Type
Working paper
Titre
Corruption and Firm Growth: Evidence from around the World
Dans
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers
Auteur(s)
FISMAN Raymond - Boston University (BU) (Auteur)
GURIEV Sergei - Département d'économie (Auteur)
IORAMASHVILI Carolin - London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) (Auteur)
PLEKHANOV Alexander - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Auteur)
Éditeur
Paris : Département d'économie de Sciences Po
Collection
Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers : 2021-05
Mots clés
Corruption, Firm growth, Enterprise surveys
Résumé
EN
We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level data set that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006-2020, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings.

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