Type
Working paper
Title
When in Rome... on local norms and sentencing decisions
In
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers
Author(s)
ABRAMS David - University of Pennsylvania (Penn) (Author)
GALBIATI Roberto - Département d'économie (Author)
HENRY Emeric - Département d'économie (Author)
PHILIPPE Arnaud - (Author)
Editor
Paris : Département d'économie de Sciences Po
Collection
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2019-04
Abstract
EN
In this paper, we show that sentencing norms vary widely even across geographically close units. By examining North Carolina’s unique judicial rotation system, we show that judges arriving in a new court gradually converge to local sentencing norms. We document factors that facilitate this convergence and show that sentencing norms are predicted by preferences of the local constituents. We build on these empirical results to analyze theoretically the delegation trade-off faced by a social planner: the judge can learn the local norm, but only at the cost of potential capture.

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