data shows that most developing countries actually are capable of enforcing their competition laws but with varying intensities. This finding challenges the assumption that developing countries only adopt antitrust laws to secure trade agreements and constantly fail to enforce these laws. Using this dataset the paper then assessed what issues contributed to the variation of antitrust enforcement across developing countries, using panel data estimation techniques to examine the relation between the potential antitrust enforcement proxies and variables representing macroeconomic, political, legal and institutional environments. The paper finds that the factors that heavily impact the level of potential enforcement are economic development, openness to trade and corruption.]

in Global Antitrust Review Publication date 2008
WAKED Dina
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[Abstract: Competition policy and regulation are essential components of economic systems at the national, regional and global levels. In Arab countries, however, heavily concentrated and inefficient economies, collusion, centralization of economic power among a few elites and general rent-seeking behaviour have aggravated challenges to the adoption and enforcement of competition and antitrust laws, thereby hindering the improvement of inefficient market structures and economic governance systems. The Arab region needs effective antitrust and competition laws and well-functioning market regulators to enhance the business environment, foster investments and improve economic performance and growth. This report reviews the current state of competition policy and regulation in the Arab region. Noting that the adoption of competition laws in the Arab region is recent compared with other regions, the report identifies challenges to effective enforcement of competition and antitrust laws and market regulators, which include, among others, lack of adequate policy drafting, complexity of competition law, institutional structure, collusion and corruption. It stresses the importance of political economy reform in the Arab region, emphasizing that the adoption and enforcement of competition laws contribute to promoting inclusive growth and development and reducing poverty. The report offers policy recommendations taking into account existing initiatives of international partners and the different stages of competition and regulation policy development in the Arab countries.]

in Journal of Law, Economics and Policy Publication date 2016
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[Abstract: This paper offers a detailed account of the encounter of developing countries with antitrust laws. It analyzes the phenomenal spread of these laws in the developing world since the early 1990s, the reasons why they adopted these laws, the challenges they face and the competition laws that fit their needs. It shows how these laws were initially adopted due to international pressure and treaty conditionality. It also shows that, contrary to prescriptions, the laws adopted are not drafted to address the special needs of developing countries and are simply cut-and-pasted from the laws of advanced nations. It highlights how this reality offers a further challenge to the implementation of these laws. This makes formatting a competition policy that is unique and tailored to the country’s needs a priority that should guide the implementation of these laws.]

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[Abstract: This Article outlines the different policy alternatives that could guide antitrust enforcement in developing countries. These include efficiency- based goals (allocative, productive, economic, and dynamic efficiency) and non-efficiency-based goals (protecting small businesses; achieving international competitiveness; eradicating poverty; and promoting fairness, equality, and justice). The actual antitrust goals selected by fifty developing countries are then presented. Finally, a proposal is made with regards to what developing countries should aim at achieving with their antitrust law enforcement. This normative take is geared towards realizing dynamic efficiencies or technological progress, coupled with redistribution through antitrust rules, as the accelerators of growth and development. Promoting growth through innovation, as an antitrust objective, corresponds to a desire to incorporate antitrust policy within a broader development agenda that is more suitable to developing countries than static efficiency-based goals.]