Co-auteur
  • CREEL Jérôme (21)
  • GAFFARD Jean-Luc (18)
  • FITOUSSI Jean-Paul (15)
  • HUBERT Paul (8)
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  • Article (42)
  • Working paper (31)
  • Partie ou chapitre de livre (6)
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L’importance et la gravité de la crise financière largement due à des mécanismes financiers pervers ne sauraient occulter la dimension réelle des désordres actuels. Le choc violent de répartition des revenus personnels qui est allé de pair avec l’émergence de la nouvelle économie a vraisemblablement créé les conditions d’une chute de la demande et donc de la production et de l’emploi qui a été masquée un temps par un endettement des ménages pauvres difficilement soutenable.

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Il presente articolo lega la drastica e diffusa diminuzione dell’investimento pubblico al «nuovo consenso» che in economia si è imposto a partire dagli anni ottanta, centrato sull’efficienza dei mercati e su un ruolo limitato della politica economica. Il consenso ha influito in particolare sulle politiche condotte in Europa, dove ha anche plasmato le istituzioni per la governance economica. La crisi del consenso consente di riflettere su riforme che permettano alla politica economica di riprendere il ruolo di motore dello sviluppo di lungo periodo che aveva nel secondo dopoguerra. Si propone una «regola d’oro aumentata» di bilancio che consenta ai governi e alle istituzioni europee di coordinarsi su investimenti (materiali e immateriali) forieri di sviluppo economico a lungo termine. Tale regola consentirebbe di recuperare una «politica industriale» europea, troppo a lungo assente, e di riaffermare la democraticità del processo decisionale.

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This paper presents a sequential model suited to analyze transitions between equilibria. Disequilibrium dynamics are obtained from a standard monopolistic competition model, by introducing a sequential structure and reasonable hypotheses about technology, finance constraints, expectation formation, and the wage setting mechanism. The response to shocks crucially depends on the institutional features of the economy, and on the monetary policy stance. In particular, some degree of wage stickiness proves necessary to avoid explosive paths. This feature of the model makes it a good candidate for the reappraisal of Keynes’ arguments on wages and unemployment.

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The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions are consistent with a New Consensus that emerged in the 1980s, limiting the role for macroeconomic policy to short term stabilizations by means of rules. I will argue that the policy inertia induced by the Consensus may have played a role in the disappointing performance of EMU economies even before the crisis. The crisis of the Consensus, and the debate on secular stagnation, proved that Keynesian and possibly persistent excesses of savings over investment may hamper growth. This has put fiscal policy back to the center of the scene, and given the General Theory, at eighty, a second youth. I will argue therefore that the EMU fiscal rule should be amended to allow semi-permanent negative government savings. I will finally argue that a modified Golden Rule may serve this objective, and allow EU-wide policy coordination. This seems the only reasonable reform with some chances of being adopted by the EU divided policy makers.

By means of a macroeconomic model with an agent-based household sector and a stockflow consistent structure, we analyse the im-pact of rising income inequality on the likelihood of a crisis for different institutional settings. In particular, we study how economic crises emerge in the presence of different credit conditions and policy reactions to rising income disparities. Our simulations show the relevance of the degree of financialisation of an economy. In fact, when inequality grows, a Scylla and Charybdis kind of dilemma seems to arise: on the one hand, low credit availability implies a drop in aggregate demand and output; on the other hand, relaxed credit constraints and a higher willingness to lend result in greater financial instability and a debt-driven boom and bust cycle. We also point out that policy reactions play a key role: a real structural reform that tackles inequality, by means of a more progressive tax system, actually compensates for the rise in income disparities thereby stabilising the economy. Results also show that this is a better solution compared to a stronger fiscalpolicy reaction, which, instead, only leads to a larger duration of the boom and bust cycle.

This paper aims at giving a theoretical background to the, some- times observed, puzzling inverse correlation between the degree of de- centralization and economic growth. We provide evidence that there is some interaction between decentralization and corruption in ex- plaining growth. Within an endogenous growth model, we analyze the problem of a benevolent central government trying to determine the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. Specifically, it can pro- duce a public good directly, but inefficiently, or it can delegate some (or all) of the production to more efficient local bureaucrats. In the latter case, however, some resources will be wasted because of corrup- tion and the costs linked to monitoring expenditures. With respect to the benchmark case, then, the possibility of corruption yields both a distorted allocation of resources (insufficient decentralization) and an overall under provision of the public good.

in Macroeconomic Policy in the European Monetary Union : from the old to the new Stability and Growth Pact Publié en 2008
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The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions are consistent with a New Consensus that emerged in the 1980s, limiting the role for macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) policy to short term stabilizations by means of rules. I will argue that the policy inertia induced by the Consensus may have played a role in the disappointing performance of EMU economies even before the crisis. The crisis of the Consensus, and the debate on secular stagnation, proved that Keynesian (and possibly) persistent excesses of savings over investment may hamper growth. This has put fiscal policy back to the center of the scene, and given the General Theory, at eighty, a second youth. I will argue therefore that the EMU fiscal rule should be amended to allow semi-permanent negative government savings. I will finally argue that a modified Golden Rule may serve this objective, and allow EU-wide policy coordination. This seems the only reasonable reform with some chances of being adopted by the EU divided policy makers.

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Il en est du commerce international comme du progrès technique : de faibles performances en matière de croissance et d’emploi, quand elles surviennent, lui sont facilement attribuées. Cet article rappelle que l’ouverture au commerce international, comme le progrès technique, crée l’opportunité de mieux allouer les ressources et de créer des richesses supplémentaires. La réalisation de cette opportunité dépend néanmoins largement des conditions qui président à la transition ainsi engagée. Ce serait une erreur de considérer que les avantages de l’ouverture au commerce international peuvent automatiquement être obtenus sans heurts ni conflits. La théorie du commerce international enseigne qu’il peut exister un conflit de répartition qui fait que les gains à l’échange ne profitent pas à tous dans un même pays. Des inégalités se forment et des catégories sociales entières enregistrent des pertes qu’il est difficile de compenser. Par ailleurs, des conflits peuvent aussi se produire entre nations. Si un progrès technique différencié met en cause l’avantage comparatif précédemment détenu par l’un des partenaires, ce que gagne l’un, l’autre le perd, alors même que le revenu mondial augmente. Toutefois, les écarts de performance évoluent sans cesse. Les spécialisations induites par des hétérogénéités en termes de coût de production ou de transport et d’externalités créent inévitablement des différentiels de croissance qui font que certains pays progressent plus vite que d’autres. Ces différentiels entretiennent un rapport ambigu avec le degré d’ouverture à l’échange international. La raison en est claire. Les conditions de l’ouverture comptent davantage que l’ouverture elle-même. Aussi est-il essentiel de connaître les conditions dans lesquelles nations et firmes s’adaptent à un changement intervenu dans le degré d’ouverture au commerce international.

in Journal of Innovation Economics Publié en 2010
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The Greek public finance crisis of the first semester 2010 has triggered discussion about the perils of fiscal unsustainability in a currency area, either through default contagion or moral hazard contagion, and it has questioned the reliance of the European Union (EU) on fiscal rules like the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In this contribution, we wish to shed light on the golden rule of public finance which, we argue, may generate fiscal sustainability without hindering economic growth (...).

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