Type
Article
Titre
Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion
Dans
American Economic Review
Auteur(s)
HENRY Emeric - Département d'économie (Auteur)
OTTAVIANO Gianmarco - Università di Bologna (Auteur)
Éditeur
US : American Economic Association
Volume
109
Numéro
3
Pages
911 - 955 p.
ISSN
00028282
DOI
10.1257/aer.20171919
Mots clés
informer, Payoffs and control rights, evaluator
Résumé
EN
An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald’s classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared from a positive and normative perspective. Granting authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is sufficiently costly. The analysis is applied to the regulatory process for drug approval.

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