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One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

 

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Type:   Article
 
Titre:   One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime
 
Auteur(s):   Do, Quoc-Anh - Département d'économie (Auteur)
Nguyen, Kieu-Trang - London School of Economics and Political Science (Auteur)
Tran, Anh N. - Indiana University (Auteur)
 
In:   American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
 
Date de publication:   2017-10
 
Éditeur:   American Economic Association
 
Volume:   9
 
Numéro:   4
 
Pages:   1-29  p.
 
ISSN:   19457782
 
DOI:   https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20130472
 
Mots-clés:   [en] patronage politics, Vietnam, hometown
 
JEL:   D72,  H76,  O15,  O17,  O18,  P25,  Z13
 
Résumé:   [en] We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
 
 

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Version de l'éditeur 2017-do-nguyen-et-tran-one-mandarin-benefits-the-whole-clan.pdf 0,32 MB
 

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